



**This electronic thesis or dissertation has been
downloaded from Explore Bristol Research,
<http://research-information.bristol.ac.uk>**

Author:

Chou, Andrew Mao-Lin

Title:

**Between wishes and interests : Britain's policy preferences on the issue of the
Falkland Islands, 1966-68.**

General rights

Access to the thesis is subject to the Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial-No Derivatives 4.0 International Public License. A copy of this may be found at <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode> This license sets out your rights and the restrictions that apply to your access to the thesis so it is important you read this before proceeding.

Take down policy

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions prior to having it been deposited in Explore Bristol Research. However, if you have discovered material within the thesis that you consider to be unlawful e.g. breaches of copyright (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please contact collections-metadata@bristol.ac.uk and include the following information in your message:

- Your contact details
- Bibliographic details for the item, including a URL
- An outline nature of the complaint

Your claim will be investigated and, where appropriate, the item in question will be removed from public view as soon as possible.

**BETWEEN WISHES AND INTERESTS:
BRITAIN'S POLICY PREFERENCES
ON THE ISSUE OF
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, 1966-68**

ANDREW MAO-LIN CHOU

**A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with
The requirement of the degree of PhD in Politics Department,
Faculty of Social Sciences, June 2000**

Words: 79,760

ABSTRACT

This thesis is an investigation into two British policy preferences in the sovereignty discussions between Britain and Argentina in the late 1960s.

Chapter 1 examines the current political impasse between Britain and Argentina over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. It then reviews the British effort to co-operate with Argentina to solve this territorial dispute in 1966-68. The sharply contrasting British attitudes to the same issue bring out the central question of this thesis: why did British conduct of the Falklands policy change from non-cooperation before the end of 1966, to cooperation with Argentina throughout 1967-68, and return to non-cooperation at the end of 1968?

Chapter 2 explores the issue from different perspectives in the published literature. As it concludes that these perspectives are not contingent enough, a call for an alternative explanation is therefore legitimised. Chapter 3 introduces and examines prospect theory. Chapter 4 tests four hypotheses to test the validity of prospect theory. Chapter 5 concludes with the implications and an assessment of future possibilities.

This thesis argues that the two turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68 were caused by the exercise of framing, the explanatory variable of prospect theory. The British conduct of the Falklands dispute in the late 1960s can be seen as largely pragmatic. In the longer term, framing may continue to have influence on the British attitude to this issue.

Theoretically, this thesis illustrates a case of framing parsed into the domain of frame and motivated framing. With this methodological design, prospect theory proves a valuable tool to explain foreign policy decision-making. It can be seen as a dual-causal framework consisting of the models of bounded rationality and cognitive psychology. Nevertheless, there is a need to differentiate the influence of a reference point from that of motivated framing. Taking loss avoidance in application of prospect theory is also shown to be problematic.

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Eric Herring, for his patient and dedicated support throughout. I must also thank to all the helps offered by the interviewees who are associated with the issue of the Falkland Islands. Sir Rex Hunt, Governor of the Falkland Islands in 1982, and Dr. Robert Osgood, writer of the *Franks Report* always responded positively to my numerous inquiries.

I should acknowledge too the comments given generously by Dr. Michael Dillon, writer of *The Falklands, Politics, and War*, Professor of Politics Department in Lancaster University. Professor Dillon and Dr. Jutta Weldes, Lecturer of Bristol University, are two valued critics, who thoughtfully point out the inconsistencies in some part of my argument in the viva, helping me develop it more robust.

I am grateful to my fellow PhD colleagues in Politics Department, Bristol University. They have made my time in Bristol unforgettable. Among them, thanks must go to Stuart Quayle, who has been extremely helpful in advancing my understanding of British politics, an area that I have found most difficult to cope with. Special thanks to Angela Bourne, too, for providing me with some untried ideas in the area of interest groups.

The greatest debt is to my wife Carlene, who quitted her job in Taipei and decided to be with me in the past four years. I am also indebted to my Mom, who has been waiting in Taiwan with great expectation for my success. Of course I can never forget my younger sister, Vivian Chou, who has played the major role in all sorts of logistics, including repairing my lousy laptop. And finally, this thesis is in memory of my father.

Andrew Chou
June 2000

AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the Regulations of the University of Bristol. The work is original except where indicated by special reference in the text and no part of the dissertation has been submitted for any other degree.

Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author and in no way represent those of the University of Bristol.

The dissertation had not been presented to any other University for examination either in the United Kingdom or overseas.

SIGNED: *Andrew Chou*
DATE: *2nd June 2000*

ABBREVIATIONS

BEBA	British Embassy in Buenos Aires
BICA	British Immigration Control Association
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
CO	Commonwealth Office
EEC	European Economic Community
FIEC	Falkland Islands Emergency Committee
FO	Foreign Office
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office¹
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
NATO	North Atlantic Organisation
SATO	South Atlantic Organisation
UKMIS	UK Mission in New York

¹ The British Foreign Office (FO) and Commonwealth Office (CO) combined in October 1968. This thesis will refer the decision-making unit after October 1968 as the FCO, and as the FO before that date.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
DECLARATION	iv
ABBREVIATION	v

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION

1.	A litany of uncertainties after the war	2
	Argentina’s national appeal	2
	Britain’s intransigence on sovereignty	4
	Self-determination—a controversial principle	8
	The enduring security concern	12
	A classic impasse	16
2.	Review of Britain’s cooperative mood in 1966-68	16
	Searching for a meeting ground	16
	The flexible notion of sovereignty	19
	Entertaining a double standard	21
	The pincer-shaped educational campaign	23
3.	Statement of the puzzles	24
4.	Justification of the case study	26
	An under-researched area	26
	Labour now in power	28
	Exploring the feasibility of three proposals	29
5.	The mode of enquiry	33
	Searching for an explanation	33
	Methodological triangulation	34
	The assumption	37

CHAPTER TWO—LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Some Soviet scholars' perspective	41
The long-standing trade link	42
The interdependence relationship	45
Calling for a hermeneutic understanding	47
2. The historical perspective	49
A critique of Beck's historical approach	50
A critique of Charlton's conception of patriotism	51
An incomplete effort	55
3. The domestic approach	55
Parliamentarianism	57
The Falklands lobbyists	60
4. The cultural approach	63
Elusive definition	64
Where to draw the line?	66
Where was the political action?	68
5. The perspective of identity	70
A static image	71
The perspective of time sequence	72
Different perceptions of spaces	75
6. The UK geopolitical perspective	80
The US-UK special relationship	81
The US staying neutral	83
The implications of SATO	84
7. The rational choice perspective	87
The neorealist hypotheses	89
Criticisms of the neorealist hypotheses	90
The neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses	94
Criticism of the neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses	96
The factor of "process"	100
8. Conclusion	101

CHAPTER THREE—PROSPECT THEORY AND ITS METHODOLOGY

1.	Content of prospect theory	103
	The two-phase description	103
	The causal mechanism applied to IR	105
2.	Justification of the choice of prospect theory	109
	A decision-making process perspective	109
	Killing two birds with one stone	112
3.	The criticisms of prospect theory	112
4.	Responses to the criticisms of prospect theory	113
	To reflect, not to simplify	113
	A critique of the concept of framing	116
5.	A reinforced understanding of prospect theory	123
	Laying down the definition of framing	125
	Observing dramatic events	127
	A summary of the approach in this thesis	130
6.	The four hypotheses and their justification	131
7.	Conclusion	133

CHAPTER FOUR—TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

1.	The observation	136
	From intransigence to flexibility	136
	The first turning-point policy preference strengthened	140
	Actions guided by the first turning-point policy preference	147
	The first turning-point policy preference on the defensive	152
	The second turning-point policy preference emerging	158
	The first turning-point policy preference lurching forward	162
	The second turning-point policy preference coming to the fore	167
2.	The explanation from the perspective of the domain of frame	170
	Enjoying the domain of gains	170
	The domain of gain dragging down	174

	A sombre prospect in 1968—a domain of loss	178
	The poor-boding outlook of British-Argentine relations	180
3.	The explanation from the perspective of the motivated framing	186
	The Antarctic Treaty—motivated framing in terms of gains	186
	Britain's reputation and the status quo	191
	Competing sets of motivated framing in 1967	193
	The FO's two-pronged motivated framing in 1968	198
	Competing sets of motivated framing in 1968	202
	British identity—the powerful reference point	207
4.	Evaluation of the four hypotheses	212
5.	Report of the ambiguities	219
6.	The limitation of the test	220

CHAPTER 5—CONCLUSIONS

1.	The empirical implications	223
	Pragmatic policy style	223
	A response to motivated framing, not to reference point	231
	Assessment of the three policy proposals	234
	No easy alternative	239
2.	A theory restatement bearing on foreign policy making	241
	Broader than rational choice models	242
	Broader than cognitive psychology	244
	A critique of loss avoidance	247
	Tension between a reference point and framing	248
	The restatement of prospect theory	250

3. An agenda for further research	253
BIBLIOGRAPHY	255
APPENDICES	290

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION

In the years since the 1982 military conflict with Argentina, the attitude of the British Government on the issue of the Falkland Islands has been perceived as having progressively hardened.¹ This contrasts sharply with the attitude of the British Government at the time of the sovereignty negotiations with Argentina from 1966 to 1968. This thesis explores the British attitude characterising this period.

Chapter 1 is divided into two main sections. The first section explains the current uncertainties surrounding the Falklands waters because of this sovereignty dispute. The second provides an account of British behaviour between 1966 and 1968, a period during which Britain became more accommodating towards the Argentines on the issue of the Falkland Islands. This contrast in the pattern of state behaviour raises two fundamental questions: why did Britain change its position from primarily supporting the wishes of the Falklands Islanders to one in which the interests of Britain became the guiding principle in 1966-68? And why did Britain reverse this policy shift at the end of 1968? These two questions further formulate the basis of this thesis: Why were there two British turning-point policy preferences on the issue of the Falkland Islands between 1966 and 1968?

Two key words have to be defined from the outset. The term “turning-point” refers to two respective policy preferences that deviate significantly from each other.² In this case, the term represents a sharp contrast of attitude in the whole British conduct of the Falklands policy. It shows that Britain changed from non-cooperation before 1966 to cooperation in 1966-68, and back to non-cooperation again in late 1968. The effects of the two policy changes were dramatic. They made the Argentines see the door to sovereignty negotiations open “suddenly after being tightly closed for over a century, and then shut again”.³ The word “policy” in this thesis is a “planned policy”. It involves “the course of action which the [British] government really intends to implement”.⁴ “Policy preference”, on the other hand, is defined as the sub-unit of

¹ Interviews with Rex Hunt, former Falkland Island Governor, on 14 June 1998 and David Taylor, former Chief executive of the Falkland Island Government on 11 December 1998.

² Yehudit Auerbach (1989) “Legitimation for turning-point decisions in foreign policy: Israel vis-à-vis Germany 1952 and Egypt 1977”, *Review of International Studies*, 15, 4, p. 329

³ Peter Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 106.

⁴ John Baylis (1977) “Introduction”, in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), p. 12.

decision-making reached immediately after policy evaluation and/or revision. It can be seen as one step prior to the "planned policy".⁵ Admittedly, a government may change attitude. But the change is worth exploring if it happens dramatically within a fairly short period. For this thesis, the British conduct of the Falklands policy in 1966-68 is a good case in point.

1. A litany of uncertainties after the war

Argentina's national appeal

The dispute over the Falkland Islands between Argentina and Britain can be traced back to 1833, when Britain landed a military force, declaring its repossession of the territory.⁶ Adding to the complexity is the dubious status of the sovereignty that can be traced further back to 1770, when Spain evacuated the British settlement on the Falkland Islands.⁷ Although the basis of Britain's argument in the past one and a half centuries has changed from the principle of prior discovery to self-determination,⁸ the change symbolises little substance from the Argentine point of view.⁹ For most Argentines, the validity of their claim is part of their national myth.¹⁰ The Falkland Islands indisputably belong to them, because Argentina inherited the claims that Spain had abandoned.¹¹ In September 1999, *Gallup of Argentina* in a national opinion poll showed that up to 73% of those consulted thought that the issue of the Falkland Islands remained "important".¹² Their contrasting perspective on sovereignty poses a mounting challenge to the British claim, to the extent that the war in 1982 did not solve this historical problem.¹³ A request for "restitution" of the Falklands was entered into the 1994 Argentine constitution,¹⁴ which includes the

⁵ A. Callincos (1986) *Ideology and foreign policy: Problems of comparative conceptualisation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 108.

⁶ Colin Gross (1968) *The fall of the British empire: 1918-1968* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 132.

⁷ Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1985) *Peace and disputed sovereignty: Reflections on conflict over territory* (London: University Press of America), p. 51.

⁸ British Government (1985) *Falkland Islands: Fifth report from the Foreign Affairs Committee*, Cmnd. 9447 (London: HMSO), p. 4; Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman (1982) *The Falklands war* (London: Andre Deutsch), p. 40.

⁹ Ruben M. Perina (1991) "The view from Buenos Aires", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publisher), p. 50.

¹⁰ Lucio Garcia del Solar (1990) *Argentina and the United Kingdom: From war to peace* (Southampton: University of Southampton), p. 11.

¹¹ Peter Calvert (1983) "Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis", *International Affairs*, 52, 3, pp. 408-10.

¹² *La Nacion*, 14 September 1999.

¹³ Jeffrey D. Myhre (1983) "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas under international law", *Millennium*, 12, 1, p. 34.

¹⁴ Patricio Gavan Connolly (1994) (trans.) *The constitution of the Argentine nation 1994* (Buenos Aires:

Falkland Islands in the boundaries of the Argentine 23rd state, Tierra del Fuego.¹⁵

If the war has taught any lesson to the Argentine elite, it is that the leaders have to become more realistic about their route to the ultimate goal. According to Carlos Menem, the former Argentine President, Argentina's strategy was to "initiate a constructive dialogue with the British government in order to create a bilateral framework", so that there would be room for cooperation between both countries "to resolve the territorial dispute in peace through negotiations".¹⁶ Indeed, the diplomatic strategy taken by the previous Menem's Administration was impressive. Menem tactfully pledged that Argentina was not going to ask Britain "to give the Malvinas back", but simply invited Britain to "fulfil" the United Nations' request to "open a dialogue" about the issue of sovereignty, and that was that.¹⁷ He also advocated the idea of shared sovereignty, appearing intent on boasting of being a true democracy capable of accommodating the islanders' way of life.¹⁸ And indeed, his five-day visit to London in autumn 1998 was described in the media on both sides as a success. The *Daily Telegraph* saw the president's laying of a wreath at St Paul's Cathedral Falklands Memorial as the "true act of reconciliation".¹⁹ Some newspapers in South America took the act as pushing the British-Argentine links to the highest level throughout the recent diplomatic history.²⁰

However, what Britain regards as "improved relations" is seen by Argentina as an opportunity to advance its territorial claim. Undeniably, Menem's visit together with all the other signs of improved relations constituted Menem's measured actions to box Britain in at talks about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. As Menem clarified in 1998, "Let there be no doubt. We are closer than ever now to opening a dialogue that will lead to an accord on the Malvinas [Falkland Islands]".²¹

Latin American Linguistic Service); *The Financial Times*, 8 April 1997.

¹⁵ Charles Maechling Jr. (1991) "Confidence building and the future", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 109.

¹⁶ Carlos Floria (1991) "The Argentine perspective", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 81, p. 101.

¹⁷ *The Financial Times*, 8 October 1998.

¹⁸ Peter Beck (1991) "Fisheries conservation: A basis for a special Anglo-Argentine relationship?" *The World Today*, 47, 7, p. 102; *The Daily Telegraph*, 3 January 1998; *The Economist*, 29 May 1999; *The Times*, 2 January 1997; 21 January 1997; 29 October 1998.

¹⁹ *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 October 1998; Falkland Islands Association (FIA) (1999a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, April, no. 74, p. 4

²⁰ *La Nacion*, 22 September 1999; *Mercopress*, 11 September 1998.

²¹ FIA (1999a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, p. 6.

The above remark was no surprise. The Argentine claim has not gone away despite the military defeat in 1982. The image that Menem has conjured up in the eyes of the world is that Argentina is different now—it has been both patient and practical about the issue of the Falkland Islands for the last two decades. Therefore, as the Argentine logic goes, Argentina is entitled to negotiate on the issue of sovereignty, and now it is Britain's move.

Britain's intransigence on sovereignty

To the disappointment of Argentina, Britain has been taking a tough approach towards the issue of the Falkland Islands since the war in 1982. It has been emphatic that the idea that a "solution" has to be found is a myth of Argentine making.²² Argentina must accept that the nature of this issue has been altered since the war in 1982.²³ The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) is willing to discuss with Argentina the general problems relating to the Falkland Islands as broadly as possible—fishing,²⁴ oil, or tourism. Britain even supports Argentina's leadership in the forthcoming Southwest Multilateral Fisheries Agreement, in which the Falkland Islands is a fellow participant.²⁵ These discussions, however, can only be conducted under a so-called "umbrella", in which sovereignty is set aside.²⁶

This marked reluctance to include sovereignty in the talks has not been relaxed since the Labour Party came into office in 1997.²⁷ Whether the Blair Government will change the conduct of Falklands policy in the future remains to be seen, but, like its predecessors, the incumbent Government has been exceedingly sensitive to any suggestion that sovereignty be included on the agenda.²⁸ With Argentina's change of government in December 1999, for instance, the British Minister of State at the FCO,

²² Sukey Cameron (1998a) "Speech to the South Atlantic Council Conference—Falkland Islands update", London, 3 February, <<http://www.falklands.gov.fk/9h.htm>>

²³ FIA (1999a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, p. 4; Hansard (Commons) col. 555, 14 July 1993; Hansard records after November 1988 are on the website and they are not arranged in the order of volumes. The referencing of them in this thesis after November 1988 as a result does not specify the number of each volume.

²⁴ Both Governments issued a joint statement declaring the conservation of fish stocks around the Falkland Islands in Madrid on 15 February 1990. See British Government (1992) "The Falkland Islands", Cmnd. 1824 (London: HMSO), p. 5.

²⁵ Hansard (Commons) col. 179, 28 April 1999.

²⁶ Walter Little (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question", in Peter Byrd (ed.) *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin), p. 142.

²⁷ *The Times*, 23 April 1997.

²⁸ FIA (1998b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, June, no. 72, p. 4; Hansard (Lords) col. 1613, 30 July 1998.

John Battle, was quick to reiterate that the change in no way weakened Britain's commitment to protecting its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.²⁹

Conceivably then, although 1999 witnessed the bilateral talks held officially between the islanders and Argentina, and a Falklands/Argentine relations' pact was signed,³⁰ these events did not signify a fundamental change in British official sentiment towards the dispute. The immediate reason for Britain's engagement in the talks lay in the sudden halt of the air service from Chile to the Falkland Islands. In March 1999, Chile protested against Britain's detention of General Pinochet and discontinued the weekly flight to the Falkland Islands.³¹ When the only air link of the Falkland Islands with the outside world was suspended, Argentina seized the opportunity to offer an alternative air route, linking Stanley, capital of the Falklands, to Buenos Aires. It even promised that there would be no suspension for any political reason.³² The talks bore fruit. On 14 June 1999, a joint statement was signed between Britain and Argentina.³³ On 16 October, the first flight from Argentina landed at Mount Pleasant, the international airport of the Falkland Islands.³⁴

The second reason for the talks was the increase of illegal fishing within the Falkland Islands' Fisheries Protection Zone. The revenue from fishing licences has been the mainstay of the Falklands economy.³⁵ To keep economic sustainability, conservation of the two main species, illex and loligo, subsequently becomes a major concern of the islanders. However, there has been a consistent threat from Argentines' over-fishing.³⁶ Reports show that the Argentine Government often underestimates "the need for additional conservation measures".³⁷ Argentina is also said to impose economic sanctions on foreign companies involved in fishing around the Falklands' waters.³⁸ On the one hand, although Argentina and Britain both signed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement in December 1995, there has been little progress so far. Neither Britain nor Argentina has ratified the Agreement, and even ratification cannot assure a

²⁹ *Mercopress*, 12 December 1999.

³⁰ *Penguin News*, 26 July 1999; *The Times*, 24 May 1999.

³¹ Hansard (Commons) col. 180, 28 April 1999; *The Economist*, 29 May 1999.

³² *Penguin News*, 4 June 1999.

³³ *Ibid.*, 16 July 1999.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 15 October 1999.

³⁵ Hansard (Commons) cols. 177-9, 28 April 1999; col. 250, 29 April 1999.

³⁶ *The Financial Times*, 6 February 1998.

³⁷ Hansard (Commons) col. 867, 18 May 1999.

³⁸ *Statement by Falkland Island Legislative Council* (1998) <http://www.falklands.gov.fk/9q.htm>

potential commitment.³⁹ In January 2000, for instance, two Argentine liners were spotted illegally poaching in South Georgia.⁴⁰ On the other hand, increasing poaching activities risk the depletion of the stocks in the Falklands' waters. In 1999, poaching by Taiwanese vessels probably accounted for over 30,000 tonnes—a quarter of overall harvest.⁴¹ Since the multilateral framework proves to be of limited value and the Falklands Government alone cannot deal with poaching effectively, a bilateral discussion with the nearest neighbour, Argentina, became a necessity to the Falkland Islands.⁴²

Oil drilling was another reason for the bilateral talks. Britain insists that oil found in the Falklands' waters in the future belong to Britain. Argentina rebuts that any oil is theirs, and threatens to impose taxes and sanctions on those international oil companies working with the Falklands Government.⁴³ To end the impasse, Britain has proposed a tax and drilling licensing regime to collect shared revenues. The technical details as a result have to be negotiated with Argentina.⁴⁴

Therefore, for the Falkland Islands and the British Government in London, the current discussions are basically out of concern for fishing, oil and communications.⁴⁵ The islanders firmly assume that the talks are exclusively geared to the technical problems. The Falkland Islands Councillors taking part in the discussions are also careful to exclude sovereignty from the agenda in order not to raise any tantalising possibility of wishful thinking on the Argentine side. Councillor Sharon Halford, to name but one, did not miss the opportunity to play down the talks. She reminded her counterpart Guido Di Tella, Argentine Foreign Minister, that “we come from very different cultures and traditions”.⁴⁶ The import of her remark was not too hard to fathom: the issue of sovereignty “is unquestionably dead in the water”.⁴⁷ Therefore, although the flights represent an emotional moment for some Argentines,⁴⁸ the island

³⁹ Joy Hyvarinen, Elizabeth Wall and Indrani Lutchman (1998) “The United Nations and Fisheries in 1998”, *Ocean Development & International Law*, 29, p. 329.

⁴⁰ *Falkland Islands News Network*, 24 January 2000.

⁴¹ *Penguin News*, 17 and 21 May 1999.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 14 July 1999.

⁴³ FIA (1998b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁴ Hansard (Lords) col. 998, 10 June 1998.

⁴⁵ *Penguin News*, 2 July 1999.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 28 May 1999.

⁴⁷ *Mercopress*, 4 April 1999.

⁴⁸ *Falkland Islands News Network*, 17 October 1999.

community on the whole is still sceptical.⁴⁹ Some islanders believe that Argentina pressed Uruguay and Chile to stop flights. Some take the discussions with Argentina as nothing but a surrender to blackmail.⁵⁰ Because of this new development, there was another new lobby group set up in late 1999, venting their frustration about the agreement signed in July 1999.⁵¹ All these indicate that, as long as the traumatic effect of the invasion still haunts the collective memory, the islanders may continue to take sovereignty as the most sensitive issue. Surely, they cannot be unaware that, ultimately, their interests will “inevitably become bound up with the [Argentine] mainland”.⁵² They may know only too well that a clash on sovereignty will affect extraction of resources from the adjacent areas.⁵³ However, given the islanders' determination to exclude sovereignty from negotiations, London seems quite satisfied to keep the talks at the functional level, where flight access, potential oil revenues and fisheries are the appropriate subjects.⁵⁴

The agony is that what Argentina wants most is precisely the one thing that Britain is least likely to offer. This thesis is therefore bound to ask how long Argentina's patience will hold out. At the time of writing, Menem has already stepped down.⁵⁵ Whether the new Argentine government, under the presidency of Fernando de la Rúa,⁵⁶ will follow his predecessor's policy is too early to say.⁵⁷ But the point is that, when the Radical/Prepaso Alliance was the Argentine chief opposition party, it had been dissatisfied with Menem's moderate approach to the issue of the Falkland Islands. They made it abundantly clear that they would not honour the 1995 oil agreement with Britain.⁵⁸ They were on record as wanting neither to accept a freeze of

⁴⁹ *Penguin News*, 23 July 1999.

⁵⁰ *Mercopress*, 14 April 1999; *Penguin News*, 21 May 1999.

⁵¹ FIA (1999) October, no. 75, p. 7.

⁵² J. E. S. Fawcett (1982) "The Falklands and the law", *The World Today*, 38, p. 206; Colin Phipps (1977) *What future for the Falklands* (London: Fabian Tract), p. 8; Lord Shackleton (1976) *Economic survey of the Falkland Islands, vol. 1* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit), p. iii.

⁵³ Peter J. Beck (1982) "Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute: The Anglo-Argentine search for a way forward", *Journal of International Studies and World Affairs*, 24, 1, p. 50; David A. Colson (1985) "The Falkland Islands crisis and the management of boundary disputes", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 213.

⁵⁴ *Penguin News*, 9 July 1999.

⁵⁵ *The Economist*, 29 May 1999, p. 65.

⁵⁶ *The Times*, 26 October 1999.

⁵⁷ Solar (1990) *Argentina and United Kingdom*, p. 11.

⁵⁸ FIA (1998c) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, September, no. 73, p. 20; *Mercopress News*, 11 September 1999.

sovereignty, nor the self-determination applied to the islanders.⁵⁹ Even the Peronists, members within Menem's political camp, seem no longer patient with the current ambiguity of the diplomatic route. For example, Prince Charles in his visit to Argentina in March 1999 called on the Argentinians "to live amicably" with the islanders, who were also "passionately attached to their traditions". To this, Carlos Ruckauf, then Vice President of Argentina, retorted that "the Prince took an intolerable attitude. The islanders have no right to self-determination as the Prince suggested. His kingdom is a powerful country, which has stolen the islands. His words show his policy of domination".⁶⁰ Ruckauf's rebuttal implied that the future of British-Argentine relations could hardly be put on a normal footing without tacit recognition of Argentinian claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.⁶¹ The plain fact therefore is that, as Rex Hunt expected, the new Argentine Government will "continue to press the sovereignty claim at every opportunity".⁶²

Britain could not possibly have misunderstood that Ruckauf's rebuttal represented Argentina's nationalist passions simmering not far below the surface. This also explains part of the reason why a regime of utilities to share benefits of fisheries and oil has been proposed as the agenda for the talks. The talks launched in 1999 could well be interpreted as the British effort to seek to address "broader collective concerns" with Argentina in order to manage a way towards peace.⁶³ With the passage of time, hopefully, both sides may produce a mechanism to ameliorate the current impasse through cooperation. Nevertheless, the following section will show that Britain's resolve to act in accordance with the principle of self-determination has rendered the British effort to develop mutual interests almost untenable.

Self-determination—a controversial principle

Britain holds a very clear position that the islanders are entitled to expect the Government's support, because self-determination is a generally accepted customary rule of international law. As one of the Falkland Islands Legislative Councillors, Mike

⁵⁹ FIA (1999a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, p. 4.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁶¹ Lowell S. Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 180; Christian Herter Jr. and Wayne S. Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/ Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 123.

⁶² *Mercopress*, 12 December 1999.

⁶³ Barry Buzan (1991a) "Interdependence and Britain? External relations", in Lawrence Freedman and

Summers, insisted, the issue is about people, not about land.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, playing the self-determination card does not necessarily mean that Britain occupies a solid and legal base in this case. To begin with, the British claim based on self-determination will not suffice from the perspective of UN Resolution 2065, approved on 16 December 1965. According to Resolution 2065, Argentina and Britain were ordered to “pursue negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution”. But they were not required to consult the inhabitants of the islands, nor their wishes. Instead, as the text stipulates, what should be taken into account are the islanders' interests in the process of the talks.⁶⁵ The UN's interpretation is indeed a pragmatic view. When Woodrow Wilson enunciated the principle of self-determination in 1918, he spoke both of interests and wishes.⁶⁶ But he later decided to take interests into consideration only,⁶⁷ because there was difficulty in putting the idea of wishes into practice. That said, Britain's adoption of the wishes of the islanders is not fully convincing either in terms of historical practice or the text of Resolution 2065.

Another problem with the British legal position lies in the notion of “self” or “peoples” in international law.⁶⁸ Firstly, as to whether the inhabitants are entitled to the right of self-determination must be determined within a colonial framework. This is because self-determination only applies to “those people who seek an end to colonial domination”, not “for people who form a minority within an existing state territory”.⁶⁹ In this respect, Britain's position is weak too. The Falkland Islanders cannot be “accurately specified” as a “self”, because the ancestors of the islanders are not an indigenous people native to the Falkland Islands.⁷⁰

Secondly, the UN clearly has taken a realist position that a state's integrity comes before the principle of self-determination.⁷¹ When UN Resolution 1514 was ratified in

Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 41.

⁶⁴ *Financial Times*, 4 January 2000.

⁶⁵ Alfredo Bruno Bologna (1983) “Argentinian claims to the Malvinas under international law”, *Millennium*, 12, 1, p. 40.

⁶⁶ Derek Heater (1996) “Woodrow Wilson and national self-determination”, *Modern Historical Review*, 7, 3, p. 6.

⁶⁷ Denzil Dunnett (1983) “Self-determination and the Falklands”, *International Affairs*, 59, 2, p. 416.

⁶⁸ W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe (1977) *The principle of self-determination in international law* (NY: Nellen), p. 40.

⁶⁹ David B. Knight (1985) “Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on post-colonial self-determination”, *International Political Science Review*, 6, 2, p. 248.

⁷⁰ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 55.

⁷¹ Michael Freeman (1999) “The right to self-determination in international politics: Six theories in search of a policy”, *Review of International Studies*, 25, 3, p. 357, p. 365.

December 1960, the major purpose was to liberalise the colonial yokes of the Third World states. But having been aware that the text "All people have the right to self-determination" might impair political unity, the Special Committee of 24, a UN subcommittee on colonisation, was quick to add that any attempt at disrupting the territorial integrity would be dismissed. The Falklands case was also acknowledged as falling within this consideration.⁷² Resolution 3160 of 14 December 1973 and Resolution 31/49 of the 17 December 1976 also confirmed this bottom line.⁷³ In this respect, Britain does not have a good argument. Neither the British Government nor the Falkland Islanders have any intention of promoting independence.⁷⁴ The islanders, indeed, are fighting for their political right to be associated with Britain.⁷⁵

Taken together, Britain apparently does not present a convincing legal argument for accepting as of fundamental importance the issue of self-determination, to the extent that even the UN supervising team is said to have "implicitly recognised the strength of the Argentine case".⁷⁶ It has on the contrary reinforced the suspicion that its claim is rooted in the political interests at stake at a given moment with the intended effect to perfect its title to the Falkland Islands.⁷⁷ This suspicion is justifiable. Looking into traditional British diplomacy, one will find that solving a political problem solely by one principle has been rare in British politics.⁷⁸ With accommodation and compromise,⁷⁹ Britain's diplomacy has long been noted for its

⁷² Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano (1982) *Argentina: The Malvinas and the end of military rule*, Ralph Johnstone (trans.), (London: Verso), p. 43; Adri  n F. J. Hope (1983) "Sovereignty and decolonisation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 6, 2, p. 397.

⁷³ Anthony Arend (1985) "The Falklands war and the failure of the international legal order", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 56; Thomas M. Franck (1985) "The strategic role of legal principles", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 25, p. 30.

⁷⁴ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, pp. 39-41.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 39.

⁷⁶ Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice (1984) *The sinking of the Belgrano* (London: Secker and Warburg), p. 9.

⁷⁷ Franck (1985) "The strategic role", p. 31.

⁷⁸ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 48; T. Wright (1994) *Citizen and subjects* (London: Routledge), p. 4.

⁷⁹ John Baylis (1989) *British defence policy, striking the right balance* (London: Macmillan), pp. 10-1; Iain Chambers (1993) "Narratives of Nationalism: Being 'British'?", in Erica Carter, James Donald and Judith Squires (eds.), *Space & place: Theories of identity and location* (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 151; Grant Jordan and Jeremy Richardson (1982) "The British policy style or the logic of negotiation?", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *Policy styles in Western Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 81.

“politics of experience”, reflecting what has been learned.⁸⁰ Labour has often found its ideologies divorced from foreign affairs.⁸¹ The Conservatives are characterised by pragmatism with no manifest goals in its party constitutions.⁸² Little wonder Francis Pym, Foreign Secretary in 1982, admitted that self-determination in this dispute was “of more recent origin”.⁸³ It is therefore reasonable to expect Britain to fail in its attempt to win a favourable position in the annual debates in the UN. In November 1987, more than 100 countries in the UN voted against Britain’s firm stance on the issue of the Falkland Islands. The result prompted a harsh attack on the government in the House of Commons at Britain’s “humiliating defeat”.⁸⁴ As late as July 1999, the UN debate in the Decolonisation Committee again passed its pro-Argentine resolution calling for talks over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands.⁸⁵ These results prove that what many states oppose is not Argentina’s claim, but their way of proceeding towards it in 1982. On the other hand, their being refused talks about sovereignty has aroused sympathy from the international community. Many commentators even suspect that the principle of self-determination, held by Britain in this case, can possibly be a self-imposed barrier to Argentina’s access to sovereignty negotiations.⁸⁶

The above suspicion certainly has its negative impact on British prestige in the UN. It indicates that the world today is inclined to urge Britain to bring the doctrine down from abstraction to working reality, rather than solely holding self-determination as a way to structure a possible outcome of the dispute. On the other hand, Britain’s commitment also cannot prevent it from being harshly criticised at home. It has come under fire as being “peculiarly intransigent”, “uncompromising”, “expensive [and] irritant”. The opposition contend that the commitment reduces the

⁸⁰ Allen Potter (1966) “The political consensus”, *New Society*, 7, 182, p. 10.

⁸¹ Bruce George (1991) *The British Labour party and defence* (NY & London: Praeger), p. 7; David Reynolds (1991) *Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the twentieth century* (London & NY: Longman), p. 40.

⁸² Patrick Dunleavy (1993) “The political parties”, in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), p. 125; Richard Rose (1989) *Politics in England: Change and persistence*, 5th edition (London: Macmillan), p. 263; Robert Leach (1995) “Political ideas”, in Maurice Mullard (ed.), *Policy-making in Britain* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 13; A. J. Davis (1995) *We, the nation: The Conservative party and the pursuit of power* (London: Little, Brown and Company), p. 448.

⁸³ Tam Dalyell (1982) *One Man’s Falklands* (London: Woolf), p. 138.

⁸⁴ Hansard (Commons) cols. 1046, 1060, 18 November 1987.

⁸⁵ FIA (1999b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, October, no. 75, p. 5.

⁸⁶ Philip Windsor (1983) “Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands crisis”, *Millennium*, 12, 1, p. 94; Lawrence Freedman (1983) “Bridgehead revisited: The literature of the Falklands”, *International Affairs*, 59, 2, p. 451; Hansard (Commons) vol. 21, col. 1028, 7 April 1982.

pool of available resources to deal with other pragmatic problems, weakens the ability to react to new situations in an open manner, and constantly exposes the islanders to renewed tension.⁸⁷ Britain can not possibly be unaware of its disadvantageous position at home and abroad. As things stand, its stand on self-determination has been suspected as a slogan,⁸⁸ limited in effect,⁸⁹ and found wanting as a political solution to fill in the security gap. In an attempt to compensate the political disadvantages, Britain has had to resort to highly costly measures of deterrence.

The enduring security concern

Successive recent British governments have tended to assume irresolution to be the source of trouble in this issue. They are determined not to repeat the failure of the defence programme in 1981, when the defence budget was severely cut.⁹⁰ The policy of "Fortress Falklands" subsequently came as a ready-made solution with annual maintenance costs of £70 million.⁹¹

Given the military build-up, nagging questions remain as to whether this policy of "Fortress Falklands" will be enough to provide for security. The concern is not baseless. With the end of the Cold War, non-military conflicts have come to the fore and attracted attention of the world politics.⁹² If security on the Falkland Islands today is defined as "perceived and actual freedom from [the Argentine] threat",⁹³ this is a subject eminently worth further study in its own right. This is because, first of all, behind such non-military threats after the end of the Cold War, there lies the central concern, that a non-military threat is no less disturbing than a military one. By

⁸⁷ Dunnett (1983) "Self-determination", p. 427; *The Guardian*, 22 September 1983; Bruce George and Walter Little (1985) *Options in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute* (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers), p. 3; Hansard (Commons) vol. 52, col. 904, 25 January 1984.

⁸⁸ J. H. W. Verzijl (1968) *International law in historical perspective, vol. 1* (Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff-Leiden), p. 325.

⁸⁹ G. Michael Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war* (London: Macmillan), p. 74.

⁹⁰ British Government (1981) *The United Kingdom defence programme: The way forward*, Cmnd. 8288 (London: HMSO); Peter Byrd (1988) "Defence policy", in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St Martin), p. 157; Michael Clarke (1992) *British external policy-making in the 1990s* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 212; Anthony Sampson (1982) *The changing anatomy of Britain* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 259; Anthony Verrier (1983) *Through the looking glass: British foreign policy in an age of illusions* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 338.

⁹¹ Gustafson (1998) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 178; *The Financial Times*, 9 June 1997. The defence budget rose to £74 million in 1997-98, see Hansard (Lords) col. 148, 12 January 1998.

⁹² Clarke (1992) *British external policy-making*, p. 79; Samuel P. Huntington (1993) "Why international primacy matters?", *International Security*, 17, 4, p. 71.

⁹³ Eric Herring (1994) "International security and democratisation in East Europe", in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (eds.), *Building democracy* (London: Leicester University

characterising conflicts as non-military, one should not obscure the fact that the degree of concern caused by them has not reduced. This concern could be more enduringly felt under the guise of no-potential-for-military clashes. However, when the definition of security expands, and "the role of force in the security system" turns ambiguous, the military means to meet a security issue may be difficult to muster.⁹⁴

The Falklands dispute nicely encapsulates what this thesis is concerned about. To begin with, as Summers admitted, the currently looming non-military threats refer to conflicts of interests, such as oil resources and fishing revenues around the Falklands' waters.⁹⁵ The established means in the name of "Fortress Falklands" is apparently inappropriate to cope with such threats.

In the second place, the objective of deterrence is to persuade an adversary that the losses "of seeking a military solution" will outweigh the "possible gains".⁹⁶ To be effective with this kind of persuasion, the defender has to demonstrate the resolve by specifying where security lies.⁹⁷ However, security after the end of Cold War can no longer be defined exclusively in military terms. The security concern derived from non-military issues can sometimes "expand the range of concern" about security.⁹⁸ When the range of security concerns expands, the non-military concerns will compete with the originally focused military concerns. Therefore the focus of specified security can be deflected. The deflection will result in two dangerous consequences.

On the one hand, with other non-military variables brought into prominence in the attention of crisis events, we may see the vigilance of military deterrence relatively reduced, although the salience of security issues are not altered. On the other hand, the degree of defence dilemma will increase on the ground that those competing variables—quarrels over resources, or policing activities—enhance the possibility of triggering crises and highlighting the contradiction between military

Press), p. 88.

⁹⁴ Laurel Richardson (1994) "Writing: A method of inquiry", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), p. 47.

⁹⁵ *The Times*, 27 October 1998.

⁹⁶ Michael Howard (1983) "Reassurance and deterrence: Western defence in the 1980s", in *The causes of wars* (London: Unwin Paperbacks), p. 228; Ned Richard Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1987) "Beyond deterrence", *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, 4, p. 6.

⁹⁷ David A. Baldwin (1997) "The concept of security", *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1, p. 26; John Orme (1987) "Deterrence failure: A second look", *International Security*, 11, 4, p. 122.

⁹⁸ Beverly Crawford (1994) "The new security dilemma under international economic interdependence", *Millennium*, 23, 1, p. 55.

defence and security.⁹⁹ To sum up, when the possibility of different kinds of non-military concern has risen to the extent of outweighing “the costs of seeking a military means”, the established military means used “to persuade” the adversaries not to resort to force will be rendered relatively weak.

If we need a reminder of how this will happen, poaching in the Falklands' waters is it. Poaching is the most serious problem threatening the natural resources of the fisheries in the Falklands' waters. As over half of the world catch of illex squid is in this area,¹⁰⁰ hundreds of fishing boats, including illegal poaching ones, will be attracted here during the harvest seasons. To address the poaching problem, a policing operation including dispersion or warning shots seems to be an effective measure mounted by the Falklands Government. Indeed, no sooner had armed patrolling boats been recruited (April 1999), than guns were fired (15 May) for the first time, and these damaged a Taiwanese fishing boat that was caught catching illex squid illegally.¹⁰¹ From the geopolitical perspective, it is hardly likely to escalate tension from policing activities to military confrontation between the British and Taiwanese Governments. But Britain has given a warning to the Taiwanese Government that poachers will have a difficult time in the harvest season in 2000.¹⁰² But in respect of British-Argentine relations, this will be a different picture. The issue of fishing rights and policing fire might poison the current political climate in the delicate British-Argentine relations and spark off new tensions. This is the defence dilemma arising from non-military concerns in today's British conduct of the Falklands policy. This kind of dilemma has no longer been limited to “societal security”, as the islanders try to keep distance from Argentina by pledging to keep the British way of life. It has instead transformed the whole issue into a concern for economic security, where “access to the resources, finance and markets” becomes a problem.¹⁰³

Finally, extension of security concerns into other areas such as the economic and environmental, does not imply that Britain's basic assumption of the military threat and the need for defending the Islands has been altered. Given the notion that military

⁹⁹ Barry Buzan (1983) *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 181.

¹⁰⁰ Peter J. Beck (1991) “Fisheries conservation: A basis for a special Anglo-Argentine relationship?”, *The World Today*, 47, 7, p. 103.

¹⁰¹ *Penguin News*, 21 May 1999.

¹⁰² *Falkland Islands News Network*, 7 February 2000.

¹⁰³ Barry Buzan (1991b) “New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century”, *International*

use for territorial conquest has become less popular because of rising costs in modern times,¹⁰⁴ Argentina's declared intention to advocate peaceful means towards a settlement of the issue could not but be reassuring.¹⁰⁵ In the short term, Argentina's neoliberal adjustment remains plagued with problems. Its overvalued peso after 1989 has proved harmful to exports. Its soaring trade deficit makes it dependent on constant foreign capital.¹⁰⁶ In the longer term, following Buzan's definition of a revisionist state, Argentina, on the issue of the Falkland Islands, could be described as a typical orthodox revisionist in its relentless pursuit of a right to the Falkland Islands "aimed at producing a redistribution" of what has been lost.¹⁰⁷ In other words, the current Argentine approach can at best be seen as having displayed itself patient enough and wait "within the system until the time is ripe".¹⁰⁸

The real concern of the Falkland Islanders is therefore twofold. First, will Argentina resurrect the decades-old technique of military intimidation? This possibility cannot be dismissed, because the newly elected president, Fernando de la Rúa, has only a fragile hold on power. The Argentine Congress is still controlled by the Peronist Party.¹⁰⁹ Second, will Britain be capable of another combat mission in the Falklands at a "reasonable" level of military expenditure?¹¹⁰ Sanders maintained that the garrison was "probably enough", but this cannot assure this thesis.¹¹¹ The British Ministry of Defence has already admitted that the military means is "symbolic, not substantive". The deterrence capability is at best a trip wire.¹¹² Some observers are therefore doubtful about Britain's capability of sustaining another Falklands operation

Affairs, 67, 3, p. 445, p. 447.

¹⁰⁴ John Garnett (1981) "The role of military power", in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds.), *Perspectives on world politics* (London: Open University Press), p. 70.

¹⁰⁵ British Government (1992), *ibid.*.

¹⁰⁶ Duncan Green (1995) *Silent revolution: The rise of market economics in Latin America* (London: Cassell), p. 211-2.

¹⁰⁷ Barry Buzan (1983) *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations* (Wheatsheaf), p. 181.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

¹⁰⁹ *The Economist*, 30 October 1999, p. 77.

¹¹⁰ Monroe Leigh (1985) "Trusteeship for the Falklands under joint U.K.-U.S. administration: A proposal", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy, and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 226.

¹¹¹ David Sanders (1993) "Foreign and defence policy", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), p. 289.

¹¹² Richard K. Betts (1993) "Systems of peace as causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), p. 269; British Government (1990b) *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, Cmnd. 1022-II (London: HMSO), p. 6.

in the late 1990s.¹¹³ Long-distance logistical support and force projection, indeed, can be a mounting challenge, reinforcing the enduring security concern that currently harasses the islanders.¹¹⁴

A classic impasse

The foregoing illustrates the persistent tension in the Falklands between Britain and Argentina. The tension, in summary, lies in the Argentines' national appeal, Britain's intransigence on self-determination, and the enduring security concern. As the current talks develop, Britain hopes that a more democratic Argentina will pursue the sovereignty issue "less passionately".¹¹⁵ But the non-aggressive attitude on the Argentine side by no means implies that Argentina will sideline the issue of sovereignty. Sovereignty for Argentina is "but an unrealised goal".¹¹⁶ Britain, in contrast, seems perfectly aware that talks about sovereignty will open the floodgates to a final transfer of it, and therefore, its resolve to act in accordance with the principle of self-determination has so far not flickered.

Nevertheless, contrary to the above attitude, Britain did not always hold a non-negotiable position over the Falkland Islands. In the history of the Falkland Islands, there were talks about sovereignty between the two Governments. The period that this thesis refers to starts in late 1966 and ends in December 1968. For two years, Britain had a more flexible attitude towards the Argentine appeal for sovereignty and, indeed, sovereignty was seriously discussed with Argentina. A review of British attitudes to the issue of the Falkland Islands during that period follows.

2. Review of Britain's cooperative mood in 1966-68

Searching for a meeting ground

In retrospect, the dynamic atmosphere for talks set in at the end of 1965, when the UN adopted Resolution 2065, calling on the British and Argentine governments to

¹¹³ Michael Clarke (1991) "Defence and security in Britain's external relations" in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University), p. 92.

¹¹⁴ Dox S. Zakheim (1985a) "The South Atlantic conflict: Strategic, military, and technological lessons", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 177; Zakheim (1985b) "The South Atlantic: Evaluating the lessons", in James Brown and William P. Snyder (eds.), *The regionalisation of warfare* (Oxford: Transaction Books), p. 41.

¹¹⁵ Waynes S. Smith (1991), "Why resolution of the dispute is important", in Waynes S. Smith (ed.), *Towards resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 11.

¹¹⁶ Inayatullah, Naeem and David L. Blaney (1995) "Realising sovereignty", *Review of International*

settle this dispute “without delay”.¹¹⁷ In June 1966, talks between the two sides were launched. In March 1967, a tacit agreement emerged whereas the British Government secretly informed Argentina that the Falkland Islands were ready to be transferred “under certain conditions”.¹¹⁸ As regards the precise definition of “certain conditions”, the British Foreign Office (FO) reiterated in Parliament its commitment to the interests of the islanders as a criterion. As Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, and Goronwy Roberts, Foreign Minister, both explained the Falklands policy in Parliament, “we are speaking of the interests [emphasis added] of the people” and “conducting talks with the Argentine about the long-term future of these islands in accordance with and in the spirit of the United Nations resolution, to which I should think both sides of the House would pay respect”.¹¹⁹

Argentina, on the other hand, saw Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands as a “residuum of a colonial empire” and assumed that transfer of sovereignty over the Falklands would not do harm to Britain's state interests.¹²⁰ Discussions of this issue for both Governments thus became a timely agenda. It would help Britain to shed the burden of the old empire, either because Britain had lost the strategic motive to hold on to it as a means of safeguarding the lines of communication,¹²¹ or because the Falklands Islands made no contribution to Britain's maritime strategy.¹²² Viewed in this light, the policy difference between Argentina and Britain during this period was one of degree, not of kind. As Lord Chalfont, Foreign Minister responsible for relations with South American states, recalled the atmosphere in the talks, “we are engaged in sincere consultations with a friendly sovereign State”.¹²³ This remark was suggestive. When the expectations of the two sides converged, the talks about sovereignty found no problem in gaining ground.

Meanwhile, if cooperation requires a means of “voluntarily and consciously

Studies, 21, p. 4.

¹¹⁷ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 94.

¹¹⁸ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review: Report of a committee of privy counsellors*, Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO), p. 4.

¹¹⁹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, cols. 34, 67, 18 March 1968; vol. 761, col. 1462, 26 March 1968; Hansard (Lords) vol. 290, col. 206, 13 March 1968.

¹²⁰ Michael Charlton (1989) *The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 9.

¹²¹ Richard Faber (1966) *The vision and the need* (London: Faber and Faber), p. 16.

¹²² Hansard (Commons) vol. 774, col. 443, 3 December 1968.

¹²³ Hansard (Lords) vol. 293, col. 1393, 26 June 1968.

mutual adjustment" with the aim of reducing uncertainty or misperception,¹²⁴ reviewing of the Franks Report also demonstrated Britain's strong inclination to meet the Argentine need. In November 1966, Britain proposed to maintain a 30-year "sovereignty freeze" as an interim period for the allowance of normalising relations between the islands and Argentina, during which period both positions on sovereignty would not be affected by any action in trade or other forms of contact. When the interim period expired, the islanders would decide to be under Argentine administration or to agree to a British presence. Argentina was clearly unwilling to give free rein to the islanders. It rejected the proposal.¹²⁵ Despite this rejection, Britain did not cease its effort. The talks went on. The first breakthrough in the talks came in March 1967, when Britain expressed its willingness to cede sovereignty, if the wishes of the islanders were respected.¹²⁶ The point to note is that, the wishes of the islanders, nevertheless, were not considered a stumbling block.¹²⁷ Instead, with the indication that the FO abided by the phrase "the principles of consultation and consent",¹²⁸ policy priority was clearly given to the interests of the islanders. In other words, the interests of the islanders became the essence of the talks. The wishes of the islanders were sidelined. As Stewart argued, "our object in the talks has been both to preserve the interests of the islanders and to see that for the future they can live on good terms with their large neighbour".¹²⁹ As regards the content of interests, the British Government assumed the position as the best judge of the interests of the islanders in the process of sovereignty transfer.¹³⁰ The FO stated that the meaning of the interests were subject to its interpretation.¹³¹ As Chalfont affirmed categorically, "We [the British officials] were the people who could decide upon the interests of the islanders, no so much the islanders themselves".¹³² To clarify Britain's stance, Stewart

¹²⁴ Joseph M. Grieco (1990) *Cooperation among nations* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), p. 22; Kenneth A. Oye (1985) "Explaining cooperation under anarchy", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.) *Cooperation under anarchy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 6-15.

¹²⁵ Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands*, p. 2; British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*, p. 5.

¹²⁶ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁷ Douglas Kinney (1985) "Anglo-Argentine diplomacy and the Falklands crisis", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 82.

¹²⁸ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 34, 18 March 1968; Hansard (Lords) vol. 290, col. 209, 13 March 1968.

¹²⁹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 4, 1 April 1968.

¹³⁰ John Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world* (London: Macmillan), p. 312.

¹³¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 19.

¹³² *Ibid.*

and Chalfont reiterated in Parliament that "the power to decide over a transfer of sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government".¹³³ As Chalfont later explained, "you really cannot, in the long run, conduct the foreign policy of an important international power according entirely to the interests, and certainly not to the wishes, of a couple of thousand inhabitants of some islands in the South Atlantic".¹³⁴

In short, if international cooperation is understood as a process intended to make both parties better off with the realisation of the adversaries' preferences,¹³⁵ there are powerful reasons for supposing that confidential talks between Argentina and Britain during the period of 1966-68 were a good case in point. The British intention to make its adversary "better off" was manifest.

The flexible notion of sovereignty

It has been widely held that the most important reason for the perceived continuity of the Falklands quarrel and Britain's unwillingness to negotiate with Argentina about sovereignty lies in the absence of substantial alternatives to the principle of sovereignty.¹³⁶ Because of this, many commentators believe that sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was essential to any form of settlement,¹³⁷ no matter whether the talks were held in 1966-68, one year before 1982, or even now. Barnett pushed the view to extremes and argued that, without sovereignty, the British elite in this case would perceive the "peril of extinction".¹³⁸

Nevertheless, insofar as sovereignty implies a confining factor, the above argument fails to account for the exceptional case of the history of the Falkland Islands, i.e. 1966-68.

The talks during this period were characterised by the British notion of

¹³³ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 1464, 26 March 1968; Hansard (Lords) vol. 290, col. 991, 27 March 1968.

¹³⁴ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 22.

¹³⁵ Robert O. Keohane (1984) *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 52.

¹³⁶ Alberto R. Coll (1985a) "Lessons for the future", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 238; Alain Rouquie (1983) "Argentina: The departure of the military-end of a political cycle or just another episode?", *International Affairs*, 59, 4, p. 585; David Rock (1985) *Argentina: 1516-1982* (California: University of California Press), p. 376; Herter and Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", p. 123; Simon Collier (1983) "The first Falklands war?" Argentine attitudes", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, p. 464.

¹³⁷ Elizabeth Young (1982) "Falklands fall-out", *The World Today*, 38, p. 327.

¹³⁸ Anthony Barnett (1982) *Iron Britannia* (London & NY: Allison and Busby), p. 147.

sovereignty over the Falklands being compatible to a considerable degree with Argentine hunger for it. When UN Resolution 2065 called for talks, the British attitude was "far more flexible".¹³⁹ As Stewart recalled, "We were quite prepared to go on discussing sovereignty".¹⁴⁰ With regard to the demand raised in Parliament that the question of sovereignty be kept from entering into the talks with the Argentines, the FO insisted that what they endeavoured to do was to build a "permanent satisfactory relationship between the islands and Argentina".¹⁴¹ To defend the designated policy geared to the interests of the islander, the FO tried to convince Parliament that there was a necessity for the talks over sovereignty. As Stewart argued, "I fully accept the proposition that one cannot buy good relations by giving away things that one should not give away. However, it is also true that if one is genuine in saying that one wants good relations, one cannot refuse to discuss a subject even if one's views and the views of [the] other party are completely at variance".¹⁴² To achieve this objective, Stewart was emphatic that sovereignty be one of the topics under discussion, because, if sovereignty had been withdrawn from the agenda, Britain would be "unable to talk to the Argentine about anything".¹⁴³

Even during the heated debate in Parliament in December 1968, when MPs were strongly suspicious of the FO's intention, Stewart did not retreat from the pressure. He went on with the belief that sovereignty was actually secondary in this territorial dispute, and firmly pledged that "negotiations involving the sovereignty of the Islands are still continuing".¹⁴⁴ Indeed, Henry Hankey, Under-Secretary at the FO, later admitted, "we did not mind letting the Islands go".¹⁴⁵

The above remarks showed that Britain's value of sovereignty in its relations with Argentina was vague from 1966 to 1968 to the extent that the British claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands could be either adjusted into a concrete policy objective in order to meet British interests elsewhere, and even that a change of hand to meet Argentina's burning appeal had been seriously discussed. It had been the

¹³⁹ Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation*, p. 313.

¹⁴⁰ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 25.

¹⁴¹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 773, col. 872, 18 November 1968.

¹⁴² Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 1462, 26 March 1968.

¹⁴³ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 25; Hansard (Commons) vol. 775, cols. 426-7, 11 December 1968.

¹⁴⁴ Hansard (Commons) vol. 775, col. 850, 16 December 1968.

¹⁴⁵ Hankey, quoted in Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 36.

stated intention of the Wilson Government to negotiate on all aspects of the dispute, including sovereignty, as long as there was a solution to it.¹⁴⁶ This flexible notion of sovereignty was clearly consoling to Argentina. It, in turn, encouraged the Argentines to pursue a negotiated settlement patiently, believing that the talks were proceeding well. As Micanor Costa Mendez, Argentine Foreign Minister in 1966-68, later noted, the signal sent from the British side to him seemed to indicate that Britain recognised the legitimate force of the Argentine claim.¹⁴⁷

Entertaining a double standard

The British approach to settlement of the dispute through talks about sovereignty can also be highlighted by the different attitudes towards the issue of Gibraltar and that of the Falkland Islands during the same period. To start with, the historical premises of the two cases were similar. Britain had held the two pieces of land against foreign protests as its possessions for centuries. The insignificant status of the two pieces of non-self-governing territories in the eyes of the British decision-makers was the same—both were downplayed in the 1960s. As recalled Joe Haines, a political correspondent for the *Sun* in 1964-68 who later became the Press Secretary to Wilson, “If I lived in Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, I would not sleep at night for worrying about it, because so far as policy is concerned, those territories are peripheral... The officials will never die in the ditch for either of them”.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, despite the same lack of concern, the two pieces of territory received different policy treatments. On 20 December 1966, the case of Gibraltar was considered in UN Resolution 2231, calling upon Spain and Britain to settle the issue. The stipulation in the text of the resolution was roughly the same as that applied in the case of the Falkland Islands. It urged both Spanish and British Governments to take into account the interests of the local population in the process of the sovereignty talks.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Britain's response to this UN resolution was in sharp contrast to that on the issue of the Falkland Islands. The FO described UN Resolution 2231 as

¹⁴⁶ Philip Ziegler (1993) *Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson), p. 343; Mary Cawkell (1983) *The Falkland story, 1964-1976* (London: Papermac), p. 63.

¹⁴⁷ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 100.

¹⁴⁸ Joe Haines (1977) *The politics of power* (London: Jonathan Cape), pp. 72-3.

¹⁴⁹ British Government (1967) *Further documents on Gibraltar, October 1966—June 1967*, Cmnd. 3325 (London: HMSO), p. 12, p. 69; British Government (1968) *Further documents on Gibraltar, June*

"disgraceful".¹⁵⁰ It protested that decolonisation did not necessarily mean the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain. In June 1967, Britain unilaterally announced a decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, where the local people would have the opportunity to express their intention either to stay under British rule, or the Spanish government.¹⁵¹ Judith Hart, British Minister of State at the FO, pledged in Parliament on 14 June 1967 that "decolonisation cannot consist in the transfer of one population, however small, to the rule of another country, without regard to their own opinions and interests... We accordingly decided that a referendum should be held in Gibraltar" in accordance with the British "powers and responsibilities".¹⁵² But Hart's position was characterised by a double standard. The Falkland Islanders were not offered alternatives to choose their way of government or to decide where their interests lay. Quite the opposite, when Argentina expressed opposition to the idea of a referendum, Britain claimed that a plebiscite was "an unusual process within the British Commonwealth" and the Falklands community was "too small to hold a plebiscite".¹⁵³ These statements were contradictory to what Hart had openly declared. Indeed, during the same period when a referendum was carried out in Gibraltar, according to Cawkell, the islanders' "own communication system was being dismantled and their dependence on Argentina organised". They "were deprived not only of information when they needed to be informed, but also of a voice".¹⁵⁴ Indeed, in the midst of suspicion, it was reported from Argentina that a timetable had been agreed, whereby Argentinian sovereignty would be recognised "in four to ten years".¹⁵⁵ The rumour even went round that Chalfont complained in Buenos Aires that, in their joint effort to persuade the islanders to accept the cession of sovereignty, Argentina did not do as much as Britain expected!¹⁵⁶

Gibraltar provided eloquent testimony to Britain's double standards in the Falklands case. It showed that Britain was more ready to accommodate Argentina, an

1967—June 1968, Cmnd. 3325 (London: HMSO), p. 6, p. 9.

¹⁵⁰ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (8), Text of interview with Bernard Braine, Conservative Front Bench Spokesman, on Commonwealth Affairs, "The Falkland Islands affairs".

¹⁵¹ Labour Party Conference (1967) *Report of the 66th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House), p. 80; Labour Party Conference (1968) *Report of the 67th annual conference*, p. 16.

¹⁵² Ibid. (1967) *Report of the 66th annual conference*, p. 80; Labour Party Conference (1968) *Report of the 67th annual conference*, p. 16.

¹⁵³ Hansard (Lords) vol. 291, cols. 738-9, 25 April 1968.

¹⁵⁴ Cawkell (1983) *The Falkland story*, p. 64.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, pp. 61-2.

¹⁵⁶ Hansard (Commons) vol. 774, col. 1533, 4 December 1968.

opposite position held toward Spain in the case of Gibraltar in 1966-67.

The pincer-shaped educational campaign

The British attitude to cooperation over the issue of the Falkland Islands was not only in principle but also in deeds. Between 23-27 November 1968, Chalfont visited the Falkland Islands. Accompanying Chalfont was Ezequiel F. Pereyra, an Argentinian diplomat.¹⁵⁷ Here, history witnessed a campaign jointly waged by the British and Argentine Governments in the form of a pincer movement targeting the islanders.

From the British side, Chalfont clearly intended to sow "seeds of gloom and uncertainty".¹⁵⁸ He attempted to persuade the local population "what cession to Argentina would mean in benefits for the islanders". He spoke before 500 islanders, pointing out their narrowness that "things are changing in the world outside. Great Britain is not the great imperialist power of the nineteenth century". Chalfont warned the islanders that, when they expressed the view to remain British, they had to "make absolutely certain" that they knew what they meant, because "their children could feel otherwise".¹⁵⁹ As Chalfont said in a menacing tone, "I am not offering any assurance".¹⁶⁰

On the Argentine side, Pereyra spoke soft words and conveyed an Argentinian friendly attitude with the assurance that the islanders need not concern themselves about their future if a transfer would take place. The future was promising, pointed out Pereyra. The transition of sovereignty would not affect property ownership. Instead, Argentina would provide oil and gas. Besides, it was a natural development for the islanders to develop links with mainland Argentina. The islanders could even feel free to live in Argentina. A Welsh community, for instance, had been living in Patagonia peacefully for more than a century.¹⁶¹ Pereyra's assurance together with Chalfont's pompous utterance exemplified a set of state behaviour consequent on international cooperation. The FO was actively engaged in managing the transfer of the islands to Argentina with a view to settling the different claims in the past 130 years.

¹⁵⁷ Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982* (Boulder & London: Westview), p. 110.

¹⁵⁸ Cawkell (1983) *The Falkland story*, pp. 63-4.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid..

¹⁶⁰ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 102.

¹⁶¹ Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute*, p. 110.

The above account can be formulated in a few words. From November 1966 to December 1968, the Wilson Government, bearing on these interests as a guiding principle,¹⁶² moved "discreetly towards transferring sovereignty to Argentina".¹⁶³ The change of policy preference during this period was conspicuous, judging from Britain's refusal to discuss the issue of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in the past 130 years. As late as September 1964, the British representative on the committee of 24 remained emphatic that the Falklands was a territorial, not a colonial dispute, and its title was not negotiable.¹⁶⁴

3. Statement of the puzzles

From December 1968 onward, the British Government changed its diplomatic tack. It declared that sovereignty was to be "neither negotiated nor ceded".¹⁶⁵ Lord Caradon, the Permanent UK Representative to the UN, 1964-70, argued that sovereignty over the Falkland Islands would not be ceded, because it was against the wishes of the islanders.¹⁶⁶ Stewart echoed this view, explaining in Parliament that the wishes of the islanders were "paramount" in the negotiations.¹⁶⁷ This position was in sharp contrast to that of the previous two years. After Resolution 2065 was passed in 1965, Caradon affirmed categorically in the UN that "the interests of people must be paramount" and Britain would not betray that UN principle.¹⁶⁸ This was the first turning-point policy preference on the British side. It would not be hard for Argentina to anticipate what the future could bring. In December 1968, however, the FO argued that a settlement of the issue was premature. The Franks Report issued by Britain in 1983 stated that the prepared Memorandum of Understanding, supposed to be issued jointly with Argentina, had to be abandoned. This was because, according to the Franks Report, the Argentines were not willing to accept the Memorandum to include the terms that "any transfer of sovereignty would be subject to the wishes of the Islanders".¹⁶⁹

¹⁶² Robert O. Keohane (1986) "Reciprocity in international relations", *International Organisation*, 40, 1, p. 20.

¹⁶³ Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation*, p. 312.

¹⁶⁴ Martin Honey and Jenny Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas: Whose crisis?* (London: Latin American Bureau), pp. 38-9.

¹⁶⁵ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 103.

¹⁶⁶ Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute*, p. 114.

¹⁶⁷ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁶⁸ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 1462, 26 March 1968.

¹⁶⁹ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*, p. 6.

But this reason is not cogent. In the text of the so-called Memorandum of Understanding, released in part by the Franks Report, there is no reference to the wishes of the islanders. The Memorandum only stated that "the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government". In other words, whether to publicise the Memorandum or not was up to London. It had nothing to do with Argentina's attitude. Argentina's attitude, instead, is found consistent throughout the two-year talks. Their negotiating basis had not changed at all ever since the ratification of Resolution 2065, which articulated that the interests of the islanders should be a primary concern in the agenda of the talks.¹⁷⁰ The explanation of the Franks Report is therefore one-sided. Argentina was not to blame for Britain's resuming the wishes of the islanders as the negotiating principle. Rather, it was apparent that to change the negotiating premise from the interests to the wishes was a unilateral decision made by the British FO at the end of 1968. The FO had sidelined the wishes of the islanders as the negotiating principle in the two years before the end of 1968. The change of policy preference in late 1968 constituted the second turning-point decision, which effect cannot be lightly dismissed. To be sure, the change revived the long-standing controversy. The issue from then on has been characterised by two mutually conflicting principles—wishes vs. interests—blocking each other. As some officials recalled, the end of 1968 could be ascertained as the watershed of the whole issue of the Falklands Islands.¹⁷¹ Lord Wallace confirmed that Britain since December 1968 had "abandoned an attempt to reach a settlement with Argentina on sovereignty."¹⁷² Mendez on the Argentine side also admitted that at the end of 1968, a sense of disillusionment began to set in among the Argentine officials.¹⁷³ These remarks indicate that the spate of contradictions in the British conduct of the Falklands policy is well worth reflecting upon. Why did Britain change its traditional attitude and begin talks with Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1966? Why did the Wilson Government change the negotiating principle from the interests of the islanders to their wishes in December 1968? What kind of theoretical mechanism

¹⁷⁰ Bologna (1983) "Argentinian claims", p. 40; Joan Pearce (1982) "The Falkland Islands dispute", *The World Today*, 38, p. 161.

¹⁷¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 27.

¹⁷² William Wallace (1983) "How frank was Franks?", *International Affairs*, 59, 3, p. 454.

¹⁷³ Nicanor Costa Mendez (1987) "Beyond deterrence: The Malvinas-Falklands case", *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, 4, p. 120.

reflects such a causal relationship for the two turning-point policy preferences? What are the implications of these policy shifts?

4. Justification of the case study

An under-researched area

The two turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68 are by no means a unique case when seen in the context of the next decade of negotiation from 1966 to 1982, before the war broke out. Throughout the 16 years after 1966, Britain had unceasingly repeated its effort in making proposals in the talks. However, a series of proposals including communications agreements in 1971, the idea of condominium in 1974, the scientific cooperation in 1978, and the leaseback proposal in 1980 as well as a series of educational campaigns, all proved abortive.¹⁷⁴ The negotiations eventually ended up switching back to the previous position—respecting the wishes of the islanders. The ultimate return to the status quo as it was in 1966-68 demonstrates that December 1968 was the watershed for “a realistic understanding” of this issue.¹⁷⁵ Seen from the series of failed attempts in the next decade when the wishes of the islanders eventually came to the fore as the major barricade to further efforts in cooperation, this case study represents a non-typical event. This non-typicality will strengthen the potential of this thesis to make limited generalisations. In other words, the two policy preferences seem entitled to be the topical questions that constitute a central concern of the academic field.¹⁷⁶ It is in this sense that Britain’s policy preferences on the issue of the Falkland Islands become an important question in international politics.¹⁷⁷

The second point to justify the case choice is that the British conduct of the policy in respect of the Falkland Islands during the 1960s is under-researched, to the extent that many scholars tend to see the 1960s as part of the continuity in the full Falklands history.¹⁷⁸ Decision-makers, equally, paid scant attention to the dramatic

¹⁷⁴ Michael Dillon (1988b) “Thatcher and the Falklands”, in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), *Belief systems and international relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 169

¹⁷⁵ Alberto R. Coll (1985b) “Philosophical and legal dimensions of the use of force in the Falkland war”, in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 46.

¹⁷⁶ Arnold A. Rogow (1957) “Comment on Smith and Apter: Whatever happened to the great issues?”, *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, p. 769.

¹⁷⁷ Coll R. Alberto (1985b) “Philosophical and legal dimensions of the use of force in the Falklands war”, in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 46.

¹⁷⁸ Lowell S. Gustafson (1984) “The principle of self-determination and the dispute about sovereignty

development during this period. This de-emphasis, however, was not because the period was less significant relative to the moment prior to the war in 1982, so that the policy shifts were allowed to slumber.¹⁷⁹ Rather it is because the sovereignty talks were confidential.¹⁸⁰ Decision-makers as a consequence tended to be careful not to dwell on it. Stewart, serving as the head of the FO twice in 1966-68, glossed over the Falklands policy during the period without revealing the details, so did the Franks Report published by the British Government in 1983.¹⁸¹ George Brown, who took over Stewart's position in October 1966 and later handed it back to Stewart in March 1968, does not even mention it in his autobiography.¹⁸² On the other hand, confidentiality also brought about some hearsay reports. *The Economist*, for instance, wrote that it was not until "1977 the question of a transfer of sovereignty was formally discussed ... for the first time".¹⁸³ Thomas argued that "for more than 130 years, successive British governments maintained that British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies was not negotiable".¹⁸⁴ Perina reported that "the first official conversations between Argentina and Britain were carried out in London in 1970".¹⁸⁵ These accounts are mistaken. They show that the issue of the Falkland Islands in the 1960s is a grey area in the Falklands history that needs exploring more. If the goal of social sciences is to identify behavioural patterns of decision-making and, i.e. the British attitude on the issue of the Falkland Islands, the silence is not appropriate. Without the effort to explore this grey area as part of the Falklands history, readers, who are interested in the issue proper, will run the risk of overlooking

over the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands", *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 37, 4, pp. 85-7; Robin Knox-Johnston (1995) *Cape Horn: A maritime history* (London: Hodder & London: Westview), pp. 196-205; J. C. J. Metford (1968) "Falklands or Malvinas?", The background to the dispute", *International Affairs*, 44, 3, pp. 473-7; David Sanders (1990) *Losing an empire, finding a role: British foreign policy since 1945* (London: Macmillan), p. 126.

¹⁷⁹ Robert Andrew Burns (1986) *Diplomacy, war, and parliamentary democracy: Further lessons from the Falklands or advice from academe* (Lanham, NY & London: University Press of America), p. 8; Clive J. Christie (1985) *Nationalism and internationalism: Britain's left and policy towards the Falkland Islands, 1982-1984, Hull papers in politics, no. 37* (Hull: University of Hull), p. 2; Anthony Verrier (1983) *Through the looking glass: British foreign policy in an age of illusions* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 340.

¹⁸⁰ Hansard (Commons) vol. 762, col. 1061, 9 April 1968.

¹⁸¹ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*; Michael Stewart (1980) *Life and Labour: An autobiography* (London: Sidwick & Jackson), pp. 174-5.

¹⁸² George Brown (1971) *In my way: The political memoirs of Lord George-Brown* (London: Victor Gollancz).

¹⁸³ *The Economist*, 10 April 1982, p. 29.

¹⁸⁴ David Thomas (1991) "The view from Whitehall", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 40.

¹⁸⁵ Perina (1991) "The view from Buenos Aires", p. 57.

the British decision-makers' consciousness involved in this dispute.

Labour now in power

Part of the reason to justify the study is that the Labour Party is now in power. This thesis is not to argue that, because the Wilson Government in the late 1960s and the Blair Government at present are the same party, history will be repeated. The ultimate force of motivation can never be homogeneous between the two governments bearing the same name. But it is important to note as a caveat that, different from their Tory counterparts, Labour, as some argue, tends to accept the idea of talks on sovereignty as a means of reducing the overall costs of defence and diplomacy.¹⁸⁶

In the late 1960s, some Labourites put it ideally at the annual Labour conference that "We are not interested in British sovereignty. We leave that to the Tory Party".¹⁸⁷ Denis Healey, Labour's Defence Minister in the 1960s, also emphatically maintained that Britain should not refuse to discuss sovereignty with Argentina. This was because, according to Healey, in 1984, Britain had launched negotiations over the sovereignty of Hong Kong without consulting the four million inhabitants of Hong Kong. There was by the same token no reason why a perpetual settlement of the Falklands could not follow suit, especially since Argentina had become a democratic regime.¹⁸⁸ As regards the incumbent Prime Minister Tony Blair, he is on record as having said, "given the starkness of the military option, we need to compromise on certain things". As Blair explained, Britain's position "should not be determined by the wishes of the Falkland Islanders", and that "promise of self-determination for the Falklanders could lead to a full-scale war".¹⁸⁹ Perhaps more striking is Blair's Christmas message to the Falkland Islanders in 2000, in which he promotes the policy

¹⁸⁶ David Carlton (1970) *MacDonald versus Henderson: The foreign policy of the second Labour government* (London: Macmillan), p. 219; Michael Cocks (1989) *Labour and the Benn factor* (London & Sidney: MacDonald), p. 139; Malcolm Deas (1989) "Further forward thoughts on the Falklands", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 160; Bruce George (1991) *The British Labour party and defence* (London: Praeger), pp. 6-7; Michael R. Gordon (1969) *Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy: 1914-1965* (California: Stanford University Press), p. 14; Walter Little (1991) "Political opinion in Britain" in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 73; Peter Madgwick (1994a) *A new introduction to British politics* (London: Stanley Thornes), p. 376.

¹⁸⁷ Labour Party Conference (1969) *Report of the 68th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House), p. 319.

¹⁸⁸ Hansard (Commons) vol. 52, col. 904, 25 January 1984.

¹⁸⁹ John Rentoul (1995) *Tony Blair* (London: Warner), p. 104; *The Times*, 3 May 1997.

of dialogue with Argentina.¹⁹⁰ All these evidences incline this thesis to identify New Labour as a party being less intransigent towards the current deadlock.¹⁹¹

However, British governments also tend to be engulfed in policy confusion, whenever there are critical choices to be made between integration into an interdependent international community through regional development and keeping sovereignty.¹⁹² The essential point therefore has to be narrowed down as the following question: under what circumstances will the flexible mood of the Labour Government on the issue of the Falkland Islands come alive again?

Lastly but not exhaustively, this case study is, in part at least, a response to the call for academic concern. As Bulpitt observed, British political scientists display more of "an interest in the general subject of government", but are "markedly reluctant to develop any enthusiasm for the study of particular governments". An effort at specific focus on one government instead is often left to "historians or memoir-mongers".¹⁹³ Heeding Bulpitt's complaint, this thesis is better placed to designate a specific unit for solving our puzzle in Chapter 1, and the unit to be observed is the Labour Government under Harold Wilson, 1966-70.

Exploring the feasibility of three proposals

This research can also be justified by the need to explore the feasibility of the following three proposals—the idea of leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration into the Antarctic Treaty System. This thesis makes it clear that these three proposals are not chosen randomly solely because they are relevant. Each of the proposals, indeed, has been seriously discussed by the two sides before, publicly promoted by Argentina, or suggested by the scholars. For the purpose of solving this historical sore, this thesis seeks to shed light on the feasibility of them through understanding the causes of the puzzles, since it has been well said that "politics is the art of the

¹⁹⁰ *Financial Times*, 4 January 2000.

¹⁹¹ Barry Jones and Michael Keating (1985) *Labour and the British state* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 107; Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996) *The Blair revolution: Can new Labour deliver?* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber), p. 20.

¹⁹² Richard Little (1988a) "The study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 256; Steve Smith (1991) "Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy", in Lawrence Freeman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 56.

¹⁹³ Jim Bulpitt (1988) "Rational politicians and conservative statecraft in the open polity", in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan), p. 5.

possible".¹⁹⁴

The idea of leaseback

The leaseback proposal is an expedient to transfer sovereignty to Argentina with guarantees of a continuation of a British lifestyle. This approach can be summarised as "one country, two systems". It implies a certain degree of autonomy in the Falkland Islands for a fixed number of years after the transfer of sovereignty. As Beck, George and Little, argue, the idea of leaseback is advisable and promising because it constitutes a combination of British administration and Argentine sovereignty.¹⁹⁵ Beck, following the Hong Kong model, suggested a 99-year period for leaseback to come true.¹⁹⁶ He criticised Britain's tendency to ignore Argentina's ultimate goal,¹⁹⁷ arguing that "it is clearly easier for a European than for a Latin American power to concede territorial sovereignty in Latin America".¹⁹⁸

It seems to this thesis that, because the Hong Kong solution as a design for an eventual settlement of a territorial dispute has already been put into practice, leaseback in the Falklands question can be one possible option. However, there is contention that the likelihood of resuming discussions about leaseback was low on the ground that Britain, after the war, has tried to separate the case of Hong Kong from the issue of the Falkland Islands.¹⁹⁹ But it has to be remembered that British policy-makers have floated the idea of leaseback twice in the Falklands history.²⁰⁰ It was initiated at the end of 1940,²⁰¹ gaining currency after 1977, and was even broadly considered as "realistic" by the Thatcher Government before the war in 1982.²⁰² In 1983, Raul Alfonsin, former President of Argentina, was clearly prompted by the case of Hong Kong and re-staged the leaseback proposal.²⁰³ If "compromise is one of the

¹⁹⁴ Terry McCarthy (1999) "The son of heaven?", *Time*, 29 November 1999, p. 38.

¹⁹⁵ Beck (1982) "Cooperative confrontation", pp. 37-58; Beck (1986) *The international politics of Antarctica* (London & Sidney: Croom Helm); George and Little (1985) *Options in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute*, pp. 1-12.

¹⁹⁶ Peter J. Beck (1985) "The future of the Falkland Islands: A solution made in Hong Kong?", *International Affairs*, 61, 4, pp. 650-1, pp. 654-5.

¹⁹⁷ Peter J. Beck (1983) "Research problems in studying Britain's Latin American past: The case of the Falkland dispute 1920-50", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 2, 3, p. 13.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid. (1982) "Cooperative confrontation", p. 256.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 154.

²⁰⁰ Herter and Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", p. 127.

²⁰¹ Martin Honeywell and Jenny Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas: Whose crisis?* (London: Latin American Bureau), p. 36.

²⁰² Herter and Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", p. 153.

²⁰³ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, pp. 106-7; Hansard (Commons) vol. 75, col. 527, 14 March

things politics is all about",²⁰⁴ and if Charlton is correct that the issue of the Falkland Islands is characterised by the tendency to refute the "general truth that history does not repeat itself",²⁰⁵ it is likely that the British Government will reconsider the idea of leaseback as the "most elegant approach to [re]move the current dilemma".²⁰⁶

Shared sovereignty

Shared sovereignty is a concept under which both national anthems are played and national flags are hoisted, but neither government directly rules in the same piece of territory. Instead, the two governments involved only symbolically send representatives to the islands on a personal basis, where the inhabitants elect their own representatives into the council. Under this condition, troops are not needed on station, nor is there a change of lifestyles.²⁰⁷ This idea is advocated following the existing model of Andorra, the mountainous state on the border between France and Spain. Andorra is exemplified as a case of dual sovereignty, where Spanish rights and French influence converge.²⁰⁸ Former President Menem had once publicly promoted this proposal,²⁰⁹ which was supported by scholars such as Dent, Herter and Smith. Having seen that the Andorrans have lived under this customary arrangement for 700 years, these scholars openly questioned "why prejudice or preclude that possibility in the Falklands/Malvinas", given that Andorra has a larger population than the Falkland Islands?²¹⁰ Indeed, some Argentine nationalists have recently been trying to draw this notion in by suggesting that Argentina's national flag fly in the Darwin Cemetery in the Falkland Islands, where 237 Argentine soldiers killed in the war lie buried.²¹¹ More specifically, the notion of shared sovereignty may be compatible with the thinking pattern of New Labour, whose political project also partakes of the idea of community.²¹² Given the idea of shared sovereignty, will the Blair Government take this proposal on board?

1985.

²⁰⁴ Robert Jervis (1979) "Deterrence theory revisited", *World Politics*, 31, 2, p. 323.

²⁰⁵ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 74.

²⁰⁶ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 152-3; Beck (1985) "The future of the Falkland Islands", p. 647.

²⁰⁷ Martin Dent (1989) *Shared sovereignty: A solution for the Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Paper); Herter and Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", pp. 127-8.

²⁰⁸ Pierre Raton (1984) *The international status of Andorra* (Andorra: Grafinter), p. 25.

²⁰⁹ FIA (1998a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, p. 3.

²¹⁰ Herter and Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", pp. 127-9.

²¹¹ *La Nacion*, 21 October 1999; 2 November 1999.

²¹² Philip Gould (1998) *The unfinished revolution: How the modernisers saved the Labour party*

Integration into the Antarctic Treaty System

Sir Vivian Fuchs, President of the British Royal Geographical Society, made a proposal that the Falklands dispute be put into the institutional framework of the Antarctic Treaty. His rationale is not hard to fathom. It is hoped that the Antarctic Treaty System will restrain unnecessary risk-taking behaviour of the two disputants, and through it the uncertainties around the Falklands' waters can be largely swept aside.²¹³

Fuchs' scheme can hardly be said to be baseless. The major characteristic of the Antarctic Treaty is to leave the territorial claim frozen. It has been a successful mechanism to maintain peace around Antarctica.²¹⁴ Encouraging evidence showed that British and Argentine representatives did not walk away from the discussion on the establishment of mineral regimes attached to the Antarctic Treaty, even during the war in 1982.²¹⁵ This might imply that both sides were cautious to observe the status quo in Antarctica and to keep it exclusively for peaceful purposes, despite the military clash.²¹⁶ It is also arguable that Britain may take this as an option, because, once the Falklands territory enters into the domain of the Antarctic Treaty, the Falklands Islands are internationalised, and Britain will never be a loser.

The Falkland Islands Legislative Council apparently planned to integrate the islands into this institutional framework. Richard Ralph, former Governor of the Falkland Islands, was keen to build up the functional image of a connection between Antarctica and the Falklands. Boasting of the important contribution of the facilities on the islands to the research activities of the British Antarctic Survey, he was quoted as saying that no place engaged in Antarctic research could compete with the service offered by the Falkland Islands.²¹⁷ Will the Falkland Islands Government successfully

(London: Abacus), p. 256.

²¹³ Christopher Mitchell (1994) "Conflict research", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), pp. 128-41; Jack Child (1988) *Antarctica and South American geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* (NY: Praeger), p. 89.

²¹⁴ V. E. Fuchs (1983) "Antarctica: Its history and development", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 19.

²¹⁵ Peter J. Beck (1989) "British relations with Latin America: The Antarctic dimension", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 181; Christopher C. Joyner (1985) "Anglo-Argentine rivalry after the Falklands: On the road to Antarctica?", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 208.

²¹⁶ Colson (1985) "The Falkland Islands crisis and the management", p. 216; Gerald S. Schatz (1974) (ed.) *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington Books), p. 97.

²¹⁷ FIA (1998b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, p. 15.

get London to agree to enter the territorial dispute into the framework of the Antarctic Treaty framework in an attempt to “influence the debate involving the future of Antarctica”?²¹⁸ Research designed to address this issue may help shed some light on this question.

To summarise, this thesis chooses the period from 1966 to 1968 as the subject, partly because it is under-researched, and partly because it is a watershed in Falklands history. The period is an important watershed because throughout the next 16 years, the essence of the talks from 1968 to 1981 is two negotiating principles competing with each other. The competition constitutes the topic of this thesis—between the wishes and the interests.²¹⁹

5. The mode of enquiry

Searching for an explanation

The goal of the enquiry is to generate an explanation for the stated puzzle. To this goal, this thesis believes that historical documents alone are insufficient to generate a reliable explanation.²²⁰ This is because, although the basic aim of research is to bring forward new data,²²¹ the data cannot speak for itself.²²² To provide an explanation, this thesis makes the effort to observe phenomena systematically with the help of theory.²²³ However, it is admitted that the interaction of the two Governments is far more complex than this thesis hopes to comprehend.²²⁴ The report will always be

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 10.

²¹⁹ British Government (1983) *Falkland Islands review*, p. 7.

²²⁰ Martin Bulmer (1984) “Facts, concepts, theories and problems”, in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Sociological research methods: An introduction*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan), pp. 44-5; Chava Frankfort-Nachmias and David Nachmias (1996) *Research methods in the social sciences*, 5th edition (London: Arnold), p. 14.

²²¹ Amitai Etzioni (1978) “Introduction: Policy research”, in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *Policy research* (Netherlands: E. F. Brill, Leiden), p. 5.

²²² James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee (1995) *Thinking theory thoroughly: Coherent approaches to an incoherent world* (Oxford: Westview), p. 4.

²²³ Graham Allan (1991) “Qualitative research”, in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds.), *Handbook for research students in the social sciences* (NY & London: Falmer), pp. 180-1; Errol E. Harris (1970) *Hypothesis and perception: The roots of scientific method* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 196; David T. Lykken (1970) “Statistical significance in psychological research”, in Pietro Badia, Audrey Haber and Richard P. Runyon (eds.), *Research problems in psychology* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley), p. 276.

²²⁴ Edwin A. Burt (1965) *In search of philosophic understanding* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 186; Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (1998) *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, vol. 1 (Bristol: Thoemmes), p. 57; Anatol Rapoport (1958) “Various meaning of ‘theory’”, *American Political Science Review*, 52, 4, p. 983; Barbara Leigh Smith, Karl F. Johnson, David Warren Paulsen and Frances Shocket (1976) *Political research methods: Foundations and techniques* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.), p. 46.

open to modification.²²⁵ Admitting the limitation on certainty, on the other hand, does not mean that any alternative explanation will be as reliable as what this thesis produces.²²⁶ Its epistemological base is by no means relativism. Instead, this thesis seeks to produce a statement, with which it intends to conclude either true or false a proposition from a given perspective by given evidence.²²⁷ Above all, although this thesis has no intention of predicting an exact tendency of the issue in the future,²²⁸ it tries to preserve a scientific attitude.

Methodological triangulation

Methodological triangulation refers to the adoption of multiple methods to explore one specified set of phenomena.²²⁹ The strategy is advisable because a researcher may commit errors of “significant oversight and misguided conclusions” in observation. This does not mean that a triangulated structure in methods will automatically increase the validity of the report, but it certainly helps to “gain a more holistic view of the setting” to maintain the credibility of the inference.²³⁰ By this reasoning, this thesis employs a procedure consisting of a literature review, archive study and personal interviews. Of these, the former two are the major approaches. With negation as a technique in inference, the literature review in Chapter 2 will help focus this thesis on the area where potential answers lie.²³¹ With regards to the archive study in Chapter 4, inference will be attempted through a theoretical framework. Personal interviews will serve as a supportive approach intermittently. The rationale of this arrangement can be illustrated as follows.

In the literature review, Chapter 2 puts forward “a series of theories”, rather than an isolated one, to appraise the published literature. The series of theories not only

²²⁵ Robert Jervis (1991) “Models and cases in the study of international conflict”, in Robert L. Rothstein (ed.), *The evolution of theory in international relations: Essays in honour of William T. R. fox* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press), p. 79.

²²⁶ Martyn Hammersley (1995) *The politics of social research* (London: Sage), pp. 17-8.

²²⁷ Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and relativism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 20.

²²⁸ David G. Smith (1957) “Political science and political theory”, *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, p. 743.

²²⁹ A. Michael Huberman and Matthew B. Miles (1994) “Data management and analysis methods”, in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), p. 438; Sidney Tarrow (1995) “Bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide in political science”, *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, pp. 473-4.

²³⁰ Jennifer C. Greene (1994) “Qualitative programme evaluation: Practice and promise”, in Denzin and Lincoln, *Handbook of qualitative research*, p. 537; Janice M. Morse (1994) “Designing funded qualitative research”, *ibid.*, p. 224.

²³¹ F. H. Bradley (1922) *Principle of logic*, vol. 1 (London: Oxford University Press), p. 114.

refer to those perspectives in the past, but the perspectives that have the potential to solve the puzzles.²³² This arrangement will broaden the scope of view to include those relevant methods discussed among scholars on the issue of the Falkland Islands.²³³ With this "series of theories" under review in Chapter 2, this thesis will go beyond the commonly assumed link between one theory and one experiment. It will instead present itself in a triangular form of competition among rival theories.²³⁴ In this way, another form of triangulation takes shape in Chapter 2, where various perspectives including dependence, historical, domestic, cultural, social, world-system approaches will be assessed and competing theories such as neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist models will also be entered into the equation. When the above frameworks prove inadequate, the first part of methodological triangulation ends. Chapter 3 will then follow with an alternative strategy.

Archive study is another important part of triangulation in this thesis. In Chapter 4, this thesis tries to reconstruct the problem situation under the guidance of a theory that is to be specified in Chapter 3. Fortunately under the 30-year British archival rule, the official documents of the FO in 1968 were released and transferred to the Public Record Office, Kew Garden, London, in January 1999. By observing the first-hand data left by the British FO in this period under study, Chapter 4 will maximise the validity of observation to be made.²³⁵

Regarding personal interviews, this thesis pursued them in a structured way that the respondents answered a series of questions in the same order.²³⁶ The questions' wording is shown in Appendix A. In addition, this thesis also adds some open-ended questions with a view to reducing the chances of guessing by the interviewees.²³⁷

²³² Jon Clark and Gordon Causer (1991) "Introduction: Research strategies and decisions", in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds.), *Handbook for research students in the social sciences* (London: Falmer), p. 172.

²³³ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1995) "The importance of research design in political science", *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, p. 477.

²³⁴ Imre Lakatos (1970) "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes", in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 118, p. 122.

²³⁵ Zeev Maoz (1986) "Multiple paths to choice: An approach for the analysis of foreign policy decisions", in Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds.), *Different text analysis procedures for the study of decision making* (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research foundation), p. 85

²³⁶ Anfrea Fontana and James H. Frey (1994) "Interviewing: The art of science", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), p. 363.

²³⁷ Michael F. Schober and Frederick G. Conrad (1997) "Does conversational interviewing reduce

Nevertheless, although personal interviews are useful,²³⁸ they have limitations. This is because, firstly, the targeted interviewee is defined as a person involved with the issue of the Falklands Islands in the 1960s. This definition is narrow. It will heighten the concern about the low-rate of qualified interviewees. As to this difficulty, it is said that the low-rate can be coped with by using the "snowballing" technique to trace out the appropriate targets. "Snowballing" is advised on the assumption that "people with similar characteristic or attributes are likely to know each other".²³⁹ In this regard, the Falkland Islands Association is an ideal target because of its role as a lobby group.

However, a small population and a chosen respondent as the result of "snowballing" is likely to produce a homogenous set of answers. This concern will presumably inhibit the intended broad scope in argumentation, and run the risk of depending on extreme cases that may disproportionately influence the findings.²⁴⁰ This is unacceptable from the perspectives of a detached observer and theory evaluation. Bowing to this concern, this thesis will avoid statistical sampling. Nevertheless, if sampling is given up, the precision in generalisation is sacrificed. Consequently, personal interviews as a source of data have to be judged in a reserve capacity by this thesis.

Secondly, with thirty years passing, the memory of the potential interviewees may fail.²⁴¹ Valid interviewees could therefore be very few. Besides, what makes the interviewing account possibly one-sided is that the responding answers may be deeply influenced by the emotive aspects of the war. Because of these concerns, this thesis would like to treat the data from interviewing as supportive sources only.

It has to be acknowledged that however devoted in the methodological

survey measurement error?", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61, 4, pp. 595-6.

²³⁸ Charlotte Dargie (1998) "Observation in political research: A qualitative approach", *Politics*, 18, 1, p. 65.

²³⁹ Ronald Czaja and Johnny Blair (1996) *Designing surveys: A guide to decisions and procedures* (London: Pine Forge), p. 111; Graham Kalton and Dallas W. Anderson (1986) "Sampling rare populations", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 149, 1, pp. 77-8.

²⁴⁰ Horst Stenger and Siegfried Gabler (1994) "Theory and practice of sample survey", in Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (eds.), *Trends and perspectives in empirical social research* (Berlin & NY: Walter de Gruyter), pp. 125-38; Seymour Sudman (1972) "On sampling of very rare human populations", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 67, p. 335.

²⁴¹ William Foddy (1993) *Constructing questions for interviews and questionnaires: Theory and practice in social research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 91; Seymour Sudman and Norman M. Bradburn (1989) *Asking questions: A practical guide to questionnaire design* (San Francisco & Oxford: Jossey-Nass), p. 146.

arrangement and however broad the scope, this thesis may still miss some variables, because observation is theory-laden and theory is focused on its key variables only.²⁴² However, by expounding sophisticated conceptual structures in an attempt to both advance a theory and solve the empirical puzzles,²⁴³ this thesis is at least on the right track closer to the common concerns in the academic circle.²⁴⁴

The assumption

The unit of analysis includes the Falkland Islands Government, the whole sub-units of the FO/FCO as well as the Wilson Cabinet from 1966 to 1968. To identify the decision-making units hierarchically from the Cabinet down to the sub-units of the FCO implies where the data will come from. But the identification is not a passing whim. Basically, it is a functional assumption.

To start with, this thesis realises the weakness in a functional perspective. Functionalist phraseology restates rather than explains. Having a role to play is a far cry from saying that one is willing to fulfil one's role responsibly.²⁴⁵ Decision-makers sometimes make choices without "acknowledged responsibility" or significant attention to the policy consequences.²⁴⁶ Ultimately, the "complexity of events is too great for them to grasp what is going on".²⁴⁷ Nevertheless, these criticisms do not de-emphasise the need to explore the decision-makers in the FO/FCO as a unit of analysis. Because, firstly, as Griffith and Booth explain, "No government wishes to demonstrate in public its internal dissension and so decisions once come to are presented by all Ministers as the policy of Government".²⁴⁸ A functional perspective

²⁴² Ottar Hellevik (1984) *Introduction to causal analysis: Exploring survey data by cross-tabulation* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 28; D. C. Phillips (1987) *Philosophy, science and social inquiry: Contemporary methodological controversies in social science and related applied fields of research* (Oxford: Pergamon), p. 11; David Sanders (1994a) "Behaviour analysis", chapter prepared for inclusion in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and methods in political science* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1995), p. 13.

²⁴³ Norman K. Denzin (1978) *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*, 2nd edition (NY: McGraw-Hill), p. 50, p. 73; Ernest Gellner (1985) *Relativism and the social sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 125-6.

²⁴⁴ A. J. R. Groom (1990) "The setting in world society", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for international cooperation* (London: Pinter), p. 3; Randy Stoecker (1991) "Evaluating and rethinking the case study", *The Sociological Review*, 39, 1, p. 88.

²⁴⁵ Lars Hertzberg (1986) "The concept of role and human behaviour", in Barcan Marcus et al. (eds.), *Methodology and philosophy of science VII* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 540

²⁴⁶ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach (1988) *The elusive quest: Theory and international politics* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press), p. 151.

²⁴⁷ Cornford, J. P. (1974) "Review article: The illusion of decision", *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 2, p. 239.

²⁴⁸ J. A. G. Griffith and M. A. J. Wheeler Booth (1989) *Parliament functions, practice and procedures*

can be seen in this light as far as a decision or policy preference is concerned.

Secondly, a functional perspective can be reinforced by observation when the latter is designated as decision-makers-oriented.²⁴⁹ A coherent interpretation from a functional perspective becomes pertinent in that the observation of decision-makers' attitude and motivation can serve as the stepping stone for exploring the perception and behaviour of the whole unit under analysis.²⁵⁰ This thesis therefore believes that the exploration from the functional perspective can link the policy preferences of the decision-makers to the whole structure of the issue. More specifically, through the functional perspective, the major concern of this thesis is looking for patterns of behaviour in collective forms. Collective patterns of behaviour, nevertheless, cannot be self-contained by applying an individual's knowledge only. They are a reflection of the immediate environment of the whole issue.²⁵¹ In other words, by accepting a functional assumption, this thesis treats the FCO as a structure absorbing and synthesising different views in the bureaucratic structure.²⁵²

Therefore, although a functional perspective may not present the exact necessary and sufficient causality in foreign policy analysis,²⁵³ so far as the potential to produce a "contingent" report is concerned,²⁵⁴ the FO/FCO's decision-making cannot be lightly dismissed.

More generally, from the conventional perspective of "collective responsibility" in Britain,²⁵⁵ the FO/FCO is arguably a dominant unit in executing foreign policy,²⁵⁶ because it can unify different opinions into a concrete one in order to respond to

(London: Sweet & Maxwell), p. 24.

²⁴⁹ Michael Quinn Patton (1990) *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (London: Sage), p. 32.

²⁵⁰ A. Nuri Yurdusev (1993) "Level of analysis and unit of analysis: A case for distinction", *Millennium*, 22, 1, p. 83.

²⁵¹ Carol H. Weiss and Michael J. Bucuvalas (1980) *Social science research and decision-making* (NY: Columbia University Press), p. 178.

²⁵² Ellen Kennedy (1991) "Towards a theory of state and sovereignty in contemporary Britain", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 161; Georg Sorensen (1997) "An analysis of contemporary statehood: Consequences for conflict and cooperation", *Review of International Studies*, 23, 3, p. 257.

²⁵³ David Braybrooke (1958) "The relevance of norms to political description", *American Political Science Review*, 52, 4, p. 996.

²⁵⁴ Derek Layder (1988) "The relation of theory and method: Causal relatedness, historical contingency and beyond", *The Sociological Review*, 36, 2, p. 445, p. 460.

²⁵⁵ Colin Seymour-Ure (1970) "The 'disintegration' of the cabinet and the neglected question of cabinet", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 24, 3, p. 202; Douglas V. Verney (1977) *British government and politics: Life without a declaration of independence* (NY & London: Harper & Row), pp. 60-1.

²⁵⁶ Darel E. Paul (1999) "Sovereignty, survival and the Westphalian blind alley in international relations", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, p. 225.

external realities.²⁵⁷ More specifically, while it was the Prime Minister who decided the Cabinet agenda, it was the Foreign Secretary who placed an issue onto the Cabinet agenda.²⁵⁸ The years of the Wilson Government was also reported as the era when "lengthy meetings on big questions" were held in the Cabinet.²⁵⁹

As Vital explained the role of the FO/FCO in the overall British bureaucratic system:

It is perhaps best seen, however, as the chief component of the central, vertical column of inter-connected authorities which are ... in charge of the formulation and implementation of major external policy and which extends downwards from the Cabinet, through the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, the Foreign Secretary, the Foreign Office itself, and on to the Diplomatic Service in the field.²⁶⁰

Vital's observation lends a lot of weight to the assumption of this thesis. Although the influence of the FO in the 1960s had given ground relatively to the departments dealing with economies,²⁶¹ it is, admittedly, the antenna that sensitises an analyst. It is also ultimately the FO that sets strategic guidelines for foreign policy in explicit form as most "government decisions are made within the confines of single government departments".²⁶²

Thirdly and perhaps more relevant to this assumption is that the Falklands dispute in the 1960s is peripheral in Britain's overall foreign policy.²⁶³ Because of its

²⁵⁷ Andrew Moravcsik (1997) "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics", *International Organisation*, 51, 4, p. 518.

²⁵⁸ Matthew Bonham and Michael Shapiro (1976) "Explanation of the unexpected: The Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 141; Keith Dowding (1993) "Government at the centre", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), p. 179.

²⁵⁹ Peter Riddell (1997) "Cracks in the Cabinet cement", *The Times*, 10 November, p. 22.

²⁶⁰ David Vital (1968) "The making of British foreign policy", *The Political Quarterly*, 39, 3, p. 225.

²⁶¹ Douglas Hurd and Andrew Osmond (1967) "The trouble with Britain's diplomacy", *New Society*, 9, 248, p. 953.

²⁶² Brian W. Hogwood and Thomas T. Mackie (1985) "Cabinet structures in individual countries: The United Kingdom, Decision sifting in a secret garden", in Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood (eds.), *Unlocking the cabinet: Cabinet structures in comparative perspective* (London: SAGE), p. 47.

²⁶³ Tony Benn (1980) "The case for a constitutional premiership", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 33, 1, p. 13; Archie Brown (1967) "What power has a prime minister?", *New Society*, 9, 244, p. 792; Ronald Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament* (London: Constable), p. 448; Patrick Gordon Walker (1970) *The*

low priority, it left the sub-units in the FO a lot of room to exert influence on the policy outcomes. Based on the functional assumption, this thesis expects to see more secretariats assume “a limited, but more substantial” decision-making role in the name of the FO, as more power is devolved to deputy secretary levels in the 1960s.²⁶⁴ In other words, the two turning-point policy preferences indicate that the FO, as the representative or state actor in foreign-policy making, might seize more room to interpret and initiate actions, even though its effort sometimes proved unsuccessful. This, in turn, will endorse the functional assumption of this thesis to see the FO/FCO as a unitary actor in a collective form throughout the whole study.

cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape), pp. 112-3.

²⁶⁴ Martin Burch and Ian Holliday (1996) *The British cabinet system* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 22.

CHAPTER TWO—LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 2 is concerned with the published literature in the issue of the Falkland Islands. As part of triangulation, this thesis will examine answers from various perspectives that have been explored by some scholars. These perspectives include the Soviet viewpoint, historical, domestic, cultural, social, UK-geopolitical and rational choice theories. The purpose of the discussion is threefold. It adds substance to the historical review presented in the previous chapter. It specifies the nature of the deficiencies in the explanations made from these perspectives. It also indicates the ways in which these deficiencies will be tackled.

1. Some Soviet scholars' perspective

As stated in Chapter 1, little work has been explicitly done on British conduct of its Falklands policy in 1966-68. This lack of research has reinforced an impression of policy continuity, to the extent that some writers ascribe this unending territorial dispute to British imperialist ambition.¹ This misunderstanding comes in the main from the scholars on the Soviet side.² In 1984, the "Social Science Today" in the Soviet Union published its interpretation of this issue. The major theme of the interpretation is partially characterised by dependence theory that tends to interpret the controversies between the North and South as a reflection of efforts by the western powers to preserve their colonial enterprises.³ Argentina in this vein is seen as having been financially dependent on London on the grounds that the former was almost a British commercial colony.⁴ The dispute has thus been grounded in historical reasons with imperialist ambition behind it.⁵ The continuity of the issue of the Falkland Islands as a result is interpreted as Britain's desire to preserve the vestiges of

¹ Pavel Boiko (1984) "Mounting anti-imperialist struggle", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), p. 110.

² Robert A. Isaak (1995) *Managing world economic change: International political economy* (NJ: Prentice-hall International), pp. 193-5.

³ Benjamin J. Cohen (1973) *The question of imperialism: The political economy of dominance and dependence* (London: Macmillan), p. 206; Chris Brown (1985) "Development and dependency", in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International relations: A handbook of current theory* (London: Francis Pinter), pp. 62-3; Theotonio Dos Santos (1970) "The structure of dependence", *American Economic Review*, 60, 2, p. 231; J. Stanley and Barbara H. Stein (1970) *The colonial heritage of Latin America: Essays on economic dependence in perspective* (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 198.

⁴ Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1996) *Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism* (London & Chicago: Pluto), p. 86.

⁵ Linda Steinbaum (1984) "Background to the conflict", in "Social Science Today", p. 24.

colonialism.⁶ This interpretation is not limited on the Soviet side only. Dillon saw the British decision-makers “often trapped by a defence culture imbued with nostalgia for the global age of British power”.⁷ The talks in 1966-68 leading nowhere were a result that could be seen as a throwback to Britain's imperial history. Accordingly, the bilateral talks in a co-operative form in 1966 were an outcome of the rise of national liberation movements that pressurised the colonial system to retreat.⁸ Britain's decision to give up the Memorandum of Understanding that was supposed to be jointly issued with Argentina in 1968, by the same token, “was but a pretext for taking a shortcut to further its global strategy, i. e. plans to set up a military base on the islands”.⁹ To concur, Lazarev contended that Britain could have settled the issue through international arbitration, but for its relentless imperial ambitions after WWII.¹⁰ Some even claimed that unless British imperialism was uprooted, neither side would find a way out of the political impasse.¹¹ A cursory examination of these arguments reveals outrage directed at Britain's imperialist exploitation. However, the historical record shows that such representations do not grasp the nature of British-Argentine relations as a general context of the issue of the Falkland Islands.

The long-standing trade link

As early as 1806, when Britain began to explore markets in South America, Britain had been aware of the importance of recognising Argentine sovereignty in trading for business.¹² Since then, Britain had viewed Argentina as a place of economic interest rather than a political sphere.¹³ This attitude had been retained for the next 150 years, except 1845-7, when the dictator General Juan Manuel de Rosas tried to denounce foreign influences by launching protective measures against foreign

⁶ Vlasdimir Miroshvsky (1984) “Britain's armed invasion of La Plata”, in “Social Science Today”, p. 21.

⁷ G. Michael Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war* (London: Macmillan), p. 89.

⁸ Andrei Goncharov (1984) “Introduction”, in “Social Science Today” (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), pp. 5-6; Izabella Shokina (1984) “Argentine workers' movement at the new stage”, in “Social Science Today”, p. 102.

⁹ Yuri Khrunov (1984) “The South Atlantic in imperialism's plans”, in “Social Science Today” (eds.), p. 31.

¹⁰ Marklen Lazarev (1984) “The legal aspect of the conflict”, in “Social Science Today”, p. 65.

¹¹ Walter Little (1988) “Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question”, in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St Martin), p. 155; Anthony Sampson (1982) *The changing anatomy of Britain* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 259; David Sanders (1990) *Losing an empire, finding a role: British foreign policy since 1945* (London: Macmillan), p. 126.

¹² Martin Honeywell and Jenny Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas: Whose crisis?* (London: Latin American Bureau), p. 34.

¹³ Harry S. Ferns (1960) *Britain and Argentina: In the nineteenth century* (Oxford: Clarendon), pp. 28-51, p. 86, p. 97, p. 110, p. 275, p. 279.

commodities. In September 1845, Britain responded to Rosas' blockade by allying with France and sending a naval fleet in an attempt to reopen the closed market. However, when the British Government realised that a blockade of Buenos Aires was detrimental to trade, it resumed the traditional economic policy and abandoned the blockade.¹⁴

After the 1860s, British investment in Buenos Aires began to take off.¹⁵ Contact between Britain and Argentina was institutionalised into a long-standing trade link. As things stood, the link proved resilient enough to attack financial crises occurring in Buenos Aires and explicitly evinced the interdependence relationship between the two sides. The two grave crises in 1890 and in the early 1930s will support this argument.

By the late 1880s, Baring Brothers of London, a leading financial firm in Buenos Aires, had acted as a representative of the Argentine Government to extract the loan of British capital invested in Argentina.¹⁶ However, in 1889, owing to the rapid expansion of credit in Buenos Aires, Baring failed to attract the loan that it had underwritten to rebuild the water supply system in Buenos Aires. This failure to endorse the checks brought about a hurried flight of foreign capital, and caused huge unemployment as well as homelessness. The crisis seriously undermined the Argentine economies and led to the fall of the Juarez Cleman Government in August 1890.¹⁷

As half of Argentina's capital foreign investment came from London when the crisis occurred,¹⁸ there were powerful financially interested groups in Britain urging the use of political tools to interfere in Argentina's financial independence.¹⁹ Nevertheless, despite being well positioned to exploit the political gains, the British Government was resolved to meet the crisis purely in economic terms. In November 1890, the Bank of England agreed to continue the investment and honour the

¹⁴ John Lynch (1993) "From independence to national organisation", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 11, p. 33.

¹⁵ E. Bradford Burns (1982) *Latin America: A concise interpretative history* (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 133; Roberto Cortes Conde (1993) "The growth of the Argentine economy, 1870-1914", David Brookshaw (trans.), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 76.

¹⁶ Aldo Ferrer (1967) *The Argentine economy* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press), p. 103; David Rock (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982* (California: University of California Press), pp. 71-2.

¹⁷ Ron Smith (1991) "The political economy of Britain's external relations", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 136.

¹⁸ *Mercopress*, 30 November 1999.

¹⁹ P. Whitetaker Arthur (1964) *Argentina* (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 50.

signature of the Baring Brothers by bearing half of any loss on bills incurred.²⁰ British intervention as a consequence de-escalated the crisis. In the longer term, the intervention stabilised the Argentine financial situation for a decade to come.²¹

The Great Depression in the 1930s witnessed another severe test of British-Argentine economic links. As the buying capabilities in the Western markets shrank, Britain adopted the urgent demands from Australia and South Africa for preferential access to imperial markets following the agreements at the Ottawa Conference in 1932. The British decision to import meat from other sources posed an immediate threat to Argentina. This was not only because Britain was then the largest importer of Argentine meat products, but also because Argentina did not belong to the Commonwealth. Argentina would face the possible loss of a market as the consequence of the Ottawa Agreement. Argentina at this critical moment dispatched a negotiating team, led by Vice President Julio Roca, to London in an attempt to strike a deal with Britain and save the market. The Roca-Runciman Treaty as a result was signed in 1933. Britain agreed to keep the import of Argentine meat at the level of 1931-32, whereas Argentina conceded to importation duties on its British imports at rates lower than those in 1930.²²

The significance of the Roca-Runciman Treaty to Argentina must not be lightly dismissed. It sustained the British-Argentine economic link for another two decades. Even as late as the 1960s, with the passing of Britain's imperial era, Argentina continually saw Britain as the major market for its agricultural products. Argentina had once been deeply concerned about the prospect of Britain's entry into the EEC (European Economic Community). It was willing to see Britain's success in entry, because Britain's entry into the EEC could mean Argentina's preferred status of trade with Britain could have been transferred to the EEC member states.²³ It was, accordingly, not surprising that, when de Gaulle rejected Britain's application for entry into the EEC in 1963, there was "great rejoicing" on the Argentine side.²⁴

²⁰ Ferns (1960) *Britain and Argentina*, p. 436.

²¹ P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins (1993) *British imperialism: Crisis and deconstruction, 1914-1990* (London & NY: Longman), p. 154.

²² Theodore H. Moran (1970) "The 'development' of Argentina and Australia: The radical party of Argentina and the Labour party of Australia in the process of economic and political development", *Comparative Politics*, 3, 3, pp. 83-6; Ysabel F. Rennie (1945) *The Argentine Republic* (NY: Macmillan), p. 237; David Rock (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 191-3.

²³ Rock (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982*, p. 100.

²⁴ Arthur A. Whitaker (1964) *Argentina* (NJ: Prentice-Hall), p. 17.

The interdependence relationship

Looking back, the British-Argentine relationship in history was more complex than that which the dependency theorists portrayed. Firstly, after the British took over the role previously filled by the Spaniards since 1806, the British merchants had been subject to political uncertainty in Argentina. This was not only because the occasional political dictatorship constituted the source of hindrance to their way of doing business, but also because these businessmen received rare diplomatic promotion from the British Government.²⁵ Even though naval force was called in twice, in 1807 and 1845, it proved futile. On the other hand, the influence of the Bank of England was anything but dominating. It did not occupy a dominant position as the dependency theorists interpreted. The commercial banks in Buenos Aires “were subject to competition” and to “a rapid succession of rival politicians”. They were also suffering from insufficient information for financial decision-making.²⁶ During the crisis in 1889, for instance, it was observed that Argentine policy makers held to a firm line and “left little space for compromise” in the negotiations about the loans.²⁷

Secondly, Britain’s decision to intervene in the Baring crisis in 1889 with the commitment to the financial aid was “so radical a departure from the accepted rules of laissez-faire”.²⁸ The British attempt to prevent a financial collapse in Argentina indicated that Argentina was perceived as a weighty partner in the economic field.²⁹ Although Argentine economies had never returned to the levels before the 1920s,³⁰ the Treaty was undoubtedly in the interests of the Argentine agricultural sectors and “was crucial to the economic recovery” in the 1930s.³¹ Because of the Treaty, when Argentine meat became tainted with foot-and-mouth disease in the 1940s, leading to an overall ban by most foreign markets, the Smithfield Market in London remained the only market open to the Argentine agricultural products.³² Seen in this light, the

²⁵ D. C. M. Platt (1972) “Economic imperialism and the businessmen: Britain and Latin America before 1914”, in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the theory of imperialism* (London: Longman), p. 295; Judith Blow Williams (1935) “The establishment of British commerce with Argentina”, *The Hispanic Historic Review*, 15, 1, p. 54.

²⁶ Platt (1972) “Economic imperialism and the businessmen”, p. 298.

²⁷ Ezequiel Gallo (1993) “Society and politics, 1880-1916”, Richard Southern (trans.), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University), p. 95, p. 111.

²⁸ Ferns (1960) *Britain and Argentina*, p. 448.

²⁹ Cain and Hopkins (1993) *British imperialism*, pp. 154-5.

³⁰ Simon Collier (1981) “Argentina: Domestic travail, international censure”, *International Affairs*, 57, 3, p. 477.

³¹ Cain and Hopkins (1993) *British imperialism*, p. 158.

³² Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari (1966) *Argentina's foreign policy, 1930-1962*, John J. Kennedy (trans.), (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press), p. 7; Rennie (1945) *The*

Treaty can be seen as a means of sustaining the British-Argentine traditional market that the traditional agrarian sectors in Argentina badly needed.³³ This thesis therefore is inclined to see mutual vulnerability as the link that compelled Britain to attempt to solve the trade crisis. To be rational, Britain was not obliged to buy Argentine meat. The Argentine main sources of imports were from the United States, not Britain. There had been huge trade between the two sides in favour of Argentina before the signing of the Treaty. Although the Argentine Government's pledge to "buy from those who buy from us" in the late 1920s, it proved no more than a slogan.³⁴ However, despite the trade imbalance, Britain did not deny Argentina's access to the London market. It was more likely that the Treaty was agreed on the grounds that Britain was afraid of Argentines' retaliation against British investment in Argentina, should Britain cut meat imports from Argentina.³⁵

Dependence theory apparently does not fit the case either in its assumptions or description. Quite the opposite; Argentina was hardly dictated to by British imperialist power.³⁶ What captured the important part of reality was that even in the Sixth Congress of the Third Communist International held in 1928, Argentina, among the Latin American countries, was thought to remain politically independent due to weak economic exploitation.³⁷ The above observations incline to the assertion that the British-Argentine economic link was a typical instance exemplifying more of interdependence than imperialist understanding. Ferns is correct in arguing that the British-Argentine historical relations were characterised by "growth and maturity". The links seemed to be more dependent "upon the strictest respect and independence on the plane of politics, while on the plane of economics it involved a complex and delicate interdependence".³⁸ There existed another argument that British investments were "bad" capital and the US investment was "good".³⁹ But this distinction does not

Argentine Republic, p. 234, pp. 245-6; Rock (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", p. 174.

³³ Cristobal Kay (1999) "Rural development: From agrarian reform to neoliberalism and beyond", in Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay (eds.), *Latin American transformed: Globalisation and modernity* (London, Sydney & Auckland: Arnold), p. 273.

³⁴ Ysabel F. Rennie (1945) *The Argentine Republic* (NY: Macmillan), p. 236.

³⁵ Rock (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", p. 191.

³⁶ Charles A. Jones (1992) "British capital in Argentine history: Structures, rhetoric and change", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), p. 68, p. 74.

³⁷ Carlos Ramirez-Faria (1991) *The origins of economic inequality between nations* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 73.

³⁸ Ferns (1960) *Britain and Argentina*, p. 1.

³⁹ Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro (1970) *Essays in the economic history of the Argentine republic* (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 32; Jeffrey A. Friden (1994) "International investment and colonial control: A new interpretation", *International Organisation*, 48, 4, p. 584.

advance dependence theory very far. Coding British investment as bad capital represented more of the nationalists' emotional outlet.⁴⁰ A point of departure is that, when Juan Peron after 1946 eventually opted for the purchase of British-owned railways as a symbol of anti-colonialism,⁴¹ it helped little to stimulate the Argentine economy.⁴² Peron might try to break its old economic bond, but he ultimately "had to confront the so-called "good" capital of the United States."⁴³ The act of nationalisation in fact hastened the overall withdrawal of other foreign investment, leading to agricultural and industrial stagnation up to the mid-1960s.⁴⁴

Calling for a hermeneutic understanding

A hermeneutic perspective, adding inter-subjective psychological elements to the reference of the work,⁴⁵ will show that the economic ties in British-Argentine diplomatic history were more complex than what dependence theorists describe. As Argentine General Mosconi averred, "British imperialism, contrary to the U.S. that is pursuing political and economic hegemony over the continent, is not intruding in domestic politics and foreign policy".⁴⁶ In 1960, an Argentine delegate in the UN matched Mosconi's statement by describing the European imperialists in the UN as having "the most extraordinary qualities of intelligence[,] inventiveness and most enterprising people that humanity has known".⁴⁷ It is noteworthy that these remarks were gleaned from the conviction among Argentine leaders that their economic independence, progress and order lay in British productive techniques and investing capital.⁴⁸ The opinions of these decision-makers on the Argentine side clearly indicate

⁴⁰ F. J. McLynn (1983) "Peron's ideology and its relation to political thought and action", *Review of International Studies*, 9, 1, pp. 1-2.

⁴¹ Robert A. Potash (1980) *The army and politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi* (London: Athlone), pp. 58-60.

⁴² Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982* (Boulder & London: Westview), p. 99.

⁴³ Riordan Roett (1992) "The foreign policy of Latin America", in MacRidis Roy C. (ed.), *Foreign policy in world politics* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International), p. 268.

⁴⁴ Diaz Alejandro (1970) *Essays in the economic history*, p. 32; Winthrop R. Wright (1974) *British-owned railways in Argentina: Their effect on economic nationalism, 1854-1948* (Austin & London: University of Texas Press), p. 273.

⁴⁵ Charles Taylor (1985) *Philosophy and the human sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 53.

⁴⁶ Nora A. Femenia (1996) *National identity in times of crises: The scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas war* (Nova Science Publishers), p. 56.

⁴⁷ Lowell S. Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 58.

⁴⁸ Jonathan C. Brown (1979) *A socio-economic history of Argentina, 1776-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University), pp. 227-8; Rock (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982*, p. 75; Wright (1974) *British-owned railways*, p. 8; Jorge Larraín (1999) "Modernity and identity: Cultural change in Latin America", in Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay (ed.), *Latin America transformed: Globalisation and*

that dependence theory is correspondingly weak in explaining British-Argentine relations. If we define an imperialist oppression as a combined political and economic force exerted towards another country by unlimited forcible expansion,⁴⁹ applying the phrase "imperialist/colonialist relations" to the British-Argentine link would be wide of the mark. Taking no account of the Argentine liberal aspirations, or British policy orientation towards Argentina, the interpretations made from the perspective of British imperialism are static and arbitrary.⁵⁰ It has to be borne in mind that largely through British capital after 1860, Argentina emerged from insignificance to a prominent position before WWII.⁵¹ When there were few political or military controls being directly imposed by Britain, who had little colonising motives seeking for territories in the Argentine mainland,⁵² the British-Argentine link could not be coherently interpreted as exploitative.⁵³ Argentina had never been forced out of its independent status in its dealings with Britain, and the lack of any political intrusion might be considered as one of the remarkable features of the relations that dependence theorists neglect. A hermeneutic understanding of the British-Argentine link will expose the fact that the dependence model does not adequately account for regional differences in the whole British imperial enterprise.⁵⁴ The model lacks reflective consciousness of the state actors in observing a case study.⁵⁵ It has instead precluded the reader from noticing that British imperialism was on the wane after WWII.⁵⁶ To sum up, the explanation provided by dependence theorists in this case is at best an interpretation

modernity (London, Sidney & Auckland: Arnold), p. 187.

⁴⁹ Joseph A. Schumpeter (1951a) "Capitalism", in Richard V. Clemence (ed.), *Essays on topics of J. A. Schumpeter* (NY: Kennikat), p. 192; Schumpeter (1951b) *Imperialism and social classes*, Heinz Norden (trans.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 7.

⁵⁰ Charles Reynolds (1981) *Modes of imperialism* (Oxford: Martin Robertson), p. 8.

⁵¹ Leslie Bethell (1989) "Britain and Latin America in historical perspective", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 20; Michael Charlton (1989) *The tittle platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 101; Diaz Alejandro (1970) *Essays in the economic history*, p. 2; Ferrer (1967) *The Argentine economy*, p. 103.

⁵² Ricahrd Faber (1966) *The vision and the need* (London: Faber and Faber), p. 16.

⁵³ Barry Buzan (1991c) *People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* (London: Harvester Wheasheaf), p. 27.

⁵⁴ Christine Sylvester (1999) "Development studies and postcolonial studies: Disparate tales of the 'Third World'", *Third World Quarterly*, 20, 4, p. 707.

⁵⁵ K. J. Holsti (1978) "A new international politics? Diplomacy in complex interdependence", *International Organisation*, 32, 2, p. 515; Paul Ricour (1981) "The task of hermeneutics", in John B. Thompson (ed.), *Hermeneutics and the human science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 61; Jutta Weldes and Diana Saco (1996) "Making state action possible: The United States and the discursive construction of 'The Cuban problem', 1960-1994", *Millennium*, 25, 2, p. 371.

⁵⁶ Conil Paz and Ferrari (1966) *Argentina's foreign policy*, p. 23; A. J. R. Groom (1990a) "The setting in world society", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for international cooperation* (London: Pinter), p. 10; Richard Rose (1989) *Politics in England: Change and persistence*, 5th edition (London: Macmillan), p. 41.

an ideological fashion.⁵⁷ It does not communicate enough insight into the behavioural pattern bearing on the puzzles in this thesis.

2. The historical perspective

Based on the historical approaches, both Beck and Charlton analysed the causes of the Falklands dispute in 1966-68. Beck explored the issue extensively from the philatelic affairs to the Antarctic area, while Charlton gave an intensive insight into the domestic British politics by means of interviews.⁵⁸ To take up the first question of why Britain decided to negotiate sovereignty with Argentina in 1966, Beck offered a heavy package of reasons, ranging from the UN's pressure, British economic interests, strategic calculation, concern for British identity and even the "British interests elsewhere".⁵⁹ As regards the second question why the talks dried up in 1968, Beck correctly placed the blame on Britain for its shifting the negotiating premise to the wishes of the islanders.⁶⁰

Charlton, on the other hand, found that when the talks began in late 1966, Britain's policy was torn between the policy to stand by the islanders and an equal determination to alleviate the burden of empire.⁶¹ Charlton explained that the negotiating principle, changing from the interests of the islanders to their wishes in December 1968, was intended to remedy this uncertainty. At this juncture, Charlton turned to moral language. He quoted Edmund Burke's notions of "social contract",⁶² and developed it into the power of "sympathy".⁶³ With these, Charlton explained that the unyielding drive to resist a possible transfer of sovereignty stemmed from the simple call of patriotism. In short, it was patriotic fervour inflaming parliamentary rhetoric that discouraged a possible compromise with Argentina at the end of 1968.

Beck's and Charlton's historical accounts are helpful but only to a certain

⁵⁷ Irving Louis Horowitz and Ellen Kay Trimberger (1975) "State power and military nationalism in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, 8, 2, p. 225.

⁵⁸ Peter Beck (1983b) "Argentina's 'philatelic annexation' of the Falklands", *History Today*, 33, 2, pp. 39-44; Beck (1983c) "The Anglo-Argentine dispute over title to the Falkland Islands: Changing British perceptions on sovereignty since 1910", *Millennium*, 12, 1, pp. 6-24; Beck (1983d) "Britain's Antarctic dimension", *International Affairs*, 59, 3, pp. 429-44; Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 101.

⁵⁹ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem* (London & NY: Routledge), pp. 99-107.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁶¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. viii.

⁶² Edmond Burke (1989) "Reflections on the revolution in France 1790", in Paul Langford and L. G. Mitchell (eds.), *The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 8: The French revolution, 1790-1794* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 147; Hans Kohn (1961) *The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background* (NY: Macmillan), p. 456.

⁶³ Anthony D. S. Smith (1979) *Nationalism in the twentieth century* (Oxford: Martin Robertson), p. 58.

descriptive point. These two historical approaches help an analyst with a closer look into the whole background of this dispute. They also succeed in identifying the two interesting policy shifts at issue.⁶⁴ Beck, for instance, is perfectly correct to argue that a “lack of consensus between the disputants and the primacy attached to the Islanders’ wishes” imprisoned the disputants in the 14-year fruitless talks before the war.⁶⁵ However, this argument is insufficient for our understanding. If one believes that the goal of reading historical accounts is to understand how a decision-maker in history “smoothes some paths and closes others off” in order not to repeat errors,⁶⁶ one cannot intellectually stop here.

A critique of Beck’s historical approach

The basic weakness of Beck’s historical researches is the tendency to take description as analysis. For the purpose of analysis, one cannot take some happenings as “necessary preconditions for other phenomena”.⁶⁷ Basically, a case study attempts to explain the dynamic of a certain period in a wholistic manner, as some historian pledged to, can be too ambitious a view.⁶⁸ This is because historical description can be frustrated by the fact that the essence of decision-making is a black box that can never be filled in with enough details. That said, the descriptions of historical events, however lengthy, have to select some features and ignore others. In the historical approach, one’s interests and ideologies will subconsciously influence one’s data selection and interpretation.⁶⁹ This thesis is, as a result, incapable of knowing (a) what Beck had omitted, despite his laborious work, and (b) whether his data were detailed enough in the process of selection. Most disturbing is his proposal to resolve this dispute. When Beck argued that to cede sovereignty would be “less painful” for

⁶⁴ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 99.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 190.

⁶⁶ Lee Benson (1972) *Toward the scientific study of history: Selected essays* (Philadelphia: Lippincott), pp. 199-200.

⁶⁷ Charles Reynolds (1973) *Theory and explanation in international politics* (London: Martin Robertson), p. 95.

⁶⁸ Randy Stoecker (1991) “Evaluating and rethinking the case study”, *The Sociological Review*, 91, 1, pp. 97-8.

⁶⁹ Baruch Fischhoff (1982) “For those condemned to study the past: Heuristic and biases in hindsight”, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 349; Ottar Hellevik (1984) *Introduction to causal analysis: Exploring survey data by cross-tabulation* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 28; David Sanders (1994b) *Neorealism, neoliberalism and the condition of contemporary international relations*, paper for presentation at a panel entitled “The state of the discipline: international relations” at the XVIth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 21-25, p. 13.

Britain, what was his hidden motivation?⁷⁰

In other words, there is a gap to straddle between description and Beck's analysis. Beck could not eschew building a causal mechanism linked between explanatory and dependent variables in a form of simple leverage in an attempt to "explain as much as possible with as little as possible".⁷¹ When he suggested that since December 1968 the "dispute had been transformed from an international problem into a domestic issue with foreign policy overtones", he refrained from admitting that the year 1968 was a watershed in the development of British policy over the Falkland Islands.⁷² He recognised that the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (FIEC) was one of "the most persistent and effective British pressure groups",⁷³ but left unanswered why this lobby group could not succeed in preventing the Memorandum of Understanding from coming into being. Beck is right to point out that "the continued paramountcy of the islanders' wishes has been British policy since 1968",⁷⁴ but to stop here without giving the rationale behind the story makes Beck's account at best a journalistic report. It lacks a political focus and inclines this thesis to the view that Beck's report commits the fallacy of "inputism"—all the input factors shape one political action.⁷⁵

A critique of Charlton's conception of patriotism

Charlton's claim that patriotism was the root cause of British intransigence is also not convincing. This is because Charlton was equivocal in providing readers with a settled definition of "patriotism". In British national history, there were two forms of patriotism waxing and waning from the 17th century onwards. These referred to "patriotism dissatisfied", people who expressed opposition to government authority; and "patriotism satisfied", people who were willing to be loyal to British Governments.⁷⁶ So far as the issue of the Falkland Islands was concerned, the two definitions of "patriotism" had competed with each other, to the extent that they once caused quite a lot confusion in the policy debates in 1770, when Spain evicted the

⁷⁰ Beck (1982) "Co-operative confrontation", p. 56.

⁷¹ Gary King, Robert O Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 29.

⁷² Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 99, p. 107.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 105.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 158.

⁷⁵ Roy C. Macridis (1996) "Comparative analysis: Methods and concepts", in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), p. 7.

⁷⁶ Louis L. Snyder (1968) *The meaning of nationalism* (NY: Greenwood), p. 148.

British from the islands (discussed later).⁷⁷

In retrospect, the major source of patriotism could be traced to the time of the English Reformation.⁷⁸ It came from the belief that the English were the people chosen to accomplish a divine plan. This belief, as it turned out, proved too valuable to be resisted by successive British Governments.⁷⁹ Patriots at this stage were defined as dissenters on the left. For one century down to 1760, most of these people were labelled as “Little Englanders”, whose attitude was seen as the “creed of opposition”,⁸⁰ backed by liberal aspirations.⁸¹ They were noted for their romantic concept of English nationality and drastic political standing.⁸²

In the fourth quarter of the 18th century, after the War of American Independence, a second mode of patriotism emerged in Britain. Patriotism was taken by some as a state-sponsored ideological movement that emphasised the value of military achievement with the purpose of building an empire.⁸³ Faced by Napoleonic expansion, British patriotism was solidified into an “outward style of Edwardian patriotism”,⁸⁴ understood as a duty to “bury all differences of opinion” to identify individual interests with a government’s power.⁸⁵ People in the name of patriots were supposed to think of the country first, and be ready to answer the call to arms with an attempt to keep the political status quo.⁸⁶

The meaning of patriotism in British history has therefore been mixed. From 1760 onward, patriotism in Britain represented two sets of conflicting ideas. It either denotes a leftist value against royal power, or a value nourished by the rightists.⁸⁷ But

⁷⁷ Julius Goebel (1982) *The struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), pp. 238-9, pp. 272-8.

⁷⁸ Christopher Hill (1989b) “The English revolution and patriotism”, in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), p. 159.

⁷⁹ John Wolffe (1989) “Evangelicalism in mid-nineteenth century England”, *ibid.*, p. 192.

⁸⁰ Hugh Cunningham (1981) “The language of patriotism, 1750-1914”, *History Workshop*, 12, p. 27; Anne Summers (1989) “Edwardian militarism”, in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), p. 250; Miles Taylor (1992) “John Bull and the iconography of public opinion”, *Past and Present*, 134, p. 95.

⁸¹ Linda Colley (1989) “Radical patriotism in eighteenth century England”, in Samuel, *Patriotism*, p. 181.

⁸² Linda Colley (1992) *Britons: Forging the nation 1707-1837* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), pp. 11-3; Richard Gott (1989) “Little Englanders”, in Samuel, *Patriotism*, pp. 90-2.

⁸³ Peter Furtado (1989) “National pride in seventeenth-century England”, in Samuel, *Patriotism*, p. 46.

⁸⁴ Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholas (1981) *Nationalist and racist movements in Britain and Germany before 1914* (London: Macmillan), p. 73.

⁸⁵ Stella Cottrell (1989) “The devil on two sticks: Franco-phobia 1803”, in Samuel, *Patriotism*, p. 260.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 261; Samuel Johnson (1977) “The patriot, 1774”, in Donald J. Greene (ed.), *Samuel Johnson: Political writings* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), p. 390; Layton-Henry Zig (1984) *The politics of race in Britain* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 7.

⁸⁷ John Brewer (1989) *The Sinews of power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London:

it is important to note that neither has excluded the other. Because of this non-exclusion, when referring to patriotism in the British case, Charlton needs to be cautious.⁸⁸ Charlton's failure to clarify what he means by patriotism in his argument will trap the reader into a problem of definition.

But contemporary readers are not the only victims of this confusion. The confusion had happened once in the history of the Falkland Islands. In 1770, Spain evicted the British garrison from the Falkland Islands.⁸⁹ In the policy debates about the proper response to this surprising event, the policy discussants were confused about whether to fight the Spanish in order to redress "an offence to the British king [George III] whose forces had been attacked in times of peace".⁹⁰ Although Prime Minister Frederick North made it abundantly clear that "England did not want the island, it was of no use to us",⁹¹ emotion was aroused in the name of patriotism on the opposition, who opted for war against Spain for the Falkland Islands. In the midst of confusion, Dr. Johnson was called in by the North Government to back the government policy. Clearly, Johnson tried to resolve the policy confusion by settling the definition of patriotism first. He declared roundly:

those men are no Patriots, who when the national honour was vindicated in the sight of Europe, and the Spaniards having invaded what they called their own, ... would still have instigated us to a war for a bleak and barren spot in the Magellanic ocean, of which no use could be made, unless it were a place of exile for the hypocrites of patriotism.⁹²

Johnson's statement launched a counter-attack against the emotional appeal of the term "patriotism" on the oppositions. The interesting point was that Johnson's interpretation of patriotism and the policy proposed was contrary to what Charlton claimed and sought to explain. The contradiction indicates that patriotism in reference

Unwin Hyman), p. xiii; Colley (1984) "The apotheosis of George III", pp. 95-6; John Plamenatz (1973) "Two types of nationalism", in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The evolution of an idea* (Canberra: Australia National University Press), p. 24; J. A. Sharpe (1987) *Early modern England: A social history 1550-1760* (London: Arnold), p. 105, p. 121.

⁸⁸ Linda Colley (1984) "The apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, royalty and the British nation 1760-1820", *Past and Present*, 102, p. 129.

⁸⁹ Goebel (1982) *The struggle for the Falkland Islands*, pp. 238-9, pp. 272-8.

⁹⁰ Adrian F. J. Hope (1983) "Sovereignty and decolonisation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 6, 2, p. 410.

⁹¹ Mary Cawkell (1983) *The Falkland story, 1964-1976* (London: Papermac), p. 23.

⁹² Johnson (1977) "The patriot, 1774", p. 396.

to the Falklands policy is a controversial and ambiguous concept that one cannot take for granted.

Indeed, the ambiguity caused by the term "patriotism" on this issue had not been resolved even 200 years later in the British Parliament. Brian Parkyn, MP for Bedford, to name but one, in the heated debate over the Falklands policy in the House of Lords in December 1968, continued to emphasise: "we should never forget that, in the world outside Europe, England is still seen by many as the only hope for a civilised world ... We must keep this in mind, accept the responsibility, and be prepared to give a moral lead of the world in getting away from the idea of national sovereignty".⁹³ His appeal reflected that the 17th-century proud and liberal voice still rang in the ears. However, Foreign Secretary Stewart, faced by the outcry in Parliament, was not convinced by the patriotic appeal. He did not lose his composure and seemed to know well where the national interest lay. As Stewart coldly commented: "There were a number of people in Parliament who either were, or claimed to be, very gravely alarmed at the possibility of our handing over the Islands. There was never any justification, I may say, for that alarm". Because, continued Stewart, "the Cabinet took the plain British man-in-the street's view about the Falkland Islanders". Chalfont concurred by stating that "There was certainly no sense of crisis. This was regarded then as a long-term problem".⁹⁴ Tony Benn in the Cabinet also expressed his concern for Britain's international reputation rather than sympathy with the islanders. He stated that Britain's unilateral walking away from talks with Argentina gave "the impression of deviousness" to the world.⁹⁵ All these statements in late 1968 could not be named as unpatriotic. Conversely, the policy preference to hold the Falkland Islands in 1968 might be seen as an unnecessary policy blunder leading to a loss of credit that Britain had taken pains to accumulate from its peaceful disengagement from the old empire.⁹⁶

Therefore Charlton's explanation of the conception of patriotism would introduce confusion. The British decision-makers' opting for discussing about sovereignty with

⁹³ Hansard (Lords) vol. 775, col. 689, 12 December 1968.

⁹⁴ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, pp. 21, p. 25-6.

⁹⁵ Tony Benn (1988) *Office without power: Diaries 1968-72* (London: Arrow), pp. 133-4.

⁹⁶ John Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world* (London: Macmillan), p. 307; Christopher Hill (1989a) "History and patriotism", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge), p. 5; Kohn (1961) *The idea of nationalism*, p. 20; Raphael Samuel (1989) "Continuous national history", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge), p. 17.

Argentina in the late 1960s could be a quite rational view, so far as defending Britain's national prestige was concerned. To trade the Falkland Islands for other long-term interests could hardly be criticised as unpatriotic. Secondly, Charlton based his argument on Burke's notion of a living continuity between past and present. But he could not use the concept selectively. When Burke advocated the "cultivation of human reasons",⁹⁷ he warned at the same time the potential danger of establishing policies by making deductions from abstract principles without noticing the situational difference.⁹⁸ Charlton's adoption of Burke's notion in such a selective way makes this thesis suspect that his interviewing account was less a statement of a thought than a means of expressing an emotion he himself felt.

An incomplete effort

This thesis is not satisfied by the answers given by Beck and Charlton, because historical approaches are at best "a body of knowledge" regarding the past.⁹⁹ Their effort is incomplete.¹⁰⁰ To distil the inner logic of the case and thereby to educate our judgement, there is a need to analyse. The inability to explain the fluctuating relationships among the investigated phenomena and the intervening variables gives this thesis the impression that these historical approaches intended to explain all the subtleties by relying on common sense. This is unacceptable. On the other hand, Charlton should "stop confusing patriotism with simple conservatism, or smothering it with damning and dismissive reference to chauvinism and jingoism".¹⁰¹ Taking patriotism as an explanation without clarifying its definition, this thesis can eventually find itself on the horns of a dilemma—whether patriotism was a driving force to retreat from the empire for the sake of British prestige, or whether to stick to the historical claim on the Islands.

3. The domestic approach

There is also a proposition that the internal struggle among domestic groups is the key factor in an international cooperative agreement.¹⁰² It is held that to fulfil a

⁹⁷ Andrew Vincent (1992) *Modern political ideologies* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 60.

⁹⁸ David Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations: From Thucydides to the present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 316-7.

⁹⁹ Dennis Kavanagh (1991) "Why political science needs history", *Political Studies*, 39, p. 480.

¹⁰⁰ Christopher Throne (1983) "International relations and the prompting of history", *Review of International Studies*, 9, 2, p. 131.

¹⁰¹ Colley (1992) *Britons: Forging the nation*, p. 372.

¹⁰² Jack Snyder (1991) *Myth of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), p. 12, p. 64.

purpose in democratic polities,¹⁰³ foreign-policy making has not only "an antagonist in front of it but a homeland behind it".¹⁰⁴ Therefore, it is argued that the domestic concern is pivotal because foreign policies are subject to debates over the distribution of interests among domestic groups.¹⁰⁵ To claim the high ground, this approach insists that "domestic preferences" are the "most powerful influence" in foreign policy making,¹⁰⁶ because, as Koslowski and Kratochwil concur, "reproduction of the practice of international actors depends on the reproduction of domestic actors".¹⁰⁷

In this vein, Freedman contended that domestic politics in the British conduct of Falklands policy before the war in 1982 was "surprisingly neglected".¹⁰⁸ Roper pointed out that Britain and Argentina in the process of negotiations were strongly driven by domestic concerns to the extent that the cost of failure had not been seriously discussed.¹⁰⁹ Robin Edmonds, the Head of the American Department in the Foreign Office, thought that the cancellation of the Memorandum of Understanding at the end of 1968 represented Britain's recognition of the essence of the issue, i.e. the drive of domestic politics.¹¹⁰

Domestic politics is of course relevant to foreign policy. Whenever decision-makers talked about a state's reputation in the world, this kind of argument reflects the belief that securing autonomy and prestige in foreign policy is sometimes a response to domestic needs.¹¹¹ Besides, the domestic politics are worth exploring in that a

¹⁰³ K. J. Holsti (1995) *International politics: A framework for analysis* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International), p. 250.

¹⁰⁴ Eckart Kehr (1977) *Economic interest, militarism, and foreign policy: Essays on German history* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press), p. 23.

¹⁰⁵ Peter B. Evans (1993) "Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, California & London: University of California Press), p. 397.

¹⁰⁶ Helen V. Milner (1993) "The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: A critique", David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate* (NY: Columbia University Press), p. 230.

¹⁰⁷ Rey Koslowski and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1994) "Understanding change in international politics: The Soviet empire's demise and the international system", *International Organisation*, 48, 2, p. 216.

¹⁰⁸ Lawrence Freedman (1983) "Bridgehead revisited: The literature of the Falklands", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, p. 450.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Roper (1983) "The Falkland war: A review of three books", *History Workshop*, 15, p. 182.

¹¹⁰ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 27.

¹¹¹ Peter F. Cowhey (1993) "Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States", *International Organisation*, 47, 2, p. 300; Andrew Moravcsik (1993) "Introduction: Integrating international and domestic theories of international bargaining", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press), p. 6.

division between international and domestic policies is sometimes difficult to draw.¹¹² Nevertheless, to what degree is the causal link between domestic politics and foreign policy present in this case? By de-emphasising the assumption of the state being a unitary actor,¹¹³ this thesis will examine domestic politics in Britain in this issue on two fronts. They are the parliamentary opposition, and the Falklands lobby, i.e. the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (FICE) set up in March 1968.¹¹⁴

Parliamentarianism

Some researchers argued that the Falklands policy was “vitiating” by the power of Parliament.¹¹⁵ It was recorded that there were “some 100 MPs” demanding the Wilson Government not to transfer the sovereignty against the islanders’ will in late 1968.¹¹⁶ Ziegler described the effect of the crossfire from the backbenchers on Wilson’s perception at that critical moment. “There is mounting opposition in the Cabinet to what was agreed before”, wrote Ziegler, “feeling in the House is very strong and cuts across the parties; and [Edward] Heath [leader of the Conservative] is already beginning to make a big public issue of it”.¹¹⁷ Indeed, since the mid-1960s, the strength of Parliament had been featured by the “influx of thoughtful, able and politically tough Members” and had become difficult for the executive to manage.¹¹⁸ In contrast to its rising influence in Parliament was the declining influence of the Foreign Office (FO) in Whitehall as the result of Britain’s dwindling world power.¹¹⁹ This contrast made the argument of parliamentarianism—a relational picture with a

¹¹² Fred Halliday (1994) “Theory and ethics in international relations: The contradictions of C. Wright Mills”, *Millennium*, 23, 2, p. 385; L. Morse Edward (1970) “The transformation of foreign policies: Modernisation, interdependence and externalisation”, *World Politics*, 22, 3, pp. 371-92; Anthony McGraw (1998) “Realism vs. cosmopolitanism: A debate between Barry Buzan and David Held”, *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 391; Steve Smith (1991) “Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy”, in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 66-7; Steve Smith and Steve Michael (1988) “The analytical background: Approaches to the study of British foreign policy”, in Michael Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 13.

¹¹³ Helen V. Milner (1997) *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations* (NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 10-11.

¹¹⁴ Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war*, p. 71.

¹¹⁵ Walter Little (1984) “The Falklands affairs: A review of the literature”, *Political Studies*, 32, 2, p. 299; John Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world* (London: Macmillan), p. 312.

¹¹⁶ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 102.

¹¹⁷ Philip Ziegler (1993) *Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson), p. 343.

¹¹⁸ Peter Jenkin (1970) *The battle of Downing Street* (London: Charles Knight & Co.), p. 66; Paul Rose (1981) *Backbencher’s dilemma* (London: Frederick Muller), p. 48.

¹¹⁹ Douglas Hurd and Andrew Osmond (1967) “The trouble with Britain’s diplomacy”, *New Society*, 9, 248, p. 953.

power asymmetry towards Parliament, based on "the principles of control over unbridled executive power and consent to government"—seems convincing in this case.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, the above argument seems to have mistaken the result for the cause, and it is one-sided. Before political reform was first launched in Britain in 1974,¹²¹ Parliament had only modest or symbolic power over foreign policy.¹²² The Whig's constitutional thinking that British rules overseas ought to be "responsive, representative and participatory" did not have significant impact on British foreign-policy makings, despite it having been widely discussed in the 150 years before the 1960s.¹²³ Rather the Whig's project had been effectively transformed into traditional constitutionalism.¹²⁴ Conventionally as a result, a Cabinet was the source of power machine as it was composed of party members drawn from Parliament. Most MPs subsequently are seen inclined to follow the party whip,¹²⁵ because showing party allegiance is the individual's first step to being selected for office.¹²⁶ In other words, the independence of the backbenchers could, more often than not, be "circumscribed" under the guise of party unity.¹²⁷ The MP's inclination to go up the ladder—aspiration for office—would make the Cabinet, not backbenchers' personal passions, a determining factor for MPs' response in Parliament.¹²⁸ The link between Parliament and the ruling party as a result would render the concept of parliamentarianism a less contingent cause of significant policy shifts.

Secondly, given a certain degree of independence among backbenchers, the effect on policy shifts owing to MP's responses in Parliament remained debatable. Basically, backbenchers define an issue differently. Some backbenchers are more involved with ideologies and less interested in concrete issues. Others are more

¹²⁰ David Judge (1993) *The parliamentary state* (London: Sage), p. 30.

¹²¹ Martin Burch and Ian Holliday (1996) *The British cabinet system* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf), pp. 10-2.

¹²² Gavin Drewry (1993) "Parliament", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), p. 154; Philip Norton (1984) *The British polity* (NY & London: Longman), pp. 260-2.

¹²³ Alan Beattie and Patrick Dunleavy (1995) "Imperial government and the formation of the British ministerial state", in Joni Lovenduski and Jeffrey Stranyer (eds.), *Contemporary political studies, I* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom), p. 122, p. 130.

¹²⁴ Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay, Michael Kenny, Ian MacKenzie and Rich Wilford (1984) *Political ideologies: An introduction* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 138.

¹²⁵ Peter Madgwick (1994a) *A new introduction to British politics* (London: Stanley Thornes), p. 186, p. 190.

¹²⁶ Norton (1984) *The British polity*, p. 260.

¹²⁷ Ronald Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament* (London: Constable), p. 327.

¹²⁸ J. A. G. Griffith (1974) *Parliamentary security of government bill* (London: PEP), p. 225.

concerned with practical issues than political ideals.¹²⁹ The different attitudes among backbenchers indicate that parliamentarianism can be a broad and vague concept. The agony from the perspective of parliamentarianism is that, according to Barnett, “nobody in the Commons actually cared very much if at all about the islanders” in the process of the sovereignty talks in 1966-68.¹³⁰ Therefore this thesis is bound to ask why there were 100 MPs united in opposition at the end of 1968. There must be political reasons why the Falkland Islands were commonly interpreted as being at stake in Parliament, so that the Government was forced to take the opposing opinion on board. But what were these reasons?

Given that there were political reasons to act, and there formed a united front among the backbenchers against the Government on the Falklands policy, the designated policy did not necessarily change solely because of Question Time in Parliament. The criticisms made in Question Time were less threatening to the executive than they might have appeared. This was partially because MPs need to table a question in advance of at least 10 sitting days, during which period, the Foreign Office had reasonable time to prepare its response in order to convince the opposition.¹³¹ Therefore, Question Time in Parliament serves more to expose “administrative discrepancies” rather than contributing to a policy shift.¹³² The British Parliament, conceivably then, as a force to influence most policy outcomes in late 1960s may be deemed to have had only a symbolic role.

The normal situation as a result was that Parliament was a “legitimising body”, functioning in a supportive rather than a checking role.¹³³ A government having a majority of seats in Parliamentary “can count on getting more if not all of its legislative proposals onto the statute books”.¹³⁴ That said, it is perhaps going too far to comment that “the Commons has become the creature of the party machine and lost its centrality to the national debate”.¹³⁵ There are influential arguments exchanged in Parliament. But the Cabinet in the 1960s was undoubtedly standing “at the pinnacle of

¹²⁹ Donald D. Searing (1995) “Backbench and leadership roles in the House of Commons”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 48, 3, pp. 420-1.

¹³⁰ Anthony Barnett (1982) *Iron Britannia* (London & NY: Allison and Busby), p. 22.

¹³¹ Andrew Adonis (1993) *Parliament today*, 2nd edition (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press), p. 133.

¹³² Madgwick (1994a) *A new introduction*, p. 202.

¹³³ R. L. Borthwick (1984) “Parliament”, in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press and St Martin's Press), p. 50.

¹³⁴ Geoffrey Alderman (1984) *Pressure groups and government in Great Britain* (London & NY: Longman), p. 76.

¹³⁵ John Barnes (1998) *Federal Britain: No longer unthinkable?* (London: CPS), p. 26.

government".¹³⁶ Wilson was indeed the power holder behind the party machine. His immediate dismissal of seven parliamentary private secretaries who had abstained on the vote for the EEC initiative on 10 May 1967, for instance, might not be unprecedented,¹³⁷ but the prompt reaction could be seen as his careful and firm control of the party.¹³⁸ In his first two tenures from 1964 to 1970, even the left in the Labour Party was judged as relatively silent,¹³⁹ compared to those defenders of *Clause Four* against the previous Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell.¹⁴⁰ Accordingly, George Brown might be under vocal fire for his addiction to liquor; Michael Stewart might be of a "dull" personality.¹⁴¹ But these examples did not suggest that the Government had difficulty in building consensus or these personalities would give in. Ultimately, the British style of politics is taken as "much less personalised".¹⁴² These personalities at the level of ministers were irrelevant to the powerful status of the government when designating a policy. Once a policy is designated, the pressure from parliamentary enquiries should not be taken for granted. As Michels concludes, echoed by Lipset,¹⁴³ "the influence exercised upon the governmental machine by an energetic opposition party is necessarily slow, [and] is subject to frequent interruptions".¹⁴⁴ By this token, when it comes to the issue of the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s, this thesis has to pay attention to the executive side in search of the key factors of policy preferences.

The Falklands lobbyists

The campaigning skill of the Falklands lobby was taken by Little as the factor

¹³⁶ R. M. Punnett (1987) *British government and politics*, 5th edition (Aldershot: Gower), p. 188; Christopher Hill (1991) *Cabinet decisions on foreign policy: The British experience, October 1938-June 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. xvii.

¹³⁷ Archie Brown (1967) "What power has a prime minister?" *New Society*, 9, 244, p. 790.

¹³⁸ James Barber (1991) *The prime minister since 1945* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 67; Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996) *The Blair revolution: Can New Labour deliver?* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber), p. 49.

¹³⁹ Richard Gilbert (1966) "The Left's dilemma", *New Society*, 7, 172, p. 74; John P. Mackintosh (1982) *John P. Mackintosh on parliament and social democracy*, David Marquand (ed.), (London & NY: Longman), p. 34, Andrew Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party* (London: Macmillan), p. 159.

¹⁴⁰ Philip M. Williams (1979) *Hugh Gaitskell: A political biography* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 659, p. 778.

¹⁴¹ Ben Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson* (London: Harper Collins), p. 255, pp. 329-30, p. 489; Alfred F. Havighurst (1966) *Twentieth century Britain*, 2nd edition (NY: Harper & Row), p. 498.

¹⁴² Richard Hodder-Williams (1970) *Public opinion polls and British politics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 96.

¹⁴³ Seymour Martin Lipset (1992) "The centrality of political culture", in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Parliamentary versus presidential government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 208.

¹⁴⁴ Robert Michels (1997) "The iron law of oligarchy", in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), p. 245.

that pressurised the Government into shifting the negotiating principle and giving up the Memorandum of Understanding. Little noted that the "Islanders are politically sophisticated". Their lobbying campaign was successful because they "presented themselves as a small people" exploited by decision-makers in London.¹⁴⁵

However, Little's explanation was no more than impressionistic, and he was reasonably reserved in his claim.¹⁴⁶ Bureaucratically speaking, lobbying activities have a long history from the 18th century onwards.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, lobbying activities have hardly been taken for granted as decisive. There are two reasons for this observation. To start with, policy makers seem deeply aware that lobbying activities tend "to reinforce existing bias within the political system".¹⁴⁸ To keep a view as balanced as possible, policy makers may also be more inclined to widen the access to different sources of lobbyist activities. The other side of the coin is that legitimacy is a fundamental criterion for the government to decide which views of the lobby groups are considered and acted upon.¹⁴⁹ In order to gain influence in policy-making, a lobby group has to be seen as legitimate. Seen in this light, the FIEC did not occupy a privileged position as a lobby group. It was known as a London-based company running a business in the Falkland Islands. In 1968, among the 800 shareholders of that company, there were only 10 per cent of them living in the islands. Most shareholders lived in Dundee, Perth and London.¹⁵⁰ The FO, in the decision-making process, had good reasons to keep a distance from the FIEC, as the latter could not legitimately be conferred an "insider status" to affect policy outcomes.¹⁵¹ The role of FIEC cannot be exaggerated in this case, as the FO would not be expected to consult the FIEC "on a regular basis".¹⁵² The influence from FIEC could be easily sidelined.

Therefore, contrary to the expectation that "the most important question concerning the interested groups is how much power" they possessed,¹⁵³ this thesis

¹⁴⁵ Little (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations", p. 149.

¹⁴⁶ Walter Little (1991) "Political opinion in Britain" in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 68.

¹⁴⁷ Samuel H. Beer (1957) "The representation of interests in British government: Historical background", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, p. 649.

¹⁴⁸ Wyn Grant (1995) *Pressure groups, politics and democracy in Britain*, 2nd edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 160.

¹⁴⁹ Lars Christiansen and Keith Dowding (1994) "Pluralism or state autonomy? The case of Amnesty International (British section): The insider/outsider group", *Political Studies*, 42, 1, p. 16.

¹⁵⁰ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, pp. 15-6.

¹⁵¹ Christiansen and Keith Dowding (1994) "Pluralism or state autonomy?", *ibid.*

¹⁵² Grant (1995) *Pressure groups*, p. 15.

¹⁵³ D. Marsh (1983) "Introduction: Interest groups in Britain—Their access and power", in David Marsh (ed.), *Pressure politics: Interest groups in Britain* (London: Junction), p. 10.

saw the influence of FIEC as being marginalised. Besides, however powerful and skilful a lobby group can be, and however heavy investment the lobby groups may put into their activities aimed at arousing aspirations, "propaganda does not constitute a movement".¹⁵⁴ In other words, lobbyists in British politics normally have no difficulties in gaining access to the governments,¹⁵⁵ but this does not mean having decisive influence in the decision-making process.¹⁵⁶ Exactly which groups' suggestion will be taken into account remains dependent upon the policy makers in Whitehall.¹⁵⁷

More destabilising to the argument made from the perspective of lobby groups was that, when the sovereignty negotiation was secretly performed and the talks were recorded in the form of a *Memorandum*, the Wilson Government was apparently in a position to sideline the lobby groups without too much difficulty.¹⁵⁸ Hence, although Grant argued that "Government makes concessions to a pressure group because of the validity of its argument",¹⁵⁹ this statement is still debatable as bearing on this case. If the talks are shrouded in secrecy, chances of debate in public are minimised. The factor of lobby groups, however persuasive in their arguments, has to be downplayed.

On the other hand, British foreign policy had been largely deemed as a continuous effort by successive governments. There was a manifest mood of indifference in British society towards foreign policy in the mid-1960s, particularly when economic problems attracted fixed attention.¹⁶⁰ This general attitude of indifference to foreign affairs will incline this thesis to the conclusion that the role of the Falklands lobby can be exaggerated in 1968. It was highly likely that the British public was ready to leave the issue of the Falkland Islands to the "narrow elite".¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁴ D. Anthony Smith (1971) *Theories of nationalism* (London: Duckworth), p. 209.

¹⁵⁵ Alderman (1984) *Pressure groups*, p. 35.

¹⁵⁶ R. T. McKenzie (1968) "Parties, pressure groups and the British political process", in Robert Benewick and Robert E. Dowse (eds.), *Readings on British politics and government* (London: University of London Press), p. 149.

¹⁵⁷ Alderman (1984) *Pressure groups*, p. 79.

¹⁵⁸ Little (1991) "Political opinion in Britain", p. 68.

¹⁵⁹ Wyn Grant (1984) "The role and power of pressure groups", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press & St Martin's Press), p. 127.

¹⁶⁰ Philip Abrams (1971) "Social structure, social change, and British foreign policy", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 139; George Gale (1970) "The 1970 election campaign", in John Wood (ed.), *Powell and the 1970 election* (Surrey: Elliot Right Way Books), p. 50; Joe Haines (1977) *The politics of power* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 71; Dennis Kavanagh (1980) "Political culture in Great Britain: The decline of the civic culture", in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The civic culture revisited* (Boston & Toronto: Little Brown and Company), p. 140; *New Society* (1966) "Observation: What is at stake?", 7, 179, p. 3; Rock (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982*, p. 347.

¹⁶¹ Joseph Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy: 1945-1973* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 34;

Under this circumstance, it will be safe to argue that foreign policies could not be the area where lobby groups had much impact on the government.¹⁶²

Perhaps Dillon is correct to conclude that “neither the power of the Falklands lobby, nor the constitutional prerogatives and political sentiments of the Commons were decisive”.¹⁶³ This statement goes to the heart of the contention. It may be the nature of the Falklands Islands policy, rather than the relative power of Parliament or interest groups at stake in the late 1960s.

To sum up, domestic politics as the explanation either from the perspective of parliamentarianism or that of lobby groups can be plagued with difficulties in this case. Firstly, domestic politics shed less light on the part each played in the decision-making process.¹⁶⁴ It is concerned even less with the exact influence of the values, held by the competing groups, on the executive.¹⁶⁵ Domestic politics is certainly yoked closely to international politics. But this thesis tends to see the interaction of domestic politics and international politics as the driving force in this issue,¹⁶⁶ because foreign policy is much more than an external expression of domestic politics.¹⁶⁷

4. The cultural approach

The cultural approach attempts to demonstrate how a state's political behaviour reflects its underlying cultural structure. Its major aim is to explain the tendency of certain groups of people in their adherence to “the perceptions, preferences, and values” that can “sustain their social relations”.¹⁶⁸ On this premise, Smith argued that the British-Argentine dispute was a cultural clash. The British decision to side with the islanders was “a rite of democracy”, organised and maintained around a cultural

Bruce George (1991) *The British labour party and defence* (London: Praeger), p. 6.

¹⁶² Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1996) *American foreign policy: Pattern and process* (NY: St. Martin's), p. 312.

¹⁶³ Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war*, p. 86.

¹⁶⁴ Ole R. Holsti (1976) “Foreign policy formulation viewed cognitively”, in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 27.

¹⁶⁵ Milner (1993) “The assumption of anarchy”, p. 475; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing (1977) *Conflict among nationals: Bargaining, decision making and system structure in international crisis* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 359.

¹⁶⁶ Fred Halliday (1994) “Theory and ethics in international relations: The contradictions of C. Wright Mills”, *Millennium*, 23, 2, p. 385.

¹⁶⁷ Jeffrey Hart (1976) “Comparative cognition: Politics of international control of the oceans”, in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 205.

¹⁶⁸ Marco Verweij (1995) “Cultural theory and the study of international relations”, *Millennium*, 24, 1, p. 95, p. 98, pp. 110-1.

code in a religious sense.¹⁶⁹ Explaining the romantic overtones of the dispute grounded in Emile Durkheim's viewpoint,¹⁷⁰ Smith dismissed domestic politics in understanding the dispute. He also denied that the British response was a consequence of patriotic fervour. Rather, following Durkheim's dichotomous line between the "sacred" and "profane",¹⁷¹ Smith argued that the cultural forces created pervasive meaning that was unacceptable to both sides. The dispute as a result became hard to avoid on the ground of a cultural division between the two sides. Furlong and Albiston reinforced this reasoning. They further elaborated the division by creating a contrast between Argentina and Britain as "authoritarianism vs. traditional open society", "personalism vs. merit", "corporatism vs. contract", "transcendentalism vs. pragmatism".¹⁷² It is to this perspective this thesis now turns.

Elusive definition

Taking culture as an explanatory variable, Smith has to explain the first question as to what culture means. The problem is that culture is too "permissive" for an observer to grasp its exact meaning.¹⁷³ Culture may refer to "language, geography, history, religion, social class, race, rural-urban residence, nationality"; or "a common political organisation, a social structure, an economic system, a religion, and a common way of life that embraces every aspect of human existence"; or "attitudes, values, norms and opinion" set "in a macro level".¹⁷⁴ It may also refer to "a system" or "norms of cognition, values, meanings, beliefs, understandings, ideologies, rules, ...symbols, emotions, expressiveness, the unconscious, behaviour patterns, structures, practice".¹⁷⁵ The character of permissiveness in the definition of culture leads to a

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 114-5.

¹⁷⁰ Philip Smith (1991) "Codes and conflict: Toward a theory of war as ritual", *Theory and Society*, 20, 1, pp. 106-8, pp. 131-2.

¹⁷¹ Jeffrey C. Alexander (1990) "Analytic debates: Understanding the relative autonomy of culture", in Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman (eds.), *Culture and society: Contemporary debates* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 18; E. E. Evens-Pritchard (1965) *Theories of primitive religion* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 65; Jeremy Larkins (1994) "Representations, symbols, and social facts: Durkheim and IR theory", *Millennium*, 23, 2, p. 245; W. S. F. Pickering (1984) *Durkheim's sociology of religion: Themes and theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 117.

¹⁷² William L. Furlong and Craig L. Albiston (1985) "Sovereignty, culture, and misperceptions: The Falkland/ Malvinas war", *Conflict*, 6, 2, pp. 140-4.

¹⁷³ Eric Herring (1995) *Danger and opportunity: Explaining international crisis outcomes* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press), p. 72; Marit Melhuus (1999) "Insisting on culture?", *Social Anthropology*, 7, 1, pp. 68-9.

¹⁷⁴ P. J. D. Drenth and B. Groenendijk (1984) "Work and organisational psychology in cross-cultural perspective", in P. J. D. Drenth, H. Thierry, P. J. Williams and C. J. de Wolff (eds.), *Handbook of work and organisational psychology* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), p. 1209.

¹⁷⁵ Mats Alvesson (1993) *Cultural perspectives on organisations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 1; David M. Schneider (1976) "Notes toward a theory of culture", in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in anthropology* (USA: University of New Mexico Press), p. 197;

sarcastic comment that anything that cannot be explained by an identifiable factor is attributed to culture.¹⁷⁶ Culture, as Alvesson adds, becomes "a word for the lazy".¹⁷⁷

Yet, those analysts following cultural approaches seem satisfied with the definition of culture being broad and permissive.¹⁷⁸ They claim that they take "delight in employing a variety of theories and methods from diverse disciplines", so that they refrain from applying any strict methodology,¹⁷⁹ because they have no intention of predicting,¹⁸⁰ but only have the need for "always writing".¹⁸¹

However, if one sets culture as one's starting point, one can be confused without a clearly defined boundary to control the explanatory variable and to estimate its causality. As Herring explained, cultural patterns across the two confrontational sides sometimes overlap.¹⁸² The overlapping ground among the above elements such as norms, values, beliefs, ideologies, can be likened to movement between "shifts of a more subterranean nature".¹⁸³ More often than not, the so-called "subterranean" framework constitutes an unstable perspective in observation. Culture as a result becomes elusive as an explanatory variable.¹⁸⁴ Analysts run the risk of circular reasoning.¹⁸⁵

Another point is that a cultural movement is "socially transmitted",¹⁸⁶ but this does not imply the reverse is true. Culture does not necessarily transmit a society. Quite the contrary, as Alexander observed, "powerful groups often succeed in

Harry C. Triandis (1994) *Culture and social behaviour* (NY: McGraw-Hill), p. 8.

¹⁷⁶ Drenth and Groenendijk (1984) "Work and organisational psychology, p. 1200; Francis Fukuyama (1995) *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity* (NY & London: Free Press), p. 34.

¹⁷⁷ Alvesson (1993) *Cultural perspectives*, p. 3.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁷⁹ Andrew Linklater (1994) "Dialogue, dialect and emancipation in international relations at the end of the post-War age", *Millennium*, 23, 1, p. 119.

¹⁸⁰ Stephen Chan (1993) "Culture and linguistic reductionisms and a new historical sociology for international relations", *Millennium*, 22, 3, p. 423; Alan Finlayson and James Martin (1997) "Political studies and cultural studies", *Politics*, 17, 3, p. 184; Clifford Geertz (1973) *The interpretation of culture* (London: Harper Collins), p. 26.

¹⁸¹ James Clifford (1986) "Introduction: Partial truth", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography* (Los Angeles, Berkley & London: University of California Press), p. 26; Mary Louise Pratt (1986) "Fieldwork in common places", in Clifford and Marcus, p. 32.

¹⁸² Herring (1995) *Danger and opportunity*, p. 72.

¹⁸³ Richard D. Johnson (1980) "Barrington Moore, Perry Anderson and English social development", in Stewart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andy Lowe and Paul Wills (eds.), *Culture, media, language: Working paper in cultural studies, 1972-79* (London: Hutchinson), p. 48.

¹⁸⁴ Michael Moran (1989) *Politics and society in Britain: An introduction*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan), pp. 34-5.

¹⁸⁵ Michael Howard (1984) *The causes of wars* (London: Unwin Paperbacks), p. 48.

¹⁸⁶ Winifred L. Amaturo (1995) "Literature and international relations: The question of culture in the production of international power", *Millennium*, 24, 1, p. 13.

transforming cultural structures" with invisible but legitimate means.¹⁸⁷ The BBC acting as a powerful "filter" for the rise of British rock'n'roll was a case in point. According to Street, because of the effective manipulation of the BBC, British rock'n'roll in the 1960s had a different meaning from that in the United States.¹⁸⁸ In other words, culture may be better treated as a dependent variable in analysis.¹⁸⁹ It may not be appropriate as an explanatory variable for a systematic observation and theory testing.

Lastly, Smith's argument is problematic in that cultural difference does not perforce link to conflict. Nearly "all the social groups" are somewhat culturally different, but not all of the cultural differences will bring about cultural conflict.¹⁹⁰ When two different cultures meet, the result is either to "perceive", to "conceive" or even to learn from others.¹⁹¹ That said, conflicting groups may be distinguished by cultural difference, but culture in most conflicts "is not what is at stake".¹⁹²

Where to draw the line?

Formidable obstacles remain if the British-Argentine relations are observed from a cultural perspective. For more than a century, Argentina had been strongly affected by Britain's liberal norms,¹⁹³ to the extent that even the US found it difficult to remove this European influence from South America ever since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.¹⁹⁴ Partly because Argentina used to be one of the leading countries of immigration,¹⁹⁵ partly because its populations were mainly of European descent, the cultural exclusiveness in Argentina was by no means distinct. Argentina was not only described as the "most European" among the South American countries

¹⁸⁷ Alexander (1990) "Analytic debates", p. 26.

¹⁸⁸ John Street (1991) "Youth culture and the emergence of popular music", in Terry Gourvish and Alan O'Day (eds.), *Britain since 1945* (London: Macmillan), p. 309.

¹⁸⁹ W. D. Rubinstein (1990) "Cultural explanations for Britain's economic decline: How true?", in Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins (ed.), *Debates in modern history: British culture and economic decline* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), p. 88.

¹⁹⁰ Brian Barry (1998) "The limits of cultural politics", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 308, p. 318.

¹⁹¹ Joanne Martin and Debra Meyerson (1988) "Organisation cultures and the denial, channelling and acknowledgement of ambiguity", in Louis R. Pondy, Richard J. Boland, Jr. and Howard Thomas (eds.), *Mapping ambiguity and change* (Chichester: John Wiley: Sons), p. 120; Richard Shapcott (1994) "Conversion and coexistence: Gadamer and the interpretation of international society", *Millennium*, 23, 1, p. 75.

¹⁹² Barry (1998) "The limits of cultural politics", p. 318.

¹⁹³ Larrain (1999) "Modernity and identity", p. 187.

¹⁹⁴ Bethell (1989) "Britain and Latin America", p. 13; Gallo (1993) "Society and politics", pp. 94-5.

¹⁹⁵ David Collier (1992) "The popular roots of the Argentine Tango", *History Workshop*, 34, pp. 93-4; Gallo (1993) "Society and politics", p. 83; Whitaker (1964) *Argentina*, pp. 53-4.

but culturally “another British dominion”.¹⁹⁶ The British influence on Argentines, on the other hand, was not limited to Buenos Aires, a cosmopolitan city. With Britain’s cheap commercial goods dumped into the Argentine interior, the British influence was actually countrywide in Argentina.¹⁹⁷ By 1914, the largest British community outside Britain was in Argentina,¹⁹⁸ in the 1940s many Argentines identified themselves with their British counterparts.¹⁹⁹ Judging from the tendency of cultural transformation to be slower than other institutional change,²⁰⁰ this thesis finds it not baseless to argue that the overlapping of two cultures constituted a subterranean force linking Britain to Argentina down to the 1960s. To put it precisely, notwithstanding the territorial dispute over the Falkland Islands in the past 130 years, there was still a “considerable fund of Argentine good will for Britain” as late as the 1960s,²⁰¹ when the two turning-point policy preferences took place. Culture was clearly not at stake.

Therefore, when Furlong and Albiston described Argentina in terms of “corporatism” as one criterion to differentiate British and Argentine cultures, their distinction can be arbitrary. If corporatism is defined as a convention that a government policy emerges from negotiations among government, business and unions, in which process, state is the major co-ordinator,²⁰² this thesis witnesses corporatism also ushered in by the Wilson Government of 1964 in Britain.²⁰³ There was, for instance, a wage freeze as part of a deflation programme by both governments at the same period,²⁰⁴ although the Argentine version might be termed more radical.²⁰⁵ The difference was therefore of degree, not of kind. It would be risky to treat the two as dichotomous.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁶ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 11; Colin Phipps (1977) *What future for the Falklands* (London: Fabian Tract), p. 4.

¹⁹⁷ Williams (1935) “The establishment of British commerce”, p. 50.

¹⁹⁸ Bethell (1989) “Britain and Latin America”, p. 11.

¹⁹⁹ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, p. 53; Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 53.

²⁰⁰ Barry Buzan and Richard Little (1994) “The idea of ‘international system’: Theory meets history”, *International Political Science Review*, 15, 3, p. 245; Carl Kaysen (1990) “Is war obsolete?”, *International Security*, 14, 4, p. 59.

²⁰¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 76.

²⁰² Furlong and Albiston (1985) “Sovereignty, culture, and misperceptions”, p. 143.

²⁰³ Robert Leach (1995) “Political ideas”, in Maurice Mullard (ed.), *Policy-making in Britain* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 20.

²⁰⁴ J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire (1990) *Politics in Britain: From Callaghan to Thatcher* (Edinburg: Cambers), p. 32; Juan Carlos Torre (1993) “Argentina since 1946”, Elizabeth Ladd (trans), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 302; Claudio Veliz (1966) “The Argentine nasserists”, *New Society*, 8, 198, p. 61.

²⁰⁵ Hector E. Schamis (1991) “Reconceptualising Latin American authoritarianism in the 1970s”, *Comparative Politics*, 23, 2, p. 211.

²⁰⁶ Giovanni Sartori (1996) “Comparing and mis-comparing”, in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), p. 23.

Likewise, when Furlong and Albiston described Britain as a “traditional open society”, it was worth stressing that, after Peron stepped down in 1955, Argentines had experienced more than a decade of liberal-democratic reforms.²⁰⁷ With many scientific and literary clubs being organised, Buenos Aires was seen as culturally “receptive to all the scientific, literary and political currents of thought that were in vogue”.²⁰⁸ It was a place of cultural liberalism that could even compete with London in cultural creeds.²⁰⁹ The people in Buenos Aires in the 1960s therefore could not have missed out on the British “New Wave”, expressive of strong working class sentiment in the theatre and novels at that period, because the new wave of British fashion was widely enjoyed across international boundaries.²¹⁰ In other words, this pattern of British cultural influence would not be dwindling merely because of British industrial decline.²¹¹ It instead proved even more influential through television in the 1960s.²¹² The overlapping values across the two boundaries in turn will support the view of this thesis that cultural difference is not persuasive as an argument for the ensuing conflict concerning the issue of the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s.

Where was the political action?

Adopting a cultural explanation for the issue of the Falkland Islands does not locate the exact source of power, nor clarify who or what exercises power in the interaction process.²¹³ To understand a particular political action, there is a need to strike a balance by reference to subjective meaning in the wider context, and the value of the power holders has to enter the equation.²¹⁴ Culture over the decision-makers is not a determining superstructure. It is neither mechanically self-functioning on the mindset of decision-makers, nor statically interpreted in meaning.²¹⁵ An individual

²⁰⁷ Veliz (1966) “The Argentine nasserists”, p. 61.

²⁰⁸ Gallo (1993) “Society and politics”, p. 94.

²⁰⁹ Larrain (1999) “Modernity and identity”, p. 187; Mark D. Szuchman (1984) “Disorder and social control in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860”, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 15, 1, p. 83.

²¹⁰ Arthur Marwick (1998) *The sixties: Cultural revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958—c.1974* (Oxford & NY: Oxford University Press), p. 118.

²¹¹ Keith Robbins (1990) “British culture versus British industry”, in Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins (eds.), *Debates in modern history: British culture and economic decline* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), p. 21.

²¹² David Childs (1997) *Britain since 1945: A political history*, 4th edition (NY & London: Routledge), p. 62.

²¹³ Robin Brown (1998) “Political studies and cultural studies: A response to Finlayson and Martin”, *Politics*, 18, 3, p. 175.

²¹⁴ R. K. Alderman and Martin J. Smith (1990) “Can British prime ministers be given the push by their parties?”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 43, 3, p. 79.

²¹⁵ Stuart Hall (1980) “Recent developments in theories of language and ideology: A critical note”, Stewart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andy Lowe and Paul Wills (eds.), *Culture, media, language: Working paper in cultural studies, 1972-79* (London: Hutchinson), p. 162; Michael Silverstein (1976) “Shifts,

can be obedient to cultural norms. But his/her behavioural response is by no means mechanical. As Wikan pointed out with such directness, it is those who use the power, not cultures themselves, that are "accountable".²¹⁶ Kier made a reinforcing point by passing that the British way of strategic thinking was a "politically inspired" activity, rather than a "culturally determined myth".²¹⁷ It is no wonder that Douglas and Crick complain that the analysts addressing cultural conflict "say nothing about politics".²¹⁸

The point to note here is that when Smith traces his argument of cultural difference between Argentina and Britain to Durkheim's assumption of "social facts" characterised by dichotomy, Durkheim's assumption does not help deepen the understanding of this issue. Durkheim's assuming "social facts" as "every way of acting...independent of its individual manifestations", will hardly escape criticism of an "epochal analysis",²¹⁹ because Durkheim's "social facts" have gone beyond an external representation.²²⁰ That is the reason why Durkheim's followers either in sociology or anthropology have no longer considered the sacred-profane dichotomy as empirically sustainable.²²¹ In explaining Britain's intransigence in 1968 as a result, Smith can not stay with the bald idea that the students of post-Durkheim have no longer endorsed.

So far as the puzzles in this thesis are concerned, a cultural explanation in this case is clearly too vague. The unclear definition, Durkheim's holistic account of preference formation, and empirically, the subterranean form of cultural link between Argentina and Britain, illustrate that the current findings based on cultural difference are an interpretation put in a hyperbolic form. The argument that culture "is more like a style than a set of preferences", as Swindler rightly avers, will leave culture at best

linguistic categories, and cultural description", in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in anthropology* (USA: University of New Mexico Press), p. 54.

²¹⁶ Unni Wikan (1999) "Culture: A new concept of race", *Social Anthropology*, 7, 1, p. 63.

²¹⁷ Elizabeth Kier (1995) "Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars", *International Security*, 19, 4, p. 59.

²¹⁸ Bernard Crick (1966) "The tendency of political studies", *New Society*, 8, 214, p. 683; Mary Douglas (1992) "Governability: A critique of culture", *Millennium*, 22, 3, p. 470; Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (1996) "Introduction: From the movement of social history to the work of cultural representation", in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming national: A reader* (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 7.

²¹⁹ Raymond Williams (1994) "Selections from *Marxism and Literature*", in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley and Sherry B. Ortner (eds.), *Culture/power/history: A reader in contemporary social theory* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 604.

²²⁰ Larkins (1994) "Representations, symbols, and social facts", p. 244; Martin Hollis (1994) *The philosophy of social sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 99.

²²¹ Evana-Pritchard (1965) *Theories of primitive religion*, p. xii; Mary Douglas (1975) *Implicit meaning* (London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. xii; Triandis (1994) *Culture and social behaviour*, p. 21.

an image that does not determine the causes to the two turning-point policy preferences stated in Chapter 1.²²²

5. The perspective of identity

Some scholars work with the idea of national identity and use it to explain foreign policy. They stipulate that the call for identity is decisive, because identity constitutes “peoples’ frames of reference in general, and their political perspectives in particular”.²²³ When people of the same identity perceive their identity under threat, they will struggle for recognition.²²⁴ From that perspective, Gustafson argued that the islanders were not a minority on which Britain took pity by accident. The sympathy with the islanders was activated by the call for a recovery of Britishness.²²⁵ Femenia advanced the view that the intransigent British position was a reaction to the fact that, with the Suez crisis of 1956 as a watershed, the British witnessed their history-congruent self-image withering away during the 1960s.²²⁶ Macleod believed that the question of national identity placed a limit on British foreign policy and therefore, the issue of the Falklands Islands in the late 1960s was by nature where British identity was at stake.²²⁷ Here, identity was taken as a psychological dynamic, triggered by an unchanged need for self-assertion.²²⁸ When it came to the British conduct of the Falklands policy in 1968, a hidden need for relating a glorious past to the present became a cause of the British policy preference to hastily invent the formula that the wishes of the islanders should be paramount. Hence, the fundamental issue in the process of the talks in 1966-68 had no longer been the credibility or compromise in the sovereignty talks.²²⁹ It was, rather, Britishness—an objectified mode of the “social consciousness”—operating in the British foreign policy.²³⁰ Therefore, although the issue of the Falkland Islands used to be a dormant territorial issue, and although it

²²² Ann Swindler (1986) “Culture in action: Symbols and strategies”, *American Sociological Review*, 51, 2, p. 275.

²²³ Fiona Devine (1992) “Social identities, class identity and political perspectives”, *The Sociological Review*, 40, 2, p. 229.

²²⁴ Francis Fukuyama (1992) *The end of history and the last man* (NY: Free Press), pp. 143-80.

²²⁵ Lowell S. Gustafson (1984) “The principle of self-determination and the dispute about sovereignty over the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands”, *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 37, 4, p. 86.

²²⁶ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, pp. 122-3.

²²⁷ Alex Macleod (1997) “Great Britain: Still searching for status?”, in Philippe G. Le Pretre (ed.), *Role quests in the post-Cold War era: Foreign policies in transition* (London: McGill-Queen’s University Press), p. 178, p. 183, p. 185.

²²⁸ Zygmunt Bauman (1992) “Soil, blood and identity”, *The Sociological Review*, 40, 4, p. 679; Stephen Howe (1989) “Labour patriotism, 1939-83”, in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), p. 137.

²²⁹ Benn (1988) *Office without power*, pp. 133-4; Little (1988) “Anglo-Argentine relations”, p. 149.

²³⁰ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, p. 9.

could be worth a settlement by ceding sovereignty in 1966, the FO found that British identity was decisive, because the talks were transformed into emotive ones. Hence, the policy preference to stick to the wishes of the islanders was understood as a therapy and a symbol of compensatory force to reverse fading Britishness.²³¹ The suspension of the Memorandum of Understanding in December 1968 therefore became a necessary result.²³²

A static image

Nevertheless, whereas these scholars made sense of the British policy preferences concerning the Falklands issue by referring to national identity, a simple specification by Britishness did not lend them well to rigorous empirical research. To start with, identity as a decisive force can be contributing to unity or disunity in the British politics. Langlands argued that "the English basis of Britishness is the source of its greatest strength, as well as its greatest weakness. It ensures strong English support for the state, while simultaneously attenuating and ensuring the persistence of Scottish and Welsh national identity".²³³ What Langlands has suggested is a need to recognise that "the moment of identification is profoundly political".²³⁴ The essential political dynamics in terms of power and in the sense of belonging cannot escape closer observation.²³⁵

That was the reason why, in the analysis of the Falklands dispute, the point that the reiterative script could construct an emotional aspect of identities and prescribed actions, as Femenia argued, was debatable.²³⁶ The link between scripture and identity cannot be taken as a causal one without considering the specific context.²³⁷ More specifically, the public, to different degrees, is capable of choosing an identity to be associated with according to the situations.²³⁸ Script-language bearing on identity does not offer an ontological force to grip on human minds. Identity is to be

²³¹ John Eldridge (1994) "Book review: 'Framing the Falklands war: Nationhood, culture and identity?'" , *Sociology*, 28, 2, p. 567.

²³² Ibid., pp. 18-9; E. J. Hobsbawn (1990) *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Program, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 163.

²³³ Rebecca Langlands (1999) "Britishness or Englishness? The historical problem of national identity in Britain", *Nations and Nationalism*, 5, 1, p. 63.

²³⁴ Ibid..

²³⁵ David Knights and Hugh Willmott (1985) "Power and identity in theory and practice", *The Sociological Review*, 33, 1, p. 23.

²³⁶ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, p. 199.

²³⁷ Smith (1971) *Theories of nationalism*, p. 20; Snyder (1968) *The meaning of nationalism*, p. 22.

²³⁸ Ernst B. Hass (1993) "Nationalism: An instrumental social construction", *Millennium*, 22, 3, p. 505.

recognised, not solely endowed.²³⁹ When perceiving the effect from the perspective of identity, an analyst will run the risk of outweighing the individual reasoning with a deterministic concept of the script structure.²⁴⁰ Above all, making an argument based on the concept of identity, the political dynamic has to be explored. This is not only because of the ethics of Kantian liberals that identity is a free "process of remaking and becoming",²⁴¹ but also because identity as a symbolic structure is subject to "political contestation" and redefinition.²⁴²

Unfortunately, although Femenia, for instance, claimed that her picture of British identity in the 1960s was "always in process" of remaking the "collective meaning",²⁴³ her description of British identity under threat was fragmented and not supportive. It makes this thesis suspect that identity, as a determining force, cannot provide an explanation for the unending dispute between the two sides in the late 1960s. To illustrate this point, the thesis argues that Femenia did not realise that in the 1960s there existed mixed, or even contrasting, views about Britishness in the British public mind. There is clearly a need for Femenia to gain enough contextual support both in time and space to strengthen the argument.

The perspective of time sequence

Femenia started her observation from the Suez Crisis. For Femenia, the loss of identity in respect of Britishness had been in evidence since then. However, the psychological backlash of the Suez Crisis in 1956 was on British decision-makers, rather than on British society. In the second half of the 1950s, British society was in a complacent mood with the rise of consumption and expectations of affluence.²⁴⁴ Childs saw Britain "changing fundamentally" and moving for the better, because of prosperity and full employment in the early 1960s.²⁴⁵ But Femenia did not pay enough attention to this fact. She took "the flare-up of racism against former colonists coming

²³⁹ Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations*, pp. 378-9.

²⁴⁰ Finlayson (1998) "Psychology, psychoanalysis and theories of nationalism", p. 153.

²⁴¹ Michael J. Sandel (1996) *Democracy's discontent* (Cambridge: Belknap), p. 12; Christopher J. Ullock (1996) "Imaging community: A metaphor of being or becoming?", *Millennium*, 25, 2, p. 440.

²⁴² Pierre Birnbaum (1996) "From multiculturalism to nationalism", *Political Theory*, 24, 1, p. 34; Roxanne Lynn Doty (1996) "Immigration and national identity: Constructing the nation", *Review of International Studies*, 22, 3, p. 239; Alan Finlayson (1998) "Psychology, psychoanalysis and theories of nationalism", *Nations and Nationalism*, 4, 2, p. 157; David Miller (1989) *Market, state, and community: Theoretical foundations of market socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 235.

²⁴³ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, p. 32.

²⁴⁴ Dick Bradley (1992) *Understanding Rock 'n' Roll: Popular music in Britain 1955-64* (Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University), p. 81.

²⁴⁵ Childs (1997) *Britain since 1945*, p. 79.

to settle in Great Britain" as the supportive example, jumping to the conclusion that "from then on, a series of identity crises ensued" leading to the eventual clash between Argentina and Britain.²⁴⁶ Nevertheless, when Femenia wrote that "everyone in the United Kingdom confronted both with the threatened loss of national symbols, and Britain's pending integration into the evolving European Community led to an intensification of national identity as a way to keep it alive",²⁴⁷ her description could be over-stated.

Regarding Britain's entry, opinion polls in 1961 showed that up to fifty per cent of the British public were in favour of joining the EEC.²⁴⁸ In 1966, public opinion in favour of entry remained a majority of above 70 per cent.²⁴⁹ Britain's entry or not, indeed, seemed not an issue at that period. Rather, entry into the EEC represented British economic aspirations then.²⁵⁰ There were some politicians in strong opposition to the entry, but they seemed to base their arguments more on parliamentary sovereignty than on identity being under threat.²⁵¹ Even Enoch Powell, one of the most controversial politicians in British politics on immigration, racial policy and entry of the EEC,²⁵² urged a "multi-racial society" in Britain by declaring in 1964 that "the immigrants are part of the community".²⁵³ This remark was in sharp contrast to his Birmingham speech—Rivers of Blood—delivered in March 1968 that shocked British society.²⁵⁴ His moderate viewpoint in 1964 indicated that the argument from the perspective of British identity as being under threat was fragmented and incoherent, so far as British identity translated into Britain's foreign policy in the 1960

²⁴⁶ Femenia (1996) *National identity*, p. 123.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

²⁴⁸ Alan Sked and Chris Cook (1993) *Post-war Britain: A political history* (London: Penguin Books), p. 237.

²⁴⁹ Uwe Kitzinger (1966) "Into Europe", *New Society*, 8, 216, p. 764.

²⁵⁰ Timothy Raison and Humphrey Taylor (1966) "Britain into Europe—So we want to join?", *New Society*, 7, 195, p. 8.

²⁵¹ Philip Goodhart (1976) *Full-hearted consent: The story of the referendum campaign—and the campaign for the referendum* (London: Davis-Poynter), pp. 142-3.

²⁵² Enoch Powell (1972) "Immigration", in John Wood (ed.), *Still to decide* (London: B. T. Batsford), pp. 201-6.

²⁵³ Paul Foot (1969) *The rise of Enoch Powell: An examination of Enoch Powell's attitude to immigration and race* (Middlesex: Penguin), pp. 66-7.

²⁵⁴ V. S. Anand and F. A. Ridley (1969) *The enigma of Enoch Powell: An essay in political racialism* (London: Mendusa), p. 5; David Caute (1988) *Sixty-eight: The year of the barricades* (London: Hamish Hamilton), p. 75; Patrick Cosgrave (1989) *The lives of Enoch Powell* (London: The Bodley Head), p. 232; Ankie M. M. Hoogvelt (1969) "Ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and Powellism", *Race*, 11, 1, p. 8; *Labour Research Department* (1969) *Powell and his allies* (London: LRD), p. 5; Roy Lewis (1979) *Enoch Powell: Principle in politics* (London: Cassell), pp. 105-6; Enoch Powell (1970) "Enoch Powell's campaign speech", in John Wood (ed.), *Powell and the 1970 election* (Surrey: Elliot Right Way), p. 101; Bill Smithies and Peter Fiddick (1969) *Enoch Powell on immigration* (London: Sphere), p. 43.

was concerned. Even in 1965, when Powell began to call for repatriation of the immigrant population, there was no steady support for his position.²⁵⁵ The lack of support not only implied that identity of local people could not be incompatible with the immigrants, but reflected that the social pressure from the immigrants leading to the so-called loss of Britishness was exaggerated. As late as 1966, BICA (British Immigration Control Association), a group campaigning for the immigration ban, did not garner visible support.²⁵⁶ When the immigration policy was debated in the 1966 election campaign, it had proceeded in a quite rational manner and was not considered a serious political issue.²⁵⁷ When the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968 was hurriedly passed,²⁵⁸ the Act might be understood as a hasty response to a possible rise of hatred among the classes. It could hardly be interpreted as a break-up of the "we-ness" of Commonwealth units.²⁵⁹ The sense of "fraternity" in the Commonwealth remained rooted in many different areas,²⁶⁰ and the general British attitude towards immigrants remains quite stable. Seen in this light, it was more likely that the explosion of the Birmingham speech might be more of Powell's exploitation of the issue of inflows of Kenya Asian immigrants in early 1968.²⁶¹ It was, according to Roth, a "classic example of misjudged brinkmanship" challenging Heath, the Tory leader,²⁶² rather than a true reflection of a social force trying to reverse the decline of Britishness.²⁶³

This interpretation is plausible. Ultimately, the inflow of immigration had been exaggerated, because there was a net outward-flowing population in Britain in the mid-1960s.²⁶⁴ There was no apparent increase in the size of Powell's supporters after March 1968, and indeed, Powell received immediate rebuttals by politicians from both parties.²⁶⁵ His popularity was limited,²⁶⁶ not only because the racist speeches

²⁵⁵ Douglas E. Schoen (1977) *Enoch Powell and the Powellites* (London: Macmillan), p. 25, p. 30.

²⁵⁶ Foot (1969) *The rise of Enoch Powell*, pp. 55-7.

²⁵⁷ Robert Rhodes James (1972) *Ambitions and realities: British politics 1964-70* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), p. 161; E. F. B. Rose (1969) *Colour and citizen: A report on British race relations* (London: Institute of Race Relations), p. 607.

²⁵⁸ Richard Boston (1968) "How the immigrants act was passed?", *New Society*, 11, 287, p. 448.

²⁵⁹ Doty (1996) "Immigration and national identity, p. 238.

²⁶⁰ A. J. R. Groom and John Kinnas (1990b) "Association", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for international cooperation* (London: Pinter), p. 71.

²⁶¹ Nicholas Deakin (1970) *Colour, citizenship and British society, based on the Institute of Race Relations Report* (London: Panther Books), pp. 133-4.

²⁶² Andrew Roth (1972) *Heath and the Heathmen* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 204.

²⁶³ Tom Nairn (1977) *The break-up of Britain: Crisis and neo-nationalism* (London: Verso), p. 285; Robert Shepherd (1996) *Enoch Powell* (London: Hutchinson), p. 374.

²⁶⁴ Colin Holmes (1988) *John Bull's island immigration and British society, 1871-1971* (London: Macmillan), p. 277.

²⁶⁵ Bill Coxall and Lynton Robins (1998) *Contemporary British politics*, 3rd edition (London:

were “single-issue based”—in the realm of immigration policy only,²⁶⁷ but also because they could be seen coming more directly from the ideologies among classes rather than national identity.²⁶⁸ It was understandable that this kind of concern came from fear of redundancy and lowering of wage rates.²⁶⁹ The fear would appear “at its strongest among unskilled working people” in Britain and it had more to do with “economic threat” of specific labour groups,²⁷⁰ or “union membership”.²⁷¹ Conceivably then, the concern had less to do with national identity. Femenia's description can be farfetched. In addition, this kind of concern with unemployment had already existed well before the Suez Crisis. In the early 20th century, there had been “coloured alien seamen problem accompanied by riots” taking place among British seamen in Cardiff, Liverpool and Newport.²⁷² It is therefore problematic to interpret the act of defending economic means as the psychological frustration of Britishness. This is because defending economic interests has always been a constant concern in human history. Femenia clearly took a constant concern as a specific one in foreign policy-making.

Different perceptions of spaces

Taking identity as an explanatory variable for foreign policy; one has to realise that the underlying question is whether one group in observation sharing a collective identity is incompatible with another group with a different identity.²⁷³ In other words, there is clearly a need for the analyst to explore the perception of identity, i.e. the perception of Britishness in this case, both in the British Isles and the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s.

According to Dillon, the Falklands Islands in the 1960s were a community in the sense of a group mutually dependent upon one another and who inclined to “act together to satisfy their needs through common forms and sets of organisations”.²⁷⁴

Macmillan), p. 477; Donley T. Studlar (1974) “British public opinion, colour issue, and Enoch Powell: A longitudinal analysis”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 4, p. 381.

²⁶⁶ Diana Spearmen (1968) “The anti-Enoch letters”, *New Society*, 11, 300, p. 945.

²⁶⁷ Schoen (1977) *Enoch Powell*, p. 39.

²⁶⁸ Benedict Anderson (1983) *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London: verso), p. 136.

²⁶⁹ James Walvin (1984) *Passage to Britain* (Harmondsworth: Penguin), p. 143.

²⁷⁰ James G. Kellas (1991) *The politics of nationalism and ethnicity* (London: Macmillan), p. 104.

²⁷¹ W. W. Daniel (1968) *Racial discrimination in England: Based on the PEP report* (Middlesex: Penguin), p. 82.

²⁷² St. Clair Drake (1955) “The ‘colour problem’ in Britain: A study in social definition”, *The Sociological Review*, 3, 2, pp. 198-9.

²⁷³ Avner De-Shalit (1996) “National self-determination: Political, not cultural”, *Political Studies*, 44, p. 910; David Miller (1993) “In defence of nationality”, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 10, pp. 12-13.

²⁷⁴ Richard Whipp (1985) “Labour markets and communities: A historical review”, *The Sociological*

Unfortunately, this geographically remote district as a group was psychologically isolated, because the British Government and the Falkland Islands Government were “consistently unresponsive to the Islanders’ views”.²⁷⁵ It was socially feudalistic, because “ideas were communicated and issues debated through direct social and personal contact”.²⁷⁶ It was also politically paternalistic, because their poor educational standards and gradual depopulation made their economic life almost dependent on the Falkland Islands Company; the latter occupied a monopoly position in the islands by holding half of the land. Because of the dependent relationship between the islanders and the vested-interest minority, according to Dillon, when the islanders’ viewpoints about their future were not responded to accordingly, there existed a rather tense relationship between the islanders and the Falkland Islands Company.²⁷⁷

Therefore, the islanders’ resolute preference to rally to “the British Crown” has to be understood from the perspectives of their dependence on the Falkland Islands Company on the islands, and the uncertainties of their fate lying ahead. With the degree of uncertainties developing to the extent that no compensation had been mentioned in the sovereignty negotiations,²⁷⁸ and that the islanders had no access to managing their future, a strong attachment to Britishness, consequently, could be taken. Upholding Britishness at this moment became an effective strategy as well as an emotive outlet to express their indignation.

The irony was that the elite in the Islands who represented the vested interests were quite satisfied to see the “loyalist politics” coming into play. This was because upholding Britishness would overcome the islanders’ ambivalent sentiments toward the Falkland Islands Company and distrust of the local Government.²⁷⁹ As Dillon explained, upholding Britishness became a primary concern and preferred strategy, because, as the situation deteriorated, loyalist politics would help the disgruntled islanders avoid confrontation with the elite. Instead, Britishness “provided vital symbolic cohesion for an otherwise fragmented and fearful community”.²⁸⁰

Seen in this light, the Falkland Islands in the 1960s were an area where there

²⁷⁵ Dillon (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war*, p. 69.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 61.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 63.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 72.

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 77.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

existed a higher level of “integral nationalism”, defined as “the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity”.²⁸¹ There might exist diverse opinions about the future. But when uncertainties arose, the forms of “acting together” sometimes would turn out to be the recipe.²⁸² The climate of the island community in the 1960s therefore can be seen as a “strong loyalism”, which undermined the potentially different opinions,²⁸³ to the extent that there arose “exaggerated mannerisms”, whereby the islanders in the late 1960s made themselves, the British abroad, more British than the British at home.²⁸⁴ This kind of integral nationalism therefore represented a typical jingoistic social mood when their future was under threat. Holding Britishness became an effort “laborious to exalt one nation at the expense of others”.²⁸⁵ It would not be a surprise that once the catalyst was provided, agitation in a nationalist sense would easily spark off.²⁸⁶ Because of this observation, Femenia is certainly satisfied to explain the case based on the integral nationalism developed in the Falkland Islands.

However, arguing in the above way will fail to consider a broader perception of Britishness in the British Isles, where the public saw things from a different perspective and it was this perspective that the Government in London was supposed to take care of. In the late 1940s, Britain had already exhibited a case of liberal nationalism in which the British public expected a “redrawing of the political map of the world” without too heavy a burden from their old imperial days.²⁸⁷ Down to the 1960s, the British Isles could be described as a place of national disintegration where the spirit of common ties, the essence of traditional neighbourhood, and the rural lines of local communities were on the decline.²⁸⁸ To the extent that industrialisation fully developed and frequency of social mobility increased, there was a generally sceptical attitude towards the traditional social relations in Britain during the 1960s.²⁸⁹ It might

²⁸¹ Hayes (1949) *The historical evolution*, p. 165.

²⁸² Ibid., p. 67.

²⁸³ Dillion (1988a) *The Falklands, politics and war*, p. 67.

²⁸⁴ Robin Cohen (1994) *Frontiers of identity: The British and others* (London & NY: Longman), p. 20.

²⁸⁵ Hayes (1949) *The historical evolution*, p. 165.

²⁸⁶ Miroslav Hroch (1985) *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: A comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among smaller European nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 183.

²⁸⁷ Carlton J. H. Hayes (1949) *The historical evolution of modern nationalism* (NY: Macmillan), p. 135.

²⁸⁸ Martin Bulmer (1985) “The rejuvenation of community studies? Neighbours, networks and policy”, *The Sociological Review*, 33, 3, pp. 439-40; George Jr. Hillery (1955) “Definition of community: Areas of agreement”, *Rural Psychology*, 20, 2, p. 118.

²⁸⁹ R. J. Hacon (1955) “Neighbourhoods or neighbourhood units?”, *The Sociological Review*, 3, 2, p. 240; Raymond Plant (1974) *Community and ideology: An essay in applied social philosophy* (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 16.

not be wide of the mark to argue that Labour's rise to power in the mid-1960s was a reflection of this "inspiring and imaginative picture" of social trends in the British Isles.²⁹⁰ Labour coming into power in the mid-1960s represented a society that was generally of the view that nationalistic egotism did not help but only made for intensifying power politics.²⁹¹ Thus, contrary to integral nationalism that was characteristic of the Falkland Islands community, the British Isles in the 1960s was a place, where nationalist appeal in foreign policy was thought of as the source of trouble. Different from the Falkland Islands characterised by paternalistic politics internally, the British Isles had lots of room for legal autonomy for certain groups with individualistic thinking.²⁹²

The contrast between the two societies reflected that identity, as a psychological force in the 1960s, could either be referring to a "conservative", "backward-looking" mindset as among the islanders on the Falkland Islands, or in a more "open-ended", receptive form as displayed by ordinary people in the British Isles.²⁹³ In other words, identity, in the name of Britishness, cannot make a total claim without differentiation. In British sovereign territories, there existed different degrees of perception of self-identification, which did not exclude one another.²⁹⁴ For this thesis, therefore, British national identity in the late 1960s as something that could possibly be translated into a factor in hostility to Argentines seemed to apply more squarely to the Falkland Islands community than to the British Isles.

Perhaps Cohen's notion of "situational identity" helps this thesis to explain the contrasted picture more precisely. As Cohen rightly argues, individuals have the tendency to construct their own social identities no doubt. However, the effect of their constructive effort can be limited, because the effect may be sometimes subject to geographical locations.²⁹⁵ This statement indicates that there is a need for the analysts of identity to take the process of identity formation seriously enough to its logical

& Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 16.

²⁹⁰ Willie Hamilton (1992) *Blood on the wall* (London: Bloomsbury), p. 103.

²⁹¹ Michael R. Gordon (1969) *Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy: 1914-1965* (California: Stanford University Press), pp. 13-4.

²⁹² Hass (1993) "Nationalism", p. 509; Johnson (1980) "Barrington Moore", p. 48; Kenneth R. Minogue (1969) *Nationalism* (London: B. T. Batsford), p. 29; Robert A. Nisbet (1962) *The quest for community* (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 9.

²⁹³ Iain Chambers (1993) "Narratives of nationalism: Being 'British'", in Erica Carter, James Donald and Judith Squires (eds.), *Space & place: Theories of identity and location* (London: Lawrence & Wishart), p. 154.

²⁹⁴ Sherry B. Ortner (1973) "On key symbols", *American Anthropologist*, 75, 5, p. 1344.

²⁹⁵ Cohen (1994) *Frontiers of identity*, p. 205.

conclusion in observing foreign policy.²⁹⁶ Indeed, with 8,000 miles of distance across the Atlantic, the British Isles and the Falkland Islands were supposed to have a different consciousness of self-identification. Analyses based on the notion of identity risk the danger of supposing two societies "to be governed by single patterns... of economic activity, political behaviour and cultural development".²⁹⁷ They cannot only stress similarities, without mentioning differences.²⁹⁸ Otherwise, it is hard for them to escape the criticism that they are making a total claim without differentiating the contrasted perception between the British Isles and the Falkland Islands community in the late 1960s.

Lastly, the impact of "political identities", as an issue for decision-makers, is "relational".²⁹⁹ To observe the concerns of decision-makers in London and their ensuing actions being aroused by an issue of identity, an analyst must embody more than one simple inference rule from everyday life.³⁰⁰ The fact was that, as Chalfont admitted, what concerned the decision-makers in London during the sovereignty negotiations were the public responses in the British Isles, not those from the Falkland Islanders.³⁰¹ Therefore, the perception of British identity among the islanders might have been powerful, but their concern could be sidelined by the decision-makers in London without too much effort. This was because the issue of national identity was essentially "interpretative".³⁰² To put it otherwise, awareness of national identity did not imply consensus. When the one side calls for attention, the other side does not necessarily react.³⁰³ There must be some contextual factors stimulating a collected

²⁹⁶ John A. Hall (1993) "Ideas and the social sciences", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), p. 54.

²⁹⁷ Raymond Williams (1961) *The long revolution* (London: Hogarth), p. 294.

²⁹⁸ Jennifer Milliken (1999) "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods", *European Journal of International Relations*, 5, 2, p. 248.

²⁹⁹ Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations*, p. 378; Jan Jindy Pettman (1998) "Nationalism and after", *Review of International Studies*, 24, Special issue, December, p. 154.

³⁰⁰ P. Robert Abelson (1981) "Psychological status of the script concept", *American Psychologist*, 36, 7, p. 717; John Dearlove and Peter Saunders (1991) *Introduction to British politics: Analysing a capitalist democracy* (Cambridge: Polity), p. 423.

³⁰¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 19; Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 1464, 26 March 1968; vol. 290, col. 991, 27 March 1968.

³⁰² Ian M. MacKenzie (1994) "Taylor and Ricoeur on narrative identity", in Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer (eds.), *Contemporary political studies*, vol. 2 (Belfast: The political Studies Association), p. 737; Andrew Vincent (1997) "Liberal nationalism: An irresponsible compound?", *Political Studies*, XLV, p. 290.

³⁰³ Eric Evans (1994) "National consciousness? The ambivalence of English identity in the eighteenth century", in Claus Bjorn, Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (eds.), *Nations, nationalism and patriotism in the European past* (Copenhagen: Academic Press), p. 154.

body to enhance or defend its shared identity.³⁰⁴ This is particularly relevant in this case where the decisive power was apparently in the FO's hands.³⁰⁵ The role of national identity cannot be overemphasised without other specific concerns being taken on board.³⁰⁶

In short, identity cannot be addressed simply in its own terms. To argue solely from the perspective of identity without reference to the development time sequence and space location is apparently insufficient. It was true that the Falkland Islanders felt their British identity under threat, but London rarely responded to that kind of concern. Discussants of identity cannot make a total claim without recognising that the people on the British Isles in the main had a substantially different perception of self-identity from those on the Falklands in the 1960s due to different life experience. When it comes to the cognitive functioning of identity, there is a need to consider the nature of the issue in question.³⁰⁷ Without this concern, the literal meaning of the word—Britishness—cannot be taken for granted.³⁰⁸

6. The perspective of UK geopolitics

From the perspective of UK geopolitics, Gamba-Stonehouse starts her argument from the assumption that the US-UK "special relationship" was the guiding principle of British foreign policy during the Cold War. Because of heavy weight having been placed on the East-West balance-of-power calculations in the British-American global strategy, argued Gamba-Stonehouse, Britain took a passive attitude in building its North-South relations including those with Argentina. South America subsequently occupied a lower priority in decision-making. This reactive mindset among the British officials brought about the British Government's underestimation of Argentina's strong appeal in the sovereignty negotiations. Misperception as a result occurred, and the dispute eventually led nowhere but war.³⁰⁹

³⁰⁴ Steve Smith (1991) "Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 70.

³⁰⁵ James Mayall (1994) "Nationalism in the study of international relations", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), p. 182.

³⁰⁶ Devine (1992) "Social identities", p. 240; Eugene Kamenka (1973) "Political nationalism—The evolution of the idea", in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The evolution of an idea* (Canberra: Australia National University Press), p. 6.

³⁰⁷ Berndt Brehmer (1976) "Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 6, p. 1001.

³⁰⁸ John J. Gumperz (1982) *Discourse strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 1, p. 4.

³⁰⁹ Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse (1987) *The Falklands/Malvinas war: A model for North-South crisis prevention* (London: Allen & Unwin), p. 41, p. 65.

Gamba-Stonehouse's inference is based on the perspective of UK geopolitics linked to the "special relationship". Her view is fundamentally the structural/hegemonic one, assuming the global competition between the two hegemonic powers during the Cold War as a decisive referent for many states in making foreign policy.³¹⁰ The US-UK "special relationship" as a result was taken as the highly relevant concerns for Britain's policy preferences in the Falklands policy.

Nevertheless, this argument serves at best a correlational description. There is no coherent evidence from the perspective of UK geopolitics to show an immediate effect on Britain's first policy preference, nor on the decision not to let the Memorandum of Understanding come into the public in late 1968. This inference is plagued with explanatory gaps in three respects.

The US-UK special relationship

In the first place, this thesis argues that, for British Governments, the essence of the "special relationship" across the Atlantic might be more of "consultation", rather than an overbearing American influence on the British conduct of foreign policy in the 1960s.³¹¹ More often than not, there existed policy conflicts between the Johnson Administration and the Wilson Government, and the causal effect of the US-UK "special relationship" during the Cold War therefore remained uncertain.³¹² Vietnam policy, which was a key ideological and military battlefield between the West and East in the 1960s, is a case in point.

In retrospect, Wilson's Vietnam policy never came up to US expectations.³¹³ His reluctance to send in troops to help Johnson in the Vietnam conflict was a proof counter to Gamba-Stonehouse's understanding based on the "special relationship". The British decision not to offer military assistance to the US was not because of its lack of military capability. President Johnson had already made it clear that what concerned the US most was not how many British troops Wilson would send into

³¹⁰ Thomas J. Christensen (1993) "Conclusion: System stability and the security of the most vulnerable significant actor", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), p. 333.

³¹¹ Jonathan Mercer (1993) "Independence or interdependence: Testing resolve reputation", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), p. 163.

³¹² Roger Morgan (1971) "The role of medium powers in world politics: The case of Britain", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), 270.

³¹³ Richard J. Aldrich (1998) "British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'special relationship' during the Cold War", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 349; Barber (1991) *The prime minister since*

Vietnam, but "the number of 'flags' represented by [different] units, however small".³¹⁴ The US had good reason to harbour this expectation. As regards American foreign policy, Southeast Asia was the place "where Britain conformed with American wishes mostly".³¹⁵ To the US disappointment, nevertheless, Britain seemed determined not to join the US force in bombing Hanoi. And as it turned out, Wilson was hardly subjected to American pressure to dispatch soldiers to Vietnam.³¹⁶ His response in the Vietnam policy bore testimony contrary to Gamba-Stonehouse's proposition that the East-West confrontation or the "special relationship" occupied a dominant place in all of Britain's conduct of foreign policy, and the policy of the Falklands dispute was one of them.

Hence, when making inferences from the world-system perspective in this case, caution is needed. A cornerstone of British-American foreign policy did exist, and the Wilson Government also reiterated that.³¹⁷ But this kind of mentality or perception could not deny other possibilities in formulating a foreign policy. Britain in the 1960s was also actively engaged in relation with Europe, the Third World and even Cuba.³¹⁸ When the US placed the embargo on trade with Cuba in 1962, Britain continued its foreign relations with Cuba and the trade between Britain and Cuba was actually booming in 1964.³¹⁹ In view of Britain's 1965 Defence White Paper, the Labour Government did not take a viewpoint on world politics consistent with either its predecessors or its US partner. It had begun to see a Soviet attack in Europe as a least likely case "even on a limited scale".³²⁰ On the other hand, the enthusiastic effort of the Labour Government to enter the ECC during this period evinced that Britain took a perspective different from the argument made from the hegemonic perspective of the Cold War.³²¹ As Brown, Foreign Secretary in 1966-68, stated, "I do take the view,

³¹⁴ Patrick Gordon Walker (1970) *The cabinet* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 125.

³¹⁵ Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy*, p. 318.

³¹⁶ F. S. Northedge (1974) *Descent from power: British foreign policy 1945-1973* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 203; Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 366, pp. 388-9.

³¹⁷ C. J. Bartlett (1977) "The military instrument in British foreign policy", in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), p. 32; Allan Kornberg and Robert C. Frasure (1971) "Policy differences in British parliamentary parties", *The American Political Science Review*, 65, 3, p. 702; Labour Party Conference (1966) *Report of the 65th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House), p. 268.

³¹⁸ Jorge I. Domínguez (1989) *To make a world safe for revolution* (London: Harvard University Press), p. 189.

³¹⁹ Pamela S. Falk (1985) *Cuban foreign policy: Caribbean tempest* (Toronto: Lexington), p. 115, p. 156.

³²⁰ Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy*, p. 202.

³²¹ Haines (1977) *The politics of power*, p. 71; Humphrey Taylor and Timothy Raison (1966) Britain into Europe? General attitude", *New Society*, 7, 194, p. 6.

and so does the Prime Minister and so do all my colleagues very strongly that I do not want the world to go on being polarised between vast giant superpowers".³²² Brown's remark explicitly showed that there were limitations on some analysts' viewpoints to make inferences from the concerns of the "special relationship" or the East-West confrontation. The Wilson Government was not ready to give in to the US global strategy when it came to making its own foreign policy.

Indeed, making inference from the perspective of "the special relationship" can be problematic in this case. This was also because Britain's traditional foreign policy strategy had been characterised by three interlocking circles: the relationship with the Commonwealth, with the United States and finally with Europe.³²³ Although the strategy seemed to a certain extent self-flattering down to the 1960s,³²⁴ "British statesmen," as Gamba-Stonehouse also acknowledged, had "deluded themselves on the need to rethink the country's role".³²⁵ The British policy makers might have realised that they were incapable of supporting a policy backed by force at home, but they, rightly or wrongly, continued to believe in the advantages of keeping Britain as flexible as possible in its three-tiered foreign policy.³²⁶ Owing to this illusion, the US-UK "special relationship" had to be reduced to a symbolic cornerstone rather than a decisive causal factor. The East-West confrontation could not be the overwhelming concern dictating to the British decision-makers' worldviews.

The US staying neutral

Another weakness in the argument made from the perspective of the world system as well as the "special relationship" stems from the US neutrality on the issue of the Falkland Islands before the war in 1982.³²⁷ When the British forced the Argentines out of the islands in 1833, the Monroe Doctrine had been in force for ten years.³²⁸ Although the Doctrine was widely known as a principle against the European interference in the Western Hemisphere, Washington's reaction to the British military

³²² Labour Party Conference (1967) *Report of the 66th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House), p. 283.

³²³ Sanders (1990) *Losing an empire*, p. 1; Kenneth Younger (1964) *Changing perspectives in British foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 7.

³²⁴ Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy*, p. 316.

³²⁵ Gamba-Stonehouse (1987) *The Falklands/Malvinas war*, p. 61.

³²⁶ J. E. Spence (1984) "British foreign policy: Tradition and change", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press and St Martin Press), p. 200; Brian P. White (1992) "British foreign policy", in Roy C. MacRidis (ed.), *Foreign policy in world politics* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International), p. 16.

³²⁷ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 89.

³²⁸ Gordon Connell-Smith (1982) "The OAS and the Falklands conflict", *The World Today*, 38, p. 340.

act in 1833 was recorded as viewing it “calmly”. It was said that the US believed a “British administration would be easier to deal with than an Argentine one”.³²⁹ Similarly, when the Rio Pact was signed in 1947, on which occasion Argentina reiterated its sovereign claim over the Falkland Islands, the US continued its neutral stance on this issue. The US announced that the “Rio Treaty cannot influence the sovereignty or the national or international status of any of the territories” on the American continent.³³⁰ This was a position in contrast to the Monroe Doctrine that upheld the idea of national independence at the same period.³³¹ In 1965, on the vote over the UN Resolution 2065, calling for negotiations to facilitate the process of decolonisation, the US abstained. Three years later in 1968, when the talks got under way between Britain and Argentina, the US still did not recognise Argentina's claim on the Falkland Islands.³³² In 1973, faced by Resolution 3160, calling for Argentina and Britain to renew and accelerate their efforts to negotiate, the US abstained again.³³³ The US keeping neutrality in the 130 years before the 1960s may prompt readers to infer this as the consequence of the “special relationship”. However, this is unlikely if one looks at the post-WWII period, when there were joint efforts by Roosevelt and Stalin to uproot European colonisation. Britain's vested interests were under heavy threat because of this move.³³⁴ A decolonisation perspective suggests that the causal effects of “special relationship” on this case were limited.³³⁵

The implications of SATO

Gamba-Stonehouse's other argument, that South America occupied a low priority in the US-UK global strategy, is also problematic. Owing to its geographic proximity and security interests during the Cold War, the US had rarely relaxed its concern about its back yard. It used to hold up the South American states as barriers to communism.³³⁶ NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) as a result had intended

³²⁹ Boris Martynov (1984) “Position of the organisation of American states”, in “Social Science Today”, p. 89.

³³⁰ Connell-Smith (1982) “The OAS and the Falklands conflict”, p. 341; Martynov (1984) “Position of the organisation of American states”, p. 91.

³³¹ Robert H. Johnson (1985/86) “Exaggerating America's stakes in Third World conflicts”, *International Security*, 10, 3, p. 44.

³³² FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (20), Foreign Office to British Embassy, Buenos Aires, Tel. no. 258, 3 April 1968.

³³³ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 180.

³³⁴ Northedge (1974) *Descent from power*, p. 217.

³³⁵ Jack Donnelly (1998) “Realism: Roots and renewal”, *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 400; Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy*, p. 205.

³³⁶ Marianne H. Marchand (1994) “The political economy of the north-south relations”, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), *Political economy and the changing global order* (London:

to militarise the South Atlantic, based on the idea to establish an allied block as part of the global strategic framework. The proposal, dubbed SATO (South Atlantic Treaty Organisation) was in parallel with NATO. It was characterised by a defence system linking the South American states to South Africa in an attempt to ensure that the Cape Route would be free from the Soviet threat.³³⁷ The importance of it cannot be lightly dismissed as a result. SATO was to be "the backdoor of NATO",³³⁸ and had been proposed by the US three times during the Cold War. One was in the late 1940s, the other during the détente in the 1970s,³³⁹ and another in 1981.³⁴⁰ What deserves attention is that the US was earnest to float the idea of SATO. It had once tried to put the question of the Falkland Islands to Argentina. If the latter were willing to participate in SATO, the issue of the Falkland Islands could be resolved more quickly and successfully.³⁴¹

The implications for US planning of trading the settlement of the Falkland Islands for SATO, despite not coming true, is suggestive. It demonstrated that the consistent US position to stay neutral was derived from the fact that the issue of the Falkland Islands was secondary in the eyes of the hegemonic powers during the Cold War. It was secondary to the extent that the islands could be traded. Nevertheless, the other case that can be made is that under the circumstance that the issue of the Falkland Islands was a secondary issue, there was naturally an autonomous status of Britain's Falklands policy that could be managed without too much concern about the global strategy. This thesis as a result tends to see the issue of the Falkland Islands as separate from global strategy.

To begin with, the ultimate reason for SATO's not coming into existence had nothing to do with the Falkland Islands. Britain indeed endorsed the proposal of SATO quite positively. In 1967, it gave up the command of Simonstown; the key naval base in the South Atlantic, to South Africa in exchange for the latter's willingness to commit its force to secure the sea routes to the Indian Ocean.³⁴² The

Macmillan), p. 290; J. Nef (1994) "The political economy of inter-American relations: A structural and historical overview", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), *Political economy and the changing global order* (London: Macmillan), p. 412, p. 416.

³³⁷ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 113.

³³⁸ M. J. Christie (1970) *The Somonstown agreements: Britain's defence and the sale of arms to South Africa* (London: The Africa Bureau), p. 15.

³³⁹ Khrunov (1984) "The South Atlantic in imperialism's plans", p. 32.

³⁴⁰ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 115.

³⁴¹ Khrunov (1984) "The South Atlantic in imperialism's plans", p. 33.

³⁴² Christie (1970) *The Somonstown agreements*, p. 10, p. 15.

major reason for the failed effort to sell the idea of SATO was that Brazil, another important component state in the military alliance, withdrew from the framework.³⁴³ It had less to do with the Falkland Islands.

The second reason to see the issue of the Falkland Islands as not being very clearly linked to the US-UK strategic concern was Britain's downplaying military role in the Falkland Islands. The Government on the whole tended to see the Falklands Islands as making no contribution to Britain's maritime strategy.³⁴⁴ The Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, for instance, reported in July 1967, "we had no defence interest in the Falkland Islands and indeed were unable to defend them effectively".³⁴⁵ In other words, if Britain's conduct of the Falklands policy had followed the strategic thinking in the context of East-West confrontation, as the US stipulated, the Falkland Islands could have been heavily militarised, as was Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean.³⁴⁶ But Britain did not choose this option. Perhaps more problematic for Gamba-Stonehouse's claim that Britain took a passive attitude in building its relations with Argentina, was that its educational campaign showed that Britain was much more relaxed and willing to discuss the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina in late 1966. The shift of the negotiating principle to the interests of the islanders, as reviewed in Chapter 1, was in contrast to the present British policy on the issue of the Falkland Islands, where their wishes is strongly emphasised. Evidently, Argentina might have good reason to believe that all it had to do was to wait in 1966-68.

Here, Gamba-Stonehouse's attribution of the cause of the British conduct of the Falkland policy to the structural theory of hegemony is too broad to be convincing. Assumptions such as the US-UK "special relationship" and lower priority of South America are not helpful in making inferences and solving the puzzles contained in this thesis. Dillon advanced a fundamental point in this regard. He argued that the issue of the Falkland Islands was "isolated from superpower rivalries" and even "unconnected with any important regional strategic balance or with global strategic relationships".³⁴⁷ This remark indicated that the hegemonic rules might exist during the Cold War. But they created an impact on the foreign policy only in the cases

³⁴³ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, pp. 113-4.

³⁴⁴ Hansard (Commons) vol. 774, col. 443, 3 December 1968.

³⁴⁵ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (17), St. J. Sugg, CO, to P. F. Hobday, MoD, secret, 6 September 1968, enclosing "Defence: Falkland Islands".

³⁴⁶ John Madeley (1985) *Diego Garcia: A Contrast to the Falklands*, report no. 54 (London: Minority Rights Group).

³⁴⁷ Michael Dillon (1988b) "Thatcher and the Falklands", in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.),

where state actors believed the discourse of hegemony to exist. The issue of the Falkland Islands in the 1960s clearly did not fall into this discourse. Instead, the case might support at Howard when he argued that the polar-system during the Cold War could be "irrelevant to the low level and peripheral conflict".³⁴⁸

Hence, arguing from the perspective of a bipolar system does not locate the causal factors for solving the puzzles in this thesis. British foreign policy concerning the issue of the Falkland Islands in the 1960s did not respond faithfully to the East-West confrontation. It is highly likely that the proponents of world-system perspective being locked into the perspective of the Cold War is owing to the fact that their major sources of research are the American official papers, which are released a generation earlier than British documents.³⁴⁹ This thesis has no doubt about the credibility of their sources, but the crux is that the US in this case had stayed neutral before 1982. For this thesis, therefore, the biggest question mark in this section hangs not over the difficulties in accessing the record of Britain's recent past, as Beck complained in his research on the issue of the Falkland Islands,³⁵⁰ but over the world-system perspective, which develops arguments littered with character-less units. To sum up, when Gamba-Stonehouse's core assumptions of the US-UK "special relations" and the world-system perspective prove logically incoherent and without distinctive causal effect, the whole argument is disputable.³⁵¹

7. The rational-choice perspective

Rational choice models constitute one of the most promising tools now available for political analysis. Basically, rational choice models intend to provide causal explanations of political outcomes on the assumption of rationality. Decision-makers are seen as consciously to pursue self-interested utility when evaluating competing alternatives under uncertainties.³⁵² Here, the driving force is rationality, which is

Belief systems and international relations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 168.

³⁴⁸ Howard (1984) *The causes of wars*, p. 44.

³⁴⁹ Kathleen Burk (1983) "Book reviews", *Political Quarterly*, 54, 2, p. 209.

³⁵⁰ Peter J. Beck (1983a) "Research problems in studying Britain's Latin American past: The case of the Falklands dispute 1920-50", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 2, 3, pp. 3-16.

³⁵¹ Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1998) *Is anybody still a realist?* Paper no. 98-14, forthcoming in *International Security*, p. 4.

³⁵² Keith M. Dowding (1991) *Rational choice and political power* (Hants, England: Edward Elgar), p. 18; Keith M. Dowding and Desmond King (1995) "Introduction", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 5; Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth (1986) "Decision making under ambiguity", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, p. s225; P. C. Fishburn (1988) "Normative theories of decision making under risk and under uncertainty", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 78.

understood as “an optimal correspondence between ends and means”.³⁵³

In the literature of international cooperation, the conventional wisdom of rational choice models is firmly wedded to another agreed assumption that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system, wherein there is no central authority to enforce a binding agreement. Each state, as a unitary actor, will be sensitive enough to keep security or survival as the consistent concern in its policy preference about the issue of cooperation with others.³⁵⁴ On this premise, there develop two divergent deductions: neoliberal institutionalist and neorealist theories that can be illustrated below.

Neoliberal institutionalists subscribe to the view that the prospect of utilities for benefit and advantage constitutes a network of social bonds.³⁵⁵ The bonds will affect states' behaviour in their relations with one another in international politics, and their most significant influence is to reduce Hobbesian fear derived from anarchy in international relations as perceived by realists. Thus, according to neoliberal institutionalists, in order to reduce the costs of conflict, or to maximise expected utilities, cooperation normally becomes a state's preferable choice in the process of interaction with other states.³⁵⁶ As interaction goes on, reciprocity such as information provision and issue linkage will function as an effective restraint on a state's behaviour to opt for free riding.³⁵⁷ State behaviour will therefore be transformed from being preference-driven to institution-driven,³⁵⁸ and the institutions will, in turn, bring about states' willingness to pursue cooperation, seeing that free riding will be punished and cooperation rewarded.³⁵⁹

³⁵³ George Tsebelis (1990) *Nested games: Rational choices in comparative politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. 18.

³⁵⁴ Chris Brown (1997) *Understanding international relations* (London: Macmillan), p. 80; Robert Gilpin (1981) *War and change in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 7; Robert O. Keohane (1984) *After hegemony: cooperation and discord in the world political economy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), pp. 2-9, p. 26.

³⁵⁵ Ranall L. Calvert (1995) “The rational choice theory of social institutions: Cooperation, co-ordination, and communication”, in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (eds.), *Modern political economy: Old topic, new directions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 257.

³⁵⁶ Hedley Bull (1977) *The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics* (NY: Columbia University Press), p. 13.

³⁵⁷ Peter Alexis Gourevitch (1996) “Squaring the circle: The domestic sources of international cooperation”, *International Organisation*, 50, 2, p. 372.

³⁵⁸ Robert O. Keohane (1989) *International institutions and state power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview), p. 6.

³⁵⁹ Mark A. Boyer (1993) *International cooperation and public goods: Opportunities for the western alliance* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), pp. 10-1; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin (1995) “The promise of institutionalist theory”, *International Security*, 20, 2, pp. 39-51; Lisa L. Martin (1992) “Institutions and cooperation: Sanctions during the Falklands Islands conflict”,

However, the effect of institutions on states' decisions to engage themselves in international cooperation has been seriously questioned by neorealism, another competing school of rational choice theory. Neorealists argue that in anarchy, where today's allies may become tomorrow's enemies, to keep relative gain is the prior concern.³⁶⁰ Each state as a consequence has no choice but to rely on a self-help effort to pursue security.³⁶¹ Neorealists contend that cooperation has rarely specified how the mutual gains will be distributed, so that institutions are at best a vehicle. Unfortunately, the dominant powers sometimes impose their will through this vehicle.³⁶² Therefore, it is admitted that inter-state cooperation should be encouraged and international institutions may have a role in the bargaining process towards cooperation, but states' decision not to co-operate with other states is caused by the constant relative-gain concerns in the process of gains-distribution. Because these relative-concerns are hardly subdued, international cooperation is often short-lived. States are less willing to co-operate than neoliberal institutionalists optimistically expect and, more often than not, they take a free ride even in the face of forthcoming institutional arrangements.³⁶³

The neorealist hypotheses

Based on the concept of relative-gain concerns, a neorealist may argue that because British colonial ambition had vanished, the relative-gains concern diminished. The Wilson Government as a result showed no hesitation in pursuing cooperation with Argentina and the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands became negotiable in 1966. Conversely, when relative-gain concerns were aroused in December 1968, the Memorandum of Understanding in preparation was called to a

International Security, 16, 4, pp. 143-78; Kenneth A. Oye (1985) "Explaining cooperation under anarchy", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.) *Cooperation under anarchy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 19; Randall L. Schweller and David Priess (1997) "A tale of two realisms: Expanding the institutions debate", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, 1, p. 3, p. 9.

³⁶⁰ Fareed Zakaria (1992) "Realism and domestic politics: A review essay", *International Security*, 17, 1, p. 482.

³⁶¹ Michael Mastanduno (1991) "Do relative gains matter?—America's response to Japanese industrial policy", *International Security*, 16, 1, p. 109; John C. Mathew III. (1996) "Current gains and future outcomes: When cumulative relative gains matter", *International Security*, 21, 1, p. 113.

³⁶² Helen V. Milner (1992) "International theories of cooperation among nations", *World Politics*, 44, 3, p. 470; pp. 469-70.

³⁶³ Joseph M. Grieco (1997) "Realist international theory and the study of world politics", in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New thinking in international relations theory* (Oxford: Westview), pp. 174-6; John J. Mearsheimer (1994/5) "A realist reply", *International Security*, 20, 1, p. 27, p. 47, p. 49; Duncan Snidal (1991) "Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation", *American Political Science Review*, 85, 3, p. 722; Arthur A. Stein (1990) *Why nations co-operate: Circumstance and choice in international relations* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), pp. 5-6.

halt. Four neorealist hypotheses may subsequently be suggested to describe the development of the British conduct of the Falklands policy in the Falklands history.

Hypothesis 1: with relative-gain concerns in its foreign relations with Argentina before the 1960s, the British Government firmly claimed its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. It therefore had refused to talk about the issue of this territorial dispute for 130 years. There was as a consequence no cooperation before 1966.

Hypothesis 2: with relative-gain concerns reduced in the 1960s, Britain decided to talk about sovereignty with Argentina in a cooperative mood in late 1966.

Hypothesis 3: Cooperation ceased to exist at the end of 1968, because of relative-gain concerns re-emerging.

Hypothesis 4: Fear of being exploited by Argentina was the consistent relative-gain concern of the British Government in the talks during this period under study.

However, this thesis finds out that the role of relative-gain concerns as an independent variable was insignificant in this case. The refutation can be made as follows.

Criticisms of the neorealist hypotheses

To begin with, relative-gain concerns in this case had gone long before the mid-19th century. The Falkland Islands had once been planned as a naval base from the strategic and economic viewpoints, but the plan was only briefly discussed during the period between 1740-50 and then abandoned.³⁶⁴ Even though Britain repossessed the islands in 1833, it is worth noting that not until 1843, when Queen Victoria granted the Falkland Islands the status of a dominion, was a colonial administration established.³⁶⁵ This decision was made after a ten-year time lag. And it was not until another nine years later in 1852, the Falkland Islands Company received a royal charter from the Queen and began to develop the colony.³⁶⁶ The developmental schemes enacted so late by the British Government can hardly be understood solely by the notion of relative-gain concerns, if this thesis puts Britain into the context in the South Atlantic. A plausible explanation for this time lag was that Britain's claim to

³⁶⁴ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 29, p. 35; Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute*, p. 47; Robin Knox-Johnston (1995) *Cape Horn: A maritime history* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), pp. 87-9.

³⁶⁵ Colin Gross (1968) *The fall of the British empire: 1918-1968* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 132; Phipps (1977) *What future for the Falklands*, p. 3.

³⁶⁶ Bethell (1989) "Britain and Latin America", p. 3.

sovereignty on the Falkland Islands represented nothing but a "historical anachronism".³⁶⁷ Relative-gain concerns in the mid-19th century were not as significant as Hypothesis 1 suggests.

The implication of Britain's slowness in the management of the Falkland Islands after 1833 is straightforward. With the rise of economic pre-eminence in Buenos Aires after the mid-19th century,³⁶⁸ the firmly rooted economic relations and cultural mixture between Britain and Argentina had effectively kept both sides reticent on the Falklands issue before the 1930s, when nationalism in Argentina came to the fore.³⁶⁹ From 1833 to the 1930s, both sides had lived with the dispute, which became an accepted part" of the bilateral relations.³⁷⁰ In the midst of the British-Argentine relations, the issue of the Falkland Islands was neither important enough to solve, nor unimportant enough to avoid.³⁷¹ Relative-gain concerns in the British conduct of the Falklands policy before the 1960s were insignificant.

Hypothesis 1 is therefore untenable. Its being disproved will render Hypothesis 2 problematic too. With fewer concerns for relative gains before the 1960s, this thesis is bound to ask the question of where the concerns for relative gains sprang from, when Hypothesis 2 is under discussion. One possible answer is the pressure on British prestige in the world with the rise of the decolonisation movement. But the nature of this kind of concern is by no means "relative". It is more of a self-imposed consciousness that has to be referred to by the British Empire in the past. Since the early 20th century, Britain had been purposefully avoiding the legal debates over the issue of the Falkland Islands. It ducked the issue not only because of a lack of confidence in its territorial claim over the Falkland Islands,³⁷² but also because of the concern that the loss of the islands could seriously humiliate Britain as a power in the eyes of the world. Consequently, "the correct policy", as was advised in 1936, was to

³⁶⁷ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 11.

³⁶⁸ Guillermo A. Makin (1983) "Argentine approach to the Falklands/Malvinas: Was the resort to violence foreseeable?", *International Affairs*, 59, 3, p. 391.

³⁶⁹ Bethell (1989) "Britain and Latin America", p. 11; Harry S. Ferns (1992) "Argentina: Part of an informal empire?", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), p. 57; Callum A. MacDonald (1992) "End of empire: The decline of the Anglo-Argentine connection 1918-1951", in Hennessy and King, p. 81; Oliver Marshall (1992) "Peasants or planters? British pioneers on Argentina's tropical frontier", in Hennessy and King, p. 143; Alistair Hennessy (1992) "Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and others", in Hennessy and King, pp. 10-1.

³⁷⁰ Ferns (1960) *Britain and Argentina*, p. 224, p. 232.

³⁷¹ Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 52; Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman (1982) *The Falklands war* (London: Andre Deutsch), pp. 40-1.

³⁷² Ibid. (1983a) "Research problems", p. 8.

“sit tight on the Falklands Islands”.³⁷³ In 1937, Anthony Eden flatly pointed out that the Falklands dispute was “essentially a matter of tactics and policy rather than law”.³⁷⁴ The fact that the British Government never referred the Falklands dispute to the League of Nations or the International Court of Justice might help readers to view the British attitude to this issue in this light.³⁷⁵ It will be very hard to argue that, from the perspective of relative-gain concerns between the two sides, Britain intended to keep ahead of Argentina in respect of national prestige. Hence, toying with the concept of relative-gain concerns, neorealists will find a paradox in this case from the perspective of relative-gain concerns between the two sides. No matter that Britain decided or declined to have talks with Argentina during 1966-68, the issue of the Falkland Islands was more associated with a symbol of power, a kind of self-imposed concern, rather than the concerns of relative-gains. Neither Hypothesis 1 and 2 are persuasive.

As to Hypothesis 3 that with relative-gain concerns re-emerging at the end of 1968, one possibility to support it was the potential interests of oil and marine algae. The potential of oil was put forward by some Soviet scholars. They believed that oil was the major reason behind the unsettlement over the sovereignty issue, because the oil reserves in the Falklands' waters were more than the North Sea.³⁷⁶ Marine algae, on the other hand, were reported as the "only large supply in the world", capable of bringing in annual income up to 12 million pounds.³⁷⁷ Britain might have good reason not to cede away the Falkland Islands because of these two items of relative-gains.

Nevertheless, the timing of the oil potential being known to the international society did not support Hypothesis 3. The potential of oil had rarely been seriously discussed before the end of 1968. Its value in making exploration was first perceived in 1969, not in 1968.³⁷⁸ The oil's economic potential was not substantiated until 1971, when the Shell Company and the University of Birmingham concluded with speculative reports about the oil deposits.³⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the Wilson Government dismissed any optimistic prospect of marine algae. It considered the annual incomes,

³⁷³ Ibid. (1983c) “The Anglo-Argentine dispute”, p. 16.

³⁷⁴ Ibid. (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem*, p. 80.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 94, 149; J. E. S. Fawcett (1982) “The Falklands and the law”, *The World Today*, 38, p. 204; Goebel (1982) *The struggle for the Falkland Islands*, p. 468.

³⁷⁶ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 139.

³⁷⁷ Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute*, p. 110.

³⁷⁸ Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, p. 139.

³⁷⁹ B. Doggan (1982) “Letters: Falklands”, *The Economist*, 1 May, p. 6; Gustafson (1988) *The sovereignty dispute*, pp. 82-6.

as reported by one commercial industry, "no more than a remote possibility".³⁸⁰ Seen in this light, the factors of oil and marine resource as explanations to the sovereignty impasse prove spurious for the period under study. Hypothesis 3 is hardly verifiable.

Neorealists may retreat to the bottom line and defend Hypothesis 4 that there at least existed constant concern of being exploited in the two-year discussions about sovereignty between Britain and Argentina. However, this hypothesis is not verifiable either. Britain did not hesitate in its response to the UN's and Argentina's demands for sovereignty talks in late 1966. Talking about British foreign policy in this period, Foreign Secretary Brown argued that his basis of foreign policy was to follow the interests of Britain. And to do it, as Brown revealingly declared, was to give "wholehearted support to the United Nations and so to order our own behaviour that we set an example to others".³⁸¹ Stewart, who replaced Brown in March 1968, did not change this internationalist viewpoint. As Stewart insisted, "We are conducting talks with the Argentine about the long-term future of these islands in accordance with and in the spirit of the United Nations resolution, to which I should think both sides of the House would pay respect. In any case, this is our policy".³⁸²

The point to note is that the contradiction between the UN's positions on self-determination and the wording "people" in the related UN documents could not be unknown to the British Government in the late 1960s.³⁸³ Resolution 2065, for instance, contradicted the text of Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations, the latter of which laid greater emphasis on the wishes of the people as a universal claim, while the former only looked at their interests. As political aspirations of both documents were identical—relief from the colonial framework, if the British Government had insisted, they might have based their stance on Article 73, instead of following Resolution 2065. Britain, indeed, was quite ready to do so in the case of Gibraltar, where the wishes of the Islanders was upheld and a referendum took place in 1968.³⁸⁴

Alternatively, Britain could also be entitled to emphasise that the nature of self-determination inside the British Commonwealth could not be understood without

³⁸⁰ Honeywell and Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas*, p. 20.

³⁸¹ Labour Party Conference (1966) *Report of the 65th annual conference*, p. 268.

³⁸² Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 34, 18 March 1968.

³⁸³ Malcolm N. Shaw (1995) *International law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 173, p. 700.

³⁸⁴ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, col. 1456, 26 March 1968; Labour Party Conference (1968) *Report of*

examining the sentiment, influence and interests within the political entities proper.³⁸⁵ It could claim that Britain would follow the natural law school that simply took self-determination as the natural right.³⁸⁶ Indeed, in the case of Gibraltar, Britain claimed that there was still much to explore with regard to local sentiment among the people there.³⁸⁷ If inhabitants in Gibraltar had been offered a choice by expressing their wishes, Britain could as well have argued that the UN failed to base the same argument for the Falkland Islanders. However, Britain assumed a more accommodating attitude towards Argentina's appeal. No sooner did Resolution 2065 determine that Britain's claim on the Falkland Islands needed to be settled peacefully by talks than Britain decided to change its pledge to the interests of the islanders as a guiding principle for the ensuing talks. This attitude inclines this thesis to conclude that the British conduct of the Falklands policy throughout the period in 1966-68 was hardly related to what Hypothesis 4 intends to explain from the perspective of fear of being exploited.

To summarise, relative-gain concerns were marginal in the British conduct of the Falkland Islands before and after the 1960s. All the four hypotheses formulated from the concept of relative-gains concerns prove empirically debatable from the point of view of helping to solve the puzzles examined in this thesis.

The neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses

In the spirit of neoliberal institutionalists, this thesis develops four working hypotheses to test causal power of neoliberal institutionalism in the case of the Falkland Islands. Neoliberal institutionalists may bring forward the first hypothesis that to keep Britain's prestige in the midst of the decolonisation movement, respecting UN Resolutions 2065 became a necessity. Britain as a result began the talks over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Hypothesis 1).

Neoliberal institutionalists may also propose a second hypothesis and argue from the perspectives of issue linkage and reciprocity. The hypothesis may be formulated that, based on the assumption that the issue of the Falkland Islands had to be resolved before securing Latin American markets, Britain adopted the strategy of issue linkage,

the 67th annual conference of the Labour Party (London: Transport House), p. 81.

³⁸⁵ Peter Madgwick (1994a) *A new introduction to British politics* (London: Stanley Thornes), p. 447.

³⁸⁶ David B. Knight (1985) "Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on post-colonial self-determination", *International Political Science Review*, 6, 2, p. 263.

³⁸⁷ Alfred Cobban (1969) *The national state and national self-determination* (London & Glasgow: Collins), pp. 159-60.

and so it began the sovereignty talks (Hypothesis 2).

The above two hypotheses to explain Britain's willingness to have sovereignty talks with Argentina in 1966 are justifiable on the ground that keeping international prestige and expanding economic markets were two significant concerns of British decision-makers in the 1960s. On the one hand, the Falkland Islands admittedly was an obstacle to the trade and the overall British relations with South America.³⁸⁸ To be sure, respecting UN Resolution 2065 could help relieve its pressure in a climate of decolonisation. Britain could be seen as adopting the strategy of issue linkage with a view to shedding this "embarrassing encumbrance to" its foreign policy in the 1960s.³⁸⁹ Moreover, the issue of the Falkland Islands was clearly a barrier to the potential markets, because the existence of the territorial dispute was interpreted as a colonial symbol. Talking about sovereignty could circumvent the barrier to markets.³⁹⁰ Taken together, cession of sovereignty could be seen as a trade-off for British prestige and better chances of trade in South America.

Meanwhile, the central concern of the neoliberal institutionalists is how to monitor a mechanism to enforce the institutions of cooperation in the longer term.³⁹¹ Among the mechanisms, states' decisions not to co-operate are attributed to ideas being absent in the decision-making process.³⁹² This thesis subsequently puts forward another two hypotheses as follows.

Based on the notion of ideas, one hypothesis can be formulated that the idea of anti-colonialism as part of Labour's ideology prompted the sovereignty negotiation with Argentina to take place in 1966 (Hypothesis 3). Neoliberal institutionalists can also produce the fourth hypothesis, arguing that reduction of the maximised gains led to Britain's reluctance to continue the discussion of sovereignty with Argentina in December 1968. Britain as a result called a halt to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding that was supposed to be issued jointly with Argentina (Hypothesis 4).

³⁸⁸ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 9.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

³⁹⁰ Karen Brutents (1984) "The conflict in the South Atlantic: Consequences and lessons", in "Social Science Today", p. 137.

³⁹¹ John Gerard Ruggie (1998) *Constructing the world polity: Essays on international institutionalisation* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 10.

³⁹² Jeffrey T. Checkel (1997) *Ideas and international political change: Soviet/Russian behaviour and the end of the cold war* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), p. 5; John Ferejohn (1993) "Structure and ideology: Change in Parliament in early Stuart England", in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and foreign policy*, p. 208; Geoffrey Garrett and Barry R. Weingast (1993) "Ideas, interests, and institutions: Constructing the European community's internal market", in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and foreign policy*, p. 204.

Neoliberal institutionalism in this case seemed to carry more weight in explanation of Britain's policy preference in 1966 than that in 1968. However, neoliberal institutionalists have little cause for optimism. In terms of causal effect, the second turning-point policy preference emerging in December 1968 is the substantial evidence that renders the prior hypotheses made by neoliberal institutionalists untenable.

Criticism of the neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses

Hypothesis 1, with reference to prestige, proves the least sustainable in this case. Britain would have already known that arguing based on the wishes of the islanders was unacceptable to Argentina. The resumption of the negotiating principle—the wishes of the islanders—created nothing but a barrier to the success of the talks. Also, Britain could not have been unaware that upholding the wishes was not stipulated in the text of Resolution 2065. Its unilateral announcement in the talks was tantamount to denying the UN legal authority in maintaining an international order. Britain might have already anticipated that Argentina would not keep silent in the international forum after Britain's changing the negotiating line. Argentina's vocal protest in the UN could be more disturbing to Britain's prestige. Despite these concerns, the second British policy preference hastily came to the fore in late 1968. In this respect, Brown and Stewart clearly had bitten off more than they could chew.

Banking on Hypothesis 2, characterised by issue linkage as a strategy, is also problematic. Britain seemed quite slow in response to secure these possible gains of prestige and potential markets. From the perspective of issue-linkage, when over 100 MPs were united in expressing their concern, which came as an obstruction in the process of talks, the Government should have pressed on with their initiative rather than passively retreat. The Wilson Government should have granted compensation in an attempt to encourage concessions from the islanders. They should also have redefined the given issue by making the resolution of the dispute attendant more heavily on, for instance, national security.³⁹³ However, to the disappointment of the neoliberal institutionalists, the policy outcomes proved the opposite. The Wilson Government followed neither option that neoliberal institutionalists are ready to suppose. First, the British Government did not offer any side-payment. It was said that

³⁹³ H. Richard Friman (1993) "Side-payments versus security cards: Domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations", *International Organisation*, 47, 3, p. 405.

Argentina would provide side-payment to the islanders.³⁹⁴ Secondly, the Wilson Government even in the heated parliamentary debates in 1968 did not make an attempt to redefine the issue such as the one talking about the potential trade with Argentina. In the midst of doubts that Britain was to sell frigates to Argentina in exchange for title over the islands, and that Britain discussed with the Australian, New Zealand and Canadian Governments about accommodating the islanders, the Wilson Government just flatly dismissed both speculations as unfounded.³⁹⁵ With no evidence of side-payment having been raised by the British Government, and no effort of redefining the issue, the claim of neoliberal institutionalist to maximise the British interests is doubtful. The doubt will render Hypothesis 2 invalid.

The idea of anti-colonialism or self-determination as a binding force in Hypothesis 3 also proves incoherent. During the talks, rumours circulated among the islanders. It was said that if the islanders would not accept the arrangement, economic sanctions could be applied against them in five years.³⁹⁶ It was also said that the negotiations would eventually bring about a transfer of sovereignty.³⁹⁷ Nevertheless, if ideas of the world view and Labour's ideologies of anti-colonialism did specify the policy orientation, as many neoliberal institutionalists claim,³⁹⁸ why did the Wilson Government pay little attention to the democratic need of the islanders but only talk of their interests before the end of 1968? Why were the interests as a guiding principle in sovereignty negotiations put in such an abstract form? Why were the interests of the Islanders so arbitrarily subject to the British officials' interpretation? The principle of respecting the islanders' life style in this case seems to be left with a piece of rhetoric without having real meaning in it.

More devastating to Hypothesis 3, the Wilson Government seemed never to have seriously thrashed out answers to the following central intriguing questions. If the Government was fully aware of the Argentine public claim that no agreement would be concluded without the transfer of sovereignty,³⁹⁹ and, if the sovereignty was no doubt legally and exclusively British, as the FO reiterated, then what was the point of the talks? These dilemmas make this thesis wonder whether ideas as a causal force

³⁹⁴ Hoffmann and Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute*, p. 111.

³⁹⁵ Hansard (Commons) vol. 763, col. 480, 25 April 1968

³⁹⁶ Ibid., vol. 764, col. 54, 7 May 1968; vol. 769, col. 35, 22 July 1968.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., vol. 761, col. 1449, 26 March 1968; vol. 765, cols., 279-80, 21 May 1968.

³⁹⁸ Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993) "Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework", in Goldstein and Keohane, *Ideas and foreign policy*, p. 13.

³⁹⁹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 762, col. 1061, 9 April; vol. 763, col. 479, 25 April 1968; vol. 775, col.

can be sustainable without other concerns. It seems that there was little contact "between ideas seeking access to policymakers and policymakers seeking access to ideas" in late 1968, when Britain decided to suspend the Memorandum of Understanding.⁴⁰⁰ The doubt prompts this thesis to question the effect of ideas in Hypothesis 3.⁴⁰¹

Neoliberal institutionalists may defend Hypothesis 4 by arguing that, because of non-existence of maximised gains, Britain was unwilling to continue the talks, and subsequently the negotiating principle was changed. But evidence to verify Hypothesis 4 is also hard to muster. On reflection, if one observes British investment opportunities in Argentina in the mid-1960s, one would find that the prospect of gains from trade with Argentina in 1966-68 was generally on the rise. During the period under study, Juan C. Onganía's regime was devoted to policies of economic growth by changing the previous management into a far more liberal style.⁴⁰² Controls of imports were abolished,⁴⁰³ and economic progress by 1968 had been remarkable. The growth of industrial production soared seven times from 1.6 per cent in 1966 to 11.1 in 1968. Public investment also increased at an annual rate of 22 per cent.⁴⁰⁴ Whether this would close the cycle of economic instability remained to be seen, but more notably, in an attempt to dismiss the speculation before the world, the Onganía Government launched a policy to devalue the Argentine peso down to 40 per cent once and for all. The sharp devaluation did not lead to a self-generating inflationary mechanism as it did with the previous regimes, but proved a success.⁴⁰⁵ The devaluation helped the Argentine Government become capable of financing its needs through the sale of treasury notes and medium-term bonds and successfully stabilised the economy.⁴⁰⁶ The financial stability in turn greatly strengthened Argentina's purchasing capability,⁴⁰⁷ which made its federal deficit significantly decrease from 25 per cent in 1966 to 5 per cent at the end of 1968.⁴⁰⁸ The annual inflation rate also fell

429.

⁴⁰⁰ Albert S. Yee (1996) "The causal effects of ideas on policies", *International Organisation*, 50, 1, p. 93.

⁴⁰¹ Mark M. Blyth (1997) "Any more bright idea? The ideational turn of comparative political economy", *Comparative Politics*, 29, 2, pp. 246-7.

⁴⁰² Robert A. Potash (1996) *The army and politics in Argentina, 1962-1973: From Frondizi's fall to the Peronist restoration* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), p. 210.

⁴⁰³ Alexander Craig (1967) "Argentina: The latest revolution", *The World Today*, 23, 5, p. 206

⁴⁰⁴ Rock (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982*, p. 348.

⁴⁰⁵ Potash (1996) *The army and politics*, p. 225.

⁴⁰⁶ Torre (1993) "Argentina since 1946", p. 302;

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.; Potash (1996) *The army and politics*, p. 225.

⁴⁰⁸ Marvin Goldwert (1972) *Democracy, militarism, and nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966, an*

from 30 per cent to 8 per cent.⁴⁰⁹ The rise of gold and foreign exchange holdings in 1968 was four times Argentina's holdings in 1966.⁴¹⁰

From the perspective of neoliberal institutionalism, the liberation of trade in the Argentine market, the resumption of economic growth, and the economists' terms of "supply and demand" could not have come at a better time for British capital to be invested. Neoliberal institutionalists can hardly deny that all these economic prospects were promising gains. And indeed, after the decision to integrate the Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central American Common Market was declared in April 1967, British overseas representatives also began to talk about the potential gains from the Latin American Common Market.⁴¹¹ The problem, however, was that, despite the inducement of potential trade in Argentina, the Wilson Government's ultimate rejection of the mutual agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding did not come to terms with this orthodox description of demand and supply in economics. Why did the Wilson Government withdraw the designated policy, given the promising prospect of gains? Hypothesis 4 presents this thesis with another puzzle rather than an answer. The FO's eventual decision to reject the mutual agreement in 1968 indicates that governments "are not merely the victims of economic trends".⁴¹² The assumption of rationality in neoliberal institutionalism is economic terms rather than psychological one.⁴¹³ But an economic factor is insufficient. The case of the Falklands indicates that it will be more pointed to think about economic motivation within the political context in this case.⁴¹⁴ The opposite cannot be helpful.

Neoliberal institutionalists may retreat to the bottom line and try to defend their position by arguing from the perspective of reciprocity. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that iteration in "the shadow of the future" can reduce the security concern in the Prisoner's Dilemma and keep cooperation sustainable in prospect of joint gains.⁴¹⁵

interpretation (Austin & London: University of Texas Press), p. 202.

⁴⁰⁹ David Jordan (1970) "Argentina's new military government", *Current History*, 58, 342, pp. 85-6.

⁴¹⁰ Torre (1993) "Argentina since 1946", pp. 303-4.

⁴¹¹ FCO 7/64, A6/71, (10), K. Unwin, British Embassy, Montevideo, to Brown, restricted, 19 January 1968.

⁴¹² Paul V. Warwick (1994) *Government survival in parliamentary democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 92.

⁴¹³ Herbert A. Simon (1986) "Rationality in psychology and economics", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s210.

⁴¹⁴ Susan M. McMillan (1997) "Interdependence and conflict", *Mershon International Studies*, 41, p. 55.

⁴¹⁵ Charles Lipson (1984) "International cooperation in economic and security affairs", *World Politics*, 37, 1, p. 5; Duncan Snidal (1985) "The game theory of international politics", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under anarchy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 51; Michael Taylor (1976) *Anarchy*

Therefore, a case can also be made that, if one puts the issue into a longer time frame, one can observe that there had already been an institutional framework existing after the talks between 1966 and 1968. Indeed, the FCO after 1968 kept on forwarding proposals to solve the issue in the following decade. These may be the direct monitoring effect of neoliberal institutionalism. However, the element of iteration remains empirically unsubstantiated in this case. From 1966 to 1981, just before the war, a 15-year effort in negotiation was not too short a time frame. Iteration did occur between the two sides, but dilemmas about how to solve the issue remained acute for Britain, particularly the Thatcher Government after 1979.⁴¹⁶ The failure in restraining a dormant dispute from escalating into war, in turn, makes this thesis deeply aware that "reciprocity is no panacea in bilateral relationships".⁴¹⁷ Reciprocity as a factor in this case seemed to be even marginalised in the following 15 years leading up to the war.

Taken together, the British policy on the issue of the Falkland Islands from 1966 to 1968 exemplified a weak case to support the neoliberal institutionalist claim. Despite the idea of self-determination and the concern for British prestige in the UN, as Brown and Stewart had been so keen to cast in international politics, Britain still failed to meet these ideal, legal and moral expectations. A lack of corresponding action by Britain to secure the absolute-gains in 1966-68 through issue-linkage also proves devastating to what neoliberal institutionalists assume. Even if this thesis puts these kinds of concern into a longer time frame, the neoliberal institutionalist model remains misleadingly restrictive in providing a satisfactory explanation in this case.

The factor of "process"

The failure of the rational-choice models in explaining the issue during the period under study lies in the tendency of international cooperation to be highly "context dependent".⁴¹⁸ An analyst has to be aware that when contextual factors change, changes of decision-makers' belief systems and interests sometimes take place, and the policy preferences change as well. Of course, rational choice models cannot be criticised for this. Their theoretical focus is not on the decision-making

and cooperation (London: John Wiley & Sons), p. 8.

⁴¹⁶ Richard Ned Lebow (1989) "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the Falklands war", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and deterrence* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press), pp. 96-7.

⁴¹⁷ Robert O. Keohane (1986a) "Reciprocity in international relations", *International Organisation*, 40, 1, p. 11.

processes. Given this, the search for causes is bound to come up short. As Keohane suggests, the lack of concern for contextual factors will obscure the source of changes in the decision-makers' conscious preference, and therefore prove incapable of being relied upon with a possible answer to the puzzles in this study.⁴¹⁹ Perhaps for this reason, there has already existed the call for attention to the decision-making process since the late 1970s.⁴²⁰ Indeed, looking into the process as an important methodological concern is most relevant in the British case, because, as Hill complains, there was "little work on the foreign policy-making process with structured case studies in Britain". Even less are "in the areas of political psychology and group dynamics" where the "analysis of top-level policy formulation in Britain" was the focus.⁴²¹ It is owing to this concern that a decision-making model concerned about process becomes the candidate of choice.

8. Conclusion

As Chapter 2 draws to a close, it seems fair for this thesis to report as follows. Arguments based on British imperialism, historical narratives, patriotism, domestic politics, cultural conflict, national identity, the US-UK "special relationship" and global strategic concern, and the rational-choice models have proved methodologically insufficient in solving the puzzles why Britain changed the negotiating principle from the wishes of the islanders to their interests and then back to their wishes again in 1966-68. The Soviet perspective and the argument of identity provide a distorted or static picture of the historical background. Patriotism needs a precise definition. Cultural and domestic politics approaches have omitted the important factor in respect of the subjective force of a conscious decision-maker. Historical narratives and the perspective of UK geopolitics prove far-fetched. Rational choice theories are also incapable of explaining consistently the preference reversals.

A coherent answer still lies hidden. This wider exploration into the existing literature has helped clarify different dimensions of this territorial dispute. However, these dimensions are insufficient to provide a coherent synthesis in a more organised

⁴¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr. (1988) "Neorealism and neoliberalism", *World Politics*, 40, 2, p. 248.

⁴¹⁹ Robert O. Keohane (1988) "International institutions: Two approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, pp. 388-92.

⁴²⁰ J. R. Anderson (1983) *The architecture of cognition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 46-7.

⁴²¹ Christopher Hill (1991) *Cabinet decisions on foreign policy: The British experience, October 1938-June 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 3-4.

manner.⁴²² Their failures indicate that the factors, reviewed in this chapter, are in need of being integrated into a systemic design in order to identify a generally behavioural pattern in British decision-making in the issue of the Falkland Islands.⁴²³ In other words, there is a need to look for a particular model in existence in an attempt to draw on themes interlacing concepts and propositions from more than one of the above conceptions or approaches.

At least one thing is pretty sure. From the rational-choice perspective, or from the long-run historical understanding, the two British turning-point policy preferences on the issue of the Falkland Islands were an anomaly. But we are not discouraged by this anomaly. This is because the “perception of anomaly is often a preliminary to discovery”. It, in turn, justifies and encourages the effort of conjecturing “about a more satisfactory general theory that could avoid such anomalies”.⁴²⁴ The enquiry in Chapter 2, above all, has marked a start toward that end and a methodology to handle this challenge is waiting in the wings.

⁴²² Robert Latta and Alexander MacBeath (1964) *The elements of logic* (London: Macmillan), p. 374.

⁴²³ Morton A. Kaplan (1957) “Balance of power, bipolarity and other models of international systems”, *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, p. 685; Charles C. Ragin (1994) *Constructing social research: The unity and diversity of method* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge), p. 161.

⁴²⁴ Ronlad Rogowski (1995) “The role of theory and anomaly in social-scientific inference”, *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, p. 469; Andrew M. Scott (1967) *The functioning of the international political system* (London: Collier-Macmillan), p. 6.

CHAPTER THREE—PROSPECT THEORY AND ITS METHODOLOGY

Chapter 3 is concerned with the role that prospect theory can play with reference to the two British turning-point policy preferences in the sovereignty talks with Argentina in respect of the issue of the Falkland Islands from 1966 to 1968.

The chapter consists of six sections. Section 1 introduces the main characteristics of prospect theory and the key relevant concepts from the International Relations (IR) literature. Section 2 justifies the choice of theory. Section 3 deals with the concept of framing, the explanatory variable of prospect theory. Section 4 examines the current conceptual and methodological problems of prospect theory. Section 5 elaborates the basic key word of prospect theory—framing—to facilitate further observation.¹ And finally in section 6, this thesis presents four hypotheses, setting the framework for empirical observation in the following chapter.

1. Content of prospect theory

The two-phase description

Prospect theory is a utility model to explain decision-making. It divides the practice of decision-making into two phases—editing and evaluating. In the editing phase, prospect theory adopts the concept of representativeness, with which a decision-maker simplifies the complex external realities. The concept of representativeness is borrowed from cognitive psychology. Representativeness is characterised by similarities to the properties of past events. Based on the concept of representativeness, prospect theory argues that if a decision-maker faces a complex issue, representativeness becomes possible in use, because representativeness is, functionally speaking, image provocative as well as reflective.² It will lead decision-makers "to magnify conditional probabilities of events" owing to the similarity in question,³ or helps simplify the complexities of an issue for the decision-makers. Through the effort of magnification or simplification, representativeness helps

¹ Gary King, Robert O Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 193.

² Lennart Sjöberg (1980) "Volitional problems in carrying through a difficult decision", *Acta Psychologica*, 45, p. 128.

³ Maya Bar-Hillel (1982) "Studies of representativeness", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 69; J. A. Fodor and Z. Pylyshyn (1988) "Connectionalism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis", *Cognition*, 28, p. 7; Zeev Maoz (1986) "Multiple paths to choice: An approach for the analysis of foreign policy decisions", in Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds.), *Different text analysis procedures for the study of decision making* (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research Foundation), p. 75.

decision-makers grasp the background information for further inference. In the process of achieving this end, according to prospect theory, decision-makers will try to identify or locate a reference point as a short cut in the editing phase.⁴

The term "reference point" is a key word that has to be clarified at this stage. Referent points can be understood as the "indicators" in the decision-makers' minds alongside the decision-making process. It is an indicating operator, sending signals to a perceiver as the judging criterion for the perceiver to decide whether to go ahead in pursuit of what has been viewed, or to halt the action until the next reference point is searched out.⁵ Theoretically, a reference point can be seen as a substantive form of representativeness in mental activities.

The point to note in prospect theory is that the effect of a reference point is not restricted to the editing phase. According to prospect theory, decision-makers, after passing the editing phase, will proceed with their reference point of an issue into the evaluating phase, and it is in the second phase of mental activities that subjective values enter into the equation. Decision-makers in the evaluating phase will make analyses of offered prospects, and encode the consequent outcomes to decide whether the outcomes are gains or losses. In encoding various possible outcomes as gains or losses, the decision-makers will also consider their subjective values such as their motivations or the designated goals, before they make a choice between prospects for gains and likelihood of losses.⁶ At this juncture, the reference point again plays a decisive role. It becomes an interpretative operator and criterion of measurement. Prospect theory foresees that decision-makers will exhibit a strong tendency to have their reference points serve as the judging criterion of choice in the evaluating phase.⁷

In terms of the editing and evaluating phases, locating a reference point becomes not only a way to reduce the manifest complexities of an issue to an acceptable level, but the major causal factor in decision-making.⁸ The act of locating or identifying the

⁴ Robert Axelrod (1976a) "Decision for neo-imperialism: The deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 78, p. 95.

⁵ Ruth M. Corbin (1980) "Decisions that might not get made", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (NJ, Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 57.

⁶ Norman H. Anderson (1986) "A cognitive theory of judgement and decision", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevón (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), p. 65.

⁷ Jack S. Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for international conflict", *International Political Science Review*, 17, 2, p. 180.

⁸ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979) "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk", *Econometrica*, 47, 2, p. 274.

reference point is termed by some analysts as framing. Prospect theory expounds the idea that policy preference is ordered by framing. Various experimental findings prove that framing is one of the critical components of decision-making that can compete with other competing factors such as script and identity.⁹ Since a reference point helps a decision-maker to ponder in the editing phase and to reflect in the evaluating phase, it becomes the essential root of framing. Decision-maker's cognitive response in the editing phase and policy preferences in the evaluating phase are believed to be under the influence of the reference point, to the extent that prospect theory is taken as a reference-dependent theory.¹⁰

The causal mechanism applied to IR

What merits attention is the causal mechanism derived from prospect theory in the IR literature. The hypothetical mechanism of prospect theory takes framing as the explanatory variable, and risk-oriented behaviour, the dependent variable. It stipulates that decision-makers are often influenced by the way an issue is framed.¹¹ If an issue is involved with distribution of gains or losses, framing an issue with an anticipated effect in positive or negative terms will bring about different risk behaviour.¹² More precisely, if an issue is framed in terms of gains in prospect, decision-makers will be risk-averse. Their policy preference in the course of action tends to be self-restrained. Conversely, if an issue is framed in terms of losses, decision-makers will be risk-acceptant (or risk seeking) in an attempt to reverse the expected losses.¹³ Prospect theory also invokes the following three variables to explain causal relations, namely, loss avoidance and status quo bias, decision weight, and preference reversals.

⁹ P. Robert Abelson (1981) "Psychological status of the script concept", *American Psychologist*, 36, 7, p. 722; Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein (1988) "Knowing what you want: Measuring labile values", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 399; R. Spears, Abraham S. C. S., Abrams D. and Sheeran P. (1992) "Framing in terms of 'high-risk groups' versus 'risky practices' and prognoses of HIV infection", *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 2, p. 200.

¹⁰ John C. Hershey, Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul J. H. Schoemaker (1988) "Sources of bias in assessment procedures for utility functions", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 439.

¹¹ Irwin P. Levin, Sara K. Schnittjer and Shannon L. Thee (1988) "Information framing effects in social and personal decisions", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, 5, p. 527; Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein (1988) "Response mode, framing, and information-processing effects in risk assessment", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 165.

¹² C. Miguel Brendl, E. Tory Higgins and Kristi M. Lemm (1995) "Sensitivity to varying gains and losses: The role of self-discrepancies and event framing", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 6, p. 1046.

¹³ Chris Tallant and Robert Strachan (1995) "The importance of framing: A pragmatic approach to risk assessment", *Probation Journal*, 42, 4, p. 205.

Loss avoidance and status quo bias

In contrast to most rational choice theories that tacitly assume gains-seeking as the primary concern, proponents of prospect theory are of the view that the dynamic part of decision-making in the evaluating phase is characterised by the notion of loss avoidance (or loss aversion). This is because, according to Tversky and Kahneman, the phenomenon of diminishing returns—the value of a good diminishes with continual increases in its gains—takes place.¹⁴ Secondly, loss avoidance takes place because it is much more difficult for people to adjust to losses than to gains. Because the perception of loss often looms disproportionately larger than that of gains, whenever a decision-maker is required to leave the status quo,¹⁵ he or she will perceive the change as making the situation worse.¹⁶ In Levy's words, the psychological temperament of loss avoidance is significant, because human beings "tend to value what they have more than comparable things they do not have, and also because the dis-utility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of acquiring it".¹⁷ To the extent that loss avoidance is conspicuous, there develops the notion of the status quo bias in decision-making.¹⁸ It is reported that decision-makers in bargaining normally have a strong inclination to keep to the status quo when there are competitive sets of framing in respect of a same issue.¹⁹ Some adherents of prospect theory argue that, because the perceived psychological pains of giving up current possessions is so pronounced, the framing in terms of gains will give ground to the framing in terms of losses.²⁰ Brooks argues that the status quo bias is a dominant

¹⁴ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982a) "The psychology of preferences", *Scientific American*, 246, 1, p. 162.

¹⁵ Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990) "Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the case theorem", *Journal of Political Economy*, 98, p. 1342; Jack Knetsch (1989) "The endowment effect and evidence of non-reversible indifference of curves", *American Economic Review*, 79, 1, p. 1282; Richard Thaler (1980) "Toward a positive theory of consumer choice", *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation*, 1, pp. 43-7.

¹⁶ Janice Gross Stein (1993) "International co-operation and loss avoidance: Framing the problem", in Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), p. 21.

¹⁷ Levy (1997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice", p. 89.

¹⁸ William Samuelson and Richard Zechhauser (1988) "Status quo bias in decision making", *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 1, pp. 7-8.

¹⁹ David E. Bell (1988) "Disappointment in decision making under certainty", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 359; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1991) "Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5, 1, p. 198; Jack Knetsch and J. A. Sinden (1984) "Willingness to pay and compensation demanded: Experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XCIX, pp. 507-21.

²⁰ Els C. M. van Schie, and Joop Van der Plight (1990) "Problem representation, frame preference, and risky choice", *Acta Psychologica*, 75, p. 257.

factor in decision making. It dominates the decision-makers' perception to the extent that prospect theory is a structural model corresponding to neorealism. As Brooks concluded, neorealism is but the "representative of prospect theory".²¹

Decision weight

The second axiom of prospect theory is the idea of decision weight. Decision weight is a psychological force that is said to be able to "multiply" the expected value of each possible outcome, and, to a large extent, determine where a reference point lies in decision-making.²² According to prospect theory, decision-makers are "more akin to [use] estimation" than objective probability in making judgements.²³ Even if there is statistical probability available for decision-makers' reference, decision weight will normally replace objective probability,²⁴ or at least render it "less representative" in a risk equation.²⁵

The implications of decision weight are twofold. First, decision weight leaves a lot of room for subjective value-systems to operate in decision-making. Therefore, prospect theory admits the existence of human bias when elucidating reasons for some choice errors or risky choices.²⁶ Second, decision weight strikes a balance of description in decision-making because, when decision weight enters the decision-making process, the pure cognitive function of representativeness, which this thesis will take issue with later, will be subdued.

Preference reversals

In explaining decision-making, prospect theory does not stress the notion of "consistency".²⁷ Instead, it argues that, although inconsistency may create certain negative meanings for those who perceive it, it is rarely considered as unacceptable,

²¹ Stephen G. Brooks (1997) "Duelling realisms", *International Organisation*, 51, 3, p. 454.

²² Schie and Plight (1990) "Problem representation", p. 244.

²³ Manuel Leon and Norman H. Anderson (1974) "A ratio rule from integration theory applied to inference judgements", *Experimental Psychology*, 102, 1, p. 34.

²⁴ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1982b) "On the psychology of prediction", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 48; Yaacov Trope (1982) "Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one's memory", in *ibid.*, p. 387.

²⁵ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1973) "On the psychology of prediction", *Psychological Review*, 80, 4, 238; Kahneman and Tversky (1982c) "Subjective probability: A judgement of representativeness", in *ibid.* p. 32.

²⁶ Karen E. Jacowitz and Daniel Kahneman (1995) "Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 11, pp. 1161-2, p. 1165.

²⁷ Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth (1988) "Behavioural decision theory: Process of judgement and choice", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 116.

because, as McGuire explains, human beings are adaptable.²⁸ Prospect theory is of the view that decision-makers are pursuing policy as they hurtle along in the changing environment. A policy should be seen in the form of "zigs and zags",²⁹ because a decision-maker is capable of accommodating the realities.³⁰ "We may have to accept that", as Cornford explained, "any modern government is an incoherent system".³¹ Therefore, the concern for consistency cannot be overwhelming. And indeed, decision-makers normally are capable of explaining away the inconsistencies in order to keep their evaluation congruous with the existing frame of reference.³² According to the causal mechanism built up by prospect theory, a risk-averse choice, for instance, is made because the payoffs are seen as significantly better than the current reference point. If, with the passage of time, the payoffs are perceived worse than the current reference point, a decision-maker will become risk-acceptant to defend the current utilities. In other words, as long as the alternative choices remain relevant to the existing set of framing, any decision-making is to be seen by prospect theory as a congruent part of choice behaviour.³³ Consistency or not may not be a major concern of a decision-maker.³⁴

This inattention to consistency in decision-making is certainly in sharp contrast to rational choice theorists. The latter school sees a decision from the perspective of final expected utilities.³⁵ A choice is the end product of mathematical calculation, in which process decision-makers are "gain-maximising initiators". Decision-makers in rational choice theory are also expected to be free from bias because they presumably concentrate on measuring final expected utilities.³⁶ Policy preference is taken as consistent and transitive within a defined period as a result of mathematical

²⁸ William J. McGuire (1967a) "The current status of cognitive consistency theories", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in attitude theory and measurement* (NY: Wiley & Sons), p. 415; McGuire (1967b) "Cognitive consistency and attitude change", in Fishbein, *Readings in attitude theory*, p. 357.

²⁹ Roger Hilsman (1967) *To move a nation* (NY: Doubleday), p. 5.

³⁰ Berndt Brehmer (1976) "Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 6, p. 1000.

³¹ Cornford, J. P. (1974) "Review article: The illusion of decision", *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 2, p. 239.

³² Tadeusz Tyszka (1986) "Information and evaluation process in decision-making: The role of familiarity", in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevon, *New directions*, p. 160.

³³ Robert J. Reilly (1982) "Preference reversal: Further evidence and some suggested modifications in experimental design", *American Economic Review*, 72, p. 582.

³⁴ David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (1988) "Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making", in Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions*, p. 25.

³⁵ Klemens Szaniawski (1980) "Philosophy of decision making", *Acta Psychologica*, 45, p. 339.

³⁶ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (1989) "Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter", *World Politics*, 41, 2, p. 210.

calculation.³⁷ It is in this sense that preference reversals are behavioural anomalies for rational choice theorists.³⁸ They reflect failure of decision-makers in following a normative procedure in decision-making.³⁹ But prospect theory finds no problem in providing explanations for the phenomena of preference reversals to occur. This is because prospect theory is more inclined to see people choose an option on the principle of “being satisfying”, meaning “good enough”,⁴⁰ instead of “maximising” alternatives assumed by rational choice theories.⁴¹ Viewed in this light, a reference point can be dynamically re-located by a decision-maker with a change of contextual information. In other words, framing is always subject to counter-framing.⁴² There is no sense of irrationality in preference reversals.⁴³

Taken together, the tendency to avoid losses, the weight of subjectivity and the violation of the major tenets of rational choice models in respect of consistency constitute three basic characteristics of prospect theory. Although Tversky and Kahneman restrict the application of prospect theory to description,⁴⁴ they have roundly asserted that rational choice models are not empirically sustainable and fundamentally flawed. They argue instead that individual decisions found in their laboratory prove not supportive of the standard decision-making theories based on the assumption of rationality and consistent behaviour in decision-making. Their findings seem to have elevated prospect theory to a level competing with the theories of rational choice.⁴⁵ It is this promising prospect that this thesis now turns.

2. Justification of the choice of prospect theory

A decision-making process perspective

³⁷ George A. Quattrone and Amos Tversky (1988) “Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice”, *American Political Science Review*, 82, 3, p. 720.

³⁸ Bruno S. Frey and Reiner Eichenberger (1989) “Should social scientists care about choice anomalies?”, *Rationality and Society*, 1, 1, pp. 101-22.

³⁹ Martin Hollis (1996) *Reason in action: Essays in the philosophy of social science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 2; Werner W. Pommerehne, Friedrich Schneider and Peter Zweifel (1982) “Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon: A re-examination”, *American Economic Review*, 72, p. 569; Amos Tversky, Paul Slovic and Daniel Kahneman (1990) “The causes of preference reversal”, *The American Economic Review*, 80, 1, p. 215.

⁴⁰ Stuart A. Ross (1976) “Complexity and the presidency: Gouverneur Morris in the constitutional convention”, in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 111.

⁴¹ Tore Sandven (1999) “Autonomy, adaptation, and rationality—A critical discussion of Jon Elster’s concept of ‘sour grapes’, part II”, *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 29, 2, p. 201.

⁴² Zeev Maoz (1991) “Framing the national interest: The manipulation of foreign policy decisions in group settings”, *World Politics*, 43, 1, p. 89.

⁴³ Tversky and Kahneman (1991) “Loss aversion in risk choice”, p. 1057.

⁴⁴ Ibid. (1986) “Rational choice and the framing of decision”, *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, p. s272.

⁴⁵ Ibid. (1979) “Prospect theory”, p. 263.

The first point to justify the choice of prospect theory as the methodology lies in a different perspective that prospect theory holds. To begin with, in the realm of decision-making literature, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism have proved singularly un-illuminating with regard to the two British turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68. But it has to be noted that these two rational choice models are looking for expected utilities as an explanation, rather than taking interest in enquiries into the process of choosing.⁴⁶ Viewed in this light, this thesis may hit on a proper track if it adopts the perspective of prospect theory, because in cases of qualitative research, the process of policy development is an important perspective, especially for understanding the happening of preference reversals.⁴⁷ With its two-phase hypothetical construct, prospect theory represents exactly this kind of concern. Briefly speaking, representativeness in the editing phase will have cognitive function "from the point of view of processes". Alongside the process, location and re-location of a reference point in the evaluating phase may be a viable chain alongside the decision-making process.⁴⁸

Next, the choice of theory can also be justified from the point of view of evaluating prospect theory. As Farnham urged, to build up the explanatory power of prospect theory, it must "be evaluated in the light of its competitors".⁴⁹ Although the explanatory difficulties of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism shown in Chapter 2 have been demonstrated, their fundamental weakness in explanation does not mean that prospect theory will have a better claim. To respond to Farnham's call for a test in a competitive manner, this thesis so far has not fulfilled its task. A verification of prospect theory is still wanting.

More specifically, the dispute over the Falkland Islands is a territorial issue. As Stein argues, a territorial dispute can be seen as being characterised by a "static" preference pattern with the end utilities approximately the same in most human negotiations.⁵⁰ Levy concurs, by maintaining that "power and territory are notoriously resistant to the type of interval level of measurement required by either expected

⁴⁶ Richard K. Ashly (1984) "The poverty of neorealism", *International Organisation*, 38, 1, p. 59.

⁴⁷ Graham Allan (1991) "Qualitative research", in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds.), *Handbook for research students in the social sciences* (NY & London: Falmer), p. 179.

⁴⁸ J. R. Anderson (1983) *The architecture of cognition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 46-7,

⁴⁹ Barbara Farnham (1992) "Introduction", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, p. 168.

⁵⁰ Stein (1993) "International co-operation and loss avoidance", p. 12.

utility theory and prospect theory".⁵¹ Indeed, for most sovereign states, the framing of a territorial issue is static, as territoriality is inseparable from the concept of sovereignty. For revisionists, framing can also be static because a territorial issue is involved with seeking to reverse an imbalance of interests.⁵² Even for institutionalists, framing of a territorial dispute can also be static in that territoriality is taken as vital to the extent of being the root of social meaning.⁵³ Therefore, in light of a territorial dispute being an exceptional case due to uncompromising framing, the issue of the Falkland Islands becomes the "least-likely" case to fit prospect theory.⁵⁴ With a view to advancing the explanatory terrain of prospect theory, the testing effort is worthwhile.

Secondly, the test of a territorial dispute is worthwhile because a territorial dispute is a new frontier in application of prospect theory. Exponents of prospect theory rarely extend their cases beyond the domains of economic issues,⁵⁵ and the institutional framework of alliance.⁵⁶ Klinger may be an exception. He applies prospect theory in the case of the American Civil War, which can be seen as a similar case on territorial conflict. However, his approach in observation is highly debatable because, as Klinger admits, military strategy consists of strategic, operational and tactical levels. Klinger did not differentiate them in the analysis, and his findings as a result remained inconclusive.⁵⁷ Hence, examining the Falklands dispute can be seen as an effort to explore a new frontier that Klinger has not finished. The selection of the issue is helpful to theory evaluation in that the case is ideally characterised by "non-typicality".⁵⁸

⁵¹ Jack S. Levy (1992) "Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and analytical problems", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, p. 293.

⁵² Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf), p. 321.

⁵³ James A. Caporaso (1992) "International relations theory and multilateralism: The search for foundations", *International Organisation*, 46, 3, p. 127.

⁵⁴ Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George (1997) "Research design tasks in case study methods", draft paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, 17-19 October.

⁵⁵ Robert Jervis (1992) "Political implications of loss aversion", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, pp. 187-204; Pauly (1993) "The political foundations of multilateral economic surveillance", pp. 94-127.

⁵⁶ Stephen G. Walker (1995) "Psychodynamic process and framing effects in foreign policy decision-making: Woodrow Wilson's operational code", *Political Psychology*, 16, 4, pp. 697-717; Stephen Walt (1991) "Alliance formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and bandwagoning in cold war competition", in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Dominoes and bandwagonings: Strategic beliefs and great power competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 54.

⁵⁷ Jane M. Klinger (1999) *When in the realm of losses: Prospect theory and decision making in war*, paper presented at the International Studies Association, 16-20 February, p. 16.

⁵⁸ King, Keohane and Verba (1994) *Designing social inquiry*, p. 42.

Killing two birds with one stone

To minimise bias and to take a systematic observation,⁵⁹ this thesis is not satisfied with Wendt's remark that "issues of substance" are more meaningful than choices of methods.⁶⁰ This thesis, instead, is of the view that looking at substance exclusively tends to commit the fallacy as the analyses following the historical approach. To avoid this, the concerns of selecting theory and methods have better be integrated and mutually supportive. A theory in choice can be justified by the possibility of elevating the representative status of a case under research, while case selection can advance a theory by the possibility of reinforcing the explanatory power of a theory in evaluation.⁶¹ In this sense, the goal of this thesis can be made clearer at this stage. The purpose of this thesis is to identify behavioural patterns in British decision-making on the issue of the Falkland Islands, and to test theories with results to share with IR students.⁶² To use Little's expression, this thesis intends to "kill two birds with one stone—providing an improved understanding" of British cooperation with Argentina over the Falklands issue in the 1960s, "while demonstrating the virtues of a scientific approach to foreign policy analysis".⁶³

3. The criticisms of prospect theory

Nevertheless, prospect theory meets with counter-arguments. The first doubt about prospect theory concerns the effect of framing. It has been contended that, because the findings are mainly from the laboratory,⁶⁴ the framing effects are uncertain in application.⁶⁵ Some scholars find that "the shifts from risk-taking to risk aversion are less pronounced than those obtained by Tversky and Kahneman in the human life tests".⁶⁶ Therefore, it is contended that framing effects are limited in

⁵⁹ King, Keohane and Verba (1995) "The importance of research design", p. 478.

⁶⁰ Alexander Wendt (1998) "On constitution and causation in international relations", *Review of International Studies*, 24, Special Issue, December, p. 111, p. 115.

⁶¹ David E. Apter (1957) "Theory and the study of politics", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, p. 754.

⁶² Ernest Nagel (1968) *The structure of science* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), pp. 455-6; Charles C. Ragin (1994) *Constructing social research: The unity and diversity of method* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge), p. 33.

⁶³ Richard Little (1988a) "The study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 247.

⁶⁴ Roderick M. Kramer (1989) "Windows of vulnerability or cognitive illusions? Cognitive processes and the nuclear arms race", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1, p. 97.

⁶⁵ Schie and Plight (1990) "Problem representation", p. 244.

⁶⁶ Joop van der Plight and Els C. M. van Schie (1990) "Frames of reference, judgement and preference", in Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone (eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 1 (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), p. 70.

practice.⁶⁷ Levy complains that prospect theory has failed to provide IR students with a theory of collective decision-making. It is as a result limited in its application to the level of individuals' choices only.⁶⁸ In addition, the status quo bias is still questionable. Levy, for instance, claims that the status quo bias is "mis-specified".⁶⁹ The "bias", argues Levy, "is really a referent point bias, a greater tendency to move toward the reference point than expected-utility predicts".⁷⁰ Another question is posed by this thesis as follows: since decision weight is characterised by subjective values at work, under what circumstances does decision weight comes to the fore?

The foregoing criticisms—methodological ambiguity about the effect of framing; evidence found only at the level of single individual's choice; and uncertainties about the status quo bias and decision weight—are by no means insignificant. They constitute issues confronting the legitimate position of prospect theory in the aspects of definition, empirical observation and methodologies. Although all these uncertainties, believes Levy, arise from no clear theory to guide the way to observe how "an actor frames a choice problem",⁷¹ this thesis cannot intellectually stop here. To adopt prospect theory as the perspective for understanding the British conduct of the Falklands dispute in the 1960s, this thesis takes issue with the above, and leaves the status quo bias issue to the empirical observations in the next chapter.

4. Responses to the criticisms of prospect theory

To reflect, not to simplify

This thesis contends that prospect theory is not for studying an individual's choices only. There have been many reports confirming the effect of framing at group level.⁷² In the literature on cognitive psychology, which takes representativeness as an explanatory variable, there is evidence showing that employment of a reference point

⁶⁷ Elaine Vaughan and Marianne Seifert (1992) "Variability in the framing of risk issues", *Journal of Social Values*, 48, 4, p. 123.

⁶⁸ Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining", p. 184, p. 192.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 189.

⁷⁰ Ibid. (1997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice", p. 91.

⁷¹ Levy (1992) "Prospect theory and international relations", p. 291; Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining", p. 191.

⁷² Philip Bobko, Larry Shetzer and Craig Russel (1991) "Estimating the standard deviation of professors' worth: The effects of frame and presentation order in utility analysis", *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, 64, 2, p. 181; Baruch Fischhoff (1983) "Predicting framing", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 9, p. 116; Gordon F. Pitz (1980) "The very guide of life: The use of probabilistic information for making decisions", in Wallsten, *Cognitive processes in choice*, p. 91; Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly (1982) "Egocentric biases in availability and attribution", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 187.

for social decisions is conspicuous, and that the degree of risk-orientation is reinforced at collective levels.⁷³ These explain that framing may not always be confined to the individual level.⁷⁴

For those scholars who think prospect theory is exclusively for understanding an individual's choice, they confuse the assumption of prospect theory with its entailing argument. It is true that prospect theory assumes an individual perspective. Nevertheless, the purpose of prospect theory starting the argument from the assumption of the individual-actor level is to set a boundary for observation. But to set a boundary does not mean to limit the effect of the analytical power of prospect theory, given that the policy preferences of the FCO have to be analysed contextually and conditionally. As far as a foreign policy goes, this concern about the individual-actor assumption can be relaxed. Because in foreign policy, there are some actors whose concerns are "decisive enough" and cannot be reduced to the level of other individuals or other collective groups.⁷⁵ Foreign Secretaries of the United Kingdom and Presidents of the United States of America in the decision-making literature are of this type. It is some individuals' thinking patterns that govern the "thinking and behaving" of their inferiors in the bureaucratic echelons.⁷⁶ Hence, in terms of foreign policy, it is justifiable to structure the groups under observation as a "personalised" view, because the influence can be seen as coming from the top down to the bottom. As Tony Benn, Minister of Technology 1966-70, observed, "the conduct of [British] Government business can be said to reflect a personal and automatic, rather than a collective and democratic, spirit".⁷⁷ Dunsire shared a similar view. He found that despite the call for political neutrality, civil servants are rarely neutral in exercising their powers. Their expressed opinions (subjective value-systems) hardly go beyond the interests and concerns of their working units. The collective opinion of the working units in turn is subject to the Ministers, Secretaries or Prime ministers in the

⁷³ Jeffrey Berejekian (1997) "The gains debates: Framing state choice", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4, pp. 789-805; Ruth P. Mack (1971) *Planning on uncertainty: Decision making in business and government administration* (NY: Wiley-Interscience), p. 126; David M. Messick (1986) "Decision making in social dilemmas: Some attributional effects", in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevon, *New directions*, p. 223.

⁷⁴ Marilyn B. Brew and Roderick M. Kramer (1986) "Choice behaviour in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 3, p. 545.

⁷⁵ Barry Hindess (1990) "Analysing actors' choice", *International Political Sciences Review*, 11, 1, p. 88.

⁷⁶ Charles E. Osgood (1967) "Cognitive dynamics in the conduct of human affairs", in Fishbein, *Readings in attitude theory*, p. 435.

⁷⁷ Tony Benn (1980) "The case for a constitutional premiership", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 33, 1, p. 13.

bureaucratic echelons.⁷⁸ They could be seen as one distinctive body because, ultimately, the interests of both ministers and civil servants within the same department can be identified. As Weir and Beetham observed, "they act as a partisan arm of the executive",⁷⁹ and should be seen as "partners in government".⁸⁰ These remarks lend much weight to the assumption of prospect theory. They indicate that the "state-as-individual" assumption remains closely contingent in terms of "collective responsibility" in British politics. There will be no problem to take this individual-actor assumption to reflect the internal dynamic of the British Foreign Office.

Thirdly, a "personalised" view is by no means an individual one in practice. This is because personal influence in the context of foreign policy can be limited in "time and energy".⁸¹ Therefore, despite the unitary-actor assumption, it does not mean that observation of group activities can be omitted. With the function of representativeness at work, as stressed by prospect theory, policy calculation "is not simply something inside the head of an individual".⁸² Rather, the result of decision-making has to be taken as a reflection of a social and historical collective endeavour. The formation of policy preferences should be treated as collective effort.⁸³

In fact, with the function of framing based on the notion of representativeness, it will become difficult for an observer to tell exactly whether a foreign policy is made at the individual or collective level. Owing to this difficulty to differentiate, the criticism whether a decision is made at the individual or collective level in a bureaucratic framework seems not to be a dire threat to the unitary-actor assumption made earlier in Chapter 1, or adopted by prospect theory. This assumption by no means implies that it will restrict observation to only one or two decision-makers, or disregard group activities.

To summarise, this thesis does not sympathise with the criticism that the application of prospect theory is limited to individual choice only. On the contrary, the testing results of prospect theory in the published literature have already suggested the

⁷⁸ Andrew Dunsire (1988) "Bureaucratic morality in the United Kingdom", *International Political Science Review*, 9, 3, p. 187.

⁷⁹ Stuart Weir and David Beetham (1999) *Political power and democratic control in Britain: The democratic audit of the United Kingdom* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 190.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁸¹ Chris Brown (1997) *Understanding international relations* (London: Macmillan), p. 74.

⁸² Edward E. Sampson (1981) "Cognitive psychology as ideology", *American Psychologists*, 36, 7, p. 732.

⁸³ David Hackett Fischer (1970) *Historian's fallacies: Toward a logic of historical thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), p. 217.

potential interplay between individual and collective choice. The fundamental point is whether the level of analysis highlights “the nature of the problem and the questions posed” or not.⁸⁴ As long as an analyst explores the case in a systematic manner corresponding to prospect theory, the findings cannot be lightly dismissed.

A critique of the concept of framing

What concerns this thesis most is the criticism that the concept of framing is ambiguous. Indeed, to evaluate prospect theory, what is at stake is an unclear boundary of framing for empirical observation and information-gathering in a systematic manner. Because of the ambiguity, many case studies either did not capture the spirit of what is afoot in prospect theory, or adopted the weakest part of it in their applications. Since the major concern of this thesis is theory evaluation,⁸⁵ some key points in methodology have to be clarified before setting out the task of falsification.

Framing not solely given

Part of the criticism comes from the fact that Tversky and Kahneman, forefathers of prospect theory in the realm of economics, have not provided the analysts with a clear concept of framing. Framing, for Tversky and Kahneman, refers to the “frame of reference”, which gives rise to an organising principle for decision-makers to understand an issue and formulate a policy. By using framing with the connotation of “frame of reference”, Tversky and Kahneman argue that the representativeness can strengthen the influence of framing on the ordering of policy preferences.⁸⁶ This emphasis on representativeness inclines the IR analysts to read into framing a rule to govern the decision-makers’ understanding of a complex issue. Under this rubric, some IR scholars exclusively present framing in descriptive terms, such as the domain of frame or “dominance of explicit information”. Some report that framing consists of “the basic units of thinking”,⁸⁷ which helps “define a decision maker’s subjective sense of situation” and even motivations.⁸⁸ Others declare that framing will differentiate

⁸⁴ Paul Martin and Patrick Baterson, Frs (1993) *Measuring behaviour: An introductory guide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 9.

⁸⁵ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1995) “The importance of research design in political science”, *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, p. 475.

⁸⁶ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991) “Loss aversion in risk choice: A reference-dependence model”, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CVI, 4, p. 1039.

⁸⁷ Michael Billing (1987) *Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 122.

⁸⁸ J. W. Atkinson and D. Birch (1978) *Introduction to motivation* (NY: Can Nostrand), p. 33; Christopher Roney J. R., E. Tory Higgins and James Shah (1995) “Goals and framing: How outcome focus

issues among different sorts of reality,⁸⁹ and help a decision-maker to recognise “the importance of the situation”.⁹⁰ Some are even quite satisfied with a general rule of thumb and suggest that “frame, framing and framework” were actually similar in connotations.⁹¹

The crux here is that, Tversky and Kahneman are too ready to stress the determinant impact of cognitive representativeness in framing without realising that this kind of understanding about framing is at best a contextual factor.⁹² It is only relevant to “the surface appearance of” a newly emerging issue. It does not correspond to the whole content of the task of choice in question described by prospect theory.⁹³

By referring to “the frame of reference”, Tversky and Kahneman seem to identify framing as a mentally structural hold in the editing phase of prospect theory. But their having taken representativeness as the core of prospect theory has led astray some analysts of prospect theory. To the extent that the followers apply the meaning of framing exclusively to the editing phase, the existence of subjective forces in the evaluating phase is disregarded.⁹⁴ Policy preferences in these circumstances become a pure cognitive response to the frame of an issue. This is misleadingly restrictive in respect of description, and methodologically unhelpful, in terms of theory evaluation.

For instance, in the analysis of Eisenhower’s decision making in the 1956 Suez Crisis, McDermott argued that the main reason for the US not to intervene with force was that Eisenhower enjoyed a domain of gain. Before the eruption of the crisis, Eisenhower was “an overwhelmingly popular president”. When the crisis broke out, Britain and France intended to reverse the situation, caused by Nasser’s nationalising the Suez Canal. But Eisenhower, despite the concern of the western alliance, was quite satisfied with the new status quo created by Nasser. According to McDermott, because Eisenhower was “so firmly entrenched in the domain of gains”, he was

influences motivation and emotion”, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 11, p. 1152.

⁸⁹ Erving Goffman (1974) *Frame analysis: An essay on the organisation of experience* (London: Penguin Books), pp. 10-11, p. 79.

⁹⁰ Kramer (1989) “Windows of vulnerability”, p. 81.

⁹¹ Robert M. Entman (1993) “Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm”, *Journal of Communication*, 43, 4, p. 53.

⁹² N. S. Fagley and Paul M. Miller (1990) “The effect of framing on choice: Interactions with risk-taking propensity, cognitive style, and sex”, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16, 3, p. 496.

⁹³ John S. Carroll (1980) “Analysing decision behaviour: The magician’s audience”, in Wallsten, *Cognitive processes in choice*, p. 70.

⁹⁴ Mary Henle (1955) “Some effects of motivational processes on cognition”, *Psychological Review*, 62, 6, p. 429.

cautious. Eisenhower, as a result, made a risk-averse decision not to use force.⁹⁵ This explained in part why Eisenhower did not support Anthony Eden's demand for intervening with force. From the perspective of prospect theory, concluded McDermott, the result of risk-aversion in the US decision-making was within the framework of prospect theory.

Clearly, following Tversky and Kahneman, McDermott could well justify her finding. Given the definition of framing, understood exclusively as the domain of frame, McDermott might well preclude the influence of Eisenhower's individual attitudes, private intention, the US disposition and desirability. But McDermott has to be reminded that research bearing on the domain of frame is insufficient so far as prospect theory is concerned. Practically, without observing the subjective force working as a filter in interpreting the incident, how can we expect Eisenhower's established representativeness in the Suez Crisis to be sustainable? Why can McDermott confidently report that Eisenhower's insistence that "risk should never be driven by fear of the future" was on the grounds of his domain of gains?⁹⁶ How can Eisenhower be said to see "possibilities of improvement in the Middle East, although the present developments [of the crisis] were adverse"?⁹⁷ For sure, it is problematic to discuss decision-making proportionately within the domain of frame, without even mentioning Eisenhower's political motivation behind. McDermott could hardly disregard the internal motives of the actors, such as motivation and desire, from the point of view of prospect theory.⁹⁸

McDermott's problem on methodology is suggestive. It shows that to define framing as "dominance of explicit information" or the "organisation of experience" is partial and insufficient.⁹⁹ First of all, the definition of framing falls exclusively into the language of "decision frame" or representativeness is a result of its being unevenly covered by Tversky and Kahneman. Framing under this circumstance is constructed exclusively within cognitive psychology.¹⁰⁰ But this kind of definition is in practice unconvincing. If framing is understood in the way that Tversky and Kahneman

⁹⁵ Rose McDermott (1998) *Risk-taking in international politics: Prospect theory in American foreign policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 143-5, p. 155.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 162.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 144.

⁹⁸ Richard P. Bennett and Joseph P. Carbonari (1976) "Personality patterns related to own-, joint-, and relative-gain maximising behaviours", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 6, p. 1127.

⁹⁹ Kramer (1989) "Windows of vulnerability", p. 81; Goffman (1974) *Frame analysis*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁰ A. John Maule (1985) "Cognitive approaches to decision making", in George Wright (ed.),

suggest, or in the ways that IR analysts think Tversky and Kahneman intentionally suggest, we will end up with too mechanical a description of decision making. Risk-averse or risk-acceptant propensity will be restrictively interpreted as a structural product without realising that information encoding may not happen in accordance with the perception of the decision-makers.¹⁰¹

Prospect theory, with its two-phase practice in decision making—editing and evaluating—is by no means a pure context-dependent theory. Tversky and Kahneman clearly have not offered a balanced definition of framing corresponding to both the editing and evaluating phases of prospect theory. Pragmatically, a decision cannot be interpreted as a “biological” or “intuitive” response to human surroundings.¹⁰² It is for this practical concern that prospect theory becomes a competitive model of decision-making. The degree of receiving a given set of input data, or in other words, perception, will depend on both “the context and the status of the perceivers”.¹⁰³

Part of the reason for this under-estimation of the internal dynamic of decision-making in prospect theory is that Tversky and Kahneman have neglected it. They do mention the intervening element of subjective force in the evaluating phase, but, unfortunately, they do not sustain their argument by elaborating on the way representativeness is filtered, and then adopted, as a reference point when decision making comes to the evaluating phase. Rather, they pay more attention to status quo bias and loss aversion, under the name of “reflection effect”.¹⁰⁴ Their emphasis is of course helpful in distinguishing prospect theory from rival models. However, the uncritical use of the terms framing across the two phases, editing and framing, has weakened the explanatory force of prospect theory and created methodological problem in observation.¹⁰⁵ Tversky and Kahneman justify their silence in this area by openly admitting the difficulty of gauging subjective probability in mental

Behavioural decision making (NY & London: Plenum), p. 79.

¹⁰¹ John B. Best (1995) *Cognitive psychology*, 4th edition (Minneapolis: West Publishing), p. 5.

¹⁰² Billing (1987) *Arguing and thinking*, pp. 123-4; Susan Carey (1995) “On the origin of causal understanding”, in Dan Sperber, David Premack and Ann James Premack (eds.), *Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 272.

¹⁰³ David Chalmers (1995) “High-level perception, presentation, and analogue: A critique of artificial-intelligence methodology”, in Douglas Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (eds.), *Fluid concepts & creative analogies: Computer models of the fundamental mechanisms of thought* (NY: BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.), p. 171.

¹⁰⁴ Kahneman and Tversky (1979) “Prospect theory”, pp. 268-9.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. (1985) “The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice”, in Wright, *Behavioural decision making*, p. 27.

representation and by reporting that there is no “formal theory of framing”.¹⁰⁶

Nevertheless, this thesis does not share the view that the report of no theory can suffice as a legitimate reason. To claim that “there is no theory” is not enough. There is also no uniform theory of cognitive responses in the decision-making process.¹⁰⁷ The causal assertion of representativeness is still considered no more than “an artificial science”.¹⁰⁸ Current understanding about the exact causal explanation of the mental behaviour remains hypothetical.¹⁰⁹ No definitive answer and agreed analysis can be offered at present.¹¹⁰ We do not really know to what extent human preference is affected by representativeness alongside the cognitive processes, and, ultimately, all the common themes for discussion of representativeness have to be treated as a hypothetical construct.¹¹¹ However, Tversky and Kahneman seem to borrow the idea of representativeness with confidence. They put it to use in describing the editing phase without questioning that representativeness is also a relatively new branch in cognitive psychology.¹¹² By this token, why cannot they borrow other factors from other disciplines to deal with the evaluating phase in prospect theory and create a balanced viewpoint? When Tversky and Kahneman intend to elevate the persuasive status of representativeness in prospect theory, by arguing that causal data have greater impact than incidental data,¹¹³ without subjective judgement playing a part, how can we tell which data are causal and which, incidental?

Indeed, subjective force in the decision-making process can hardly be subdued,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. (1972) “Subjective probability: A judgement of representativeness”, *Cognitive Psychology*, 3, p. 425.

¹⁰⁷ Steve Chan and Donald A. Sylvan (1984) “Foreign policy decision making: An overview”, in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), *Foreign policy decision making: Perception, cognition, and artificial intelligence* (NY: Praeger), p. 5; Gordon F. Pitz and Natalie J. Sachs (1984) “Judgement and decision: Theory and application”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 35, pp. 150-1.

¹⁰⁸ Michael I. Posner (1982) “Information processing models—In search of elementary operations”, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, p. 508.

¹⁰⁹ Jean Ladriere (1986) “Scientific and ethical rationality”, in Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn and Paul Weingartner (eds.), *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science VII* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 701.

¹¹⁰ Daryle J. Bem (1967) “Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena”, *Psychological Review*, 74, 3, p. 198.

¹¹¹ Oswald Huber (1990) “Cognitive processes in multistage decision making”, in K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie and G. Erdos (eds.), *Lines of thinking: Reflections on the psychology of thought, vol. 1: Representation, reasoning, analogy and decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), p. 332; Andre Vandierendonck (1990) “Rule structure, frequency, typicality gradients, and the representation of diagnostic categories”, in Gilhooly et al. (eds.) *Lines of thinking*, pp. 39-40.

¹¹² Manfred Thuring and Helmut Jungermann (1986) “Constructing and running mental models for inferences about the future”, in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevon, *New directions*, p. 164.

¹¹³ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982c) “Causal schemas in judgements under uncertainty”, in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 118.

because these characters are often pre-disposed before an issue emerges.¹¹⁴ As Toda rightly noted, the cognitive decision system cannot operate without the help of subjective force such as “desires, loves, and hates”.¹¹⁵ Disregarding the motivation at the receiving end, just as McDermott did in her research of Eisenhower in the Suez Crisis, is to take the evaluating phase out of the classic concern of prospect theory. This omission destroys the theory *per se*.

Unfortunately, contrary to the analysts of prospect theory mentioned above, there are also some analysts, who define framing as “the identification of reference points”,¹¹⁶ or “selecting a particular referent point in terms of which decision options are made more salient”.¹¹⁷ They tend to see framing as “the process by which a communication source, such as a news organisation, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy”.¹¹⁸ Defining framing in this way is to put the concept into another extreme. Because it only describes how a decision-maker uses all available information to pre-empt or evade the imposition of exogenous cognitive processes without proper consideration of broader contextual factors. This attitude is unconvincing. A policy outcome and behaviour of decision-making cannot be explained solely by reference to the structure of the frame. It will leave reader a self-contained notion of policy preferences in views without paying attention to the structural constraints. Richardson's study of the same subject, the Suez Crisis, in the light of prospect theory will betray this weakness.¹¹⁹

Framing not solely chosen

Richardson in her analysis of the Suez Crisis argued that the US decision process was cautious and sensitive to various adverse consequences. Different from McDermott's argument based on the impact of the domain of gain, Richardson reported that Eisenhower displayed himself as a good example of rational choice

¹¹⁴ Charles Vlek (1987) “Towards a dynamic structural theory of decision behaviour”, *Acta Psychologica*, 66, 1, pp. 227-8; Allan W. Wicker (1969) “Attitude versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt response to attitude object”, *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, 4, p. 42.

¹¹⁵ Masanao Toda (1980) “Emotion and decision making”, *Acta Psychologica*, 45, p. 133.

¹¹⁶ Levy (1996) “Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining”, p. 183; Levy (1997b) “Prospect theory and the cognitive-rational debate”, in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 90.

¹¹⁷ John A. Fleishman (1988) “The effects of decision framing and others' behaviour on cooperation in a social dilemma”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32, 1, p. 164.

¹¹⁸ Thomas E. Nelson, Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley (1997) “Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance”, *American Political Science Review*, 91, 3, p. 567.

¹¹⁹ Louise Richardson (1993) “Avoiding and incurring losses: Decision-making in the Suez crisis”, in Stein and Pauly, *Choosing to co-operate*, pp. 170-201.

models throughout the crisis.¹²⁰ With this reasoning, Richardson thought that explanation from the perspective of rational choice remained superior. She did not think that prospect theory outdid rational choice models in this case. Although there was no evidence that the US decision-makers were risk-seeking during the crisis, Richardson believed that the lack of evidence did not support prospect theory with much force. For Richardson, instead, the US policy preference seeking to avoid the higher expected losses seemed to “correspond more closely to an orthodox utility maximisation model”.¹²¹ This was because, as Richardson observed, the US decision-makers during the crisis behaved in a way that “approximated [to] rational choice”.¹²² Richardson was therefore more convinced of rational choice models. She concluded that framing, as the explanatory variable of prospect theory, is questionable. Since the US was capable of controlling the situation, “frames are not given, but chosen”.¹²³

This thesis has no quarrel with Richardson over the finding that there was a large proportion of rationality in US decision-making in the Suez Crisis. But what cannot suffice in Richardson’s conclusion is the statement that framing is chosen, not given. Richardson has clearly pushed the argument into another extreme. It is not too difficult to find a contradictory example in Richardson’s writing to refute this rash conclusion. Richardson needs to be reminded that there was another analogue—appeasement of Hitler, the so-called Munich complex—in her study of the Suez Crisis. According to Richardson, the British decision-makers had a strong imperative to avoid the symptom of appeasement from reoccurring during the Suez Crisis. This powerful image of the Munich complex led Britain to be inclined to respond by using force and to “discount almost completely the risks of” taking military action.¹²⁴ The point to note here is that Richardson’s description of the Munich image deeply rooted in the British psyche could hardly be a chosen or a self-imposed reference point. Rather, the Munich complex should be properly seen as a pre-ordained lesson living in the history of the British mind that Eden, the Prime Minister, found it so hard to escape from. When it came to the crisis in 1956, as a result, the framing impact of this historical lesson, as Richardson also agreed, has actually presented a contradictory picture to the conclusion Richardson reached that framing is chosen not given.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p. 191.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 201.

¹²² Ibid., p. 200.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 210.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 187, p. 189.

Still, it is very hard to judge whether the US policy makers' sensitivity to the analogue of "anti-colonialism" leading to the decision not to intervene, as Richardson argued, was a result of its chosen reference point or historical aspiration. It will not be without foundation to argue that anti-colonialism during the crisis as a reference point around which the US framing was formulated could also be a reflection of the US historical isolationist awareness, to keep a distance from the European colonialist image.¹²⁵ At this juncture, it will be debatable to conclude that the US decision-makers chose framing as they intended. It seems safer to argue that framing is not solely chosen, nor is it subject to the decision-makers' wishes.

As Richardson's case analysis stands, researchers who take cognitive power out of framing will restrict the explanatory power of prospect theory, and this will entail an arbitrary leap in making inference. This is not the essence of prospect theory. Richardson is right up to a point in the evaluating phase, where decision weight characterised by subjective value systems plays an important part during the crisis in 1956, but she is right only up to this point. The epistemological sources of framing have to be sustained from both subjective power and cognitive factors. Framing cannot be a good for a decision-maker to choose at will.

5. A reinforced understanding of prospect theory

Hence, framing is neither mentally structural, nor chosen at one's will. But what is it? Entman, in communication theory, has expressed the concern that the idea of framing is conceptually scattered.¹²⁶ Entman's complaint is important in its own right, but complaint simply will not do. The cause of the problem is the lack of rigour in the field in appraising the theory under discussion. Unfortunately, there exists an "unwillingness" to specify what constituted the main body of a theory, and a tendency to adopt "Auxiliary propositions to explain away flaws" rooted in the theory in question among the IR students.¹²⁷

In "Framing Japan[s] problem: The Bush administration and the structural impediments initiative (SII)", Mastanduno applied prospect theory to his analysis of the interaction between Japan and the US. Mastanduno tried to explain why the US

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 191, p. 197.

¹²⁶ Robert M. Entman (1993) "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm", *Journal of Communication*, 43, 4, pp. 51-8.

¹²⁷ John A. Vasquez (1997) "The realist paradigm and degenerative versus progressive research programs: An appraisal of neotraditional research on Waltz's balancing proposition", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4, p. 899.

President Bush, when faced with the impatience of the US Congress, signed the structural impediments initiative (SII) in 1989, rather than placing the Super 301 Provision as a measure of sanction against Japan. Mastanduno argued that, the Bush Administration decided to sign the SII as a result of loss avoidance. The losses referred to the trade policy slipping out of the hands of the Bush administration, and destabilising the long-term multi-lateral trading system. However, the framing on the side of the US Congress was also consistently shown in terms of loss.¹²⁸ Mastanduno therefore found it difficult to explain why the Bush administration could be so effective in winning over the opposition and getting its policy accepted in the face of pressure from the US Congress. Mastanduno sought help in the notion of power, and declared that it was the high-level intervention by Bush earlier in March 1990 that explained the decision to ratify the SII.¹²⁹

In “Co-developing the FSX fighter: The domestic calculus of international cooperation”,¹³⁰ Spar set out to analyse the negotiations between the US and Japan about the FSX fighters in 1988. Spar argued that the Pentagon’s framing in terms of absolute losses carried more weight than the framing formulated by the Commerce Department, who was against the co-development of FSX fighters because of the relative-gain concern.¹³¹ As regards the question as to why the Pentagon won the policy debates with the Commerce Department about the FSX programme, Spar again found his explanation of loss avoidance unsustainable.¹³² Spar did not delve into the understanding but stopped here instead. He concluded that the Pentagon was a “powerful internal player” in the domestic bargaining process.¹³³

Mastanduno and Spar, to name but two, exemplified the tendency of the analysts concerned to bear a shallow understanding of the notion of framing. It is also infinitely easier to behead problems by invoking the notion of power at the concluding parts and shifting the attention from the core of prospect theory to other expedient excuses. Apparently, there is a need to reverse the meaning of framing to its original state in classical prospect theory terms. To fulfil this task, this thesis is obliged to add greater clarity about definition of framing.

¹²⁸ Mastanduno (1993) “Framing the Japan problem”, p. 45, p. 52, p. 56.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 61.

¹³⁰ Debora Spar (1993) “Co-developing the FSX fighter: The domestic calculus of international cooperation”, in Stein and Pauly, *Choosing to co-operate*, pp. 65-92.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 85.

¹³² Ibid..

¹³³ Ibid., p. 86.

Laying down the definition of framing

To get back to the essence of prospect theory, this thesis thinks that it is helpful to undo the ambiguous package of framing by separating it into the domain of frame and motivated framing with a view to facilitating observation through hypothesising.

Let this thesis borrow the idea of cognitive response and define the domain of frame as “the cognitive operations responding to a structure with the function of representativeness that helps simplify an issue and provide” an influential signpost for policy preference.¹³⁴ Also, let this thesis borrow the idea of strategic thinking and define the motivated framing as an act of “steering the reasoning processes by increasing the representativeness of the desired outcomes”.¹³⁵ However, just as the editing and evaluating phases in prospect theory are not exclusive, the motivated framing and domain of frame have to be seen as “two different but intertwined processes” pointing towards the formation of certain policy preferences.¹³⁶ Ultimately, the barrier between the domain of frame as an explanatory scheme and motivated framing as an internal explanatory one can be terminological rather than real.

In justification, this thesis assumes the domain of frame as a primitive force in the editing phase. As Stein and Welch argue, “any attempt to apply prospect theory to the study of foreign policy choice at present requires treating reference points” in the editing phase “as exogenous”.¹³⁷ This ontological status of reference points in the editing phase can be justified, partially by the understanding that political leaders can hardly manufacture policy making at the very beginning,¹³⁸ and partially by the reasoning that “new programs cannot be constructed on green field sites”.¹³⁹ Normally, when an issue emerges, decision-makers do “not know what to model” at the initial phase of their encounters. This makes decision-makers usually the “inheritors before they are choosers”, as they are sometimes “introduced into a policy environment dense with past commitment”.¹⁴⁰ The past commitment can be profoundly influential. As

¹³⁴ McDermott (1998) *Risk-taking in international politics*, p. 20, p. 27.

¹³⁵ Best (1995) *Cognitive psychology*, pp. 390-1.

¹³⁶ Gregory R. Lockhead (1980) “Know, then decide”, in Wallsten, *Cognitive processes*, p. 144.

¹³⁷ Janice Gross Stein and David A. Welch (1997) “Rational and psychological approaches to the study of international conflict: Comparative strengths and weaknesses”, in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 63.

¹³⁸ David Dolowitz and David Marsh (1996) “Who learns what from whom: A review of the policy transfer literature”, *Political Studies*, 44, p. 355.

¹³⁹ Patrick Humphreys (1986) “Intelligence in decision support”, in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevón, *New directions*, p. 333.

¹⁴⁰ R. Rose (1993) *Lesson-drawing in public policy: A guidance to learning across time and space* (NJ:

Weldes argues, there has been an established image of an issue held by the state officials when they “approach international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of the international system and of the place of their state”.¹⁴¹

Thus prompted, in applying prospect theory, this thesis thinks it appropriate to begin with observations from the perspective of the domain of frame, based on the assumption that it is exogenous to the decision makers’ general perception of this issue. In this regard, data rooted in social context as a source of perceptions and meaning are what this thesis is to observe. In Lebow’s words, “It is necessary to show that policymakers understood these constraints and opportunities and formulated the initiatives in response to” the context.¹⁴²

This thesis then observes the motivated framing in the evaluating phase by searching for data related to argumentation. Observation will include decision-makers’ acts of debating, arguing and defending their policy preference in public or private talks.¹⁴³ Basically, this thesis assumes that process of making a choice is a striving towards a better ground of argumentation in an attempt to stand by a policy preference.¹⁴⁴ The so-called “better ground” is understood as an argument justified or supported by the people concerned.¹⁴⁵ This understanding is relevant to the British foreign policy faced by the parliamentary system.¹⁴⁶ Hence, decision-makers’ arguing for the chosen reference point is presumed as an act to prove that they know the game well,¹⁴⁷ because they have “experienced high evaluative and/or discriminative choice”.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, when Giddens argues that the source of arguments comes from

Chatham House), p. 78.

¹⁴¹ Jutta Weldes (1996) “Constructing national interests”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, 3, p. 280.

¹⁴² Richard N. Lebow (1999) “The rise and fall of the Cold War on comparative perspective”, *Review of International Studies*, 25, special issue, December, p. 37.

¹⁴³ Paul Pierson (1993) “When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change”, *World Politics*, 45, 4, p. 616.

¹⁴⁴ Henry Montgomery (1987) “From cognition to action: The search for dominance in decision making”, in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds.), *Process and structure in human decision making*, (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons), p. 23.

¹⁴⁵ Oswald Huber (1989) “Information-processing operators in decision making”, in *ibid.* p. 33.

¹⁴⁶ Robert de Hoog and Godfried van der Wittenboer (1968) “Decision justification, information structure and the choice of decision rules”, in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevón, *New directions*, p. 191.

¹⁴⁷ Martin Hollis (1994) *The philosophy of social science: An introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 197.

¹⁴⁸ Ivan D. Steiner (1980) “Attribution of choice”, in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Progress in social psychology*, vol. 1 (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 28.

power in interaction,¹⁴⁹ Giddens has apparently put the cart before the horse. The source of power should be seen as the effect of persuasion. Power cannot be sustained without establishing a supportive public opinion.¹⁵⁰ Before getting a better ground of the power, justification of it is the prior concern.¹⁵¹ The effort of justification has to be understood as effective argumentation, where reasons and action mutually contribute to the confirmation (or rejection) of one's reference point about the debated issue. In other words, to consolidate a reference point, a decision-maker has to argue, defend, and debate. This kind of act, in turn, constitutes an effective pointer for decision-makers to reflect where the motivated framing lies.

Observing dramatic events

Nevertheless, if making framing empirically observable is the goal, to provide a set of definitions of framing is insufficient. It, at best, offers a static view. The thesis can hardly avoid the criticism of being ignorant of the gap between the domain of frame, as the "objective levels of the stimuli", and the motivated framing as "subjective values".¹⁵² It seems that, instead of laying down the definition of framing, there is still a need to make it clear what links the domain of frame to motivated framing and what constitutes the interaction between the two forces. In other words, this thesis is forced to face the question, given that policy "change does not occur automatically",¹⁵³ what causes the interaction between the domain of frame and motivated framing, leading to a confirmation and relocation of a reference point?

To answer this methodological question in observation, this thesis has to relate it to decision weight, which is still an outstanding problem in prospect theory. For the purpose of analysis, this thesis adds the view that a dramatic event is entitled to be one valid decision weight. This is because, firstly, a dramatic event is a moment for decision-makers to realise the existence of contextual factors such as representativeness, or potential reference points that they have not paid enough

¹⁴⁹ Anthony Giddens (1974) "Elite in the British class structure", in Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens (eds.), *Elites and Power in British society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 19; Giddens (1995) *A contemporary critique of historical materialism* (London & Basingstoke), p. 105.

¹⁵⁰ Vera Daniel (1952) "Physical principles in human cooperation", *The Sociological Review*, XLIV, 1, p. 132.

¹⁵¹ M. Bertilsson (1997) "The theory of structuration: Prospects and problems", in Christopher G. A. Bryant and David Jary (eds.), *Anthony Giddens: Critical assessments, vol. 1* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 55.

¹⁵² John Richard D. (1987) "Making judgements when information is missing: Inference, biases, and framing effects", *Acta Psychologica*, 66, 1, p. 72.

¹⁵³ Andrew P. Cortell and Susan Peterson (1999) "Altered states: Explaining domestic institutional change", *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1, p. 191.

attention to. Functionally speaking, because a dramatic event is rich with recognisable informative elements,¹⁵⁴ it is a social chance for decision-makers to enter or confirm their decision weight in the process of judgement.¹⁵⁵

To be succinct, from the point of view of decision-makers, a dramatic event is an objective commodity that represents "communicative knowledge".¹⁵⁶ It has the potential to attract the attention of decision-makers,¹⁵⁷ because it is characterised by "typicality", "similarity", "vivid-ness", "salience", "familiarity" or "concrete-ness" of the issue in question.¹⁵⁸ As a result, a dramatic event is expected to lead decision-makers to exaggerate its effect or consequence when they perceive it.¹⁵⁹ It will either provide the decision-makers with stronger incentives to re-locate a reference point, or communicates directly with the audience, whose opinions, in turn, often pressurise the decision-makers to relocate the reference point.¹⁶⁰ Arguably, a dramatic event can be seen as an occasion in which cognitive representativeness and strategic thinking are linked. It exhibits a strong signal and may either soften, or intensify, the current interaction of the decision-maker's motivated framing and domain of frame. Indeed, the occurrence of a dramatic event will influence the existing reference point in use and indirectly give impact to the existing domain of frame. That explains part of the reason why Harold Wilson would admit that his government had been "blown of course" due to the pressure of dramatic events in the late 1960s.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁴ David Austen-Smith (1992) "Strategic models of talks in political decision making", *International Political Science Review*, 13, 1, p. 57.

¹⁵⁵ Roger Sibeon (1999) "Agency, structure, and social chances as cross-disciplinary concepts", *Politics*, 19, 3, p. 142.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. (1983) "Precision of knowledge and the flow of information, open peer commentary, and author's response", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 6, 1, p. 56.

¹⁵⁷ Fred I. Dretske (1981) *Knowledge and the flow of information* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 44.

¹⁵⁸ Michael W. Eysenck and Mark T. Keane (1990) *Cognitive psychology: A student's handbook* (London & Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 459; Andrew M. Herbert, G. Keith Humphrey and Pierre Jolicoeur (1994) "The detection of bilateral symmetry: effects of surrounding frames", *Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 48, 1, pp. 140-8; Shelley E. Taylor (1982) "The availability bias in social perception and interaction", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 192; Amos Tversky (1977) "Features of similarity", *Psychological Review*, 84, 4, p. 327, p. 340; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1980) "Casual schemas in judgements under uncertainty", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Progress in social psychology, vol. 1* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), p. 70; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1982a) "Judgements of and by representativeness", in Daniel, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 85; Tversky and Kahneman (1982b) "Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases", in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, *Judgement under uncertainty*, p. 11; Lawrence M. Ward (1975) "Heuristic use or information integration in the estimation of subjective likelihood", *Bulletin of the Psychological Society*, 6, 1, p. 43.

¹⁵⁹ Michael Mastanduno (1993) "Framing the Japan problem: the Bush administration and the Structural Impediments Initiative" in Stein and Pauly, *Choosing to co-operate*, p. 61.

¹⁶⁰ Robert T. Riley and Thomas F. Pettigrew (1976) "Dramatic events and attitude change", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 5, p. 1011.

¹⁶¹ Weir and Beetham (1999) *Political power*, p. 139.

The implications of observing dramatic events are threefold. Admittedly, a dramatic event in the decision-making process does not necessarily mean an explicit causal factor. This is because strategic learning existing within the motivated framing process about a dramatic event “is basically inductive in nature”.¹⁶² There is no certainty as to whether the perceivers’ selecting operators will function properly to catch the strong signals, or interpret the signals as expected by the senders. Therefore, a causal response has to be left with a reasonable degree of suspicion.¹⁶³ However, since a dramatic event is enriched with potential reference points available for being taken as representativeness in decision-making, an analyst, seeking to explain changes of policies, will find in it an opportunity to observe a new representativeness of the issue on the horizon against a larger context.¹⁶⁴

Secondly, with the notion of dramatic events, the challenge to the ontological assumption about the domain of frame can be effectively subdued. This is because a dramatic event is loaded with new information. It makes the domain of frame more dynamic than the so-called primitive force of ontological structure. Assisted by a dramatic event as a good predictor of decision-making and policy reversals, a detached observer in doing research will tacitly assume that structural impact can be instantiated, reproduced, and transformed by human action.¹⁶⁵ It also prevents an observation of strategic thinking from falling prey to reductionism.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, taking note of a dramatic event alongside the decision-making process, the observation can be kept dynamic.

Thirdly, it is acknowledged that “process tracing” is an important element of prospect theory that stresses the decision-making process.¹⁶⁷ However, emphasising “processes” is insufficient to “understand how history smoothes some paths and closes

¹⁶² Hillel J. Einhorn (1980) “Learning from experience and sub-optimal rules in decision making”, in Wallsten, *Cognitive processes in choice*, p. 3.

¹⁶³ Oswald Huber (1986) “Decision making as a problem solving process”, in Brehmer, Jungermann, Lourens and Sevón, *New directions*, p. 113; Kenneth R. MacCrimmon and Ronald N. Taylor (1975) “Problem solving and decision making”, in Marvin D. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organisational psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally), p. 1399; U. Neisser (1983) “Components of intelligence or steps in routine procedures”, *Cognition*, 15, p. 189..

¹⁶⁴ Maria E. Q. Gonzales, Tony French and Paul Treffner (1990) “A naturalistic approach to mental representation”, in Gilhooly, Keane, Logie and Erdos, *Lines of thinking*, p. 61.

¹⁶⁵ A. E. Wendt (1987) “The agent-structure problem in international relations theory”, *International Organisation*, 41, 4, p. 359.

¹⁶⁶ Giddens (1984) *The constitutions of society: Outline of the theory of structuration* (Berkley: University of California Press), p. 25

¹⁶⁷ John W. Payne (1980) “Information processing theory: Some concepts and methods applied to decision research”, in Wallsten, *Cognitive processes in choice*, p. 99.

others off".¹⁶⁸ It still bears too much similarity to the historical approaches, of which we have been critical in Chapter 2. To be distant from the historical approaches, discussants of prospect theory in their observation can single out dramatic events from other trivialities along with the effort of "process tracing",¹⁶⁹ based on the assumption that the effect of dramatic events may help attract the attention of decision makers.¹⁷⁰ As Jervis notes, decision-makers do not simultaneously estimate several utilities.¹⁷¹ Instead, they look at only one or two "salient" values in policy calculations,¹⁷² whereupon decision weight multiplies the salient effect of the reference points in question. Apparently, observing a dramatic event may fill this demand.

To sum up, in light of the essence of prospect theory, focusing on dramatic events in the effort of "process tracing" can help evaluate the contextual meaning of an issue (i.e. domain of frame).¹⁷³ It also opens access to observing the change of strategic thinking with the passage of time (i.e. motivated framing).

A summary of the approach in this thesis

Let this thesis briefly recapitulate the main argument of this section. First, for the purposes of analysis of the British intention, desirability, and interests in decision-making, exponents of prospect theory need take a balanced point of view about the unitary-actor assumption. Second, it is no longer satisfactory to have the ostensible comment that framing has "direct influence on the choice available".¹⁷⁴ There is a need to treat framing as an independent variable seriously. To meet this need, this thesis makes a distinction between the domain of frame and motivated framing. The distinction not only demonstrates a mental picture corresponding to what prospect theory describes, but may help this thesis explore a case study systematically both from a structural perspective and the perspective of rational strategic thinking. Meanwhile, the interaction of the two distinct dimensions will be reinforced by the

¹⁶⁸ Pierson (1993) "When effect becomes cause", p. 616; Robert D. Putnam (1993b) *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 181.

¹⁶⁹ James N. Rosenau (1997) *Along the domestic-foreign frontier: Exploring governance in a turbulent world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 26.

¹⁷⁰ Ralph Norman Haber (1983) "Can information be objectivised?", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 6, 1, p. 71.

¹⁷¹ Robert Jervis (1988) "Realism, game theory, and cooperation", *World Politics*, 40, 3, p. 321.

¹⁷² Ibid. (1976) *Perception and misperception in international politics* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 137.

¹⁷³ Robert Axelrod (1976b) "Results", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 244; Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon (1972) *Human problem solving* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall), p.21.

¹⁷⁴ McDermott (1998) *Risk-taking in international politics*, p. 27.

related dramatic events taking place during the period under study. The observation of dramatic events will keep this thesis from being bogged down by too many variables in the effort of “process tracing”, and help meet the requirement of keeping observation task-specific. On the other hand, it has to acknowledge that the above imperatives do not exhaust the immediate task in observation. But it at least gives this thesis a starting point of it.

6. The four hypotheses and their justification

To explain the two British turning-point policy preferences in 1966-68, Section 6 offers four hypotheses in the light of prospect theory. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are the testing grounds for the first policy preference in 1966. Hypothesis 3 and 4, the second in December 1968. The subject under observation is the Foreign Office (FO) of the Wilson Government, 1966-70.

Hypothesis 1: Let this thesis suppose at this stage that in late 1966, Britain framed the solution of the Falklands dispute in terms of gains. The Government therefore was risk-averse and tended to talk about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina.

Hypothesis 2: Let it, for a moment, be granted that Britain framed the solution of the issue in terms of losses—losses including trade opportunities with South American countries and Britain’s world reputation. In view of prospect theory, the Government was risk-acceptant and decided to hold talks with Argentina.

Hypothesis 3: Let this thesis agree for now that, in 1968, the British Government framed the issue in terms of losses, so that it changed the policy line by upholding the wishes of the islanders again. The change of policy preference was therefore understood as a display of risk-acceptant behaviour under the condition that the British Government knew only too well that there would be a potential threat from Argentina.

Hypothesis 4: Let it, for the moment, be accepted that Britain framed the solution of the Falklands issue in terms of gains, so that the Government decided to change the policy preference in pursuit of gains. The change was a case of risk-averse style of decisional behaviour.

These four hypotheses will indicate the line of enquiry in the next chapter. Meanwhile, because Hypothesis 1 contrasts with Hypothesis 2, whereas Hypothesis 3

is the opposite of Hypothesis 4, testing the two sets of hypotheses will bring about exclusive results. It is expected that verification of one hypothesis (Hypothesis 1 and 3) will be to the exclusion of the other (Hypothesis 2 and 4), and vice versa. This counter-factual arrangement can be justified by the premise that any hypothesis can be possibly true or false, "with no definitive view being held" before proceeding to a test.¹⁷⁵ Because of this uncertainty, the counter-factual arrangement constitutes an exploratory basis for the puzzle stated in Chapter 1.¹⁷⁶

Some preliminary clarifications are in order, nonetheless. First, the four hypotheses may be suggested in an arbitrary manner. This is because proposing hypotheses is subject to no strict logical rules through deduction or induction.¹⁷⁷ Somehow, presenting hypotheses "involves guesswork", which act "has always something arbitrary" inside the innovative process.¹⁷⁸ That said, it is pointless to attempt a comprehensive portrayal of what causes are behind the formulation of hypotheses. The premise of suggesting these hypotheses, instead, is to have them "uncertain to some extent".¹⁷⁹

However, reservation to supply effective justifying reasons for the four hypotheses does not mean that "inventive talent" alone produces them.¹⁸⁰ It seems appropriate for this thesis to hold the line that the guesswork has to be disciplined by relevance to the British foreign policy during the period under study.¹⁸¹ In this regard, when the hypotheses argue that the Wilson Government framed the issue in terms of gains, and alternatively, in terms of losses, they can be justified by the following reasons. Firstly, as Chapter 1 and 2 have noted, the utilities throughout the decision-making process in 1966-68, such as good relations with Argentina, Britain's

¹⁷⁵ Nicholas Rescher (1964) *Hypothetical reasoning* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 4; James D. Fearon (1991) "Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science", *World Politics*, 43, 2, p. 170.

¹⁷⁶ Dudley Shapere (1985) "Observation and the scientific enterprise", in Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (eds.), *Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science* (Cambridge: MIT), p. 36.

¹⁷⁷ Peter Achinstein (1985) "The methods of hypothesis: What is it supposed to do, and can it do it?", in Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (eds.), *Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science* (Cambridge: MIT), pp. 128-9.

¹⁷⁸ Achinstein (1985) "The methods of hypothesis", p. 132; H. Poincare (1952) *Science and hypothesis* (London: Dover), p. 210.

¹⁷⁹ Rescher (1964) *Hypothetical reasoning*, pp. 1-3.

¹⁸⁰ Robert E. Butts (1968) (ed.) *William Whewell's theory of scientific method* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh), p. 130; Robert Latta and Alexander MacBeath (1964) *The elements of logic* (London: Macmillan), p. 307.

¹⁸¹ James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer (1980) *Fundamental of logic* (London: Collier Macmillan), p. 363.

international reputation, Labour's ideology of internationalism and the Argentine potential market, etc. were reiterated on many occasions by British officials. They were not those utilities that had rarely entered into the policy equation in the British FO. For instance, British Foreign Secretary Brown told Costa Mendez, Argentine Foreign Minister, with such typical directness, "We British are interested in two things: in keeping a good friendship with Argentina and in having better communications and better trade" with it.¹⁸² Stewart admitted in July 1968, "it is commonplace today that the task that takes up more of the time and energy of the diplomatic service than any other is the commercial task, the task of helping British export".¹⁸³ From these remarks, the four hypotheses meet the basic line of plausibility requirement. They at least do not commit the fallacy of an "illegitimate use of the imagination".¹⁸⁴

7. Conclusion

Chapter 3 investigates the contents of prospect theory with a view to facilitating empirical observation concerning the two British turning-point policy preferences in the conduct of the Falklands policy in 1966-68. After examining the main points of prospect theory and justifying the choice, this thesis argues that the gap between the individual and collective behaviour in drawing inference can be superficial, because a policy preference can be seen as a reflection of attitude within a working unit. The policy outcomes as a result can be taken as a co-ordinated effort, reflecting the interplay between individual and collective choice.

This thesis, then, criticises the customary usage of the term framing, which has been understood exclusively from the cognitive perspective. Discussants of prospect theory have neglected to observe the conscious acts of argumentation, which are an important part of human thinking and decisions.¹⁸⁵ This thesis is of the view that framing cannot be purely cognitive work. To solve a complex issue, the psychological part characterised by subjective value-systems has to be included in the decision-

¹⁸² Michael Charlton (1989) *The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 100.

¹⁸³ Anthony Sampson (1971) "The institutions of British foreign policy", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and west Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 185.

¹⁸⁴ James Clark Maxwell (1965) *Scientific paper, vol. 1* (NY: Dover), p. 420.

¹⁸⁵ W. Ray Crozier (1990) "Accounting for decisions: Justification and rhetoric", in Gilhooly, Keane, Logie and Erdos, *Lines of thinking*, p. 317.

making literature.¹⁸⁶ This thesis as a result calls for balanced attention to the two-phase operation of framing in future observation.

To do this, this thesis first divides the concept of framing into the domain of frame and motivated framing. It then defines the domain of frame as “basic operations that simplify and provide an influential signpost for choice”. The idea of domain of frame is corresponding to “situated cognition”, where decision makers immerse themselves.¹⁸⁷ Hence, the variables such as organisational goals and contextual atmosphere presumably become the resources for policy calculation in the editing phase.¹⁸⁸

On the other hand, the domain of frame and the resource dependencies it entails are not fixed. This thesis acknowledges that the decision-makers concerned can, and do, negotiate and renegotiate different domains of frame. This thesis, as a consequence, adds the reflective element of strategic thinking in the name of motivated framing into the definition of framing. It takes motivated framing as a conscious effort in “steering the reasoning processes by increasing the availability or representativeness of the desired outcomes”. Motivated framing, understood in this way, becomes a deliberate act of “goal framing” with the implication of political manipulation, because it is decision-makers that interpret and negotiate constraints or opportunities.¹⁸⁹ Methodologically, an observer can be assured of the force, as long as the observed preference, or reference point, has been seriously argued or defended in an open policy debate.

Nevertheless, this thesis is fully aware that the two definitions only provide a static picture. To invigorate a dynamic description of the foreign policy decision-making process, this thesis thinks it important to identify dramatic events as the operators that often have impact on the decision-makers’ policy equation. This arrangement appears to let this thesis off the hook, because, presumably, with the assistance of dramatic events in observation, it will help the “process tracing” distant from the pure historical approaches, and become more task-specific. Hopefully, with the methodological design consisting of cognitive response, subjective force, and the

¹⁸⁶ Mark Snyder and William B. Swann Jr. (1976) “When actions reflect attitudes: The politics of impression management”, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 5, p. 1041.

¹⁸⁷ James G. Greeno (1989) “A perspective on thinking”, *American Psychologist*, 44, 2, p. 135.

¹⁸⁸ Herbert A. Simon (1986) “Rationality in psychology and economics”, *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s210.

¹⁸⁹ Yaacov Schul and Yoav Ganzach (1995) “The influence of quantity of information and goal framing

intervening force of dramatic events, the framework for observation is clarified, and the road for falsification of the theory thus opens up. Lastly, this Chapter presents four hypotheses in light of prospect theory, and purposefully arranges them in a counterfactual form.

Limitation has to be in order, however. This thesis does not hesitate to admit that the methodological framework presented here is neither exhaustive nor all encompassing. Many factors that could affect the two policy preferences in the issue of the Falkland Islands during the period under study can inevitably be ignored. This is because the researcher's sensitivity to the data may be unconsciously regulated and, somehow, bounded, after moving into hypothesis testing in Chapter 4.¹⁹⁰

Nevertheless, the above hypothetical framework leads to the expectation that a systematic observation of the historical archives and relevant biographies may throw some light on what this thesis is concerned about.¹⁹¹ In this regard, official papers in the archive are thought to be "the backbone of the FCO".¹⁹² *Hansard*, on the other hand, is taken by this thesis as a guide, because in the policy debate, *Hansard* "contains calm, deliberate speeches in which ministers describe with clarity and detail the objectives they expect".¹⁹³ With the assistance of the above, this thesis in the following chapter seeks to fill in the gap between the particular details and general knowledge of this case, and to extend prospect theory beyond its present explanatory terrain.¹⁹⁴

on decision", *Acta Psychologica*, 89, 1, p. 32.

¹⁹⁰ Gunnar Karlsson (1989) "Rules and strategies in decision making: A critical analysis from a phenomenological perspective", in Montgomery and Svenson, *Process and structure*, p. 58.

¹⁹¹ Rosati has justified the use of public archive leading to the confirmation of decision-makers' motivation. See Jerel A. Rosati (1984) "The impact of beliefs on behaviour: The foreign policy of the Carter administration", in Donald A. Sylvan and Steven Chan (eds.), *Foreign policy decision making* (NY: Praeger), p. 163.

¹⁹² Geoffrey Moorhouse (1977) *The diplomats: The Foreign Office today* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 117.

¹⁹³ Ian Loveland (1993) "Redefining parliamentary sovereignty? A new perspective on the search for the meaning of law", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 3, p. 328.

¹⁹⁴ Robert Axelrod (1976d) "Limitations", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 258.

CHAPTER FOUR—TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

Chapter 4 examines the process of evolution of the two turning-point policy preferences in Britain's conduct of Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968. To fulfil this task, it will observe the archive in Public Record Office released after 1999 as well as the *Hansard* record. It then identifies the behavioural patterns of the British Foreign Office (FO) in the light of prospect theory, tries to explain systematically the changes of policy preferences, and assess the four hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3.

The time frame of this case study ranges from 1965, when “the issue was first brought formally to international attention”,¹ to December 1968, when Britain rejected the Memorandum of Understanding. The observation of the archive, however, has to end in early November 1968, because no official papers about the case of the Falkland Islands have been released since that date to the time of writing. The explanatory framework consists of two dimensions: (1) domain of frame (2) motivated framing. Based on this framework, this thesis will conclude with an assessment of the four hypotheses, formulated in Chapter 4, and produce a report of the ambiguities in and limitations of the test.

1. The observation

From intransigence to flexibility

On 16 December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065. It demanded that Argentine and British Governments “proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee [of 24] with a view to finding a peaceful resolution” to the dispute concerning sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. To this end, the Resolution stipulated that both sides take into account the interests of the inhabitants. Britain abstained during the voting on the grounds that the Falkland Islands were not a colonial territory.²

Two weeks later in January 1966, Michael Stewart, British Foreign Secretary, paid a visit to Buenos Aires, where he was greeted by vociferous nationalist groups,

¹ *British Government (1983) Falkland Island review: Report of a committee of privy councillors*, Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO), p. 4.

² FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (17), B. L. Barder, UK Mission in NY, to E. G. Donohoe, Commonwealth Office

urging a resolution of the issue. Stewart, however, was adamant. He stressed that the importance of respecting the wishes of the islanders should be part of the settlement, and suggested a need to re-open the lines of communication cut off by Argentina. On the other hand, Stewart was emphatic that Britain "did not consider that the United Nations Resolution had any relevance to the question of sovereignty", although he also expressed his willingness to discuss many aspects of the issue.³ A joint communiqué by Britain and Argentina was issued on 14 January 1966. Both sides reiterated their hope to of entering into the discussions "without delay" as demanded by the UN.⁴ This was followed by the second joint communiqué in mid-July, 1966.⁵

The official papers show that Britain remained unyielding for the best part of 1966. Despite Argentina's pressure for a "return" of the islands,⁶ sovereignty was not negotiable and the wishes of the islanders were the primary concern.

The first visible evidence of a change of attitude on the British side emerged at the third round of talks held between 28 November and 9 December 1966. Henry Arthur Frederick Hohler and Trafford Smith, two British Assistant Under-secretaries of State, proposed to freeze the legal position on the Falkland Islands for forty years, and at the end of this time-frame, the islanders would be allowed to choose between British and Argentine sovereignty. The proposal was flatly rejected by the Argentine representative, Brigadier Don Eduardo McLoughlin, Argentine Ambassador to Britain.⁷ As no progress was made thereafter, the third joint communiqué was issued with nothing of note in the text. More specifically, despite the three joint communiqués intending to reaffirm the "cordial atmosphere" in the talks,⁸ neither side showed any sign of giving ground regarding their respective sovereignty claims.⁹

On 5 January 1967, Argentina announced the establishment of a new department aimed at recovering the Falkland Islands. Foreign Minister Nicanor Costa Mendez

(CO), restricted, 8 February 1967.

³ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (1), T. C. Barker, to News Department and UN Political Department, secret, 22 November 1968, enclosing "Anglo-Argentine talks on the Falkland Islands".

⁴ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (17), Barker to Donohoe.

⁵ Ibid..

⁶ Ibid..

⁷ United Nations General Assembly, "Falkland Islands (Malvinas): Working paper prepared by the Secretariat", A/AC.109/L. 358, distribution limited, 2 February 1967.

⁸ "Falkland Islands: Working paper".

⁹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 733, col. 239, 8 August 1966.

openly expressed his firm resolve that Argentina's revolution would not be complete unless Britain returned the Falkland Islands.¹⁰ The FO certainly did not miss the strong signal or underestimate the significance of it. In his report to the FO, Michael Creswell, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, expressed his concern about the change in Mendez's attitude.¹¹ Despite this, the UK Mission in New York (UKMIS), in the following rounds of talks with McLoughlin held from late January to mid-February 1967, kept as its bottom line the need to respect the wishes of the islanders. They argued that "the Falklands Islanders could not be expected to acquiesce in Argentine rule unless the islanders had some personal knowledge" of Argentina. McLoughlin seemed to be persuaded,¹² but he complained that Argentina could not just wait for the slow progress of the negotiations, always appearing to end with the conclusion—"we are still talking", because there was strong domestic pressure in Argentina. To further pressurise Britain, McLoughlin hinted that Argentina might raise the issue again at the UN in April 1967.¹³

What made Argentina's complaint more substantial was that in late February 1967, McLoughlin received the news that Smith would postpone a trip to the Falkland Islands with him until October 1967—a disappointing move that was interpreted by McLoughlin as a delaying tactic.¹⁴ Argentina began to bank on the general trend of the decolonisation movement as pressure on Britain. In February 1967, Argentina enlisted the support of 21 Latin American and Caribbean countries for its claims to the Falkland Islands at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission in Mexico City, where the major purpose ironically was to ratify a nuclear test ban treaty. The statement was issued under the subject "Situation of the Falkland Islands in the framework of the Treaty with reference to Argentina's claim to sovereignty" on 13 February 1967. Although it was odd to integrate the issue of the Falkland Islands into the framework of a nuclear test ban, the move to single out Britain for criticism proved a success. Argentina had shown the world that there was a widespread recognition of Argentina's claim on the issue of the Falkland Islands and sent another strong signal to Britain that

¹⁰ FCO 7/148, AA 4/5, (1), J. T. Caff, British Embassy, Buenos Aires (BEBA), to M. W. Atkinson, American Department, FO, restricted, 5 January 1967.

¹¹ FCO 7/126, AA1/11, (1), Michael Creswell, BEBA, to John. G. S. Beith, FO, confidential, 10 January 1967.

¹² FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (5), H. A. F. Hohler to Trafford Smith, CO, confidential, 6 February 1967.

¹³ Ibid., (9), Smith to Hohler, "Conversation with the Argentine Ambassador", 14 February 1967.

¹⁴ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (15), Smith to Hohler, personal and confidential, 1 March 1967.

Argentina meant business.¹⁵

The FO immediately sent Hohler to express its concern. Britain protested that the resolution was obviously an “ill-conceived manoeuvre”, because the resolution in Mexico City concerning the Falkland Islands was irrelevant to nuclear bans—the main purpose of that meeting.¹⁶ Notwithstanding this protest, Argentina clearly succeeded in sending a stronger signal to Britain. The FO began to realise the need to take the issue of the Falkland Islands seriously to prevent further unexpected harm to Britain's international reputation. On 20 February, Robin Edmonds, Head of the (Latin) American Department, referred to the talks with Argentina over the Falklands dispute as “formal” for the first time.¹⁷ This change of reference was apparently a result of the awareness that waves of Argentine diplomatic offensives in the name of anti-colonial “have-not” petitioners could be detrimental to Britain's prestige, despite the friendly climate alleged in the previous joint communiqués.

One week after the Mexico City resolution was announced, the foreign ministers of American countries at the plenary session of the OAS (Organisation of American States) Conference in Caracas were motivated to announce another resolution (Resolution 96) urging Britain to move more quickly on this issue.¹⁸ Creswell was the leader of the British observer team at the Conference. He was quick to counter that the international atmosphere had been prejudiced by the Mexico City resolution. The original phrase in the UN resolution aimed at resolving the dispute about sovereignty was “inaccurate”. Britain had no doubt about its sovereignty. The talks could be regarded only as “discussions”, not “negotiations”.¹⁹ At this juncture, however, Creswell's insistence on differentiating between “negotiation” and “discussion” as a way to keep British sovereignty found no support from London. In the draft Resolution 96 that Creswell had sent back to the FO twice for endorsement, the FO showed little interest in amending the text of the resolution from “negotiations” to “discussions”.²⁰ This indifference in London indicated that the FO began to have

¹⁵ FCO 7/150, AA4/7, (1), BEBA to American Department, FO, restricted, 17 February 1967; FCO 7/150, AA4/7, clipping, *New York Times*, “Latin A-ban Treaty nearly completed”, 13 February 1967.

¹⁶ Ibid., (2), AA4/7, FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 118, confidential, 21 February 1967.

¹⁷ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (10), R. H. G. Edmonds to Creswell, secret, 20 February 1967.

¹⁸ FCO 7/151, AA4/8, (2), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 126, 25 February 1967.

¹⁹ Ibid., (1), Creswell, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 125, confidential, 25 February 1967.

²⁰ FCO 7/151, AA4/8, (3) FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 131, unclassified, 27 February 1967; AA4/8, (6), Sir M. Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 130, confidential, 27 February 1967; (7), FO to BABE, Tel. no. 140,

second thoughts about its sovereignty claim in this territorial dispute. Indeed, the following archive will show that, in an attempt to save its international prestige and mitigate its impatient counterpart, Britain seemed ready to see its policy change from intransigence to flexibility.

The first turning-point policy preference strengthened

Between 9-16 March 1967, one week before McLoughlin returned to Buenos Aires for routine consultations, there were discussions among the ministers and officials on the British side concerning the future of the Falkland Islands. The major concerns of the policy discussions were compensation to be given to the islanders, the exact period of transition and the possibility of a referendum.

Regarding compensation, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee was of the view that to strengthen the British position, Britain could compensate for the disturbance caused to the islanders in the process of negotiations.²¹ Edmonds, however, did not think the proposal of compensation advisable. He insisted that there was no need to mention compensation in the talks, because it would be more appropriate to see compensation “fall[s] on the Argentines rather than on the British taxpayer”. Besides, as Edmonds was also aware, if the talks about compensation “got to the ears of the Islanders themselves”, they “would have a demoralising effect”.²²

Regarding the referendum, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires had no confidence in proposing a referendum owing to the fact that it was once suggested to Argentina but was rejected in late 1966. Pakenham in his letter to Hohler stressed that Argentina was fully hostile to a referendum so the proposal would not help the talks. The proposal might, on the contrary, prompt the Argentines to make a “premature report” to the UN in April.²³ In respect of the transitional period, Hohler was obviously the one who had exerted marked influence on the reduction from 40 years to 20 years. He justified the reduction of the transitional period because 20 years were not significantly different from the period he offered in the talks in late 1966.²⁴

confidential, 27 February 1967.

²¹ FCO7/140, AA4/2, (23), Edmonds to Hohler, 16 March 1967.

²² Ibid..

²³ Ibid., (17), Pakenham, BEBA, to Hohler, FO, Tel. no. 167, secret, 13 March 1967.

²⁴ Ibid., (16), Hohler to BEBA, Tel. no. 162, secret, 13 March 1967.

To defend this attitude change, Hohler's argument seemed self-contained. As Hohler explained, twenty years were a period "long enough to allow the older generation to disappear from the scene, but not long enough to entangle the question of the Falkland Islands with that of the Antarctic", which would come up for review from 1991 onwards.²⁵ No evidence shows that there was strong and effective opposition to this explanation at this stage.

The only exception was Cosmos Haskard, Governor of the Falkland Islands. In the process in which the first preference came to the fore, it is noteworthy that a mixed sense of shock and worry could be heard from him. On 13 March 1967, no sooner had Haskard been informed about the development of the whole issue, than he wrote to Brown, reminding Brown of the existing contradiction between the two sets of statements: Britain had no doubt about British sovereignty, while it "prepared in principle to cede sovereignty".²⁶ "I strongly urge that there should be no haste in this matter", protested Haskard, because the "inhabitants are unprepared for an early development" along the policy lines set out by the FO. The Governor insisted that the FO be frank in its policy as to what kind of supports and to what degree the islanders could expect from the British Government, if the transfer of sovereignty occurred. In addition, added Haskard, Argentina had to be precise in what kind of guarantees it could offer to the islanders.²⁷ Nevertheless, Haskard had apparently been isolated from the decision-making process since November 1966. The only response made by the FO was to emphasise confidentiality.²⁸

On 17 March 1967, before Foreign Secretary Brown met McLoughlin, the newly emerging Falklands policy was shaping up. It was characterised by a twin-track approach, the logic of which went as follows. (1) Britain decided to announce its position to "be prepared in principle to cede sovereignty over the Islands". However, Britain would make it clear that this concession could not be justified, unless it took place "in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants". To facilitate the integration of the Falkland Islands into Argentina, therefore, a referendum with a period of transition would be needed. (2) However, Britain did not expect Argentina to accept

²⁵ Ibid..

²⁶ Ibid., (21), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 46, secret, 13 March 1967.

²⁷ Ibid., (22), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 47, secret, 14 March 1967.

²⁸ Ibid., (24), Secretary of State, Commonwealth Office to Haskard, Tel. no. 66, secret, 23 March 1967.

the proposal of a referendum, and the talks could quite likely break down. (3) In order to prevent Argentina from walking away and again making rattling noises embarrassing Britain in the UN, an “interim agreement” would be proposed as a second-track.

The second track strategy could be summarised as follows. (1) Britain would announce its determination to cede sovereignty as long as the change was acceptable to the islanders. (2) Argentina needed to offer guarantees to the islanders. (3) Britain would propose a resumption of communication means between Argentina and the Falklands and ask for the freezing of legal claims on both sides for at least 20 years. (4) This interim agreement would be subject to review at the end of 10 years.²⁹

On 17 March 1967, McLoughlin called at the FO before his leaving for Buenos Aires. Brown communicated to him the British attitude to the issue of the Falkland Islands. As planned, he first reminded McLoughlin that Britain had already made a great breakthrough, because this was the first time in the Falklands history that Britain had announced its desire to cede sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.³⁰ Nevertheless, if a referendum were held immediately, it was highly likely that the inhabitants would opt for the UK. Therefore, as Brown proposed, a referendum after a transitional period would be a better choice. McLoughlin did not give in. He replied that the only proposal presented by Argentina was to return the Falkland Islands to Argentina. He believed that Britain “should be capable of obtaining a certain degree of acquiescence on the Islanders’ part”. Having noticed that the first-track strategy had failed to trap McLoughlin, Brown put forward the alternative—the interim agreement as planned. It is important to note that, in offering McLoughlin the second-track proposal, Brown combined point (3) and (4) by halving the transitional period from 20 years to 10 years. With this, Brown dropped the hint that the transition could be even shorter, and it might not necessarily take ten years for the islanders to have a fresh look at the current situation. McLoughlin took the message and returned to

²⁹ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (20), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 49, 9 March 1967.

³⁰ Ibid., (24), R. G. H. Edmonds to Secretary of State, confidential, enclosing, enclosing (1) “Speaking notes”, “Falkland Islands: Anglo-Argentine dispute”, “Call of the Argentine Ambassador on Friday 17 March at 3.30 p.m.”; (2) “The Secretary of State’s second alternative proposal, given to the Argentine Ambassador on 17 March”, 16 March 1967.

Buenos Aires.³¹

Despite the emphasis on confidentiality, the FO clearly did not anticipate the mass media lurking in the wings. The contents of the talks on 17 March were carried by the Argentine news agency, Saporiti, and it was picked up by Associated Press and BBC Radio Newsreel on 22 March 1967.³² This was another disagreeable surprise to the FO. Brown promptly instructed the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to alert Argentina to the need to keep the talks on a confidential basis, as confidentiality was “as much in their interests as in ours”, without which, as Brown warned, it would “have a deplorable effect on public opinion”.³³ On the domestic front, the FO had the News Department hold a news conference. The News Department admitted that the subject of the Falkland Islands had been discussed with Argentina, but it was “untrue” that Britain had decided to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands.³⁴ In any discussions about this subject, reiterated the FO, the “wishes of the inhabitants must be the cardinal factor”.³⁵ To cope with the protests emanating energetically from the Members of Legislative Council in the Falkland Islands, Brown warned Haskard not to go beyond the statement issued by the News Department. Instead, Haskard was instructed to emphasise “the necessity to keep the talks entirely confidential at the present stage” in order to avoid unnecessary press speculation.³⁶

On that same day, 22 March 1966, Pakenham went to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and put forward Brown’s point about confidentiality. Argentina was apparently willing to co-ordinate and its response was quite positive. It agreed to deal with the issue as “technically” as possible, decided to abandon the previous position to treat the Falkland islanders as “invaders”,³⁷ and even acknowledged that McLoughlin’s symbolic visit to the Falkland Islands would still be premature.³⁸ Pakenham was most

³¹ Ibid., (25), American Department, departmental distribution, Amendment Slip, secret, enclosing “Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the FCO on Friday, 17 March at 3.30 p.m.”, secret, 28 April 1967; FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (33), Secretary of State, CO, to Haskard, Tel. no. 61, secret, 22 March 1967.

³² Ibid., (43), Haskard to Secretary of State, CO, Tel. no. 54, secret, 25 March 1967.

³³ Ibid., (28), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 190, confidential, 22 March 1967.

³⁴ Ibid., (27), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 189, FCO/CO/WH distribution, 22 March 1967.

³⁵ Ibid., (32), FO and CO to certain missions, guidance no. 51, FCO/CO/WH distribution, restricted, 23 March 1967.

³⁶ Ibid., (34), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 66, secret, 23 March 1967.

³⁷ Ibid., (31), Pakenham, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 176, unclassified, 22 March 1967.

³⁸ FCO 7/149, AA 4/6, (22), Creswell to FO, confidential, 14 March 1967.

encouraged by these friendly responses. In his report sent back to the FO, he commented upon the Argentine attitude quite positively, which might consolidate the FO's attitude. The text went as follows:

it is appropriate to emphasise the decision of the Argentine Government to achieve the unification of national territory according to the standards of justice and equity which inspire the nation's home and foreign policy; in accordance with its traditional attitude there is no doubt that the Republic will take due account of the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands.³⁹

Pakenham's observation represented a sympathetic view towards Argentina. One of the officials sharing this view was Creswell. The latter met Quijano, Argentina's Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in early 1967. After the meeting, Creswell seemed satisfied and impressed by Quijano's pledge to keep the issue in low profile. In his report to the FO, Creswell confirmed that there were indications that Argentines had "disposed of the matter", and "the matter was now of historical interest only".⁴⁰ As Creswell commented on the factor of timing to the talks and urged an earlier settlement of the dispute,

it was a peculiarly favourable moment for the Argentine Government to deal with the subject without emotion or demagogic appeals, since the parties were in suspense and there were no votes to catch. It was to be hoped therefore that we might profit by these favourable circumstances to come to an Agreement while the going was good.⁴¹

The important thing to note is that Creswell and Pakenham were not alone in holding this optimistic view towards Argentina. Hohler joined the side and expressed a similar view. As Hohler put it analytically:

the important thing is that the present Argentine Government is very well disposed and anxious to arrive at an honourable solution of this long-standing dispute. Their attitude contrasts very favourably with

³⁹ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (30), Pakenham, BEBA, to FO, Tel. no. 175, unclassified, 22 March 1967.

⁴⁰ Ibid., (47), Creswell, BEBA, to Edmonds, American Department, FO, on "Falkland Islands", confidential, 7 April 1967.

⁴¹ Ibid..

that of the Spaniards. Also, unlike their predecessors, they have the necessary authority to carry out any engagements into which they may enter.⁴²

By interpreting the Argentine attitude as "well-disposed", Hohler, one of the negotiators in the talks, was not only flexible towards the sovereignty claim but also confident about the talks, where he expected cooperation from his counterparts as well. Regarding the negotiating strategy in the talks, he postulated that

there are also a number of possible ways in which we could improve the review procedures, some of which might appeal to the Argentines. For example, the agreement could be reviewed annually or every five years by an Argentine and British representative, with a representative of the Islands as an observer.⁴³

The FO had already known that Argentina was more interested in the second proposal—the interim agreement that Brown had suggested to McLoughlin on 17 March 1967.⁴⁴ It was also fully aware that Argentina was very sensitive to the distinction between the interests and the wishes, especially the provision that the change had to meet with the islanders' acceptance. To tide over this difficulty, it seemed that the FO needed to sideline the wishes of the islanders, as this principle constituted the major thrust of the argument that the FO found hard to cope with. On 19 April 1967, Edmonds suggested that "the wishes of" be deleted from the draft.⁴⁵ This proposal was officially adopted later on 28 April in the so-called "Amendment Slip", which was distributed among Private Office and UKMIS.⁴⁶ Deletion of the wishes constituted explicit evidence for the first turning-point policy preference. This change clearly indicated that the British officials at this moment were quite disposed to helping Argentina settle down the wording.

To justify this sensitive change in wording, Brown explained to McLoughlin at the meeting on 26 April 1967 that liability to the islanders' acceptance as a provision

⁴² Ibid., (53), Edmonds to Hohler, secret, 25 April 1967, enclosing (1) "Speaking notes", "Falkland Islands: Anglo-Argentine dispute", "Call of the Argentine Ambassador on Wednesday, 26 April, at 3 p.m."; (2) Hohler to MacLehose, secret, 25 April 1967.

⁴³ Ibid., (58), Hohler to Creswell, secret, 1 May 1967.

⁴⁴ Ibid., (48), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands", confidential, 19 April 1967.

⁴⁵ Ibid., (49), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands", confidential, 19 April 1967.

⁴⁶ Ibid., (57), American Department, FO, distributed, confidential, 28 April 1967.

to a settlement was "deliberately phrased to be as flexible as possible".⁴⁷ In other words, "a referendum would not be the only possible means of ascertaining the wishes of the islanders".⁴⁸ Brown conveyed his confidence by expressing the view that a formula that "must be found whereby the population of the Islands would be seen themselves to have been persuaded of the advantages of a change of sovereignty".⁴⁹ In respect of the advantages, Brown in front of McLoughlin, ascertained that the second-track proposal was a constructive one, through which Britain "intended to give Argentina every opportunity to explain to the Islanders the advantages of a change of sovereignty".⁵⁰ It is interesting to note that, at this juncture, the importance of a referendum was no longer emphasised by Brown. The FO's emphasis changed. The islanders "advantage" seized the diplomatic rhetoric.

The meeting on 26 April was a short-term success for both sides. McLoughlin seemed convinced of Brown's sincerity, because the islanders' interests were evidently accentuated by the talk of advantages, upon which the first policy preference was found. In his written reply, McLoughlin admitted that the process of transfer ought not to be in a hurry.⁵¹ Although Costa Mendez, on 2 May, changed McLoughlin's language, asking Creswell to increase the tempo of the negotiations,⁵² Mendez's demand did not go contrary to Brown's main objective in the talks—"to make progress, not simply to keep the ball in play".⁵³

On the British side, the first policy preference, characterised by emphasising the islanders' "advantages" began to show signs of strength after the meeting in early May. Hohler became more confident. He reported that "the Argentines have moved one step in our direction, by accepting the principle of a transitional period, during which freedom of communications would be restored and legal rights frozen".⁵⁴ In respect of the view held by the Commonwealth Office that Haskard had to be

⁴⁷ Ibid..

⁴⁸ Ibid., (53), "Speaking notes"; ibid. (50), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands: The Argentine Ambassador's call on Friday, 21 April at 4 p.m.", secret, 20 April 1967.

⁴⁹ Ibid. (50), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Falkland Islands".

⁵⁰ Ibid., (54), "Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, 26 April at 5 p.m.", secret, 27 April 1967.

⁵¹ Ibid., (65), Edmonds to Hohler, on "Suggested tactics for meeting with the Argentine Ambassador on [sic] May", secret, 8 May 1967.

⁵² Ibid., (59), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 221, confidential, 4 May 1967.

⁵³ Ibid. (66), Hohler to D. Allen, confidential, 10 May 1967.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Hohler to Creswell, secret, 1 May 1967.

consulted about the interim agreement, Hohler was critical of the attitude of the Commonwealth Office for its being "tiresome". He thought that the intransigent attitude was inappropriate particularly as the FO had reached the moment at which to "get down to drafting" an interim agreement. Since Costa Mendez had already told Creswell that Argentina was under domestic pressure to produce further and significant progress, Britain, went the argument, had no reason to do anything harmful to the cooperative effort.⁵⁵

On the other side, the proposal of a referendum had been carefully withdrawn at this stage. In a letter to Creswell, Hohler defended the designated policy by dismissing the idea of a referendum. Because, as Hohler argued, "the Argentines feel so strongly about referenda, it should not be beyond the wit of man to devise a means of ascertaining the wishes of a community of some two thousand people in a less formal manner".⁵⁶ To this suggestion, Creswell's response was also straightforward and positive. As Creswell wrote:

I am sure that both we and Argentines [sic] have equally strong reasons for disliking a referendum. From our point of view a referendum which closed the door on any possibility of change would deprive us of [our] ability to resume negotiations later, and might be thought to make it impossible for us ever to transfer the territory. It would also be most illogical if we used a referendum over Gibraltar with this very object in mind, but at the same time pressed for one over the Falkland Islands upon which our minds are much more open. This would indeed cast doubt on our sincerity.⁵⁷

All the above memos were suggestive of the whole atmosphere of the FCO towards the dispute in mid-1967. Apparently, what Brown urged to make progress in the sovereignty talks was what his staff understood to be as flexible as possible in the British attitude to the issue. The first British policy preference on the issue of the Falkland Islands was thus effectively constructed.

Actions guided by the first turning-point policy preference

⁵⁵ Ibid., (66), Hohler to Allen.

⁵⁶ Ibid..

⁵⁷ Ibid., (59), Creswell to American Department.

To find the right counterpart

After clarifying Britain's attitude to the Argentine Government, Hohler met McLoughlin on 16 May 1967 in an attempt to evaluate Argentina's exact bottom line to facilitate the next step. The FO was confident in its policy shift. To Hohler's thinking, Britain would hand over a working document to McLoughlin by the end of May 1967 in order to speed up the process of the talks.⁵⁸

Nevertheless, it proved to be wishful thinking. Despite the FO being resolved to help Argentina out of the wording problem in the draft, and Hohler's clear intention was to compel McLoughlin to "get down to brass tacks",⁵⁹ the talks on 16 May did not make any progress. While Hohler was trying to be flexible on the distinction between the principles of the wishes of the islanders and their interests, McLoughlin remained intransigent on the clear distinction.⁶⁰ Hohler was apparently disappointed at McLoughlin's "inexperience and hesitancy". He complained that McLoughlin was only geared to playing "his gramophone record".⁶¹

The disappointment, however, did not lead to any change in the British intention to speed up the process of talks. To seek a further breakthrough, the FO followed Creswell's recommendation, echoed by Hohler,⁶² to side-step McLoughlin. It sought for direct talks with Costa Mendez, who, in the eyes of the FO, was a better alternative because of his having effective control over leaks to the press and the confidence of President Onganía.⁶³ The FO took the initiative on the other hand, starting to draft a working document by 21 June 1967. The purpose of this draft was twofold. Firstly, the FO managed to create a situation where "the ball is squarely in the Argentine court",⁶⁴ as it began to realise that it was Britain that had "made all the running so far".⁶⁵ Secondly, according to Brown, "a document of this nature would also strengthen the UK's position in the United Nations in the event of the talks breaking down".⁶⁶ Obviously, the reason implied that the concern for Britain's prestige

⁵⁸ Ibid., (68), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 311, confidential, 11 May 1967.

⁵⁹ Ibid., (66), Hohler to Allen.

⁶⁰ Ibid., (71), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 337, confidential, 16 May 1967.

⁶¹ Ibid., (82), Edmonds to UK Mission in NY, Tel. no. 3133, confidential, 21 June 1967.

⁶² Ibid., (74), Hohler, FO, to Sir M. Creswell, BEBA, secret, 25 May 1967.

⁶³ Ibid., (61), Creswell to Hohler, FO, secret, 4 May 1967.

⁶⁴ Ibid., (82), Edmonds to UK Mission in NY.

⁶⁵ Ibid., (89), Edmonds to UKMIS, telegram, 3205, confidential, 22 June 1967.

⁶⁶ Ibid., (88), CO to Falkland Islands (O. A. G.), telegram 120, secret, 21 June 1967.

in the UN debates was most relevant in decision-making at this stage.

On 23 June 1967, in the meeting between Brown and Mendez, Britain tried to make Argentina recognise that “it is up to them to create the conditions in which the islanders would wish to join the Argentine Republic”.⁶⁷ However, the concern for wording resurfaced. Jose Maria Ruda, the Argentine representative in the UN, admitted to Brown that the “problem was to find a form of words which would enable the Argentine Government to start the process of attracting the islanders without losing face”.⁶⁸ The meeting on 23 June did not make any significant progress. But the FO's confidence in its current Falklands policy did not weaken. This confident mood was partly because Ruda was thought a better negotiator than McLoughlin, and partly because both sides reached the consensus that a statement was needed to inform public opinion. The only difference was that what Mendez suggested was a unilateral statement. Although his suggestion did not go beyond Brown's idea of a working agreement that had been under consideration on the British side,⁶⁹ the FO seemed to be inclined to see the issue settled with a more explicit result. For the FO, a unilateral statement to put down the different positions in a written form did not faithfully reflect either the aim or the effort of the talks. The FO instead preferred a working agreement in a bilateral form, because, as the FO averred, a unilateral statement “would serve only to disturb public opinion” both in the island and in the British Isles, if the statement ended with no practical results.⁷⁰ A bilateral statement, by contrast, could have more restraining force. As far as this thesis can determine this preference for a bilateral statement might have set the foundation for the emergence of a draft Memorandum of Understanding in late 1968.

The FO interpreted the talks on 23 June 1967 as another step forward. Nevertheless, not all the British officials were of the same optimistic view. Creswell reported to the FO that he could not sense sufficient attention having been paid by Costa Mendez, particularly with respect to the need for Argentina to have “a realistic appreciation” of the currently slow progress in the talks.⁷¹ Nevertheless, Creswell's

⁶⁷ Ibid..

⁶⁸ Ibid., (90), UK Mission in NY to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 1500, confidential, 23 June 1967.

⁶⁹ Ibid., (68), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 311, confidential, 11 May 1967.

⁷⁰ Ibid., (94), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 479, confidential, 29 June 1967.

⁷¹ Ibid., (100), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 349, confidential, 5 July 1967.

concern seemed irrelevant under the condition that the first policy preference had gained ground. To prevent the newly formulated Falklands policy falling apart, Britain continued the talks with Argentina in July 1967. The two sides tried to sort out the wording to facilitate the birth of the draft agreement at this stage. On 14 July, Ruda tabled the proposal that Britain "will recognise the sovereignty of Argentina over the Islands provided that the interests of the inhabitants are duly taken into consideration". Unsatisfied, Hohler presented his version that Britain will be prepared to recognise the sovereignty of Argentina "provided that the guarantees and safeguards for the islanders' interests offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to them".⁷² Ruda responded on 24 July, stating that "to agree on a formula referring to the interests of the Falkland Islanders would not mean that the Argentine side was against any consideration of the wishes of the Falkland Islanders". Rather, continued Ruda, "this was a problem[,] which did not concern Argentina: this concerned only Britain since the population was now under her control". Besides, as Ruda added, talking about interests only could be helpful to the FO's position when the issue came to public discussion. It would give the FO "enough flexibility to deal with Parliament and with public opinion".⁷³ To this, Britain's response was no less clear-cut. G. Thomson, the British representative, in his response to McLoughlin, made clear that the FO would not use its influence "in any way[,] which would run counter to the possibility of achieving a good settlement of this old dispute".⁷⁴

Preparation of the educational campaign

In the latter part of 1967, with the emergence of trade quarrels over foot-and-mouth disease in Argentine meat products (discussed later), the sovereignty discussions over the Falkland Islands began to recede from the focus of British-Argentine relations. But this was not a red herring for the FO. The FO instead became active in initiating solutions to the dispute. The two Governments met on 21 September and 2 October 1967. When McLoughlin expressed the view that the islanders "would have something to gain" in the transfer of sovereignty,⁷⁵ Britain was

⁷² FCO 7/130, AA2/4, (1), Lord Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 1762, confidential, 14 July 1967.

⁷³ Ibid., (5), "Record of meeting between the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Permanent Representative at the United Nations held at the Foreign Office on 24 July 1967, at 10.15 AM", secret.

⁷⁴ Ibid..

⁷⁵ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (65), *ibid.*

obviously satisfied with Argentina's pledge.⁷⁶ In an attempt to accentuate this viewpoint, McLoughlin, in mid-September 1967, re-initiated a proposal to the FO for a visit to the Falkland Islands.⁷⁷ Even when McLoughlin backed down later on the grounds that he would wait patiently for the right time,⁷⁸ Britain was not discouraged. Instead, it initiated a plan for an educational campaign in December 1967, aimed at "improving communications and relations with Argentina, [with the aim of] possibly leading to a transfer of sovereignty".⁷⁹ In January 1968, it was proposed that under the circumstance that the draft of Memorandum of Understanding was completed, Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, should lead the visiting team and begin the campaign.⁸⁰ Although sinister weather had been anticipated and the visit might cause suspicion among the Falkland Islands community, the FO was still convinced that, so far as the implementation of the first policy preference was concerned, the educational campaign would be worthwhile.⁸¹

The above accounts indicated that, although these meetings ended with no public statement having been issued, the two sides saw no difference in the negotiations. Britain had expressed the intention to "give Argentina every opportunity to explain to the Islanders the advantages of a change of sovereignty",⁸² while Argentina was more willing to wait for the right timing.

From "talks" to "negotiations"

In mid-November 1967, Britain was supposed to prepare a joint statement that would be presented to the UN Fourth Committee for approval. The statement was to cover the progress of the talks over the Falklands problem in the past year.⁸³ During the drafting period, both sides were again stuck debating the wording. The FO

⁷⁶ FCO 7/155, 44/4/13, (1), memorandum of the American Department, FO, "Anglo-Argentine talks on the Falkland Islands", secret, 20 November 1967.

⁷⁷ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (1), J. S. Bennett, Gibraltar and South Atlantic Department, CO, FCO, to C. E. Diggines, American Department, FO, 15 September 1967.

⁷⁸ Ibid., (2), Diggines to Bennett, unclassified, 18 September 1967.

⁷⁹ Ibid., (6), John Beith to Creswell, confidential, 6 December 1967.

⁸⁰ FCO 7/126, AA1/11, (1), Creswell to John Beith, FO, confidential, 16 January 1968.

⁸¹ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (10), Beith to Creswell, restricted, 20 December 1967.

⁸² Ibid., (54), "Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, 26 April at 5 p.m.", secret, 27 April 1967.

⁸³ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (37), Lord Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3836, confidential, 12 December 1967.

demanded to replace “talks” by “negotiations” in the joint report,⁸⁴ as it thought that the word “negotiations” might “stimulate premature public interest” in the issue.⁸⁵ The Argentines disagreed. They argued that “talks” had connotations of an informal meaning, and that it would be fair to say that the two sides had reached the stage of “negotiations”.⁸⁶ What if the joint statement failed to be presented in the UN in time? To avoid the risk of debate in the UN because of disagreement about the preparation of a joint text, Britain backed down. The insistence on differentiation between “talks” and “discussions” was given up.⁸⁷

On 15 December 1967, the Fourth Committee adopted the draft consensus report on the current development of the talks over the Falklands issue.⁸⁸ Four days later, the General Assembly approved the consensus report.⁸⁹ For Britain, the result was relief from UN's pressure. But more positively, the talks boded well for a settlement of the Falklands dispute. Even though Argentina took a pro-Spanish position on the issue of Gibraltar in the Fourth Committee,⁹⁰ and the Argentine nationalists presented written petitions to the UN about the Falkland Islands,⁹¹ there was no panic from the FO. The FO felt assured that the protests would not “spoil the atmosphere” in the talks about the Falklands.⁹²

The first turning-point policy preference on the defensive

At the end of January 1968, the FO presented its first draft Memorandum of Understanding for inter-departmental discussion.⁹³ When the Memorandum of Understanding came into the public domain for discussion, its legitimacy began to be questioned. More disturbing to the FO was that some of the public became increasingly impatient about the uncertain future of the Falkland Islands in February

⁸⁴ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (34), Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3748, confidential, 9 December 1967; FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (35), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7330, confidential, 11 December 1967.

⁸⁵ Ibid., (38), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7398, confidential, 13 December 1967.

⁸⁶ Ibid., (36), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3835, confidential, 12 December 1967.

⁸⁷ Ibid., (39), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 7474, confidential, 14 December 1967.

⁸⁸ Ibid., (48), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3968, confidential, 16 December 1967.

⁸⁹ Ibid., (49), Lord Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 3968, confidential, 16 December 1967.

⁹⁰ Ibid., (50), D. M. Summerhays, BEBA, to Diggines, American Department, confidential, 12 January 1968.

⁹¹ Ibid., (52), Petition to U Thant, UN Secretary-General, A/AC.109/PET.898, 27 December 1967.

⁹² Ibid., (40), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 3874, confidential, 14 December 1967; *ibid.*, (42), C. E. Diggines, FO, to C. P. Hope, UKMIS, confidential, 15 December 1967.

⁹³ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (2), Draft Memorandum of Understanding by C. E. Diggines to Bennett, secret, 29 January 1968.

1968.⁹⁴ Although the members of the Executive Councils in the Falkland Islands had been vowed to secrecy after Haskard revealed part of the Government's plans to them,⁹⁵ some members began to feel uneasy and were ready to make their "appeal". Through the appeal, they attempted to alert the MPs in London that the length to which the FO had gone in their secret talks with Argentina were not fully disclosed to the Commons.⁹⁶

On 15 March 1968, with the headline "The Government abandoned people who trust it" in *The Times*, Peter Scott wrote that "In Buenos Aires I found a general impression that any minute from now the Isles Malvinas would be a part of Argentina".⁹⁷ This report came as the first challenge to the FO's Falklands policy. Although only a spark, the effect started a prairie fire in Parliament. The archive shows that both Lord Chalfont and Goronwy Roberts, two Ministers of State for Foreign Affairs, were put under heavy parliamentary pressure in mid-March 1968.⁹⁸

The FO was certainly reluctant to witness the issue developing beyond their control. Now that the legitimacy of the draft Memorandum of Understanding was being challenged, and public interest in the confidential negotiations was stirred up, the FO was forced to stand up for their policy preference. To do this, it authorised the News Department to admit that there were talks with Argentina. But different from the position in March 1967, when the FO denied that talks were about sovereignty, the FO this time insisted that the talks were instead about the long-term future of the Falkland Islands.⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (FIEC) was set up in London on March 25. Important members of the FIEC included Sir John Barlow, who was later elected as the Chairman, Hunter Christie, former British diplomat in Buenos Aires, and two MPs, Clifford Kenyon and John Smith. A meeting was held on the day when it was established. Having considered that the issue could be better supported if

⁹⁴ FCO 7/157, AA4/15 (44), C. E. Diggines, American Department, to John Beith, Parliamentary Office, on "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary Questions", 1 April 1968.

⁹⁵ FCO 7/157, FCO 7/157, AA4/15 (44), C. E. Diggines, American Department, to John Beith, Parliamentary Office, on "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary Questions", 1 April 1968.

⁹⁶ Robert Elgood (1999) *Draft of Franks Report*, p. 10.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ Hansard (Lords) vol. 290, cols., 205-11, 13 March 1968; Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, cols., 31-4, 18 March 1968.

⁹⁹ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (3), Diggines to Beith, Private Secretary, confidential, 11 March 1968.

to expose it to the public, the FIEC decided to inform the press, through which voice it exerted pressure on the Government. To do this, the FIEC issued a manifesto, bringing to the notice of the British people the wishes of the islanders. The main argument of the manifesto was as follows.

Are you aware that negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine governments which may result at any moment in the handing over of the Falkland Islands to the Argentine? Take note, that the inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future. They do not want to become Argentines... There is no racial problem, no unemployment, no poverty, and we are not in debt. Are you aware that the people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a foreign language, law, customs and culture? Because for one hundred and thirty five years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life... Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in power politics? Do you feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on us?¹⁰⁰

The above lines were indeed provocative. Perhaps having anticipated a possible row, Stewart, who had just succeeded Brown in mid-March 1968, decided to intervene. Firstly, Stewart suspended the educational campaign in an attempt to market the idea of the Memorandum of Understanding under preparation ever since December 1967.¹⁰¹ Next, on 27 March, Stewart made a statement to Parliament about the negotiating principles underlying the issue,¹⁰² and the next day, he informed the Cabinet of the FO's twin-track strategy that the FO had adopted to cope with the issue. This was the first time in the history of the Falkland Islands that the British Foreign Secretary had publicly admitted that sovereignty had been discussed with Argentina. With the decision coming into public view, the policy declaration was more a reflection of public pressure than a policy initiative. It seemed to indicate that the FO was on the defensive about its first policy preference. Viewed in this light, the effect of the FIEC's manifesto cannot be lightly dismissed.

Despite the fact that the FO was on the defensive regarding its first policy

¹⁰⁰ Ibid..

¹⁰¹ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (8), A. N. Galsworthy, CO, to Leslie Glass, UKMIS, 18 March 1968.

¹⁰² FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (5), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 242, confidential, 26 March 1968.

preference, when the issue came to public notice in March 1968, the sense of crisis in the FO should not be exaggerated. Records indicate that the FO as well as the Wilson Cabinet faced the parliamentary enquiries in quite a calm manner.

In Parliament, both Chalfont and Roberts explained confidently to the Houses about the rationale behind the talks. Both officials confirmed that the "talks have proceeded and are proceeding". And they declared that the talks "cover a wide range of subjects. It is too early to specify what form the consultations will take". Therefore, as they tried to persuade the backbenchers, "These negotiations are delicate and must be confidential".¹⁰³ Also, to explain the need for secrecy, Chalfont argued that "I believe it would not be in the interests of this House, of this country or of the people of the Falkland Islands to disclose now what those negotiations are about".¹⁰⁴

Inside the FO, these parliamentary enquiries were perceived as an opportunity to advance the FO's view on the issue. C. E. Diggines, who took over Edmonds' post as Heads of American Department, was optimistic about the response in Parliament. He argued that the MPs' enquiries were "an opportunity to make it clear that the question of sovereignty cannot be excluded" from the talks, as long as "there will be consultation with the population of the Islands about their future". As regards the essence of consultation, however, the FO insisted that the interests of the islanders as the negotiating principle remained prioritised. Diggines argued that "it would not be desirable to give the outright assurance asked for" by either the islanders or the opposition in Parliament. This was because, as Diggines explained, "the tiny population of the colony should not have what might amount to an absolute right to veto" this policy preference for sovereignty talks. Based on this reasoning, it was apparent that what worried Diggines was the possible effect of giving the power of veto to the islanders. In other words, if the islanders were given this veto power, the islanders' opposition to the talks could in turn "lead the Argentines to break off further negotiations".¹⁰⁵ To reduce this concern, Diggines saw the parliamentary enquiries as good opportunities to explain the rationale of the government stance on this issue.

The Cabinet was clearly influenced by the FO's attitude at this moment. In the

¹⁰³ Hansard (Commons), vol. 761, *ibid.*.

¹⁰⁴ Hansard (Lords), vol. 290, col. 208.

¹⁰⁵ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (17), Diggines to Beith, confidential, 12 March 1968.

Cabinet meeting, the Foreign Secretary took the view that the parliamentary rows in March 1968 were “absurd”. When Stewart reported that the FO was preparing the ground for the government to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands according to the interests of the islanders, there was no opposition voiced in the Cabinet. The only exception was James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He asked whether to keep this disputed territory would be of any use to Britain. To this question, all the Cabinet agreed that the answer was negative and that the talks were worth continuing, despite the parliamentary uproars. Stewart seized the opportunity and pledged that “I thought that I had better get firmly established on one stool”. Wilson responded, saying that “Yes, we know. You raced ahead of your stool and have defused the situation”. According to Castle, it “was the first time in a long time we had had a good laugh at [the] Cabinet”.¹⁰⁶ Castle's remark was suggestive. It indicated the atmosphere in the meeting was relaxed. It also suggests that so far as the first policy preference was concerned, Stewart was “quite pleased with the way he had managed this so as to prevent talks being called off”.¹⁰⁷ As Chalfont confidently pledged the FO's respect for the wishes of the islanders in the House of Lords on 27 March, “there is no question of Britain ceding the islands to Argentina immediately, but cession is a possibility in the future should an agreement be reached with Argentina which the islanders accept as fully satisfying their interests in all respects”.¹⁰⁸

Chalfont's statements indicated that the British attitude towards Argentina about the Falklands issue remained consistently following the twin-track strategy. The FO knew only too well that Argentina would only be satisfied to have the interests of the islanders as the guiding principle, so that Stewart was cautious when defending the policy by speaking of their wishes in Parliament. To avoid any unnecessary negative impact, Stewart, in fact, had called in McLoughlin before the Parliamentary debates on 27 March, explaining to McLoughlin that the reference to the wishes of the islanders in Parliament was a necessity.¹⁰⁹ Creswell in Buenos Aires also visited Costa Mendez on 3 April. He reassured the Argentine Foreign Minister that, despite the press reports in London that the British Government denied any immediate transfer of

¹⁰⁶ Barbara Castle (1990) *The Castle diaries, 1964-1976* (London: Papermac), p. 207.

¹⁰⁷ Castle (1990) *The Castle diaries*, p. 207.

¹⁰⁸ *Glasgow Herald*, 28 March 1968.

¹⁰⁹ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (5), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 242, confidential, 26 March 1968.

sovereignty, there was still “sufficient room for manoeuvre”, which enabled negotiations to continue. Creswell was tactful. He followed the discourse around the interests of the islanders and encouraged his Argentine counterparts that “the Islanders would no doubt judge their own interests in the light of the safeguards and guarantees offered by Argentina”. Therefore, Argentina “would have to be able to convince the Islanders by constructive actions that a new relationship would be in the Islanders’ own interests”. On the other side of the ledger, Creswell, in an attempt to keep the cooperative mood in the process of settling the issue, seemed to be more anxious about the possible press release in Buenos Aires as a result of the parliamentary rows in London. He reminded Mendez that “Britain still thought that the talks had better be kept confidential” with a view to giving room for “patient diplomacy”.¹¹⁰

The parliamentary uproars receded in early April 1968 with the FO’s maintenance that “sovereignty over the islanders will not be transferred to Argentina unless the islanders consider this to be in their interests”. Both the FIEC and the media seemed satisfied with FO’s replies.¹¹¹ However, the opposition seemed unaware of the distinction between the wishes and the interests. Their satisfaction made the FO more convinced of the twin-track strategy with the effect to sideline the wishes of the islanders.¹¹² Perhaps what made the FO more confident about its designated policy was that, according to the FO, Argentina’s general treatment of the issue in March 1968 had been “surprisingly moderate in tone”.¹¹³ Even *Cronica*, a press used to beat the nationalist drum in Buenos Aires, was exceedingly patient. *Cronica* was emphatic that “the negotiations are developing favourably for Argentina”, because, as *Cronica* explained, the British Government had ruled out a referendum in the Falklands Islands.¹¹⁴ The FO interpreted the calmness on the Argentine side as the result of practical thinking, because it was in the interest of Argentina not to make into headlines in Buenos Aires the British Parliamentary discontent.¹¹⁵ Following this interpretation, the FO after March 1968 began to realise that the opposition that put

¹¹⁰ FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (21), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 227, confidential, 3 April 1968, enclosing “Interview with Nicanor Costa Mendez on 3 April, 1968, confidential”.

¹¹¹ *Daily Sketch*, 28 March 1968; *The Times*, 29 March 1968.

¹¹² Interview with Francis Mitchell, Secretary of FIEC; *Daily Sketch*, 28 March 1968; *The Times*, 29 March 1968.

¹¹³ FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (16), J. F. R. Martin, BEBA, to Atkinson, American Department, restricted, 25 March 1968.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁵ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (7), FO/CO/WH distribution, guidance no. 89, unclassified, 29 March 1968.

the FO and its first policy preference on the defensive was not external, but domestic.¹¹⁶ The FO as a result became cautious not to accelerate the tempo of progress in the talks. In late April, for instance, it was mooted inviting the islanders to visit Buenos Aires. The invitation was declined by Diggines, who thought the suggestion premature, arguing that “the question of any return invitation for the Argentines to visit the Islands cannot be considered for the time being”.¹¹⁷

More significantly, the FO remained highly sensitive about the wording between the wishes and interests of the islanders in the parliamentary debates. In Stewart's written replies to Parliament, Diggines was particularly cautious not to let the Government's statement go beyond the settled definition, i.e. the interests of the islanders.¹¹⁸ In one of Stewart's statements responding to Knox Cunningham, MP, Stewart argued that “I can only add that H. M. Government will not fail to take into account the wishes of the inhabitants of the Islands”. On this, Diggines was quick to point out that the term—the wishes of the islanders—had not been used as a formal reply before. Nevertheless, as Diggines also admitted, respecting the wishes of the islanders had to be expressed “under this circumstance”.¹¹⁹

Diggines' instinctive response was revealing. It showed that wording of the wishes at this stage was at best an expedient response under the condition of strong parliamentary opposition. But it at maximum rhetoric. Speaking of the wishes of the islanders was by no means a true reflection of the government position, or any departure from the negotiating principle having been held since mid-1967. The first policy preference had been constructed in the way that a series of supplementary actions were coming into play.

The second turning-point policy preference emerging

On 1 May 1968, Stewart received McLoughlin to discuss the draft Memorandum of Understanding. Their talks were based on the consensus reached in mid-1967. However, there were signs of departure in the FO's strategy, despite these did not

¹¹⁶ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (7), (YC3/1), CO to Falkland Islands, confidential, 15 March 1968; FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (4), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 239, unclassified, 25 March 1968.

¹¹⁷ FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (27), Diggines to M. Gale, BEBA, confidential, 26 April 1968.

¹¹⁸ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (43), Diggines to Beith, Parliamentary Office, confidential, 29 March 1968.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, (18), Diggines to Lord Hood, Private Office, confidential, 14 March 1968.

necessarily mean that FO had radically changed its attitude towards this dispute. The archive shows that, in addition to stating the objective of the Memorandum commonly shared by the two sides, the FO put forward two different versions of the draft in paragraph 4 as follows:

The British draft: The Government of the United Kingdom have indicated that as part of such a final settlement they will recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands with effect from a date to be agreed, in the event that the Government of the United Kingdom may consider that the population of the Islands regard their interests as secured by the safeguards and guarantees offered by the Argentine Government.

The Argentine draft: As part of such a final settlement, the United Kingdom Government will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands, with effect from a date to be agree, at such time as the United Kingdom Government considers that the guarantees and safeguards offered by the Argentine Government, on which consultations will be held with the population of the Islands, duly secures the latter's interests. The Argentine Government and the United Kingdom Government will consider those interests in the light of Resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations.¹²⁰

With these two versions of paragraph 4 in the draft, Stewart made clear three principles held by the FO in their further talks. First, Britain genuinely wanted to reach an agreement regarding the dispute. Secondly, Britain, however, did not believe that it would be right to ignore the wishes of the islanders in the process of sovereignty transfer, because it would not be honourable for any British government to do so. Thirdly, Britain as a result thought it important that "it was necessary in the modern world for small communities to be in a working relationship with the nearest neighbours to which they are related by geography".¹²¹

¹²⁰ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B (95), C. W. Wallace to Beith, "Falkland Islands: Parliamentary Questions", 27 June 1968, enclosing (1) "Falkland Islands: Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Wednesday, 1 May 1968 at 12 noon", confidential covering secret; (2) "Falkland Islands: Text of draft *Anglo-Argentine* Memorandum of Understanding as of 1 May 1968", secret; (3) "Record of a conversation between Mr. Beith and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Thursday, 2 May at 3.45 p.m.", secret.

¹²¹ Ibid..

To this departure, McLoughlin, nevertheless, responded positively. He recognised the importance of the principle of consulting the islanders from the humanitarian point of view. As McLoughlin agreed, Argentina had to be patient. A transition of time was needed because the loyalties of the islanders apparently remained with Britain.¹²²

McLoughlin's pragmatic view showed that the meeting on 1 May was another high ground in the progress of the sovereignty talks. The result of the meeting convinced the FO that Argentina was becoming "increasingly aware that the barrier of suspicion they had created had to be demolished and they would have to make a major effort to woo the islanders".¹²³ On 5 July 1968, McLoughlin returned with the Argentine draft of the Memorandum of Understanding, expressing a willingness to guarantee "the interests of the islanders by making full use of modern techniques".¹²⁴ Based on this pledge, Argentina admitted that the "cultural and economic links" in the text were too restrictive and declared that more effort on the Argentine side was needed.¹²⁵ Argentina also showed its intention to pay for the building of an airfield in the Falklands and to resume a flight service.¹²⁶ From August to October, there also appeared reports that Baring Brothers, one of the biggest companies in Buenos Aires, was proceeding with plans for a possible take-over bid for the Falkland Islands Company.¹²⁷ All the proposals that could bring the islanders closer to Argentina were welcomed by the FO, since both Governments had fully agreed that the "process of enlightening the Islanders about this country and gradually improving their attitude towards Argentina was fundamental to the solution of the whole problem".¹²⁸

Obviously, the proposals made by Argentina reinforced the FO's confidence in its current policy preference in the talks, and the source of confidence also came from Argentina's successful effort not to let the press stimulate unnecessary nationalist

¹²² Ibid..

¹²³ FCO7/152, AA4/9, (9), C. W. Wallace to C. E. Diggines, restricted, 15 August 1968.

¹²⁴ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (68), "Record of conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Argentine Ambassador held at the Foreign Office on Friday, 5 July 1968, at 4.30 p.m.", confidential, 5 July 1968.

¹²⁵ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B (95), Wallace to Beith.

¹²⁶ FCO 7/186, AA21/4, (4), P. R. A. Mansfield, BEBA, to C. W. Wallace, American Department, confidential, 23 August 1968.

¹²⁷ FCO 7/186, AA2/14, (6), Philip R. A. Mansfield, BEBA, to C. W. Wallace, American Department, confidential, 23 August 1968; FCO7/137, AA3/7, (40), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 644, confidential, 1 October 1968.

¹²⁸ Ibid., (4), Mansfield to Wallace, confidential, 23 August 1968.

sentiment against the cooperative mood alongside the process of sovereignty discussions.¹²⁹ Even the Queen's decision not to visit Argentina in 1968 was favourably interpreted by the press in Buenos Aires as "a triumph for both Argentine and British diplomacy", exemplifying "British pragmatism and tactfulness" not to arouse the nationalist mood in Argentina.¹³⁰ The Argentine interpretation of the British attitude in turn reassured the FO that its current policy preference, based on the interests of the islanders, was realistic, workable and on the right track. It would not be a surprise, as a result, to observe a sense of confidence in Creswell's report a few days after the meeting on 1 May. Creswell noted, "I thought that the situation now looked better than it has [sic] for some time", because "our own position had been clearly defined in the Parliamentary statements made by the Secretary of State in April and May" of the previous year.¹³¹

Despite this confidence, there had been a slight departure in the content of the policy preference after Stewart resumed the post as Foreign Secretary in March 1968. This sign of attitude change became visible when McLoughlin questioned the real meaning of "consultation" in the context of the draft Memorandum of Understanding. On 2 May 1968, McLoughlin asked what consultation meant when the FO said that it would consult the islanders. Did consultation mean to consult about sovereignty, or about the proposed Argentine guarantees and safeguards? Stewart seized the chance and explained that London treated these two consultations as inseparable.¹³² Although the FO made clear that the reason for having to have two different drafts in paragraph 4 was merely "a matter of courtesy", that was misleading. The difference, as the FO admitted, lay in the fact that "the British draft allowed that the Islanders would express their opinion, while in the Argentine draft the decision about the future of the Islands was left to Her Majesty's Government".¹³³

The existence of the different versions of Paragraph 4 implied that the FO at this stage was caught in a policy dilemma. On the one hand, it managed to keep the cooperative mood in the sovereignty talks with Argentina. Argentina's patience and

¹²⁹ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (70), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 305, confidential, 2 May 1968.

¹³⁰ FCO 7/137, AA3/7, (33), J. Martin, BEBA, to Atkinson, American Department, FO, restricted, 8 July 1968.

¹³¹ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A. (70), Creswell to FO.

¹³² Ibid..

¹³³ Ibid..

calmness strengthened the confidence of the FO in its current policy track. On the other side, the pressure from Parliament was building up. On 20 May, a motion was carried unanimously in the Falkland Islands Legislative Council that "the wishes of the Islanders were an absolute condition in determining the sovereignty of the Falklands".¹³⁴ The FO did not miss the strong signal. Stewart's two versions of paragraph 4 were more than suggestive. They clearly reflected that moral concern for the wishes of the islanders began to gain ground. Nevertheless, so far as Argentina's calmness was concerned, the twin-track policy could not be criticised as ineffective. It effectively absorbed the negative impact of the existing dispute over the Falkland Islands. Argentina since April 1967 had rarely made an issue of it in other international forums, which was exactly to the FO's expectation.

The first turning-point policy preference lurching forward

On 9 August 1968, a politico-legal arrangement aimed at circumventing the sovereignty impasse was reached between Britain and Argentina on the text of the draft Memorandum of Understanding about the Falkland Islands.¹³⁵ The exact detail of the text is not available in the Public Records Office at the time of writing. This thesis can only record the essential points from the Franks Report issued in 1983 as follows:

The Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final settlement will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after (i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and (ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so secured.¹³⁶

The Memorandum of Understanding represented "the high water mark" in the

¹³⁴ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, (103), Diggines to Beith, restricted, 4 July 1968.

¹³⁵ FCO 7/149, AA 4/6, (55) A. M. Warburton, FO, to J. D. B. Shaw, UKMIS, confidential, 19 August 1968.

¹³⁶ British Government (1983), *Falkland Island review*, p. 6.

discussions of the transfer of sovereignty".¹³⁷ It had successfully grasped the spirit of the FO's effort in cooperation with Argentina. It also sidelined the wishes of the islanders that had been reiterated earlier in March 1968 before the two Houses. This Memorandum, indeed, set a conscious basis for further efforts in cooperation with Argentina in the process of solving the long-running territorial dispute. At the meeting to discuss the draft in the FO on 13 September, the consensus was reached inside the FO that it would be a political decision to sign this Memorandum.

Despite this consensus, Stewart's concern after mid-1967 did not diminish. It instead became more manifest as the public concern increasingly seized the spotlight through the media. On 8 October 1968, the *Daily Express* in New York carried an article, saying that Britain had determined to bow to the "inevitable" happening to the future of the Falkland Islands. According to the *Daily Express*, "the British Government was to keep the problem 'on ice' for a while until the Argentine ... gives assurance that she is ready to 'do something'". It commented that the issue at that moment was "just a question of working out the timetable". The transfer of sovereignty, by report, would take only 5 to 10 years.¹³⁸

The impact of the news release on the FO was complex. This complexity might have strengthened the FO's concern about the legitimacy of the first policy preference talking about the interests of the islanders exclusively. Superficially, the FO remained adamant. It went on with statements such as "there is no change in H.M.S.'s policy", and "there will be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the inhabitants".¹³⁹ However, the pressure had apparently sensitised the FO to the public pulse to a considerable degree. Stewart became more and more concerned about the lack of correspondence between the text of the joint memo and what the FO reiterated. "Our difficulty", as Stewart admitted later in October 1968, "arises largely from the fact that the Memorandum contains no explicit reference to the wishes of the Islanders and we think that it might therefore be represented (wrongly in my view) as denying the Islanders the right to decide on their future".¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, acknowledging the

¹³⁷ Douglas Kinney (1985) "Anglo-Argentine diplomacy and the Falklands crisis", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 82.

¹³⁸ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (19), FO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 3322, unclassified, 8 October 1968.

¹³⁹ Ibid..

¹⁴⁰ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (73), Brief no. 2, "Secretary of state's visit to the UN and Washington, 7-15

difficulties did not mean that Stewart would back down from the designated policy preference that had been continued for more than one and a half years since mid-1967.

The public pressure cannot be exaggerated at this stage, however. The room for manoeuvre was still spacious. Perhaps because of Stewart's earnest attempt to settle the dispute earlier, Stewart began to think of avoiding an Act of Parliament.¹⁴¹ Having been aware that an agreement reached with Argentina about this issue would be debated in Parliament, Stewart anticipated that there would be parliamentary rows before the Memorandum of Understanding was effected.¹⁴² However, the issue was in need of settlement. This was the main policy objective that was consciously supported in the Cabinet. Under this circumstance, Stewart's intention was crystal clear. To dispel the concern about another parliamentary row, he intended to make a detour to evade opposition. A leading question was therefore put to his staff. Stewart asked whether "an Act of Parliament would be needed to implement a transfer of sovereignty".¹⁴³

Nevertheless, this intention met opposition from F. Burrows, the assistant legal adviser in the FO. Burrows argued that, although the Falkland Islands were not part of a self-governing Dominion and, indeed, could well be ceded away without the concurrence of Parliament, it would be politically desirable to submit the case to Parliament for ratification.¹⁴⁴ No further document indicates Stewart's response to this comment. But Burrows' written answer seemed to be another challenge to undermine the first policy preference.

On 26 September 1968, the draft of Memorandum of Understanding was fully discussed for one-and-a-half hours in the Cabinet. The length of the discussion indicated that the issue of the Falkland Islands was no longer as minor as it had been before 1964. Members of the Cabinet expressed their worries about another wave of

October, 1968, Falkland Islands".

¹⁴¹ FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (4), Atkinson to Wallace, secret, 4 October 1968.

¹⁴² FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (6), Diggines to Lord Hood, Private Secretary, confidential, 21 March 1968.

¹⁴³ FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (198), "Meeting at the Foreign Office on 13 September, 1968, to discuss the draft Anglo-Argentine Memorandum of Understanding and the accompanying draft *Unilateral Statement* by Her Majesty's Government", enclosing "Falkland Islands: Proposed Unilateral Statement by H. M. G.", secret 13 September 1968.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., (5), F. Burrows, Assistant Legal Adviser, to American Department, secret, 8 October 1968.

parliamentary opposition, if the FO published the Memorandum of Understanding. Stewart remained adamant. "Yet, retorted Michael", as Castle noted, "we should certainly have a hostile reaction in the UN and there might even be armed clashes with the Argentines which—Denis Healey warned—we couldn't meet except by an enormous increase in expenditure".¹⁴⁵ Castle cut in at this juncture, suggesting that Britain insert the word "views" before "the interests of the islanders" in the Memorandum of Understanding. In other words, the text would be: "the views and the interests of the Islanders would be secured". Stewart refused, arguing that this suggestion "would be utterly unacceptable to the Argentine Government".¹⁴⁶

The meeting in the Cabinet ended without any clear decision being made. This indecision in the Cabinet did not alter the FO's designated terms in the joint memorandum, but it surely made Stewart further aware that, with the Memorandum of Understanding coming into the open, the issue would become thornier. The intermediate aim for the FO therefore was to work out acceptable conditions with a certain degree of consensus for the islanders in order to avoid unmanageable backfires. To meet this task, the FO thought that the time was appropriate to reconsider the idea of the educational campaigns that had been put to one side in March 1968.¹⁴⁷

With regard to the question that who would be the Minister to visit the Falkland Islands, John Beith in the American Department was of the view that "it would be reasonable now to see the visit in a slightly different guise. Incidentally, the Commonwealth Office have in mind Mr. Whitlock, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, and not Lord Shepherd".¹⁴⁸ Beith's proposal about whom to take on the visiting team was revealing. The decision to designate Lord Shepherd, who was with the FO, had been made in early 1968.¹⁴⁹ But to choose Whitlock, who was in Parliament, instead of Lord Shepherd in late 1968, as the FO admitted, was due to FO's increasing concern over the strong adverse reactions from the Falkland Islanders, who had developed an unfavourable image of the FO in the previous few months. The

¹⁴⁵ Castle (1990) *The Castle diaries*, p. 258.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid..

¹⁴⁷ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (8), A. N. Galsworthy, CO, to Leslie Glass, UKMIS, 18 March 1968.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., (10), Beith, American Department, FO, to Tait, Permanent Under-Secretary, confidential, 9 July 1968.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., (1), FO to Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 7, confidential, 16 January 1968.

FO seemed keenly aware that their hostility towards the FO's first policy preference would be highly likely to bring about a chain reaction in Parliament again.

It was also agreed in the FO that the proper time for a visit would be a few days before the parliamentary debates.¹⁵⁰ However, Thomson, the Commonwealth Secretary, urged a quicker decision.¹⁵¹ According to Thomson, "the timing of [the] agreement on the Memorandum had slipped",¹⁵² so that the visit would be advisable to take place "during, or shortly before, the Christmas recess".¹⁵³ Thomson's remarks might have already given a clue to what Stewart intended. For Stewart, since both Governments had tacitly accepted the Memorandum of Understanding, any delay in publicising the Memorandum would probably be unacceptable to Argentina.¹⁵⁴ As Stewart averred, "I do not think that it would be advisable to defer the Ministerial visit until the Christmas recess, as this would mean in effect that it would not take place until January, 1969". With this reasoning, Stewart issued the instruction that, if the draft Memorandum of Understanding could be approved in the Cabinet, it would be better for the ministers to launch the educational campaign in late November or early December 1968.¹⁵⁵

The FO at this stage would have been cheered by Caradon's message from the UN. Caradon reported that "there is no question of the Falklands [issue] being raised in the Committee of 24 on 23 September, nor do we expect any discussion of substance at a later stage of the Committee's work".¹⁵⁶ More soothing to the FO was Ruda's assurance that "the Argentine had waited 130 years for the Falklands and could well afford to wait another few months for an agreement".¹⁵⁷ On 26 September 1968, Caradon and Ruda sent in a joint statement to the UN Special Committee of 24.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., (21), George Thomson, CO, to FO, confidential, 30 August 1968.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., (10), Beith to Tait.

¹⁵² Ibid..

¹⁵³ Ibid., (21), Thomson to FO.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., (16), Diggines to Tait, confidential, 30 August 1968.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., (22), Stewart, "Falkland Islands: Visit by a Minister", confidential, FS/68/87, 6 September 1968.

¹⁵⁶ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (59), Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 2204, confidential, 21 September 1968.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., (60), Lord Caradon, UKMIS, to FO, Tel. no. 2212, confidential, 23 September 1968.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., (71) Caradon, "Question of the Falkland Islands: Letter dated 26 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations to the Chairman of the Special Committee", A/AC.109/302, Original: English, 26 September 1968; *ibid.*, (72) Jose Maria Ruda, "Question of the Falkland Islands: Letter dated 26 September 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United Nations to the Chairman of the Special Committee", A/AC.109/303, Original: Spanish, 26 September.

The statement was presented on an earlier annual date than it used to be. Britain affirmed in the UN categorically that "the greatest difference between London and Buenos Aires had been solved".¹⁵⁹ Perhaps with these positive signs, the FO still thought it worthwhile to stick to its first policy preference.

The second turning-point policy preference coming to the fore

The observation of the archive has to end here. No official papers have been released beyond early November 1968 at this writing. Nevertheless, a picture of the policy switch in December 1968 can be developed from other published literature and it has been summarised in Chapter 1.

On 1 November 1968, Argentina urged an increase in the tempo of the negotiations.¹⁶⁰ Britain responded positively by launching the educational campaign. On 27 November there occurred another unauthorised landing of an Argentine aircraft—the third since 1965.¹⁶¹ At this precise moment, ironically, Chalfont was becoming the first minister to visit the Falkland Islands, with the major purpose of convincing the islanders where their interests lay, and why transfer of sovereignty was the best course. In London, another wave of parliamentary rows was gaining momentum. The FIEC this time got 100 MPs behind its stance. The FCO officials were pressurised into explaining their Falklands policy in Parliament again, but to their embarrassment, they found not a murmur of support from their own backbenchers.¹⁶² On 3 December, Chalfont, upon returning from the Falkland Islands, was forced to repeat the rhetoric in the House of Lords that "there will be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders... their wishes in this matter are paramount".¹⁶³ Fred Mulley, Minister of State at the FCO, reconfirmed in the House of Commons that it was not the government policy to "transfer sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders".¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Fritz L. Hoffmann and Olga Mingo Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982* (Boulder & London: Westview), p. 108.

¹⁶⁰ FCO 7/186, AA21/4, (3), Mansfield, BEBA, to W. H. Thompson, Colonial Secretary, Fort Stanley, Falkland Islands, confidential, 1 November 1968.

¹⁶¹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 774, col. 513, 4 December 1968.

¹⁶² Peter J. Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 102.

¹⁶³ Hansard (Lords) vol. 298, cols., 27, 3 December 1968.

¹⁶⁴ Hansard (Commons) vol. 774, col. 1254, 3 December 1968.

But the situation spun out of control. The next day in the House of Commons there exploded a series of questions: why were not the wishes of the islanders to be respected as before? Why did the FCO maintain that a referendum was superficial or premature? Was it a Freudian slip to talk about strengthening communications on the one hand and the wishes of the islanders prevailing on the other? Why could not the House be told what Chalfont had said to the islanders? Why ought sovereignty to be on the agenda?¹⁶⁵ One week later, Chalfont made his second attempt at clearing the air of suspicions by reiterating that the Government "insisted on the paramountcy of the Islanders' wishes".¹⁶⁶ However, the MPs had no confidence in Chalfont's pledge. When Chalfont claimed that "it is we who decide whether that sovereignty can be disposed of",¹⁶⁷ the MPs were not convinced by this kind of rhetoric. Uproar followed. "My Lords", as the Marquess of Salisbury quipped, "the noble Lord seems to think that we are silly; we think that he is shifty—and very shifty". Lord Bowles echoed her, "too clever by half".¹⁶⁸ The discredit of the Government was more than manifest. The Government's skilful practice in the past two years, having its replies shuttling between the wishes and interests under the so-called double track policy, came under heavy fire. The legitimacy of the first policy preference in the talks was seriously undermined.

On 11 December, having seen the situation deteriorate from bad to worse, the Cabinet came to the rescue and subsequently rejected the draft Memorandum of Understanding.¹⁶⁹ Stewart was instructed by the Cabinet to make a statement on Government policy over the Falkland Islands.¹⁷⁰ His restatement in Parliament was, understandably, an unbearable moment. According to Edmonds, Stewart "was howled down on the floor of the House... Howled down by members, and nobody, no Member of Parliament in any party, and above all not in his own party, ever forgot it".¹⁷¹ The embarrassment, nevertheless, was not exclusively confined to the FO. From the perspective of collective responsibilities, the decision to withdraw the Memorandum of Understanding and to uphold the wishes of the islanders as the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., vol. 774, cols., 1530-40, 3 December 1968.

¹⁶⁶ Hansard (Lords), vol. 298, col. 533, 11 December 1968.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., col. 538.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid..

¹⁶⁹ Tony Benn (1988) *Office with power: Diaries 1968-72* (London: Arrow), p. 134.

¹⁷⁰ Castle (1990) *The Castle diaries*, p. 285.

¹⁷¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 27.

guiding principle in the talks represented a failure of the government policy that had been so keenly followed since mid-1967. Calling the preparation of Memorandum of Understanding to a halt, as Benn noted, Wilson "was a bit embarrassed because he was pretty heavily tied up in this [first policy preference] as well".¹⁷² According to Zielger, before December 1968, "Wilson still entertained high hopes that the issue could be "disposed of by transferring sovereignty to the Argentinians on terms acceptable to the inhabitants".¹⁷³ But now that the whole plan had fallen flat, the second turning-point policy preference geared to the wishes of the islanders replaced interests in December 1968, and the draft Memorandum of Understanding was put aside.

On 12 December, Stewart regained his composure. He articulated the essence of the "new" policy track by emphasising that what "I will tie myself to is this, that, whatever the form, one of the provisions must be that we should not be in a position where we could be required to hand over the islands against the wishes of the islanders. I really think that that ought to do".¹⁷⁴

Stewart's remark at this final moment can be seen as a deliberate one, reflecting the effect of the crisis in late November and early December 1968. It indicated a significant divergence of policy making from what the FCO claimed before. The second policy preference, respecting the wishes of the islanders, was thus consolidated; despite the latter term was quite short-term and had been repeatedly replaced in the next 14 years leading to the war.

In retrospect, the FO's policy preference concerning British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands had changed from Stewart's position that British sovereignty was not negotiable in early 1966, to Brown's flexible strategies that sovereignty could cede away as long as there was a transitional period. In respect of the transitional period, the attitude change was also phenomenal. The FO since late 1966 had reduced the transition period from 40 years, as proposed in November 1966, to 20 years, and then down to 10 years, as Brown proposed to McLoughlin on 26 March 1967. In October 1968, rumour had it that it had been reduced again to 5 from 10 years. On the matter

¹⁷² Benn (1988) *Office with power*, p. 134.

¹⁷³ Ziegler (1993) *Wilson*, p. 343.

¹⁷⁴ Hansard (Commons) vol. 775, cols. 610, 12 December 1968.

of the negotiating principle, the wishes of the islanders that the FO reiterated before early 1967 had also been sidelined. The interests of the islanders in the name of “advantages” came into centre stage and set the foundation for the emerging draft Memorandum of Understanding at the final stage of the talks in late 1968. Paradoxically however, the nearer it approached the final stage of the sovereignty talks, the more mounting pressure was on the publication of Memorandum of Understanding and the FO's first policy preference.¹⁷⁵

Understandably, the final decision to pledge that the wishes of the islanders were paramount was a reluctant one. It was reluctant in the sense that the long-running dispute might have been resolved once and for all, but for, in Stewart's words, “the plain British man in the street's view”.¹⁷⁶ What explanations can prospect theory provide?

2. The explanation from the perspective of the domain of frame

This thesis finds that, before the end of 1967, the British Government under Wilson's premiership enjoyed a golden period of popularity that, in the language of prospect theory, can be described as a domain of gains. The rosy picture sprang from public confidence in Wilson's heroic leadership and the optimistic economic outlook. Nonetheless, as time went by, the domain of gains began to dwindle as Wilson's EEC policy exerted a considerable negative impact on cohesion among Labour MPs. It was further damaged by devaluation of the pound at the end of 1967, leading to a series of confidence crises nation-wide. The Government's domain of frame as a result slid into a domain of losses after the end of 1967, particularly when the trade quarrels between Argentina and Britain occurred due to the foot-and-mouth disease.

Enjoying the domain of gains

Lacking a unifying consensus had been a consistent phenomenon in Labour's tradition. Incompatibility between moral values and their real practice used to embarrass the policies of Labour when in office, and this incompatibility was particularly manifest in foreign affairs.¹⁷⁷ From October 1964 onwards, however, an

¹⁷⁵ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (57), UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 2121, confidential, 12 September 1968.

¹⁷⁶ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 27.

¹⁷⁷ David Carlton (1970) *MacDonald versus Henderson: The foreign policy of the second Labour*

unusual party unity emerged.¹⁷⁸ Faced by the narrow victory, with a tenuous majority of four,¹⁷⁹ members of the Labour Party, including some active backbenchers, seemed fully aware of the need to surrender their divergent opinions temporarily, otherwise, Government policies might easily have been defeated.¹⁸⁰ The compromise engendered by the call for party cohesion, in turn, consolidated Wilson's heroic leadership.¹⁸¹

Wilson indeed was extremely capable of exploiting the chance of a narrow margin in Parliament.¹⁸² After succeeding Hugh Gaitskell as leader of the Labour party in 1963,¹⁸³ he marketed himself as a "vigorous leader committed to technological advance",¹⁸⁴ always appearing his best before the mass media.¹⁸⁵ This domain of gain that had been successfully created, was further reinforced by Labour's second victory eighteen months after the 1964 election, with the result that his majority shot up to 97.¹⁸⁶ The landslide was the first time in the twentieth-century that a Prime Minister had led his party to a second electoral victory with an increased majority. It placed Wilson at the pinnacle of power and even the opposition had to concede that he was the Party's winning asset.¹⁸⁷ More significantly, Labour in 1966 proved it was the party "most in touch with the rising new post-war generation" whose choice of it was a reflection of the new British mood.¹⁸⁸ As David Triesman, leader of CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), admitted, "I was imbued with the idea that a Labour government would produce some profound change in British

government (London: Macmillan), p. 218; Bruce George (1991) *The British Labour party and defence* (NY & London: Praeger), p. 7; David Reynolds (1991) *Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the twentieth century* (London & NY: Longman), p. 40.

¹⁷⁸ Joseph Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy: 1945-73* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 32.

¹⁷⁹ David Childs (1992) *Britain since 1945: A political history*, 3rd edition (London: Routledge), p. 179.

¹⁸⁰ Richard Gilbert (1966) "The Left's dilemma", *New Society*, 7, 172, pp. 72-3; Ben Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson* (London: HarperCollins), p. 264.

¹⁸¹ Michael R. Gordon (1969) *Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy: 1914-1965* (California: Stanford University Press), p. 278.

¹⁸² Willie Hamilton (1992) *Blood on the wall* (London: Bloomsbury), p. 103.

¹⁸³ Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 253.

¹⁸⁴ James Barber (1991) *The prime minister since 1945* (Oxford Blackwell), pp. 37-8.

¹⁸⁵ Bill Jones (1993) "The pitiless probing eye: Politicians and the broadcast political interview", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 1, p. 68, p. 78.

¹⁸⁶ Woodrow Wyatt (1977) *What's left of the Labour party?* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson), p. 81.

¹⁸⁷ Barber (1991) *The prime minister since 1945*, p. 54; Ronald Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament* (London: Constable), p. 277; Paul Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson* (London: Middlesex), p. 169.

¹⁸⁸ J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire (1990) *Politics in Britain: From Callaghan to Thatcher* (Edinburg: Chambers), p. 31; Ronald (1969) *The power of Parliament* (London: Constable), p. 277; Kenneth O. Morgan (1987) *Labour people: Leaders and lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock* (Oxford & NY: Oxford University Press), p. 251.

politics".¹⁸⁹

And indeed, alongside this enhanced popularity, Labour policy lines were attractive as well. The new Government was earnest in showing itself more disposed to combating economic problems than its predecessors. British society witnessed a wide series of economic reforms being launched. Under the pledge of "the white heat of technological revolution", the Government showed no hesitation in taking an interventionist approach in an attempt to regain Britain's position in the world economies.¹⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the Government was also confident in its wisdom of planning. According to the "National Plan",¹⁹¹ the Government's targeted growth in industrial output was set as high as 25 per cent by 1970.¹⁹² As Wilson confidently pledged, "I am here ... to give the marching orders to industrial leaders in what must be for this country a crusade. It is a crusade on which the whole future of Britain depends".¹⁹³

The short-term achievements were impressive.¹⁹⁴ In the fourth quarter of 1966, there had emerged a visible prospect of a trade surplus and balance of payments.¹⁹⁵ And there was renewed hope of economic stability in early 1967.¹⁹⁶ In his budget speech, James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, produced a neutral budget with no net tax change. His utterance—"steady as she goes"—was impressive and echoed by the Board of Trade.¹⁹⁷ With this optimistic mood, Wilson even proclaimed that in the coming year, 1967, Britain would "break out from the vicious restriction, constriction, of the balance of payments deficit from which we have suffered so long".¹⁹⁸

From the perspective of prospect theory, the Wilson Government in 1966, when the issue of the Falkland Islands emerged, was in a domain of gain. The growing

¹⁸⁹ Ronald Fraser (1988) *1968: A student generation in revolt* (London: Chatto & Windus), p. 61.

¹⁹⁰ Martin Burch and Ian Holliday (1996) *The British cabinet system* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf), p. 22; Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 273.

¹⁹¹ Andrew Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party* (London: Macmillan), p. 157.

¹⁹² Reynolds (1991) *Britannia overruled*, p. 226.

¹⁹³ Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 172.

¹⁹⁴ Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 466.

¹⁹⁵ James Callaghan (1987) *Time and chance* (London: Collins), p. 210.

¹⁹⁶ David Childs (1992) *Britain since 1945: A political history*, 3rd edition (London: Routledge), p. 191.

¹⁹⁷ Samuel Brittan (1969) *Steering the economy: The role of the Treasury* (London: Penguin), pp. 342-

3.

¹⁹⁸ Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament*, pp. 295-6.

public confidence and auspicious economic outlook gave the Wilson Cabinet an enlarged space for manoeuvre in both domestic matters and foreign policies. Despite conflicts resurfacing within the Labour Party after the election victory in March 1966, the Government showed no sign of holding back in its dealing with opposition. In the six-week seamen's strike in May 1966, it disseminated the idea that the strike was possibly communist sabotage and put down the unrest.¹⁹⁹ It won the vote on the critical motion concerning its Vietnam policy in June 1966.²⁰⁰ It refused to declare the devaluation of the pound in the latter part of 1966, believing in a "more fundamental and long-term structural reform".²⁰¹ The reshuffle of the Cabinet in August 1966 was admired as Wilson's "smartest piece of work".²⁰² To the extent that the domain of gains dominated the general perceptions of the Government, Reynold found that "Wilson was becoming trapped by preference and commitment into putting the status symbols of world power before his goal of economic regeneration" during this observed phase.²⁰³ The Defence White Paper issued in February 1965 stating that "for maintaining world peace, Britain must meet her obligations to Commonwealth and allied countries, [and] maintain a capacity for providing military assistance in many parts of the world".²⁰⁴ The White Paper demonstrated Wilson's firm belief that Britain was still a world power.²⁰⁵ At the end of 1966, when Wilson began the campaign to enter the Common Market, there was a strong political inspiration held by Wilson, who revealingly asserted that "We are embarking on an adventure of the kind that enabled the merchant ventures... We go forward in the same spirit of enterprise today. I believe the tide is right, the time is right, the winds are right to make the effort".²⁰⁶

Being in this domain of gain, the Wilson Government was willing to talk about the second track strategy in March 1967—to reduce the transitional period step by step, and to prepare the working agreement with Argentina in May 1967. Indeed, under the shelter of confidentiality in the talks, the FO found spacious room for

¹⁹⁹ Childs (1992) *Britain since 1945*, p. 183; Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, pp. 408-10; Wyatt (1977) *What's left of the Labour party?*, p. 81.

²⁰⁰ Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament*, pp. 292-3.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 293; Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 178; Philip Ziegler (1993) *Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p. 190.

²⁰² Tony Benn (1987) *Out of the wilderness: Diaries 1963-67* (London: Hutchinson), p. 477.

²⁰³ Reynold (1991) *Britannia overruled*, p. 229.

²⁰⁴ British Government (1965) *Statement in defence estimates*, Cmnd. 2592 (London: HMSO), p. 6.

²⁰⁵ Ziegler (1993) *Wilson*, p. 211.

²⁰⁶ Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 235.

manoeuvre regarding the development of the foreign policy on the issue of the Falkland Island. While it confidently spread the news that Britain would not recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in mid-1967, and the wishes of the islanders were the guides, the FO actually sidelined the pledge that it made before 1966. It progressively moved to accommodate the Argentine burning desire for sovereignty with a view to settling the historical dispute as early as possible.

Of course, there is no one-to-one and immediate correspondence between the domain of gains and the motivated framing in terms of gains. Foreign affairs should be considered a “kaleidoscope”.²⁰⁷ It is hardly “a matter of cogs and levers”, interconnecting neatly between cause and effect, but a question of mood and climate of opinion.²⁰⁸ However, with the assistance of prospect theory, it is well argued that the domain of gain made the FO confident enough to hold an optimistic view about the sovereignty talks. A self-confident policy-making style with encouraging economic outlooks gave the Wilson Government sufficient room to reconsider a new set of preference ordering in the dispute with Argentina. Indeed, Stewart had been aware of Britain’s sinking economic status,²⁰⁹ and Brown also passionately sought a fresh outlook for British foreign relations.²¹⁰ Their domain of gains can hardly be said irrelevant in this case. As Edmonds admitted unhesitatingly, the FCO “had solved or attacked so many intractable problems”. When it came to the issue of the Falkland Islands, “really anything was worth a go”.²¹¹

The domain of gain dragging down

However, Wilson's domain of frame in terms of gains did not last long. The domain of gains met its first wave of hostile challenge when Wilson’s approach to the Common Market was announced, and conflict on it within the Labour Party came to

²⁰⁷ George Brown (1971) *In my way: The political memoirs of Lord George-Brown* (London: Victor Gollancz), p. 158.

²⁰⁸ Anthony Sampson (1971) “The institutions of British foreign policy”, in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 181.

²⁰⁹ Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury (1977) *British foreign secretaries since 1945* (London: David & Charles), p. 192.

²¹⁰ Michael Charlton (1989) *The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 17.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

light in October 1966.²¹² For Wilson and Brown, the EEC policy was pragmatic rather than ideological.²¹³ For the leftists, nevertheless, the decision for entry owed more to political expediency than conviction.²¹⁴ They were of the view that the EEC represented increased living costs and the exacerbation of the balance of payment situation.²¹⁵ Britain should look beyond, globally, for better trade opportunities rather than joining an inward-looking bloc.²¹⁶ By March 1967, when both Wilson and Brown was making an exploratory tour of some EEC member states,²¹⁷ the left wing of the party began to protest loudly over the policy change and the Labour Government found itself seriously torn between intellectual and moral predicaments.²¹⁸ The foundation of Wilson's domain of gains began to shake. As far as this thesis can determine, this was the first wave of loss concern entering into the domain of frame in the coming year 1967-68, as keeping party unity was Wilson's major governing style.²¹⁹ When the policy dilemma about the EEC entry threatened "to divide the party seriously",²²⁰ no other factor could be more detrimental to Wilson's perception of the domain of frame.

The currency confidence crisis exploded when the devaluation of the pound was announced on 18 November 1967. Before that, Wilson had been a vigorous defender of the pound, and been cautious not to have the Labour Party labelled as a party of devaluation. He was convinced that devaluation was wrong and that skilful

²¹² Ziegler (1993) *Wilson*, p. 332.

²¹³ Robert Rhodes James (1972) *Ambitions and realities: British politics 1964-70* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 22; Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (1977) *British foreign secretaries since 1945*, p. 210.

²¹⁴ Uwe Kitzinger (1973) *Diplomacy and persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market* (London: Thames and Hudson), p. 287; Geoffrey Wakeford (1969) *The great Labour mirage: An indictment of socialism in Britain* (London: Robert Hale & Company), p. 232.

²¹⁵ Labour Party Conference (1967) *Report of the 66th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House), p. 280.

²¹⁶ Harry J. Johnson (1967) "The Atlantic case", *New Society*, 9, 242, p. 726; John Mackintosh (1967) "The Common Market case", *New Society*, 9, 241, p. 686; F. S. Northedge (1974) *Descent from power: British foreign policy 1945-1973* (London: George Allen & Unwin), p. 351.

²¹⁷ Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 233; Patrick Gordon Walker (1972) *The cabinet* (London & Glasgow: Fontana/Collis), p. 128.

²¹⁸ Barry Jones and Michael Keating (1985) *Labour and the British state* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 186; Gordon (1969) *Conflict and consensus*, p. 32; Mary Proudfoot (1974) *British politics and government, 1951-1970: A study of an affluent society* (London: Faber and Faber), p. 187; Leach, Robert (1995) "Political ideas", in Maurice Mullard (ed.), *Policy-making in Britain* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 21.

²¹⁹ James Barber (1991) *The prime minister since 1945* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 67; Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996) *The Blair revolution: Can New Labour deliver?* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber), p. 49.

²²⁰ Jones and Keating (1985) *Labour and the British state*, p. 186; *New Society* (1967a) "Observation: An Atlantic alternative?", 9, 223, p. 4.

management could avoid it. Indeed, that the Wilson Government had been unwilling to announce the devaluation during the sterling crisis in mid-1966 could demonstrate this conviction.²²¹ Nevertheless, with the added effect of the shortage of oil resulting from the Six-day War in the Middle East in June 1967,²²² the Government found that the value of the pound was unsustainable. It was forced to announce devaluation reluctantly by about 14 per cent.²²³ The devaluation dealt a huge blow to the credibility of the Wilson Government in several important aspects.

The immediate impact of devaluation was a cut in the defence budget, which forced the Cabinet to reconsider Britain's presence East of Suez. On 16 January 1967, Wilson announced to Parliament the decision to phase out forces East of Suez by the end of 1971.²²⁴ In the perception of the Government, the decision to withdraw was "so reluctant as to have been unintended until almost the last moment".²²⁵ Indeed, as Wilson later admitted, he was the last to be converted.²²⁶ This reluctance was understandable. To deploy forces East of Suez had been taken as essential by Wilson's Cabinet before 1966.²²⁷ The decision to withdraw was seen as "a great moment of defeat" in the light of Wilson's pledge in the policy debate,²²⁸ either when he emphasised in Parliament the British role in the world,²²⁹ or when the Defence White Paper of July 1967 was issued.²³⁰ The psychological impact on the Government's perception of the domain of frame cannot be under-examined.

Following the announcement of devaluation were the heavy cuts in public expenditure.²³¹ The success opportunities of National Planning that the British public had rarely harboured doubt about in the 1960s were therefore seriously diminished.

²²¹ Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, pp. 179-80; Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 411, p. 413.

²²² Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams (1971) *Denis Healey and the policies of power* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson), p. 225.

²²³ Willie Hamilton (1992) *Blood on the wall* (London: Bloomsbury), p. 122.

²²⁴ John W. Young (1997) *Britain and the world in the twentieth century* (London: Arnold), p. 172;

Patrick Gordon Walker (1970) *The cabinet* (London: Jonathan Cape), p. 130.

²²⁵ Frankel (1975) *British foreign policy*, p. 165.

²²⁶ Harold Wilson (1971) *The Labour government 1964-70: A personal record* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph), p. 243.

²²⁷ John Walker Young (1997) *Britain and the world in the twentieth century* (London: Arnold), p. 122.

²²⁸ Benn (1988) *Office with power*, p. 513.

²²⁹ P. Darby (1976) *British defence policy East of Suez 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 309; Reed and Williams (1971) *Denis Healey and the policies*, p. 215.

²³⁰ Lewis Minkin (1978) *The Labour party conference: A study on the politics of intra-party democracy* (London: Allen Lane), p. 296.

²³¹ Richard Crossman (1979) *The Crossman diaries: Selections from the diaries of a cabinet minister, 1964-1970*, introduced and edited by Anthony Howard (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan

For the past three years, the public had been taught to believe that devaluation was “a disgrace” and “a dishonour” by this Government.²³² Now the argument was reversed. It was argued that “the pound in your pocket has not been devalued”, despite the devaluation.²³³ The credit of the Wilson Government was thus seriously challenged.

Despite the domain of gains, it was faltering. When the FO intended to lift the ban on arms sales to South Africa, the issue of arms sales locked the whole Government into an unwelcome domain of losses.²³⁴ Initially, Foreign Secretary Brown planned to lift the ban in an attempt to moderate the economic difficulties through increasing exports. Among the arms for sale were Buccaneer aircraft and naval equipment.²³⁵ Unfortunately, this move was interpreted as a step back from its original position in 1964, when the purpose of the ban was to protest against South Africa's apartheid policy. The plan to lift the ban as a result invited harsh criticism. The Cabinet was blamed for viewing the arms sales entirely from the economic standpoint without any moral concerns. This criticism triggered an explosion of anger, extending from the hard left to the moderate party members within Labour.

Although the South African arms issue finally reached the conclusion that Britain's embargo would continue, the issue of arms sales proved detrimental to the moral standing of Wilson and the FO. The result in turn weakened the Government's manoeuvrability in foreign policy for the future. This thesis finds that the previous domain of gains, up to this point, promptly fell apart, as several policy debates began to transform into the issue of Wilson's leadership and personal credit.²³⁶ On 18 December 1967, some sectors of the press waged a “Wilson must go” campaign with the statement “Enough is enough... give us a fresh leader”. Wilson, for the first time in his administration, was forced to admit in public that his government promised much more than they could deliver, and the creditability of the Government was at stake.²³⁷

With the domain of gains being dragged down and the FO's confidence in its

Cape), p. 396.

²³² Brittan (1969) *Steering the economy*, p. 365.

²³³ Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 484.

²³⁴ Butt (1969) *The power of Parliament*, pp. 303-5; Reed and Williams (1971) *Denis Healey and the policies*, p. 231.

²³⁵ Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (1977) *British foreign secretaries since 1945*, p. 208.

²³⁶ Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, 233.

²³⁷ Steven Fielding (1997) (ed.) *The Labour party 'socialism' and the society since 1951* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press), pp. 72-5; Ziegler (1993) *Wilson*, pp. 289-94.

Falklands policy weakened, the FO's suspension of the educational campaign that had been prepared since December 1967 can be understood in this light. From the perspective of prospect theory, the FO found its room for manoeuvre in framing Falklands policy increasingly restricted. This restriction was particularly relevant after the Wilson Government moved into 1968.

A sombre prospect in 1968—A domain of loss

The domain of losses continued its psychological hold over the British leadership in 1968. Controversial policies regarding the widening trade gap, as well as the outflow of funds, fallen gold reserves, and the highest unemployment rate since 1940 dealt a heavy blow to Wilson's domain of frame.²³⁸ The Government's popularity hit a trough when the Government abandoned its target of 500,000 houses,²³⁹ reintroduced prescription charges that it had axed in 1964,²⁴⁰ and postponed the raising of the school-leaving age to 16.²⁴¹ These expenditure cuts in social policies inevitably caused several party revolts in parliament, and accompanying these revolts were waves of challenge directed to the Government's credit and Wilson's leadership.²⁴²

But the pressures facing the Government were not exclusively domestic. On the foreign policy front, the Government also found itself increasingly constrained. In 1968, Britain's international prestige had become tied to the outcome of the Rhodesia crisis and the Nigerian Civil War. However, the inconclusive negotiations with Ian Smith's minority Government in Rhodesia, left nothing but embarrassment in the Wilson Cabinet.²⁴³ The Government was bitterly attacked in the House from its own backbenchers for "selling out" Rhodesia to Smith's white minority.²⁴⁴ On the Nigerian Civil War, the increasingly widespread coverage of the worsening situation in Biafra since early 1968 also had heavily impaired the Wilson Government's standing.²⁴⁵ As the war dragged on, both Wilson and Stewart became the target of heavy criticisms for

²³⁸ Alan Sked and Chris Cook (1993) *Post-war Britain: A political history* (London: Penguin), p. 223.

²³⁹ Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 194; Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party*, p. 167.

²⁴⁰ Minkin (1978) *The Labour party conference*, p. 301; Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party*, p. 168.

²⁴¹ Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party*, p. 167.

²⁴² Benn (1988) *Office with power*, p. 133; Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson*, p. 195.

²⁴³ Thrope (1997) *A history of the British Labour party*, p. 170.

²⁴⁴ L. J. Macfarlane (1975) *Issues in British politics since 1945* (London: Longman), p. 139.

²⁴⁵ John J. Stremlau (1977) *The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967-1970* (NJ,

their deception in keeping the British stance neutral, and their wrong estimation of the length of the war.²⁴⁶ The seesaw of the warfare in Nigeria in mid-1968 subsequently brought about the most heated debates in the British Parliament since the Suez Crisis in 1956.²⁴⁷ As things stood, the two cases caused nothing less than a Government status crisis both home and abroad.

In retrospect, it may be too harsh for Crick to name the period of government as “the three wasted years”, i.e. 1966-68,²⁴⁸ but it is safer to say that the climax of Wilson’s best time was over after the end of 1967. Pimlott describes the bleak domain of loss lying ahead as follows.

Wilson and his Government did come to accept that conditions had changed, and were not as they had at first imagined. It became, after its early almost utopian phase, a government of transition: presiding over Britain’s hesitant switch from a “world” to a regional role. There was no precise moment. Rhodesia, devaluation, the end of Suez and the EEC bid all played their part, marking the gradual recognition by ministers of the new reality.²⁴⁹

The above description throws much light on the impact of the domain of loss perceived by the Wilson Government in 1968. This perception of loss could be particularly strong for Wilson personally because Wilson had been characterised as “an obsessive credit-taker”.²⁵⁰ As a result of having gone through a series of crises within only two years, Wilson became such “a figure of the past”.²⁵¹ In Healey’s words, his governance was “bizarre”.²⁵² Complaints abounded in the Cabinet that decision-making in 1968 often lacked a clear focal point.²⁵³ In addition, inter-personal relations became another hindrance to improving the domain of loss. On 15 March 1968, Foreign Secretary Brown resigned,²⁵⁴ leaving with the remark that “I don’t like

Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 116.

²⁴⁶ Wilson (1971) *The Labour government*, p. 560.

²⁴⁷ John De St. Jorre (1972) *The Nigerian civil war* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), p. 302; Wilson, *ibid.*, p. 559; Hansard (Commons) vol. 766, cols., 243-300, 12 June 1968.

²⁴⁸ Bernard Crick (1968) “How governments should lead”, *New Society*, 11, 278, p. 115.

²⁴⁹ Pimlott (1992) *Harold Wilson*, p. 566.

²⁵⁰ Peter Madgwick (1994) “Ending in failure? Lives of the great political leaders”, *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 3, p. 472.

²⁵¹ Kevin Jefferys (1993) *The Labour party since 1945* (London: Macmillan), p. 71.

²⁵² Denis Healey (1989) *The time of my life* (London: Michael Joseph), p. 334.

²⁵³ Peter Hennessy (1986) *Cabinet* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 73.

²⁵⁴ Richard Crossman (1977) *The diaries of a cabinet minister, volume three, secretary of state for*

the way you run your government".²⁵⁵

Subsequently, when the Falklands policy was being hotly debated in March 1968, criticism of the Wilson Government's credibility became a powerful tool for the opposition.²⁵⁶ The advocates of the first policy preference were forced on the defensive, and the educational campaign under preparation had to be temporarily suspended. However, the sense of crisis to the whole Wilson Government in March 1968 should not be exaggerated. The immediate effect of the domain of losses was not such an enormous threat to the whole scheme. The domain of loss was relevant, but it was still indeterminate. The FO did not call a halt to its first policy preference. Instead, in defence of its designated policy, the FO continued its twin-track strategy to formulate a set of two-pronged motivated framing. This motivated framing, as a continuous effort of the twin-track strategy, proved capable of resisting the opposition for another six months.

Nevertheless, the domain of loss did not cease deteriorating after the foot-and-mouth disease broke out in October 1967.²⁵⁷ Overall, deteriorating domain of loss made the first policy preference more and more difficult to implement.

The poor-boding outlook of British-Argentine relations

The domain of loss in 1968 described above shows a generally optimistic background to the Wilson Government. However, a gloomy portent more relevant to the British-Argentine relationship was the British ban on meat products imported from South America on 4 December 1967, because Britain suspected that the foot-and-mouth disease had come from South America.²⁵⁸ The ban, though only temporary and selective, apparently crippled Argentine exports. Economically, one third of Argentine meat was exported to Britain. The influence could not be underestimated.²⁵⁹ On the other hand, the British ban in late 1967 had a huge psychological

social services, 1968-70 (London: Hanish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape), pp. 90-1; Wilson (1971) *The Labour government*, p. 474.

²⁵⁵ Ziegler (1993) *Wilson*, p. 292.

²⁵⁶ Alan Sked and Chris Cook (1993) *Post-war Britain: A political history* (London: Penguin Books), p. 228.

²⁵⁷ FCO 7/170, AA7/3, Part A, (95), Creswell to Stewart, "The Anglo-Argentine meat problem", FO and Whitehall distributed, confidential, 8 May 1968.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*.

²⁵⁹ *The Economist*, 11 May 1968, p. 69.

impact on Argentina as well. Argentina took pride in its meat business.²⁶⁰ It could hardly believe that the finger of suspicion pointed at Argentine mutton as the source of the epidemic.²⁶¹

Meanwhile, Britain was also the major victim of this epidemic. By May 1968, nearly half a million animals had been slaughtered.²⁶² Nevertheless Britain apparently did not anticipate that the effect of the ban would make such an excessively emotional impact on Argentina,²⁶³ to the degree that the ban politically brought to the forefront other trading issues as well. Although Argentina protested that the British ban was a protectionist measure against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),²⁶⁴ evidence soon showed that Argentina also took steps to bar British exporters from obtaining contracts with the Argentine Government departments and the armed services.²⁶⁵ The FO was certainly annoyed by this retaliation as it regarded the export figures as a vital factor in the hard-pressed economic situation after devaluation in late 1967.²⁶⁶ Several meetings as a result had been held bilaterally between Argentina and Britain after the foot-and-mouth crisis. The FO reiterated that it had evidence of President Onganía's instructions to discriminate against British exporters,²⁶⁷ and indeed, at least eight cases of British export orders were found held up.²⁶⁸ The FO as a result urged Argentina to eliminate any discrimination in order to improve British-Argentine relations.²⁶⁹

Despite this urging, the Argentines denied any knowledge of such discrimination.²⁷⁰ According to the Argentine Government, the British ban had to be

²⁶⁰ Ysabel F. Rennie (1945) *The Argentine Republic* (NY: Macmillan), p. 249.

²⁶¹ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (70), *Financial Times*, "Argentina lifts 'ban' on UK contracts", 25 July 1968.

²⁶² *The Economist*, p. 67.

²⁶³ FCO 7/137, AA3/7, (4), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 777, unclassified, 30 December 1967.

²⁶⁴ FCO 7/170, AA7/3, Part A, (62), Argentine Meat Board, London, "The foot and mouth epidemic and imported meat", February 1968.

²⁶⁵ *Daily Mail*, 13 February 1968.

²⁶⁶ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (9), Malcolm Gale, BEBA to Diggines, ECO 6/3/29, confidential, 2 February 1968; *ibid.*, (19), Gale to FO, Tel. no. 125, confidential and neutral, 23 February 1968.

²⁶⁷ FCO 7/137, AA3/7, (6), C. R. Cann, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to Barker, American Department, FO, 8 January 1968, enclosing "Draft paragraphs for cable to Buenos Aires"; FCO 7/168 AA6/24, (11), minute by Malcolm Gale, on meeting with Krieger Vasena, Argentine Minister of the Economy, confidential, 5 February 1968; *ibid.*, (10), 8 February 1968; *ibid.*, (46), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 278, confidential and neutral, 20 April 1968.

²⁶⁸ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (3), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 8, confidential, 22 January 1968; FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Part B, (104), Diggines to Creswell, confidential, 29 July 1968.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, (26), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 202, confidential, 20 March 1968; (27), Diggines to O'Brian, confidential, 21 March 1968; (29), FO to BEBA, confidential, 22 March 1968.

²⁷⁰ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (48), Creswell to American Department, FO, Tel. no. 271, confidential and

lifted because Britain had made irresponsible scientific statements and Argentines could accept this.²⁷¹ Public opinion and meat exporters in Argentina on the whole could not be reassured by the reports.²⁷²

Britain clearly read this dissatisfaction on the Argentine side and the ban was actually lifted on 15 April 1968, with the exception of Argentine mutton.²⁷³ If one compares the British response with those on the US and Spanish sides, it is fair to say that the lifting of the ban on imported beef was a concession on the British side. In comparison, the US response was to cancel all the orders on the grounds that the disease might infect domestic herds.²⁷⁴ The US was following its own strict code without giving Argentina any chance to retort.²⁷⁵ The Spanish, on the other hand, refused to take any Argentine meat, unless Argentina bought its processing equipment.²⁷⁶ In contrast, the British ban on the meat was selective, moderate and temporary. More relevant to the concern of this thesis, the FO was found to be making every effort to reverse the unfavourable domain of loss shadowing British-Argentine relations, which was apparently caused by this retaliation.²⁷⁷ In reply to enquiries in the House of Commons, the FO apparently suppressed the facts. It instead argued that "we believe that no discrimination is now being practised in Argentina against British supplies".²⁷⁸

However, despite the FO's efforts, the profile of the issue on the Argentine side remained stubbornly high and there was no sign that Argentina was to lift the discriminatory order against British trade. Argentina in late June 1968 published its White Book, stating that the foot-and-mouth disease had been endemic in Britain since 1892. Argentina was not to blame.²⁷⁹ This statement certainly upset the atmosphere that the FO had taken pains to maintain. It in fact had forced the already

neutral, 18 April 1968.

²⁷¹ Ibid., (15), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 33, confidential and neutral, 19 January 1968; FCO 7/170, AA7/3, (79), Tel. no. 195, Creswell to FO, confidential, 20 March 1968.

²⁷² Ibid. (47), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 300, confidential, 19 April 1968.

²⁷³ FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Par B, (117), Malcolm Gale, BEBA, to Diggines, confidential, 3 October 1968.

²⁷⁴ *Buenos Aires Herald*, 25 February 1968.

²⁷⁵ FCO 7/170, AA7/3, Part A, (104), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Atkinson, restricted, 4 May 1968.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., (88), Malcolm Gale, BEBA, to Diggines, restricted, 10 April 1968; *ibid.*, (89), Diggines, to O'Brien and Beith, confidential, 18 April 1968.

²⁷⁷ FCO 7/176, AA10/14, Part B, (105), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 385, confidential, 25 June 1968.

²⁷⁸ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, (84), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 355, restricted, 15 May 1968.

²⁷⁹ FCO 7/171, AA7/3, Part B, (114), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Atkinson, confidential, 27 June 1968.

existing domain of loss, perceived by the FO, on to “remarkably stony ground”.²⁸⁰

The irony that Britain's decision to lift the four-month beef ban did not draw out of Argentina an explicit assurance of no discrimination was embarrassing to the FO. The logic of Argentina was that it had never admitted discrimination, and therefore it found no basis to publicly declare removal of obstacles in the way of British exports to Argentina.²⁸¹ To the FO's disappointment, as a result, the retaliation was not softened following Britain's concession on its ban.²⁸² Although it was reported that the Argentine navy was contemplating placing an order worth £150m for two submarines and one frigate in early May 1968,²⁸³ these did not materialise and, indeed, much British trade was lost by then. On 24 June specifically, with a superficial excuse that Argentina required different specifications, the Argentine navy changed its plans to buy British submarines and bought German instead.²⁸⁴ In August, there came another disappointing report that an order for eight H.S. 748 aircraft for the Argentine air force was lost to Fokker,²⁸⁵ an American aircraft industry, despite the effort that the FO had made to strike a deal.²⁸⁶

By the end of October 1968, overall, the trade quarrel between the two sides had not receded, even after the lifting of the ban on beef.²⁸⁷ The domain of loss hardly improved, and this domain of loss could hardly escape the FO's eyes. As Diggines noted with deep foreboding at the end of July 1968, “there was a general sense of disappointment here about the fact that we have not yet secured a significant number of the major contracts for capital goods which have been pending in Argentina for about six months”.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁰ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (50), Malcolm Gale to Diggines, ECO 6/4/(38), restricted, 26 April 1968.

²⁸¹ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (91), FO to Prime Minister, 28 May 1968.

²⁸² FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Part B, (39), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Diggines, restricted, 3 May 1968; FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (52), L. Sherbourne to Diggines, ECO 6/4/39, restricted, 3 May 1968.

²⁸³ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (86), A. C. Russell, Ministry of Technology, to Atkinson, restricted, 14 May 1968.

²⁸⁴ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (58), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 370, confidential, 12 June 1968; FCO 7/176, AA10/14, Part B, (103), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 420, confidential, 24 June 1968; *ibid.*, (107), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 390, confidential, 26 June 1968.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, (105) L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to I. D. S. Brown, Board of Trade, confidential, 26 July 1968; FCO 7/174, AA10/9, (6), Creswell to Stewart, confidential, 23 August 1968.

²⁸⁶ FCO 7/168, AA6/24; (68), *ibid.*, FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (99), Diggines to Beith, confidential, 12 July 1968.

²⁸⁷ FCO 7/171, AA7/3, Part B, (129), FO to BEBA, Tel. no. 625, confidential and neutral, 7 October 1968.

²⁸⁸ FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Part B, (104) Diggines to Creswell, confidential, 29 July 1968.

What was worse still was that the FO seemed unable to prevent the negative domain of frame from deteriorating. As things stood, the sense of disappointment and the failure in preventing retaliation aroused criticism of the FO's policy towards Argentina being too lenient. As one commentator among the FO's colleagues put it ironically, "It would be particularly ridiculous... after the Foreign Office had pressed hard against the continuation of the ban on Argentine meat and after our success, we were to find after all that all [purchasing] orders were not available".²⁸⁹ Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of Agriculture, concurred. He was not convinced by the FO's saying that Britain had "no machinery for carrying out" retaliation against Argentina. Rather, he insisted that Britain could easily bring the Ongania Government in Argentina to its knees by refusing to import canned meat for health reasons.²⁹⁰ C. J. MacMahon from the Board of Trade echoed this view. He affirmed that the imposition of quotas on Argentine products "could be done with a stroke of the pen".²⁹¹ In late June, Argentina published its White Book, arguing that foot-and-mouth disease had been endemic in Britain since 1892.²⁹² This response put the British FO under heavy fire again from its colleague departments. On 5 July, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food levelled its charge against Creswell. It was said that the White Book issued by Argentina was exceedingly "disturbing" and that the British Embassy in Buenos Aires was failing "to persuade them to take a more intelligent attitude".²⁹³ All these comments brought the FO's policy in dealing with Argentina into discredit among colleague departments, and constrained the FO's room for manoeuvre on the Falklands dispute—another important dimension in the British-Argentine relationship. As Diggines admitted, "we deployed every argument we could think of in favour of permitting imports of Argentine meat [,but] made ourselves pretty unpopular in the process".²⁹⁴

Although it is risky to argue that the domain of loss was a decisive factor leading to the British perception of loss perception, from the perspective of prospect theory,

²⁸⁹ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (33), P. F. Hancock to Uffen, 25 March 1968.

²⁹⁰ FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (97), Cledwyn Hughes, Minister of Agriculture, to Stewart, 30 June 1968.

²⁹¹ FCO 7/165, AA6/5, Part B, (103), C. J. MacMahon, Board of Trade, to Beith, FO, 25 July 25.

²⁹² FCO 7/171, AA7/3, Part B, (114), L. Sherbourne, BEBA, to Atkinson, confidential, 27 June 1968.

²⁹³ Ibid., (115), D. Evan, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, to Atkinson, American Department, 5 July 1968.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., (38), Diggines to M. Gale, BEBA, restricted, 11 April 1968, enclosing "Article published in the *Cronista* Commercial of 3 April Meat: Shipments will not be resumed to the UK".

taking the foot-and-mouth disease as the primitive force in the whole argument cannot be wide of the mark. As early as the end of 1967, Creswell had expressed this concern by reporting to the FO that the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease “coming on top of the Falklands question” was an unfortunate event, and it would have “brought relations once again under strain”.²⁹⁵ Chalfont agreed that the discrimination was a patent “means of applying pressure” on Britain over the Falklands.²⁹⁶ Mendez also expressed his regret that the trade quarrel was by no means “a blessing in disguise”.²⁹⁷ These remarks made by the decision-makers across the two sides lent much weight to the main argument in this section. That is, the domain of loss was a negative force against the implementation of the FO's first policy preference. It explains, at least partially, why Stewart became slow and cautious in progressing with the designated policy since March 1968. This thesis is inclined to argue that the FO was caught in a policy dilemma when it brought forward two different versions of paragraph 4 in the draft Memorandum of Understanding in mid-1968.

It was not until mid-October 1968 when the Argentine navy expressed its interest in purchasing British-made aircraft carriers that there emerged a sign of a resumption of trade,²⁹⁸ and this emergence of trade inclines this thesis to see the domain of loss stopping its further decline. The Foreign Office obviously perceived the newly emerging domain of frame characterised by a slice of gain prospect. Commonwealth Secretary Thomson urged a quicker move. He proposed that the FO resumed the educational campaign that had been suspended since March 1968. Based on this consideration, Stewart decided to launch it before it was too late. The agony was that the Argentine discrimination against the British exports lasted almost for a year. The negative psychological effect might not be what both sides had anticipated. When Stewart began to launch educational campaigns with the improving domain of frame, the timing was no longer right. In mid-October 1968, *the Daily Express* had begun to criticise the Falklands policy. The published feature lasted for ten days, which turned out to be influential enough to catch the sympathy for the islanders and constrained the FO's further initiatives in the conduct of the Falklands policy.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁵ FCO 7/137, AA3/7, (3), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 776, confidential, 29 December 1967.

²⁹⁶ FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (98), Tony Crosland, Board of Trade, to Stewart, 9 July 1968.

²⁹⁷ Ibid., (39), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 643, confidential, 1 October 1968.

²⁹⁸ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (20), Caradon, UKMIS to FO, Tel. no. 2498, unclassified, 14 October 1968.

²⁹⁹ Ibid., (18), D. M. Summerhays, BEBA, to Atkinson, restricted, 4 October 1968.

3. The explanation from the perspective of the motivated framing

The Antarctic Treaty—motivated framing in terms of gains

The thesis argues below that the initial British motivated framing of the issue in the 1960s was around the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point. This reference point helped to simplify the issue in question and it was formulated in terms of gains.

To begin with, the issue of the Falkland Islands was peripheral before 1965 when Argentina raised it in the UN. It was dormant for Britain because the islands were remote and the population, declining and small.³⁰⁰ During the 13 years of Conservative rule before 1964, no British official at the ministerial level ever visited the islands.³⁰¹ Statistics publicised in April 1968 showed that there were only 2,117 inhabitants, among which just 140 citizens were entitled to obtain full UK passports.³⁰² From 1962 to August 1966, before the official talks began, only one MP, Charles Taylor, asked the British government about the policy in the Falklands.³⁰³ Knox Cunningham and Anthony Hurd also raised concern, but their enquiries had nothing to do with sovereignty.³⁰⁴ In late 1966, only Gordon Oakes asked for a statement about the talks held in London and the illegal landings in the Falklands.³⁰⁵ To the extent that the tiny population escaped public notice, when the issue of Falkland Islands caught the eye of the FO, it was highly likely that most officials in the FO did not have much background knowledge of the issue. When the issue of the Falkland Islands emerged in the mid-1960s, the Antarctic Treaty clearly represented a symbolic model. From the perspective of representativeness, the “Antarctic factor” coming into the equation was quite a natural and understandable response. It helped analyse away the uncertainties through the function of representativeness due to geographic similarities.

Historically, the Antarctic factor bearing on the territorial dispute over the

³⁰⁰ John Darwin (1988) *British and decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world* (London: Macmillan), p. 311.

³⁰¹ Hansard (Lords), vol. 290, col. 210, 13 March 1968.

³⁰² Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, cols., 242, 26 March; vol. 762, col. 25, 1 April, 1968.

³⁰³ Ibid., vol. 659, col. 21, 8 May 1962.

³⁰⁴ Ibid., vol. 667, col. 118, 20 November 1962; vol. 689, col., 216-7, 19 February 1964; vol. 695, col. 118, 15 May 1964; vol. 699, col. 357, 30 July 1964.

³⁰⁵ Ibid., vol. 733, col. 89, 2 August 1966; vol. 733, col. 239, 8 August 1966; vol. 735, col. 59, 1 November 1966.

Falklands was a relevant dimension that could hardly be disregarded. The British claim in Antarctica centred on Graham Land, plus the South Orkneys and South Shetlands.³⁰⁶ This claim overlapped that of Argentina, who considered it possessing rights through succession from Spain.³⁰⁷ Tensions between Argentina and Britain arose from 1947 onwards when Peron attempted to demonstrate the legitimacy of the Argentinian claim in Antarctica. Britain in response launched *Operation Tabarin*, aimed at protecting the route around Cape Horn through Drake Passage. Peron reacted by sending warships cutting into the islands in Antarctica claimed by Britain.³⁰⁸ There occurred as a result notable incidents including Argentine troops firing on the British base under construction at Hope Bay in 1952, and Britain's removing Argentine huts at Deception Island the next year.³⁰⁹ In 1957, Argentina redefined its Antarctic claim. The so-called "Argentine Sea" was threatening to the British claim again as the claimed territory ran from the Falkland Islands through South Orkney, South Shetland and down to the Antarctic Peninsula.³¹⁰ With this map in mind, Argentina was emphatic that what at stake were "not merely economic resources and strategic assets, but something of the soul of the nation itself".³¹¹

Despite the discord around Antarctica, the programme of International Geophysical Year (IGY) advocated by a group of scientists in the early 1950s effectively kept this tension at bay. Applying the concept of *terra communis*,³¹² IGY was dedicated to exploring Antarctica regardless of territorial rivalries. The programme proved a success, and it seemed appreciated by both Argentina and Britain.³¹³ Antarctica since then had represented the "continent for science",³¹⁴ which

³⁰⁶ Peter J. Beck (1990) "Antarctic as a zone of peace: A strategic irrelevance? A historical and contemporary survey", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 197.

³⁰⁷ Ibid., (1989) "British relations with Latin America: The Antarctic dimension", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 169; *ibid.*, (1986) *The international politics of Antarctica* (London & Sidney: Croom Helm), p. 119; Christopher C. Joyner (1985) "Anglo-Argentine rivalry after the Falklands: On the road to Antarctica?", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), p. 197.

³⁰⁸ Beck (1986) *The international politics of Antarctica*, pp. 32-3.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., pp. 35-6; Heap, J. A. (1990) "Sovereignty as a source of stress", *ibid.*, p. 184.

³¹⁰ Jack Child (1988) *Antarctica and South American geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* (NY: Praeger), p. 73, p. 77.

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 75.

³¹² John Hanessian Jr. (1974) "Overview: Some international legal consideration", in Schatz Gerald S. (ed.), *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), p. 70.

³¹³ J. A. Heap (1983) "Cooperation in the Antarctic: A quarter of a century's experience", in Francisco

was used "exclusively for peaceful purposes".³¹⁵ The successful efforts further led to the signing of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 by 12 states including Britain and Argentina, and it entered into force in 1961.³¹⁶ Symbolically, the Treaty presented two unusual features in international politics. First, according to Rosenau, it "was the first arms control agreement of the Cold War".³¹⁷ All nuclear weapons and military exercises were, and still are, prohibited in Antarctica. Secondly, all signatory countries agreed to set aside territorial claims for the duration of the Treaty—30 years.³¹⁸ It was believed that this arrangement might not solve the territorial questions, but it froze the territorial quarrels and left a lot of room for scientific collaboration internationally.³¹⁹

The point that caught the British eye was that Argentina, despite its exclusive claim, had been an active member in supporting the IGY programme and the drafting of the Antarctic Treaty.³²⁰ "The Antarctic Treaty", recalled Edmonds, "was of fundamental importance in relation, not just to the Falklands dispute, but to all our territorial disputes then outstanding". As Edmonds emphasised, the Treaty "stood as a symbol holding out the possibilities of a new internationalism in foreign policy".³²¹ Therefore, to the extent that the Treaty was taken as the reference point for British officials in the sovereignty negotiations over the Falkland Islands, the evidence was significant. As Edmonds pointed out, the Antarctic Treaty was an important and relevant factor in the FO's perception because there was at least a case to be made by the FO in trying to convince the British Admiralty from the point of defence expenditure. Amidst the doubts over whether the Argentines would honour the Treaty in early 1960,³²² one FCO official argued,

Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 104.

³¹⁴ Bruce Davis (1990) "Science and politics in Antarctic and southern oceans policy: A critical assessment", in Herr, Hall, and Haward, *Antarctica's future*, p. 39; Patrick G. Quilty (1990) "Antarctica as a continent for science", in *ibid.*, p. 30.

³¹⁵ Barbara James (1990) *Conserving the polar regions* (East Sussex: Wayland), p. 44; Gerald S. Schatz (1974) *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), p. 97.

³¹⁶ David Rootes (1980) *Exploration into the polar regions* (London: Belitha), p. 42.

³¹⁷ James N. Rosenau and Mary Durfee (1995) *Thinking theory thoroughly: Coherent approaches to an incoherent world* (Oxford: Westview Press), p. 71.

³¹⁸ David Lambert (1987) *Our world: Polar regions* (East Sussex: Wayland), p. 42.

³¹⁹ R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (1990) "Antarctica's future symbols and reality", in Herr, Hall, and Haward, *Antarctica's future*, p. 11; Stephen D. Krasner (1993) "Westphalia and all that", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), p. 260.

³²⁰ Beck (1990) "Antarctic as a zone of peace", p. 205.

³²¹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 10.

³²² CO 1024/300, 36/41/04, (58), R. H. Graham, Captain of HMS Protector, to Secretary of the

Once the Antarctic Treaty is ratified by the signatories and the new regime is seen to be working satisfactorily, and provided that we can dispel any false ideas which other States may have got into their heads about the Falklands, then there will be no need to keep a vessel such as H.M.S. PROTECTOR continually in the area during the Antarctic summer. If we can dispense with such a vessel, it will substantially ease the serious manning problem with which the Royal Navy is faced at the moment and which is likely to continue to exist for many years.³²³

The above statement displayed a large amount of imagination among the FO's officials in the 1960s. Instead of taking it as the ontological reference point against uncertainties in this area, the FO also carefully chose it with the expectation for maintaining British sovereignty through acts of scientific collaboration.³²⁴ From the perspective of prospect theory, by anchoring the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point, Britain could transform the territorial dispute with Argentina into a prospect that there might be some benefits through a joint scientific effort.³²⁵ This framing effort also indicated that taking the Antarctic Treaty as a reference point was an act of formulating the FO's motivated framing in terms of gains, which act was corresponding to the evaluating phase of decision-making described by prospect theory.

One important point to support this optimistic view is that, as early as 1960, the FCO had made it clear by reference to the value of *HMS Protector* touring in the Antarctic area. It argued that "The Argentines recently got the wrong idea that we might be willing to make concessions over the Falklands. We should like to see these thoughts quite dead before taking any step which might give the appearance of weakening [on] our part".³²⁶ And indeed, in the cases of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, Britain before 1962 had already entered the two territories into its Antarctic claim.³²⁷

Admiralty, no. 178/NP/4, secret, 29 January 1962.

³²³ Ibid., (15), Willis J. Botton, Colonial Office, to Military Branch II, Admiralty, confidential, 30 September 1960.

³²⁴ Peter J. Beck (1987) "A cold war: Britain, Argentina and Antarctica", *History Today*, 37, 6, p. 21-2.

³²⁵ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 14.

³²⁶ CO 1024/300, 36/41/04, (12), R. E. Parsons, FO, to J. R. Poulter, Admiralty, 2 May 1960.

³²⁷ F. M. Aubun (1982) "The Falkland Islands dispute and Antarctica", *Marine Policy Report*, 5, 3, p. 3.

Hence, the decision to launch the sovereignty talks in late 1966 seemed straightforward. For Britain, since the Antarctic Treaty was a model of international cooperation, as long as the Treaty could be maintained, the restrained behaviour of both sides in the past decade might augur well. The FO's reference point consequently climbed up from the original level of the status quo that insisted on sovereignty before 1966 to the level of aspiration. The issue was formulated in terms of gain in prospect and a preference reversal took place as a result. As Edmonds confidently inferred, "if a problem as complex and as vast as that one could solve... given time, the other equally difficult disputes elsewhere in Latin America—difficult because they involved actual inhabitants—could be solved".³²⁸ The first policy preference emerged. It conditioned the atmosphere of the talks in most part of 1967.

All the risk-averse patterns of behaviour during this period including the emphasis on a cordial atmosphere in the talks but insisting on the respective sovereignty in the communiqués can be understood in this light. This emphasis was a response corresponding to the mechanism of prospect theory that foresees an issue formulated in terms of gains leading to risk-averse policy orientation. The FO's policy conduct at this stage nicely captures the description as the result of framing in terms of gains.

The reference point in terms of gains nonetheless was challenged for the first time by a dramatic event. On 28 September 1966, the *Operacion Condor* incident took place. A small group of Argentine nationalists hijacked an Argentine aircraft and illegally landed at Port Stanley, capital of the Falkland Islands.³²⁹ Nevertheless, the FO was more ready to solve the problem through diplomatic means, rather than by drastic gestures. To the anti-British protests in Buenos Aires, where the British Embassy came under fire after the *Operacion Condor* incident, the FO responded by keeping events low-keyed and termed the incident as "an illegal landing". Moreover, despite the "illegal landing", the FO declared that Britain had no intention of handing over the hijackers to The Hague Court.³³⁰

³²⁸ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 11.

³²⁹ Peter Beck (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 98.

³³⁰ Hansard (Commons) (1966) vol. 735, col. 13, 31 October; vol. 735, col. 59, 1 November; vol. 753, col. 963, 7 November.

However, *Operacion Condor* was also dramatic in the sense that it made Britain increasingly aware that the Argentine attitude on the Falkland Islands had become militant by late 1966. Several diplomatic gestures including Argentina's refusal to freeze sovereignty in November/December 1966; the establishment of an Argentine department seeking to gain control of the Falkland islands in January 1967; and Argentina's applying pressure time and again at the international occasions. All these acts on the Argentine side were dramatic in the sense that they questioned the legitimacy of the reference point anchoring on the Atlantic Treaty on the British side.³³¹ The FO as a result began to realise the need to locate another reference point for its version of motivated framing.

Britain's reputation and the status quo

On 16 March 1967, the British Embassy in Buenos Aires warned the FO in London that Argentina could not be satisfied merely by the saying that "talks were in progress".³³² It would, instead, raise the protest in the UN due to its dissatisfaction. This worried the FO. As Creswell indicated to Edmonds, "the United Nations were entitled this time to expect us to report on the progress made at the talks and not just on the fact that talks were proceeding".³³³

Both Creswell's and Pakenham's messages reflected a typical and constant concern among British officials about British prestige in the UN. Edmonds, for instance, fully saw the need to strike an agreement in the talks. On 2 February 1966, he issued two instructions stating that "UKMIS should be instructed to accept the Argentine text and to concert action simultaneously with the Argentine Mission". This was because, as Edmonds explained, the "balance of advantage now lies in avoiding any suspicion in the United Nations of inconsistencies or foot-dragging by accepting the Argentina draft as it stands".³³⁴ Edmonds' remark was significant. It suggested that, when it came to the issue of the Falkland Islands in mid-1960s, there was a pervasive sense of incompetence at managing the issue with a view to "getting due

³³¹ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (21), UK mission in New York to FO, Tel. no. 423, confidential, 10 March 1967.

³³² FCO 7/148, AA4/5, (3), H. D. V. Pakenham, BEBA, to Edmonds, American Department, FO, confidential, 16 March 1967.

³³³ FCO 7/140, AA4/2, (51), Creswell to Edmonds, restricted, 14 April 1967.

³³⁴ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (8), Edmonds to Hohler, confidential, 2 February 1967; *ibid.*, (11), FCO to UKMIS, Tel. no. 348, confidential, 3 February 1967.

attention paid to the interests/wishes of the inhabitants".³³⁵ Barder, a member of the negotiating team in New York, for instance, pointed out the vulnerability of the British position in the issue compared with the issue of Gibraltar. He stated that "Although both lots are white, the Gibraltarians give a clear impression of representing a genuine national community with its own characteristics and personality, whereas the Falklanders would probably strike many at the UN as undisguised English—or at best Scottish".³³⁶ Indeed, the islanders on the Falklands were of British descent. The inhabitants of Gibraltar by contrast were mostly Genoese, Portuguese and Maltese.³³⁷ While keeping Gibraltar had less negative implications, Britain's holding the Falkland Islands would inevitably evoke the image of British Empire. It would damage Britain's reputation in the eyes of the decolonisation movement. For the FO as a result, there was a need to distinguish the difference between the two cases.

Now that Argentina threatened to raise the issue in the UN in April 1967, and it had succeeded in Mexico City two months earlier, it was reasonable for the FO to anticipate that taking the Antarctic Treaty as the reference point was problematic. It would not reduce the tension between the two sides. An appropriate reference point was needed. The FO in mid-1967 was forced to relocate its reference point. This reference point seemed no longer appropriate to stay at the level of aspiration, namely, to follow the model of the Antarctic Treaty. Rather, there was a need to pull it down from the level of aspiration, i.e., the Antarctic Treaty, to that of the status quo, i.e., British reputation in the UN. In other words, the motivated framing in terms of gains had to be replaced by another reference point around which it constituted motivated framing in terms of maintaining the status quo. A preference reversal in British decision-making thus took place.

To sum up, the anchoring effect of the Antarctic Treaty in terms of gains had been weakened by *Operacion Condor*, Argentina's flat rejection of the sovereignty freeze and varied moves in mobilising support for its claim before the international community in late 1966 and early 1967. The FO at this critical moment placed its decision weight on Britain's reputation, which subsequently became the FO's

³³⁵ Ibid., (2), G. W. Harding, American Department, to Barder, UK mission in New York, restricted, 24 January 1967.

³³⁶ Ibid., (10), Barder, UKMIS to G. W. Harding, American Department, restricted, 31 January 1967.

³³⁷ Jorri Duursma (1996) *Fragmentation and the international relations of micro-states: Self-*

reference point to anchor upon. In other words, seeking to protect Britain's world reputation became a new but dominant motivated framing. Evidence can be found from its effectively toning down the other competing sets of motivated framing in 1967.

Competing sets of motivated framing in 1967

After the Antarctic Treaty lost its representative status as a reference point, there existed two sets of motivated framing competing with the FO's major concern about British prestige. The first set was the motivated framing in terms of gains, which was formulated by the FO. Another was the motivated framing in terms of losses, sustained in the main by Governor Haskard. Both competed with the reference point mentioned above, the British reputation. However, neither of the two could effectively occupy a dominant place before the end of 1967.

The competing framing in terms of losses

The set of motivated framing in terms of loss came mainly from Haskard, who saw the newly emerged policy preference for sovereignty transfer as detrimental to government credibility. Since March 1967, Haskard had filed a series of protests, urging the FO to decelerate the tempo of the transfer in the decision-making process. He pessimistically anticipated that the question would come up for public debate at the beginning of May 1967 and until then, the government and its policy would be embarrassed.³³⁸ Cyril Osborne and Frank Kenyon, two MPs, who visited Lord Chalfont in London and expressed similar views on 4 May 1967, echoed Haskard's concern for government credibility. According to the documented papers, Kenyon added a much more circumstantial description of the mind of the Falkland people that might lead to the criticism of the Government's sell-out. "They had been distinctly rattled by the *Operacion Condor* Incident and the length of time it had taken for [the icebreaker] *Protector* to arrive".³³⁹ Another source in this line of reasoning came from P. Mansfield, the official in the British Embassy, Buenos Aires. Mansfield reported

determination and statehood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 52.

³³⁸ Ibid., (45), memorandum by Atkinson, on "Falkland Islands", 31 March 1967.

³³⁹ FCO 7/242, AAF22/1, (21), Smith to Hohler, confidential, enclosing "Record of meeting between Chalfont, Sir C. Osborne and Mr. Kenyon, MPs, at 11 am on 4 May 1967", 4 May 1967.

that the islanders "were anxious for restoration of communications with Argentina".³⁴⁰ Creswell, on 18 May 1967, also shared this kind of concern by writing that "to pronounce on the inhabitants interests without consulting their wishes would be suggestive of just that paternalistic colonial attitude of which our critics have accused us".³⁴¹ Taken together, this motivated framing was characterised by eye-catching phrases such as "a sell-out", being "anxious" or "embarrassing".

The FO's response to this set of motivated framing was, however, disappointing to Haskard. While stressing the need to keep confidential about the bargaining points as well as the FO's true intention regarding its policy preference, the FO clearly de-emphasised the possible uproars in the Falkland Islands with a view to not provoking Argentina.³⁴² In respect of Haskard's complaint that the change of the first policy preference, talking about the interests exclusively and sidelining the wishes of the islanders, came too soon, the FO remained indifferent. London was of the considered opinion that the transitional period could not be extended further. Any further delay of this transfer of territory, as the FO argued, "would involve a real risk of souring the atmosphere with the Argentines". At this juncture, when both the FO and Haskard framed the issue in the same terms of loss, Haskard's version of it seemed less convincing to most staff in the FO. Creswell, for instance, sympathised with Haskard, but remained adamant and apparently standing on the FO's side. Creswell argued that "I know that the Governor would shudder at the prospect of having to talk in this strain to his Islanders, but really it is what the Government ought to do if we really want to get anywhere".³⁴³

Creswell's statement indicated the degree of confidence in the whole FO in mid-1967. It also revealed that, theoretically, loss avoidance is a vague concept that fails to explain the two contrasting opinions both formulated in terms of loss. In a telegram replying to Haskard, who proposed to visit London in May, Brown did not feel that his designated policy was threatened by this proposed meeting. He told Haskard to bring the statistics forward to London, and the data could show to the FO about "the land and property values, numbers of people who might wish to join relatives outside

³⁴⁰ FCO 7/152, AA4/9, (2), P. R. A. Mansfield to Creswell, restricted, 12 May 1967.

³⁴¹ Ibid., (72), Creswell to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 255, confidential, 18 May 1967.

³⁴² FCO 7/140, A4/2, (26), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 56, secret, 18 March 1967.

the Islands or be assured of compensation, or who would otherwise wish to leave the Islands in the face of an uncertain future, and those who might stay on".³⁴⁴

No evidence could be more obvious than this typical directness. The FO had sidelined Haskard's version of motivated framing in terms of losses. And indeed, the FO's confidence seemed founded on better arguments. Argentina had already exhibited a cooperative and friendly "frame of mind". The newly reformulated policy—gearing to the interests of the islanders—"would afford the best hope of achieving an amicable settlement of the dispute".³⁴⁵ Therefore, although Haskard reiterated his warning and expressed uneasiness for the islanders, the FO found no difficulty in justifying the need to keep the negotiations secret. Based on concern for Britain's international prestige, the FO justified the need to keep the talks confidential by arguing that "any leakage would lay the UK open to a breach of faith by the Argentine".³⁴⁶ For the FO, consciously or unconsciously, the reformulated policy preference in March 1967 was sensible, risk-averse, and worth implementing. This was not only because Argentina "had been taking a much less intransigent line",³⁴⁷ and "the Argentines have moved one step in our direction",³⁴⁸ but also because the British reputation was the bottom-line that it had to defend. Judged from its motivated framing in terms of the status quo, and the reference point anchored on British prestige, the FO could be seen as risk-averse. It was careful not to breach the promise over the sovereignty with a view to defending national prestige.

The competing framing in terms of gains

In mid-1967, Creswell came up with his personal idea for a possible solution. He suggested that "the Argentine would be more likely to convince the Islanders if they could hold out some prospects of economic development". In this way, as Creswell averred, the islanders "would have something to gain from a change of sovereignty".³⁴⁹ To substantiate the idea that "a selling campaign is no good if you

³⁴³ Ibid., (61), Creswell to Hohler.

³⁴⁴ Ibid., (42), Secretary of State, CO to Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 73, secret, 31 March 1967.

³⁴⁵ Ibid., (26), Secretary of State, CO, to Sir C. Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 56, secret, 18 March 1967.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., (41), Secretary of State, CO to Haskard, Falkland Islands, Tel. no. 72, secret, 31 March 1967.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., (56), Foreign Office to BEBA, Tel. no. 267, secret, 27 April 1967.

³⁴⁸ Ibid., (58), Hohler, Foreign Office, to Sir M. Creswell, BEBA, secret, 1 May 1967.

³⁴⁹ Ibid., (59), Creswell to Hohler.

really have nothing to sell”,³⁵⁰ Creswell also put forward various schemes including the development of the South of Patagonia, with which the islanders could share benefits.³⁵¹ These schemes were impressive to the extent that even Haskard aroused a hope of gains. For a short while, Haskard had sat himself on the fence and argued that, only if the Argentines had no “real proposals for economic development of islands, ... we can justifiably claim that they are being more ‘colonialist’ than we are”.³⁵²

However, the kind of motivated framing in terms of economic development looking for potential gains did not become the dominant force. The possible reason for its failure has to be attributed to the FO's inability to convince its colleague departments through argumentation. Basically, most departments in the Wilson Government, except the FO as well as one or two military attachés in Buenos Aires,³⁵³ resisted such a suggestion that there would be gains in prospect.³⁵⁴ They argued that it might be timely to talk about sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, but it was not the right moment for trade with South America. The Treasury, for instance, was suspicious of Argentina's general inflationary tendencies and debt problems in 1967. The Board of Trade, on the other hand, took a rather dim view about the potential gains from trade with Argentina:

the ideas in the Foreign Office paper about increase[d] aid, technical assistance, and, in particular, about how aid could be used to finance down payments on large contracts, never has a chance of getting off the ground; ... any improvement is, however, likely to take time and this raises the question... of now or never. Have we then missed the bus? At the risk of seeming to make a virtue of necessity, I think probably not. ... If 1966 was still not too late to catch the bus, perhaps 1970 will prove no worse.³⁵⁵

The FO was clearly dissatisfied with the above report that rendered the FO's potential motivated framing in terms of gains aborted. Edmonds argued that that “until

³⁵⁰ Ibid., (61) Creswell to Hohler.

³⁵¹ Ibid., (59), Creswell to Hohler.

³⁵² Ibid., (72), Creswell to FO.

³⁵³ FCO 7/174, AA10/9, (1), Creswell to FO; FCO 7/166, AA6/12, (1), G. J. MacGillivray, BEBA, to L.F. Crick, Bank of England, 17 March 1967.

³⁵⁴ Ibid., (3), D. J. Halley, Treasury Chambers, to D. R. Ford, Department of Economic Affairs, 26 January 1967.

³⁵⁵ FCO 7/56, A6/31, (1), T. W. Carvey to C. O'Neill, “Working group of trade policy towards Latin America”, confidential, 23 December 1966.

the rest of Whitehall and British industry do reach the conclusion that Latin America should be treated as something better than a Cinderella, we cannot expect to exert much political influence in the area".³⁵⁶

Nevertheless, seen from the exchange of arguments within the Wilson Government, the motivated framing in terms of gains before 1967 proved superficial. The Wilson Government had good reason to be suspicious about the financial capability of the Argentine Government. That was because Argentina in mid-1967 was still faced with balance of payment difficulties.³⁵⁷ Even the general attitude in the FO towards the trade with Argentina remained uncertain. In the departmental debates over the Argentine request for stand-by credit in March 1967,³⁵⁸ for instance, the FO refused to offer governmental guarantee to the civil banks for the proposed standby credit to Argentina.³⁵⁹ This was a stance quite opposite to that of France.³⁶⁰ Therefore, although both Argentina and Britain sides agreed that indirect benefits accruing as a result of British industrial investments could be substantial, it was apparent that Argentine purchasing policies tended to favour those countries increasing purchases from Argentina.³⁶¹

Secondly, Argentina was interested in purchasing some British military hardware. This intention clearly met Stewart's major purpose of boosting exports.³⁶² However, there was external constraint and this constraint came from the US regional security concern. Although the US kept neutral in the issue of the Falkland Islands, as Chapter 2 states, the US was keen to oppose this kind of transaction between Britain and the South American states. The sale of Sea-Hawk fighters was a case in point. In early February 1967, the American Embassy protested against Britain's selling Sea-

³⁵⁶ FCO 7/20, A2/19, (1), Edmonds to Sir Denis Allen, "British policy towards Latin America", 14 February 1967.

³⁵⁷ FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (5), A. F. Toms, minute on "Argentina: Note of meeting with leaders of Argentine delegation to Kennedy Round Talks", 7 February 1967.

³⁵⁸ FCO 7/166, AA6/12, (4), P. Reilly, British Embassy, Paris, to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 277, confidential, 31 March 1967.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., (6), Foreign Office to British Embassy, Paris, Tel. no. 858, confidential, 5 April 1967; (8), D. H. T. Hildyard to Edmonds, secret, 6 April 1967.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., (3), Edmonds to E. R. D. Hildyard, 28 March 1967; (7), Reilly to Foreign Office, Tel. no. 283, confidential, 5 April 1967; (9), S. Goldmanto C. J. Morse, Bank of England, confidential, 6 April 1967.

³⁶¹ Ibid., (6), BEBA, to Brown, despatch no. 6 (E) (1132/67), restricted, 9 February 1967.

³⁶² David Thomas (1989) "The United States factor in British relations with Latin America", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 69.

Hawks to Argentina.³⁶³ Britain explained that Sea-Hawks had only secondary strike capability, obsolete and defensive-purposed. They would not risk the danger of tipping the power balance among the South American states, because Sea-Hawks were incapable of competing with American Sabres that had been widely sold to Latin America.³⁶⁴ But the US was not convinced. According to the US, the sale “would have an extremely negative impact on the objectives my Government is pursuing in Latin America in its efforts to limit the application of financial resources for defence purposes”.³⁶⁵ The US protest led Britain to cancel the contract. The cancellation indicated that when Argentina seemed to focus exclusively on military hardware,³⁶⁶ the market opportunities would be significantly reduced.

In short, the FO's motivated framing in terms of gains before 1967 did not become a dominant one. One of the reasons was clearly the lack of immediate evidence to support its legitimacy. However, when the domain of frame deteriorated with the rise of foot-and-mouth disease and Argentina's trade retaliation, as well as the Government's credibility hitting the trough on the domestic front, the FO was forced to further reinforce its motivated framing. To do this, the FO strategically combined the motivated framing in terms of gains with the reference point—Britain's prestige—anchoring at the level of status quo, despite the former prospect of gain remained controversial among the colleague departments. With this, a two-pronged motivated framing emerged in early 1968.

The FO's two-pronged motivated framing in 1968

Stewart after the parliamentary rows in March 1968 became gradually aware that the first step toward fulfilling a transfer of sovereignty would hinge on the agreement of the draft Memorandum of Understanding both at the inter-departmental meeting, and in Parliament.³⁶⁷ To enter the FO's version of motivated framing into the policy debates and make it acceptable, the FO in 1968 took pains to sort out a new motivated framing. This motivated framing created a broad spectrum of views sweeping upward

³⁶³ FCO 7/173, A10/7, (1), minute by T. J. B. George to Figg, restricted, 3 February 1967.

³⁶⁴ Ibid., (6), Creswell to Edmond, secret and guard, 5 May 1967.

³⁶⁵ Ibid., (3), Jonathan D. Stoddart, political-military affairs, US Embassy, London, to Leonard Figg, Defence Department, Foreign Office, confidential, 29 March 1967.

³⁶⁶ Thomas, p. 81.

³⁶⁷ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (19), Diggines to Dennis Allen, Private Secretary, confidential, 5 September 1968.

to the level of gains and downward to the level of losses in measurement. It was characterised by three bargaining levels, consisting of the level of the status quo, that of loss and that of gain.

To put it succinctly, the FO justified its draft Memorandum of Understanding by putting forth, firstly, a motivated framing in terms of losses with a reference point anchoring on the British-Argentine relationship. The FO argued that partially because Argentina pressed the claim so vigorously in the UN, and partially because the Argentine policy followed peaceful means, the newly formulated Falklands policy, speaking of the interests of the islanders, was a worthy proposal in correspondence to the Argentines' psychological need. If the British public did not appreciate this newly formulated policy, and if this led to no progress towards an agreement with Argentina, the FO foresaw that it "would inevitably have a negative effect on our relations with almost all other Latin American countries". The negative effect, according to the FO, included the present Argentine pragmatic strategy in pursuance of the claim being replaced by a nationalist one, and that "the climate for increasing our exports in a large and expanding market would be seriously prejudiced". Because of this kind of concern for losses, the sovereignty talks as a result were seen as a wiser choice.

Secondly, this new motivated framing became more powerful when the FO justified its position by emphasising the importance of Britain's prestige, another reference point anchoring at the level of status quo. As Stewart explained to parliament,

We should not treat Resolution [2065] passed in the General Assembly simply with silence, still less with contempt. In the kind of world in which we live it is of great importance to maintain this principle, if it can be done, the building up of the authority of the United Nations is of enormous importance both to us and to mankind. This is in accordance with Her Majesty's Government's policy of working within the United Nations. These talks have proceeded and are proceeding. They cover a wide range of subjects. It is too early to specify what form [that] the consultations will take place. These negotiations are delicate and must be confidential.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ Ibid., col. 1459, 26 March 1968.

The point to notice here is that, as Hennessy observed, "There may be rare occasions when it is desirable to emphasise the importance of some decision by stating specifically that it is the decision of Her Majesty's Government".³⁶⁹ When Stewart used "Her Majesty's Government's policy" to defend his policy preference, no implication could be more straightforward than this resolve to keep Britain's prestige before the world forum. In other words, if Britain could not put forward the Memorandum of Understanding in time, and settle the dispute earlier, the British status as well as its influence in the UN Security Council "would be seriously undermined".³⁷⁰ To prevent this loss, went the argument, Britain "must rely on Latin American support in any subject of major concern" in the UN.³⁷¹

Accompanying this motivated framing, the FO also tried to formulate a sense of no alternative. As Goronwy Roberts, the Foreign Minister, explained the unavoidable: "The islands have constituted a running sore in our relations with Argentina for over a century. Without betraying our obligations to the islands we want to do what we can to improve relations with Argentina and Latin America as a whole".³⁷² Therefore, the Falkland Islanders, as the FO argued, "should seek neighbourly relations with Argentina on the neighbouring Latin-American continent".³⁷³

A more persuasive part of this motivated framing was geared to the weak British defence capability regarding the Falkland Islands. As St J. Sugg, Minister at the Commonwealth Office, pointed out, "the difficulties of defending the Falkland Islands is clearly one of the reasons for HMG wishing to enter into an agreement with the Argentines".³⁷⁴ As D. M. Summerhays argued,

one should not lose sight of the fact that the present regime is a military one, brought to power in 1966 by the Armed Forces. It has a strong nationalist school of thought, both within and outside the Armed Forces which is inclined to criticise the [Argentine] Government for any sign of weakness. The Government has

³⁶⁹ Peter Hennessy (1986) *Cabinet* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 8, p. 11.

³⁷⁰ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (2), Diggins, FO, to J. S. Bennett, CO, secret, 29 January 1968.

³⁷¹ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Michael Clark Hutchison, MP, 1 October 1968.

³⁷² *Daily Mail*, 29 March 1968.

³⁷³ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Michael Clark Hutchison, MP, 1 October 1968.

³⁷⁴ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (17), St J. Sugg, CO, to P. F. Hobday, MoD, secret, 6 September 1968, enclosing "Defence: Falkland Islands".

announced its intention to regain possession of the Falkland Islands, and in the event of repeated failure to obtain its aim by other means, it might as a last move be tempted to take military action to this end. As you will see, the Argentine capability for airborne operations is increasing.³⁷⁵

What caught the eye further was that the FO did not exclusively dwell on the sense of loss or inevitability in its arguments. Rather, it tried to persuade its colleague departments that there was no sense of loss. The Argentine claim, as the FO explained, was based “mainly on her view of her juridical rights to the territory” and there was something wrong to be put right. According to the FO, Argentines had expressed the wish to let the islanders remain on the same land, and apparently they had no need for more territory. Therefore, the logic went, what the FO pursued in the talks was meaningful and with no sense of loss.

The persuasiveness of the two-pronged motivated framing did not stop here. The FO was motivated to stretch its motivated framing towards the other end of the spectrum. It argued that the talks were not only because of the concern for losses, but for gains. If the Cabinet could ratify the Memorandum of Understanding, many contracts, for instance, would “greatly increase the level of British exports in Argentina”. This kind of encouraging argument was not baseless, as Argentina's economic policies and performance had been relatively successful so far.³⁷⁶ Thus prompted, the FO was making an attempt to set up a language of gains in prospect. It intended to propagate the window of opportunity for trade, despite there being a considerable degree of exaggeration in its argument. Chalfont, for instance, used to show his sympathy for the Board of Trade that the timing was not right for British investment.³⁷⁷ However, when it came to the debates over the Falkland Islands, the FO seemed fully engaged in manipulating the framing of this issue in terms of potential gains. They relentlessly spread the view that the bilateral relationship remained “cordial”, and “problems of common interests are being satisfactorily

³⁷⁵ FCO 7/241, AAF10/1, (87), D. M. Summerhays, BEBA, to Diggines, secret, 31 May 1968.

³⁷⁶ FCO 7/21, A2/19, Part B, (78), R.C. Samuel to Rodger, 23 January 1968, enclosing “Expert working group on Latin America, 7-10 November, 1967: The situation in Latin America”, issued by NATO, confidential.

³⁷⁷ FCO 7/168, AA6/24, (62), memorandum by P. H. Gore-Booth, “Commercial relations with Argentina”, confidential, 26 June 1968.

handled".³⁷⁸ In other words, the FO had been trying to create a picture that there was an amicable atmosphere in the talks. By doing this, it attempted to reverse the bleak domain of losses for the most part of 1968, despite the purposeful retaliation by Argentina.³⁷⁹ The FO was ready to respond to the sour atmosphere with the positive thinking that "we are engaged in sincere consultations with a friendly sovereign state".³⁸⁰

The two-pronged motivated framing with a package of reference points anchoring on the British reputation, foreign relations and potential trade was thus formulated. It proved a tentative success, as it seemed persuasive enough to justify the Government stance in a series of parliamentary enquiries from March until mid-November 1968.³⁸¹ During this period, there was a stereotypical reply coming in the main from Chalfont. "I cannot say what the outcome of the talks will be", explained Chalfont, but the FO was "guided by [a] strong regard for the interests of the people of the Falkland Islands, and [we] will see that there is the fullest consultation with them".³⁸² With regard to the idea of "interests", Stewart continued with his paternalistic view and harped on the designated motivated framing that the FO "believed that a greatly improved relationship between the Islands and their nearest neighbour, Argentina, is in the best interests of the Islanders".³⁸³ In retrospect, Stewart might have been aware that the FO's policy preference for taking the interests of the islanders as the principle in the talks could not be fully convincing. He might also realise that there were complaints among the colleague departments about the lenient policy towards Argentina. But as long as it effectively cooled down the Argentine nationalists, the policy could hardly be criticised as unintelligent or unacceptable.

Competing sets of motivated framing in 1968

There are two sets of motivated framing demurring against the above FO's

³⁷⁸ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (100) and (102), Parliamentary question, John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell), 8 July 1968: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he will make a statement on Anglo-Argentine relations.

³⁷⁹ FCO 7/164, AA6/5, Part A, (96), Creswell to FO, Tel. no. 447, confidential, 15 July 1968.

³⁸⁰ Hansard (Lords) vol. 293, cols., 1392-3, 26 June 1968.

³⁸¹ Hansard (Commons) vol. 773, col. 872, 18 November 1968.

³⁸² FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A. (5), Diggines to Lord Hood, 19 March, enclosing "Falkland Islands: Replies to MP's letters"; *ibid.*, (6), Chalfont to J. Hiley, 20 March 1968; *ibid.*, (7), Chalfont to E. S. Heffer, 20 March 1968.

³⁸³ FCO 149, AA4/6, (73), Brief no. 2, "Secretary of state's visit.

version in 1968. One was Haskard's motivated framing in terms of losses that continued to exist. The other was the motivated framing that sought to link the issue to Gibraltar, which was formulated by G. Lathbury, the Governor of Gibraltar. Nevertheless, the FO effectively subdued both sets of motivated framing even though they were formulated in terms of loss.

Haskard's motivated framing in 1968

It became evident that Haskard's motivated framing was transformed into moral concerns, although the concerns could hardly compete with the dominant one produced by the FO. On 19 January 1968, Haskard wrote to the Commonwealth Office (CO), "I have recently become increasingly concerned that the cardinal factor in Falkland Islands, namely the human problem, is in great danger of being overlooked". Subsequently, the "absence of first-hand knowledge of the Falkland Islands human problem could so easily result in the risk of wrong decisions being taken".³⁸⁴ Earlier in an interview, Haskard, without the FO's official permission, publicly remarked that "he felt this coming Southern winter would be a period of increased tension and the likelihood of a small scale landing [would be] much greater".³⁸⁵ Haskard's remarks indicated that he was grasping at straws by scare mongering. He apparently made an attempt to force a motivated framing into the domain of the issue by emphasising the moral concern of loss.

Nevertheless, Haskard's version of motivated framing could not effectively prevent the FO's policy from focusing on the policy objectives of following the guidance of the interests of the islanders. In February 1968, Haskard visited London, seeking to reverse the FO's policy orientation. The visit did not achieve what Haskard wanted. On his return to the Falkland Islands on 16 February 1968, Haskard was instructed to express the view that he had taken "the opportunity of stating the viewpoint of the Falkland Islanders in general terms. The negotiations are not yet terminated and the talks are still confidential. In these negotiations, the British Government is being guided by strong regard for the interests of the people of the

³⁸⁴ FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (2), Haskard to Arthur Galsworthy, CO, Tel. no. 14, secret, 19 January 1968.

³⁸⁵ FCO 7/241, AAF10/1, (81), P. F. Hobday, MoD, to Atkinson, American Department, FO, covering secret, 29 April 1968, enclosing "Extract from Naval Party Periodic Report: 1 February to 12 March 1968".

Falkland Islands".³⁸⁶

Again in late September 1968, the pressure of the Executive Council in the Falkland Islands built up as the result of the news coverage by the *Daily Express* in New York. On 8 October, the *Daily Express* reported that the calculated move of British Government about the future of the Falkland Islands. According to the *Daily Express*, Haskard personally "knew that the moves were under way but had been forbidden by London to talk about them".³⁸⁷ The effect of the prompting text was dramatic. The Falkland Islands Members of Council put forward the hearsay to Haskard, and Haskard was found in a weak position no longer capable of sticking to the so-called twin-track argument based on both consultations [with the islanders] and confidentiality [in the talks].³⁸⁸

When Haskard urgently called for guidance due to the pressure, he was told to wait and not to reveal the FO's intention to get the Memorandum of Understanding approved through the Cabinet. The FO wanted Haskard to keep patient, because, according to the FO, "this matter has to be handled in the next two months".³⁸⁹ Therefore, the FO instructed, "it would be desirable to postpone the meeting of the Legislative Council" until the publication of the Memorandum of Understanding.³⁹⁰

The FO's response to Haskard indicated that Haskard's moral concern might be capable of challenging the legitimacy of the FO's motivated framing, but the FO found no difficulty in coping with the frontal attack delivered from the perspective of moral concern. In response to the complaints that the government statement on the issue was "evasive", Chalfont asserted that the FO's negotiating principle based on the interests of the islanders was consistent, rather than evasive, in the past six months.³⁹¹ To the criticism that property values in the Falkland Island had dropped sharply due to uncertainties caused by the FO's first policy preference, Chalfont bluntly rebutted that "farming land in the Islands seldom changes hands"; and housing prices in Stanley, the

1968".

³⁸⁶ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (27), Beith to Lord Hood, confidential, 16 February 1968, enclosing "Statement for the Governor of the Falkland Islands to make on his return to Port Stanley".

³⁸⁷ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggines.

³⁸⁸ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggines.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., (14) CO to Haskard, Tel. no. 220, secret, 24 September 1968.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., (13), Beith to Diggines.

³⁹¹ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (115), Chalfont to Captain Kerby, 4 October 1968.

capital of the Falkland Islands, were “very reasonable”.³⁹² Chalfont assured the MPs as well as members of the Falkland Islands Legislative Council that “we have studied those wishes constantly in the course of negotiations”.³⁹³ Modern facilities such as the hospital, school, and air service in Buenos Aires, as the FO maintained, would provide easier access for the islanders, and they were less expensive than travelling back to Britain.³⁹⁴ In a reply to John Rodgers, MP, who seemed unconvinced and still stressed the wishes of the islanders, Chalfont replied as follows. “I don’t think the Falkland Islanders are supposed now to know all the details of the United Kingdom nationality laws”, as Chalfont lectured. “We do not believe that it is necessary to hold any plebiscite at present in the Falkland Islands to make known the wishes of the population”.³⁹⁵

Lathbury's motivated framing in 1968

As reported earlier, the FO's motivated framing was broad, but it was not broad enough to link the issue itself to the similar case of Gibraltar. Lathbury, the Governor of Gibraltar, was more ready to link these two cases and took a sympathetic stance with the Falkland Islands. Lathbury argued from the perspective of issue-linkage that the FO had to respect the psychological value of the Falkland Islanders, because both pieces of territory should reflect “the existing constitutional practice”. The link therefore constituted a symbol that “we shall not hand over either the people [or] territory to another state against their wishes”. Having noticed that “there are not proposals for constitutional talks” in the Falkland Islands, Lathbury argued that “If there were to be a revision of the Falkland[s] constitution which necessitated a new order in council we should be willing to include a preamble similar to the one we shall be including in the Gibraltar order”.³⁹⁶

Despite this moral concern, Lathbury’s argument proved to be unpersuasive to the decision-makers in the FO. The FO, in a telegram sent to Lathbury on 23 July 1968, expressed its view that “it is undesirable to confirm so positively as you suggest that there is a direct connection between the cases of Gibraltar and the Falkland

³⁹² Ibid., (122), Chalfont to Lord Balniel, MP, 18 October 1968.

³⁹³ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (56), Chalfont to Arthur Jones, MP, 8 April 1968.

³⁹⁴ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, Part B, (114), Chalfont to Hutchison.

³⁹⁵ FCO 7/157, AA4/15, Part A, (82) Chalfont to John Rodgers, MP, 15 May 1968.

³⁹⁶ FCO 7/158, AA4/15, (109), G. Lathbury, Gibraltar to CO, Tel. No. 158, personal and secret, 22 July

Islands", because, explained the FO, "the parallel situation does not at present arise".³⁹⁷ To make the official position clear and to dissipate the unnecessary effect as a result of Lathbury's argument, the FO explained that "it would be wrong for Ministers at this stage explicitly to link the Falklands with Gibraltar... [although] it should be sufficient to say there are similarities".³⁹⁸ More significantly, in its unilateral statement attached to the draft Memorandum of Understanding, the FO indicated its perception of the settlement as an exclusive package. "The questions still to be resolved are complex", as the draft went. The FO "will ask the Islanders to regard the question of the efficacy of the safeguards and guarantees and that of the possible cession of sovereignty to Argentina as a single issue".³⁹⁹ Arguing in this way, the FO seemed to know only too well that only by keeping a distance from the issue of Gibraltar could it contain a possible solution of the Falklands question within manageable proportions. It therefore had to silence Lathbury.

In retrospect, the FO's two-pronged motivated framing effectively subdued Haskard's and Lathbury's versions of motivated framing in terms of loss and human concerns. The wishes of the islanders, persistently formulated by Haskard, and echoed by Lathbury, were kept at bay before December 1968. The FO with its version of motivated framing delivered a promising perspective in terms of gains from trade, and was toning down the fear of a minor loss—the Falklands. It was confident that the Government was rightly situated in the centre of framing about the issue of the Falkland Islands, to the extent that Haskard's and Lathbury's were sidelined. More reassuring of this view was that, with the Memorandum of Understanding on the verge of being publicised in late 1968, the Falkland Islanders were reported as having become more realistic and the Argentines' expressed intention to keep the issue distant from nationalistic lines, as time went on.⁴⁰⁰ On 29 August 1968, the FIEC presented its solution to this dispute in which there were 8 points raised.⁴⁰¹ But Creswell and Diggines effortlessly rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it was "completely

1968.

³⁹⁷ Ibid., (110), CO to Governor Gibraltar, Tel. no. 310, personal and secret, 23 July 1968.

³⁹⁸ Ibid., (108), C. W. Wallace to Beith, restricted, 23 July 1968.

³⁹⁹ FCO 7/149, AA4/6, (73), Brief no. 2, "Secretary of state's visit".

⁴⁰⁰ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (84), Creswell to Diggines, confidential, 20 September 1968.

⁴⁰¹ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (83) Haskard to J. C. Morgan, confidential, 29 August 1968, enclosing "Paper prepared by the Falkland Island Emergency Committee in July 1968: Suggested solution for the Falkland Islands controversy".

unrealistic" and not "a realistic answer to the Argentine's claim".⁴⁰²

British identity— The reference point

Reserving a section to discuss British identity does not mean that the impact of this reference point can be taken as exclusive. British identity as one of the moral concerns undoubtedly went in parallel with Haskard's version of motivated framing in terms of losses and with Lathbury's argument based on issue-linkage. But it should be seen as one reference point integrated with the above two. Because of the integration, its influence was progressively strengthened and proved capable of undermining the FO's two-pronged motivated framing, however rational the latter could be.

As things stood, British identity emerged as one candidate reference point as early as March 1968. The emerging source of it could be traced to mass media. Most mass media after early 1968, when the issue came into public, tended to make their reports with the prompting conclusion such as "Almost all the inhabitants of these somewhat inhospitable islands off the southern tip of South America are of British (mostly Scottish) descent; five-sixths of them were born there".⁴⁰³ On 25 March 1968, for example, the Falklands dispute made the headlines on BBC TV's programme, "Twenty Four Hours". A. Barton, the representative of the Falkland Islands in London, sensationally described the issue as "a matter of prestige", and the islanders "the most loyal little community in the world". Firmly standing behind the idea of British identity, Barton argued that the islanders would find it difficult to remain loyal both to the Queen and the Argentine republic.⁴⁰⁴ That was a moral appeal that was momentous enough to raise eyebrows of the backbenchers, as some of them were inclined to take moral concern as their chances to express their view freely in Parliament.⁴⁰⁵ In the following week, with the publication of the manifesto issued by the FICE, the issue of the Falkland Islands made the headlines in Britain. The views expressed can be summed up from the *Daily Mirror* that went as "the Falkland Islands

⁴⁰² Ibid., (84), Creswell to Diggines, confidential, 20 September 1968; ibid., (95), Diggines to Tait, confidential, 16 October 1968.

⁴⁰³ *Spectator*, March 29 1968.

⁴⁰⁴ FCO 7/235, AAF3/1, (56), "Verbatim transcription from BBC *Twenty Four Hours—Falkland Islands*, broadcast on 25 March 1968.

⁴⁰⁵ Austin Mitchell (1994) "Back-bench influence: A personal view", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 4, p. 699.

are as British as Hampstead Garden Suburb".⁴⁰⁶ Since then, the framing of the issue was characterised by the language that British identity was under threat and it began to gain momentum in the British mass media. In mid-1968, George Bolton, Chairman of the Bank of London and South America got the notion of identity to Stewart's ear. Bolton wrote that the key to the emotive aspect that had affected the islanders and the Falklands lobbyists was the question of nationality.⁴⁰⁷ In October, the *Daily Express* also put the issue in a suggestive and sensational manner. It reminded the readers of the islanders' identity by writing that "almost all of them [are] of Scottish descents".⁴⁰⁸

Efforts to relocate the reference point

However, British identity, among other different sets of motivated framing, cannot be seen as if it had swimmingly approached the FO's perception exclusively and without other preconditions involved. This thesis argues that it was the unceasing act of motivated framing in terms of loss in the past two years, reinforced by the contextual factors also characterised by loss perception that constituted an effective push to undermine the FO's two-pronged motivated framing.

In mid-1968, the FO began to search for a more appropriate reference point from the historical archive. Three cases were under survey. They were the issues of Heligoland, the Gambia and Los Islands, and Jubaland. A lengthy report was presented to Stewart on 6 October 1968. According to this report, consultation based on the wishes of inhabitants in these cases could not have been stressed more in the policy debates. This finding served as another window for the FO through which to consider other potential reference points worth anchoring upon.

The FO's research into the historical archive represented its new effort of relocating a more contingent reference point in this issue. To start with, all three cases were colonial territories ceded away peacefully by Britain. Heligoland switched to German hands in 1890. The Gambia and Los Islands were ceded to France as part of the Gambia Protectorate in 1904. Jubaland changed sovereignty to Italy in 1924. They functionally provided representativeness for the image of the issue of the Falkland

⁴⁰⁶ Woodrow Wyatt (1968) "Stand firm on Falklands", *Daily Mirror*, 29 March 1968.

⁴⁰⁷ FCO 7/137, AA3/7, (31), George Bolton, Bank of London and South America, to Stewart, 18 June 1968.

⁴⁰⁸ FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (13), Beith to Diggines.

Islands. With this representativeness, it was likely that the FO would cast its doubt on the legitimacy of the first policy preference for respecting the interests of the islanders only, while in contrast, Britain emphasised the wishes of the inhabitants in the three historical cases.

In other words, although the principal of self-determination was far less influential in these three cases, the wishes of the inhabitants in the transfer were highlighted. In the case of Heligoland and Jubaland, the parliamentary debates were mostly involved with questions of whether there were sufficient attempts to consult the native population, and whether compensation was made.⁴⁰⁹ These cases exhibited a sharp contrast to the FO's Falklands policy preference in 1966-68.

In the second place, it was admitted that there was no parliamentary question on the grounds of secrecy in the case of Gambia and Los Islands, and that debates over the cession of Gambia had more to do with the 20th century blueprints of the Empire than any moral concerns.⁴¹⁰ However, no matter whether the policy was secret or not, British nationality was the major concern in the decision-making process, except in the case of Jubaland, where the inhabitants were largely Africans. British nationality was important in the case of Gambia and Los Islands, to the extent that Britain rejected the French proposal that people opting for British nationality should withdraw. The emphasis on British nationality was a contrast to the British conduct of the Falklands policy. It was certainly ironic that the FO could not find a firm basis for its policy preference for respecting the interests, instead of their wishes. In terms of nationality, additionally, it could be even more difficult to argue that the islanders were not of British identity.

Bennett, the writer of the report, used more space in description of the case of Heligoland. According to Bennett, on 1 July 1890, the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty was signed by Germany, which thereby gave up its enormous colonies in Uganda and Witu in exchange for a tiny island, Heligoland, which the German Reich thought

⁴⁰⁹ FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (6), J. S. Branney to C. E. Diggines, secret, 10 October 1968, enclosing (1) L. Branney to J. S. Branney on "Previous cessions of British territory", secret, 6 October 1968, and (2) "Memorandum of the nationality provisions, safeguards, and the consideration given, especially in Parliament, to the inhabitants' wishes, in certain cessions of British territory".

⁴¹⁰ Alfred Collin (1965) *Balfour's burden: Arthur Balfour and imperial preference* (London: Anthony Bond), p. 11, p. 210, p. 257.

strategically important.⁴¹¹ Historically speaking, the Treaty was a success for the Salisbury Government. It helped Britain secure the sources of the Nile valley,⁴¹² and had Bismarck subordinate his colonial ambitions in the interests of German-British relations.⁴¹³ The Treaty was a milestone for the "coming of the British Empire" in East Africa.⁴¹⁴ However, before the decision to transfer Heligoland was made, apprehension was explicitly expressed in the British Parliament. The Government was criticised for "failing to provide for the yet unborn children of present Heligolanders opting for British identity".⁴¹⁵ Although the Liberal Oppositions and his own Conservative Party placed a lot of store by Salisbury's foreign policy in Africa,⁴¹⁶ and identity was by no means an important factor in the management of the past 83-year possession of Heligoland,⁴¹⁷ Salisbury still found it difficult to cope with the opposition. William Gladstone on the opposition, for instance, found British nationality an effective tool to embarrass the Government in Parliament.⁴¹⁸

Conditional factors

This thesis has no evidence to show the effect of Bennett's report on Stewart. To reinforce the argument, conditional factors characterised by dramatic events have to be counted in. These events could include the poor-boding outlook for British-Argentine trade relations in 1968; the increased coverage of the issue by the mass media after March 1968; the unexpected leak about the Government's twin-track strategy in early October; the relentless protests launched by the FIEC in the language of a "sell-out" as a result of the news coverage; and the Argentines' illegal landing. Other contributing factors to this argument included the words to Stewart from

⁴¹¹ Andrew R. Carlson (1970) *Germany foreign policy, 1890-1914, and colonial policy to 1914: A handbook and annotated bibliography* (NJ: Scarecrow Press), p. 96.

⁴¹² Ronald F. Dreyer (1987) *The mind of official imperialism: British and Cape government perceptions of German rule in Namibia from the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty to the Kruger telegram (1890-1896)* (Essen: Reimar Hobbing Verlag), p. 91.

⁴¹³ Winfried Baumgart (1982) *Imperialism: The idea and reality of British and French colonial expansion, 1880-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 148-9; Edgar N. Johnson and John Dean Bickford (1927) "The contemplated Anglo-German alliance: 1890-1901", *Political Science Quarterly*, 62, 1, p. 4.

⁴¹⁴ Ronald Robinson, John Callagher and Alice Denny (1961) *African and the Victorians* (London: Macmillan), p. 294.

⁴¹⁵ FCO 7/160, AA4/17, (6), Branney to C. E. Diggins.

⁴¹⁶ D. R. Gillard (1965) "Salisbury's Heligoland offer: The case against the 'Witu Thesis?', *The English Historical Review*, 80, 3, p. 551.

⁴¹⁷ R. Heron-Fermor (1890) *Speech in condemnation of the cession of Heligoland*, delivered in Brighton on July 9, 1890.

⁴¹⁸ Paul M. Kennedy (1980) *The rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: George

Bolton, Chairman of the Bank of London and South America in mid-1967, Lathbury's motivated framing in terms of issue linkage to the case of Gibraltar, and more generally, a series of policy crises home and abroad in 1968.

Perhaps a more immediate factor to strengthen British identity as the reference point was Chalfont's educational campaign that was put in motion in late November 1968, and proved counter-productive. As Chalfont recalled the general mood in the Falkland Islands, when he launched the educational campaign in late November 1968, "The response was one of scepticism, to put it mildly. The view was quite simple, and I thought somewhat simplistically, 'We are British. We are not interested in your plans for any future world in which we should become Argentinians. We are British, that's all there is to it'".⁴¹⁹ Chalfont's description suggested that the strength of the motivated framing in terms of loss, loss of Britishness came into the fore. It moved the framing of the issue toward an insurmountable reference point that the FO's two-pronged version of motivated framing, however rational, found it hard to cope with. Therefore, it seems remarkable to argue that Bennett's report might have had a certain reinforcing impact, strengthening the motivated framing in terms of British identity, under the circumstance that Bennett's research was instructed to do. The instruction could not be baseless. It, in turn, might prove that the FO was faced with a policy dilemma, so that it made an attempt to look for more sensible reference point in late 1968.

Indeed, Britishness means more than "a matter of paying taxes, voting, using state welfare services".⁴²⁰ It could become more eye-catching than all the previous ones, with the effect enlarged to such a deplorable degree that any British bystanders would find it hard not to be in sympathy with it. Britishness at this critical moment became a powerful reference point for the Falkland Islands community in the sense that, after two years of disquieting rumours, enough was enough in December 1968. For the Cabinet as a whole, the decision-makers also found no reason not to avow their sympathy when faced by the simple sentence that "we are British". Stewart's motivated framing at this stage, by contrast, gave nothing but an impression of

Allen & Unwin), p. 208.

⁴¹⁹ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 23.

⁴²⁰ Asad Talal (1990) "Multiculturalism and British identity in the wake of Rushdie affair", *Politics & Society*, 18, 41, p. 458.

deviousness.⁴²¹ From the perspective of interaction between the FO's motivated framing and that of the Falkland Islands, Britishness as a reference point was capable of drawing the FO's decision weight to be with the Falkland Islands particularly when the FO was faced with a deteriorating domain of loss in late 1968.

4. Evaluation of the four hypotheses

The section is to evaluate the four hypotheses made in Chapter 3. This thesis starts from Hypothesis 4, which goes as follows: Britain framed the solution of the Falklands issue in terms of gains in late 1968. Because of this perception of gains, the Government decided to change the policy preference in pursuit of gains. It began to sideline the previous principle of respecting the wishes of the islanders. Instead, it was inclined to see the interests of the islanders as the guiding principle in the talks for the next two years. The policy change, in accordance with the mechanism of prospect theory, was a case of a risk-averse style of decisional behaviour.

A closer reading of the archive shows that Hypothesis 4 is problematic. To begin with, when the issue of the Falkland Islands approached the final stage in late 1968, the FO became increasingly aware that the motivated framing in terms of loss could be an insurmountable challenge to the implementation of its designated policy preference. Despite the persuasive argument based on the two-pronged motivated framing, the concern of loss was evident in Stewart's putting forward to McLoughlin the two different versions of paragraph 4 in the draft Memorandum of Understanding. It was also manifest in Stewart's failed attempt to make a detour to evade opposition in Parliament.

The FO went to great pains to sustain its motivated framing of the issue in terms of gains for most part of the period. But the result was not up to the FO's expectation. The model of the Antarctic Treaty turned out to be wishful thinking and the call for the exertion of political influence in South America through trade expansion proved superficial. This failure to continue the motivated framing in terms of gains has to be attributed to the deteriorating domain of loss in 1968. The declining domain of frame was exacerbated by the Argentine discrimination against the British exports after late 1967. Haskard's and Lathbury's motivated framing in terms of loss, in addition, became even more difficult for the FO to subdue, as the dominant reference point

⁴²¹ Castle (1990) *The Castle diaries*, p. 285; Benn (1988) *Office with power*, p. 134.

bearing on this issue began to anchor on British identity and eventually rendered the educational campaign in late November 1968 aborted. Faced by the second wave of parliamentary rows occurring within one year, the Wilson Government had no choice but to back down. The retreat reflected both the impacts of the domain of loss perceived by the Wilson Government, and that of motivated framing around Britishness, which turned out to be a powerful appeal with the occurrence of unauthorised landing of an Argentine aircraft at the eleventh hour.

Hypothesis 4 is problematic also because the policy shift in late 1968 was a risk-acceptant, not a risk-averse, decision from the perspective of British-Argentine relations. According to the MoD, military action against the Falkland Islands would be most likely, when Argentina perceived that all diplomatic means of achieving their aims had been exhausted in December 1968. With the prospect of withdrawing the Memorandum of Understanding, the MoD foresaw the Falkland Islands to be “a tempting target for a military operation designed to embarrass the British Government”.⁴²² The MoD also admitted that the likelihood of a military clash was elevated from the point of view of timing and capability. In respect of capability of defence, the MoD admitted that there were no friendly airfields, through which Britain could project an immediate task force. Although, the Argentine forces were “only moderately effective by European standards”, as the MoD averred, if Argentina decided to launch them, their relative strength in the neighbouring area would “constitute a serious threat to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies”, which had only symbolic and vulnerable forces committed to them.⁴²³ The crux is that, despite the military concern emerging in mid-1968, the FO still decided to make a policy shift by re-emphasising its respect for the islanders' wishes in December 1968. This pledge to take the wishes of the islanders as the guide by no means indicated that the FO had not been aware of potential threats from Argentina. On the other hand, the policy shift was also tantamount to a vitally insurmountable barrier to further negotiations, as the issue could have been resolved in the last minute but for abandoning the draft of Memorandum of Understanding. For the FO, as a result, the policy shift in late 1968 was grudging and risky.

Hypothesis 4 is as a result invalid. Refutation of Hypothesis 4 inclines this thesis

⁴²² FCO 7/156, AA4/14, (17), *ibid.*

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

to accept Hypothesis 3 as follows. The British Government framed the issue in terms of losses in late 1968, so that it changed the policy line by upholding the wishes of the islanders again. The change of policy preference was, therefore, understood as a display of risk-acceptant behaviour under the condition that the British Government knew only too well that there would be a potential threat from Argentina.

Nevertheless, the evaluation of prospect theory has not been completed yet. Regarding the first policy preference for respecting the interests of the islanders, this case study finds out three weaknesses in Hypothesis 2. For this moment, let this thesis repeat Hypothesis 2 as follows: Britain framed the solution of the issue in terms of losses in late 1966. The perception of loss included trade opportunities with the South American countries and Britain's world reputation. From the mechanism of prospect theory, this thesis expects that the Government would be risk-acceptant due to perception of loss. Britain therefore decided to hold talks with Argentina.

Firstly, as this case study shows, the first policy preference for respecting the islanders' interests was a result of the Government's enjoying a domain of gain. And because of this domain of gain, the FO formulated the issue in similar language characterised by looking for gains. Some decision-makers in the FO including Foreign Secretary Brown admitted that the issue of the Falkland Islands was a minor concern, and they did not mind letting the Falklands go. There was also no sense of crisis when the talks were launched. The dominant framing during this period was one of optimism: For Britain, the political concerns of the dispute over the Falklands with Argentina were "short-term in nature".⁴²⁴ Britain would have something to sell in exchange for long-term interests in South America. The islanders, in addition, would gain something in returns after a transfer of sovereignty. This description of the frame, either referring to motivated framing or domain of frame, as a result contradicts what Hypothesis 2 presents.

Secondly, from the perspective of the dependent variable—the risk orientation, the decision to hold talks with Argentina in late 1966 could hardly be interpreted as risk-acceptant either towards Argentina or domestic opposition. Even in late 1966 when *Operacion Condor* incident took place, Britain was more ready to solve the

⁴²⁴ Richard Ned Lebow (1989) "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the Falklands war", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and deterrence*

conflict through diplomatic means instead of other drastic gestures. For the whole Wilson Government, although there emerged a decline of domain of gains, and the reference point going from the level of aspiration (the Antarctic Treaty) down to the level of status quo (preservation of British reputation), Britain had no explicit intention to walk away from the talks. The FO understood pretty well that walking away might annoy Argentina. Evidently, it is difficult to argue that Britain was risk-acceptant toward British-Argentine relations before December 1968. This thesis is more inclined to see a risk-averse pattern of behaviour on the British side, which finding will render Hypothesis 2 problematic.

The risk-averse pattern of behaviour was significant as well on the domestic front. To be sure, the FO's effort to tone down Haskard's motivated framing in terms of losses and Lathbury's motivated framing in terms of issue-linkage did not mean that the FO paid no attention to moral concern. Quite on the contrary, because of moral concern, confidentiality was strongly emphasised among the officials, the suspicion that the Government was looking for gains was flatly rejected in Parliament, and the educational campaign in preparation was delayed in March 1968.

Thirdly, Hypothesis 2 is problematic in that the perception of loss in this hypothesis does not exactly correspond to what prospect theory assumes. When Hypothesis 2 takes trade opportunities as one element of motivated framing and characterises it in terms of loss, i.e., the loss of trade potential, it has, with benefit of the hindsight, been found exaggerated. Most departments in the British Government did not think that the timing of trade was appropriate, however prosperous the Argentine economies appeared to be. By this understanding, loss of trade potential in Hypothesis 2 has to be seen as an appeal, reflecting the FO's aspiration and its version of motivated framing with a view to influencing the colleague departments in the whole cabinet. The appeal of trade potential with Argentina seems to communicate to the audience that here was an appeal lying ahead and that Britain had better not miss the chance. In other words, if Britain had mishandled the issue or refused to start the talks, the prospect of potential gains would come to naught. The result would entail the reference point—expected utilities of trade—dropping from an aspired level of expectation to the status quo. The loss perception in Hypothesis 2 as a result could be

seen as an appeal to avoid psychological disappointment.

Nevertheless, Hypothesis 2 clearly commits the error of confusing the motivated framing in terms of loss stipulated by prospect theory, with the notion of loss avoidance, which is a constant in human behaviour, relative to expected utilities. Basically, the notion of loss avoidance is broader than the classic terms of loss in prospect theory. In prospect theory, loss perception, or framing in terms of loss, refers to loss of utilities worse than the status quo. It gives the reader a clear picture of mechanism for framing an issue either in terms of gains or losses. The notion of avoidance, in contrast, refers either to the concern of loss of utility better than that of the status quo (i.e., potential trade), or to that worse than the status quo (i.e., Britain's prestige). That said, loss avoidance is a catchall definition consisting of reference points both at the level of aspiration and that of the status quo. Its broader perception of loss is elusive, so far as a mechanism in prospect theory is concerned. It can lead an analyst onto the horns of a dilemma in a case study without exactly knowing which kind of framing in prospect theory (in terms of gains or losses?) that a decision-maker has taken into his/her strategic thinking.⁴²⁵

If one looks from the perspective of the FO, which situated itself between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, one can find that the FO's decision-making represented a decision-making style characterised by loss avoidance throughout 1966-68. The FO, for instance, was deeply aware of the threat of leaks to the mass media by emphasising confidentiality. It was carefully keeping the moral concern at bay, separating the issue from the case of Gibraltar, making effort to improve the deteriorating British-Argentine relations against the trade retaliation. Indeed, even openly declaring to respect the wishes of the islanders could be taken as a decision reflecting loss avoidance with a view to preserving the Government's creditability faced by the parliamentary rows. However, closer scrutiny shows that taking loss avoidance as an explanatory variable does not throw much light on the mechanism of prospect theory. There are no coherent and unequivocal relations to be generated between loss avoidance and risk-orientation behaviour. Given the expectation for good relations with Argentina owing to loss avoidance, why did the FO take Britishness as the final obstruction to the talks? Given the possible domestic

⁴²⁵ Edward Rhodes (1998) "Book review", *American Political Science Review*, 92, 4, p. 986.

opposition, why did the FO relentlessly propose the talks? Loss avoidance lacks much force in explanation. It seems proper to treat loss avoidance as a dependent variable, instead of an explanatory one. More relevantly, the fear of losing utilities cannot be taken as the specific claim in prospect theory, because loss avoidance may occur whenever “individuals feel incapable of coping with the threat”.⁴²⁶

Taken together, this thesis falsifies Hypothesis 2. The refutation is not only because the FO exhibited a risk-averse behavioural pattern towards both Argentina and the domestic opposition, but also because the notion of loss avoidance risks a catchall definition and it can be elusive to account for a mechanism of explanation. Loss avoidance, at best, can be seen a constant phenomenon. It has gone beyond what prospect theory can precisely define, and but does not lead to the true understanding of prospect theory.

In short, refutation of Hypothesis 2 inclines this thesis to conclude that it is safer to accept Hypothesis 1— Britain framed the solution of the Falklands dispute in terms of gains in late 1966. The Government therefore was risk-averse and tended to talk about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina.

Caution, however, is needed after evaluating the above four hypotheses. To begin with, the two policy preferences can be interpreted as the result of the combined effect of the domain of framing and the motivated framing in terms of gain/loss. When a series of reference points including the Antarctic Treaty, Britain's prestige, better relations with Argentina, potential trade and preservation of Britishness came forward in the policy calculations, these reference points were functioning as representativeness in a cognitive sense. However, after most reference points proved problematic in defence of the Government's policy, and after dramatic events including news leak and parliamentary rows challenged the first policy preference, strategic thinking became the decisive force in relocating other reference points and preference reversals therefore took place.

Thus prompted, strategic thinking, based on subjective values, should not be under-estimated, otherwise prospect theory can be mistakenly considered as a

⁴²⁶ Ronald W. Rogers and C. Ronald Mewborn (1976) “Fear appeals and attitude change: Effects of a threat's noxiousness, probability of occurrence, and the efficacy of coping responses”, *Journal of*

structuralist view. On the other hand, because strategic thinking is heavily influenced by subjective values, motivated framing in the evaluating phase of decision-making is not necessarily formulated in an exclusive or static form. Framing in terms of gains does not exclude the possibility to frame the same issue in terms of losses, and vice versa. That said, motivated framing can be broadly formulated and consist of prospects of both gains and losses. During the period from mid-1967 to late 1968, the FO's two-pronged motivated framing was a case in point. Because of a broader viewpoint, this two-pronged motivated framing proved more persuasive than other competing motivated framing and, to a considerable degree, helped the first policy preference move forward to the final objective against the declining domain of frame.

The last point suggests the next. Since the FO occupied better ground in argumentation (assisted by confidentiality in the talks, of course) during the period, Haskard's motivated framing in terms of moral concern and Lathbury's in terms of issue-linkage were not effective competitors, despite that their versions of motivated framing were in terms of loss. With this finding, it will be sensible to conclude that framing in terms of losses is not necessarily a decisive force to shift a policy orientation. In other words, so far as a decision-maker is concerned, a reference point set at the level of aspiration does not necessarily give ground to one set at the level of the status quo. Levy is therefore correct to contend that the status quo bias is "mis-specified".⁴²⁷ The status quo bias cannot be taken as unchangeable. Indeed, before late 1968, suppressing the competing sets of motivated framing in terms of losses reflected the FO's earnest effort to keep the issue under control. This earnest effort to sort out a compromise with Argentina, in turn, reflected the FO's pragmatic diplomatic approach with a subjective value behind it. An observer could hardly find fault with the FO's toning down the competing sets of motivated framing in terms of loss, and Brown's emphasis on confidentiality, as talking about the interests of the islanders exclusively could leave room of freedom for policy manoeuvre.

Overall, this section argues that the two policy preferences in 1966-68 were the results of the combined effect of domain of frame and motivated framing. However, to avoid a structuralist claim, framing as a concept needs more precision in

Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 1, p. 60.

⁴²⁷ Jack S. Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, *framing*, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for international conflict", *International Political Science Review*, 17, 2, p. 189.

explanation. Britain neither framed the solution of the issue in terms of gains so that the talks began, nor did it frame the issue in terms of loss so that the draft of Memorandum of Understanding was abandoned. Different domains of frame that the Wilson Government was situated in are a contributing factor that cannot be underestimated. This distinction between the motivated framing and domain of frame, again, justifies the effort of this thesis in Chapter 3.

Secondly, motivated framing is not necessarily formulated in an exclusive form. It can broadly consist of different bargaining levels with the reference points both anchoring at the level of aspiration and the level of status quo.

Thirdly, the status quo bias is, as a result of the above finding, not necessarily a dominant reference point. As the case analysis shows, there were occasions when the status quo bias in terms of loss was replaced by motivated framing in terms of gain, such as in late 1966 when Britain set the Antarctic Treaty as a model for the Falklands dispute. On the other hand, the case study also demonstrates that loss avoidance may be a constant phenomenon in human behaviour. Since loss avoidance cannot be taken as a specific claim in prospect theory, taking loss avoidance as explanation may not advance prospect theory very far.

5. Report of the ambiguities

Given the explanation from the perspective of prospect theory, uncertainties remain that can be illustrated as follows. First, to what extent did Bennett's research of the three historical cases affect the FO's policy orientation after October 1968? There was no official paper to show Stewart's response, and, admittedly, Stewart was not obliged to respond.⁴²⁸ Secondly, it is not certain whether the two policy preferences were a reflection of Wilson's personality, or his style of leadership. In this regard, there were reports that Wilson was good at balancing between losses and gains. As Wilson personally admitted, he preferred the so-called Attlee's method, characterised by evasion,⁴²⁹ whenever faced with uncertainties.⁴³⁰ It was recorded that Wilson made

⁴²⁸ Naeem Inayatullah (1997) "Theories of spontaneous disorder", *Review of International Political Economy*, 4, 2, 319-48; Tversky and Kahneman (1986) "Rational choice and the framing of decision", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, p. s251; Charles Lipson (1984) "International cooperation in economic and security affairs", *World Politics*, 37, 1, p. 17.

⁴²⁹ Martin Francis (1997) *Ideas and policies under labour, 1945-1951: Building a new Britain* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press), p. 231.

⁴³⁰ Wilson (1971) *The Labour government*, p. 481.

a concession on less important issues for the sake of party unity.⁴³¹ This thesis is bound to raise the question: is personality a variable that makes the argument correlational rather than causal? Thirdly, was secret diplomacy, rather than rationality in policy debates, the decisive factor that FO's motivated framing could tone down the opposition? Given that the sense of loss avoidance was consistent, as this thesis has examined, why did the FO choose Chalfont to visit the Falkland Islands since it had already been aware that the islanders bore an unfavourable image of the FO. Why did the FO not foresee that the educational campaign could fail due to strong suspicion? More specifically, if the policy switch was the causal result of framing, then why, after the wishes of the islanders had been confirmed as paramount, did the FCO still make unceasing effort in proposing talks with Argentina? This thesis will try to deal with some of these ambiguities in Chapter 5 and leave the rest for further study.

6. The limitation of the test

This thesis has to acknowledge the limitation in this test. While recent releases of the FCO's documents have been encouraging, constraints still operate. This thesis finds that the current British Government remains deeply cautious in their release of the archive concerning the issue of the Falkland Islands during the period under study. For instance, the full and final version of Memorandum of Understanding at the end of November 1968 has not been de-classified.⁴³² Quite the opposite, its reservation period has been extended from 30 to 40 years. In addition, the Falkland Islands Government's documents, kept in File 80, can be expected to contain transcripts of the opinion exchanged between Governor Haskard and his bureaucratic branches. Observation of them helps analyse the internal dynamic of the Falklands society in the late 1960s. However, all the related legislative and executive council minutes as well as administration records have been removed from this file. In addition, the newly established National Progress Party in the Falkland Islands and their activities can be an important dimension for this thesis to observe the development of ethnic nationalism in this case.⁴³³ Their party activities, according to the index, should have been filed under CO 1024/566. To the disappointment of this writer, no record of the

⁴³¹ Wyatt (1977) *What's left of the Labour party?*, p. 80; *New Society* (1967b) "Labour and unemployment", 10, 261, p. 419.

⁴³² FCO 7/155, AA4/13, (67), American Department, Foreign Office (FO), Memorandum of Understanding, closed until 2008, 24 October 1967.

related information has been released so far. The extension of 10 years to keep some essential data from the customary 30 years is telling. It indicates that the dispute over the Falkland Islands remains a sensitive issue and that Britain is still addressing it with care.

Secondly, despite the effort in the past year and the snowballing technique being used, the result of the 10 personal interviews (See Appendix C) is very limited and not as helpful as this thesis initially imagined. The major difficulties lie in three aspects. First, sadly, many of the people who were in the thick of it during this period are now deceased.⁴³⁴ The interviewees currently involved with the issue, by contrast, have little knowledge of the issue owing to confidentiality. From Sir Rex Hunt the eldest among the interviewees, to the youngest, Saul Pitaluga, they all admitted their inability to provide exact information about the period under study, although they were helpful in introducing the concerned individuals to this writer. Because of this low response rate and low representation in sampling, this thesis has to limit the use of interviewing data.⁴³⁵

Secondly, with the lapse of 30 years, the memories of some the interviewees are very sketchy. Robin Pitaluga, father of Saul Pitaluga, complained that his personal records no longer existed. Cosmo Haskard, perhaps for his personal politeness, even suggested that the Public Record Office could be a better place for this writer to explore than doing a personal interview with him. But are they really forgetful? The suspicion of this thesis reinforces the view that the issue remains sensitive.

Finally, in the process of snowballing, the writer had an opportunity to be introduced by Robin Pitaluga to Frank Mitchell, one of the members of the FIEC in 1968. The writer made contact with Mitchell via the Falkland Islands Association's London office in May 1999. Mitchell, however, set the condition that the interview had to be held in the Taiwanese Embassy, 50, Grosvenor Gardens, London, because,

⁴³³ FCO 7/136, AA3/5, (6), Creswell to FO, confidential, 13 November 1967.

⁴³⁴ This writer obtained from Osgood the name list of the FIEC in 1968. Among the 15 members, the whereabouts of two (Dr. Robin, Director of Polar Research, and Professor Metford, Bristol University) were unknown, and 12 were deceased. The names of the deceased were A. G. Barton, R. V. Goss, S. Miller, Sir John Barlow, Hunter Christie, Sir Miles Clifford, N. X. Cameron, Clifford Kenyen, John Smith, W. W. Blake, A. A. Blake, and J. R. Yorath. Other people outside the FIEC that were relevant were Creswell, Sir J. Boyd-Carpenter.

⁴³⁵ Douglas R. Berdie and John F. Anderson (1974) *Questionnaires: Design and use* (NJ: Scarecrow), p. 14.

as he insisted, the interview should be formal. However, despite this writer's effort, this request was rejected by the Taiwanese Embassy. Part of the reason, this writer ventures to guess, was that the Taiwanese Embassy was afraid of other implications from the firing on a Taiwanese fishing boat in the Falklands' waters in mid-1999. The refusal subsequently forced the writer to call off the interview.

Nevertheless, the data taken from the personal interviews are taken as supplementary, as Chapter 1 supposes. The case analysis and the explanation made from the perspective of prospect theory still constitute the essential concern of this thesis and help create a forward-looking view to discuss the implications of the test in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 5—CONCLUSIONS

Chapter 5 is dealing with the implications in the sense of logical entailment. It consists of two parts. Empirically, this thesis argues that the British conduct of the Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968 was pragmatic in policy style. The three options raised in Chapter 1 including leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration into the Antarctic Treaty System will be assessed based on this argument. Looking into the foreseeable future, this thesis expects that Argentina will continue to press Britain for sovereignty talks. The current British Government, on the other hand, is likely to find the issue increasingly difficult to treat as a doing-nothing one. However, any arrangement aimed at circumventing the sovereignty impasse will only postpone the problem to another day.

Secondly and theoretically, this thesis explores the strengths and weaknesses of prospect theory. It argues that framing, as an explanatory variable in prospect theory, provides a coherent explanation for decision-making and risk-oriented propensity. Prospect theory proves more powerful than the notion of representativeness in cognitive psychology. The theory is also more of value than the concern with utilities in rational choice theories.

This thesis, however, has to report that there is tension existing between a reference point and a set of motivated framing in prospect theory. The decision outcome may not necessarily be reference-dependence, because, as the case shows, motivated framing can be one thing, and a reference point can be another. The two notions are not automatically corresponding. This finding will undermine the view that prospect theory is a reference-dependent theory, as is understood in Chapter 3. Also, caution is needed in applying prospect theory solely from the perspective of loss avoidance or the status quo bias. Loss avoidance is a vague term that embraces diverse, but sometimes compatible, utilities. Finally, this thesis concludes by suggesting an agenda for further study.

1. The empirical implications

Pragmatic policy style

If policy style is understood as “the main characteristics of the ways in which a given society formulates and implements its public policies”,¹ a convincing case can

¹ John Baylis (1989) *British defence policy, striking the right balance* (London: Macmillan), p. 10;

be made in which Britain's conduct of the Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968 featured a significantly pragmatic policy style. The sense of pragmatism, nevertheless, should not be interpreted as an impromptu performance of the FO. Rather, pragmatic policy style here has to be understood as a result of interaction between the FO and the overall framing of this issue in the late 1960s.

The most elementary point to support this interpretation was that the first policy preference emerging in late 1966 reflected FO's understanding of this issue that "the policy of status quo" was not "necessarily opposed to any change whatsoever".² During this period, there were hardly any sign of a pre-defined notion of sovereignty, acting as a legitimate force leading the way to deny Argentina's burning desire for retaking the Falkland Islands. Rather, Britain sought to build a mechanism, emphasising cooperation instead of the risks after the series of the sovereignty talks.³ The FO was readier to compromise, as long as its long-term interests, including a better relationship with Argentina and Britain's prestige in the UN, could be maintained. The first preference reversals in the whole history of the Falkland Islands thus took place in late 1966.

In order to cope with the domestic suspicion, from mid-1967 to December 1968, this pragmatic attitude was further strengthened. The FO was actually flexible enough to have the principle of this newly designated policy dancing between the wishes and interests of the islanders. With this rhetorical strategy, it embarked on a course of profound policy change by producing a two-pronged motivated framing to defend its policy orientation. This dual set of motivated framing proves a success. It helped the FO hold a bargaining position broadly straddling both the level of aspiration in terms of gains and the level of status quo in terms of losses. Despite the poor-boding outlook of British-Argentine relations in 1968, it made the FO's argument persuasive and effective, to the extent that Haskard, Governor of the Falkland Islands, who consistently questioned the legitimacy of the FO's policy with his motivated framing in terms of losses, had to acquiesce. Viewed in this light, the FO's first turning-point

Jeremy Richardson, Gustafsson Gunnell and Jordan Grant (1982) "The concept of policy style", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *Policy style in Western Europe* (London: George Allen and Unwin), p. 2.

² Hans J. Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, 3rd edition (NY: Alfred.A.Knopf), p. 42.

³ David Strang (1991) "Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: Realist and institutional account", *International Organisation*, 45, 2, p. 162; Andrei P. Tsygankov (1997) "From international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: The foreign policy discourse of contemporary Russia", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, 2, p. 249.

policy preference could hardly be criticised as unreasonable or irrational. The dual set of motivated framing both in terms of gains and losses was, in Morgenthau's words, the "art of diplomacy".⁴ From the initial contact between the two sides about the issue in late 1966 to the educational campaign in late November 1968, the FO's decision-making exemplified a self-interested state-actor developing "processes for making joint decisions" with Argentina, in an attempt to solve "dilemmas of common interests or common aversions".⁵ Seen from the decision-making and implementation of it, the first turning-point policy preference in late 1966 reflected a typical case of political realism that sovereignty is not an absolute concept for foreign policy. It was instead subject to "reinterpretations", and after the FO's artful framing of the issue, the wishes of the islanders that were iterated before 1966 were, indeed, sidelined.⁶

The second point bore witness to the view that the FO was pragmatic is that the Government was not blinded by the effectiveness of the rhetoric strategy that had worked quite well in most part of this period. When the Government was faced with strong opposition from the domestic front in December 1968, concerns for British prestige and better relations with South America became less relevant. When the domain of frame deteriorated from a prospect of gains to that of losses,⁷ and when relentless opposition framed the issue as a sell-out in December 1968, the FO did not stick to its original premise that the designated policy for talks was for Britain's long-term interests and prestige. The Government instead was quick to realise that there existed no supporting mechanism to produce intended results.⁸ It subsequently rejected the Memorandum of Understanding that it was supposed to issue jointly with Argentina at the end of 1968 and it changed the negotiating principle from the interests of the islanders to their wishes. Here the FO in late 1968 demonstrated its policy style characterised by pragmatism again. It had never presumed the contemporary condition under which foreign policy operated should be consistent or unquestionable.⁹ The second preference reversal thus took place. Perhaps more significant is that the eventual shift of policy preferences back to the wishes of the

⁴ Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations*, p. 541.

⁵ Arthur A. Stein (1990) *Why nation co-operate: Circumstance and choice in international relations* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), p. 54.

⁶ Ibid., p. 313.

⁷ Simon James (1994) "The Cabinet system since 1945: Fragmentation and integration", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 4, p. 628.

⁸ John Orbell (1991) "A 'cognitive miser' theory of co-operator's advantage", *American Political Science Review*, 85, 2, p. 525.

⁹ Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations*, p. 9.

islanders was by no means irrational. The reversal of policy preference can be seen as a means of dealing with the imbalance of government power and government responsiveness, caused, first of all, by the lack of Falklands lobbyists before March 1968, when the FIEC was established.¹⁰

From the perspective of prospect theory, the reason for this imbalance was that there were not enough reference points for further inference in policymaking. As Evans observed, when international negotiations were initiated, they were hardly a direct response to the pressure from the local constituency.¹¹ This in part explained why the voice of the lobby groups had rarely been heard up to the point when the draft Memorandum of Understanding came out for public discussions among colleague departments in early 1968.

Likewise, this lack of sufficient reference points available not only explains the immediate influence of the Antarctic Treaty and British prestige on the decision-makers, but reflected a typical British mindset in the 1960s, when most of the British public did not "care about the issue", owing to its being minor. On the other hand, even if some did care, these people lacked "the power, to act upon those preferences".¹² Thus, the FO found little difficulty to locate the Antarctic Treaty and British prestige as the initial reference points. The two reference points, chosen earlier in late 1966 and early 1967, could be ready-made and were located quite conveniently in light of the fact that room for manoeuvrability remained spacious for the FO before the domain of frame of this issue deteriorated.

Of course, it has to be admitted that this imbalance of government and lack of responsiveness were also caused by the FO's deliberate effort to sideline moral assessment, and instead to emphasise confidentiality.¹³ This effort, indeed, reflected the impetus of motivated framing of this issue as described in the evaluating phase of the prospect theory. Nevertheless, stressing confidentiality in the talks has to be seen

¹⁰ Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (1965) *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 476.

¹¹ Peter B. Evans (1993) "Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, CA & London: University of California University), pp. 397-430.

¹² Peter F. Trumbore (1998) "Public opinion as a domestic constraint in international negotiations: Two-level games in the Anglo-Irish peace process", *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, 3, p. 561.

¹³ Hansard (Commons) vol. 761, cols., 14-5, 34, 1461, 1466, 18 March 1968; vol. 762, col. 5, 1 April 1968; vol. 775, col. 242, 16 December 1968; vol. 763, col. 479, 25 April 1968; vol. 764, col. 32, 6 May 1968.

as a calculated move. It was no means irrational. It highlighted the FO's pragmatic strategic thinking in its attempt to bring the sovereignty talks under control. Without this effort, the FO could have found it difficult to keep reasonable room for policy manoeuvre against the unfavourable domain of loss setting after the end of 1967. It also explained why, when Argentina rejected the proposal of a sovereignty freeze in November 1966, the FO readily replaced it with British prestige. The relocation of the reference point illustrated Britain's constant concern owing to some hostile Argentine moves on different international occasions in respect of the Falklands dispute. Overall, stressing confidentiality was a practical necessity under this circumstance. It was this practicality that constituted the FO's pragmatic policy style concerning this dispute.

However, when the FO at the final stage became aware that Britishness proved an irresistible motivated framing, it capitulated. The capitulation cannot be interpreted as reflecting an inconsistent policy style. Rather, in the light of social meaning, the capitulation was, again, necessary because the FO at this moment was forced to realise that Britishness in late 1968 became the major reference point. Britishness indicated where prestige and power of the Wilson Government lay and the FO found quite difficult to argue down in a perfectly rational form.¹⁴ The policy shift in December 1968 emphasising the wishes of the islanders, as a result, was exactly what Morgenthau subscribed to. It showed that the moral concern for protecting "cultural identity against encroachments by other nations" did play a part in decision-making.¹⁵ As Morgenthau warned, "only foolhardy egocentrics are inclined to pursue a policy of prestige for its own sake".¹⁶ When the overall framing of the policy was transformed by Falklands lobbyists into "a sell-off of the British identity", it was unreasonable for the FO not to square up to this kind of motivated framing and to reject what had been deliberately planned. The reference point anchoring on British prestige in the UN had to be given up.

As this case illustrates, the second policy preference was an unintended outcome. The decision to call a halt to the Memorandum of Understanding in preparation was

¹⁴ Dennis Chong (1992) "Social incentives and the preservation of reputation in public-spirited collective action", *International Political Science Review*, 13, 2, p. 195.

¹⁵ Hans. J. Morgenthau (1951) *In defence of the national interest: A critical examination of American foreign policy* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf), p.972; Robert Jervis (1994) "Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the scientific study of international politics", *Social Research*, 61, 4, p. 858, p. 867.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

hurriedly made. The FO took unwillingly a guiding principle in the talks to respect the wishes of the islanders, and the declaration in late 1968 was risk-acceptant.

However, it was not unintended in the sense of being unacceptable to the Wilson Government. Indeed, the reversal of policy preference taking place in late 1968 should be seen as an extension of Wilson's pragmatism. This argument is plausible, because Wilson often "talked about politics in the crudest nationalist terms" even when he enjoyed his enviable domain of gains before 1968.¹⁷ He seemed fully aware that there would be considerable degree of folder to supply its governing power by upholding the perception of Britishness as part of national sentiment under the heading of "making Britain great" or "the spirit of Dunkirk".¹⁸ By this token, when the Government's credibility hit the trough in 1968, the motivated framing with a reference point around Britishness could be still helpful. It at least did not fall beyond Wilson's appetite so far as his pragmatic policy style was concerned. In other words, the reference point anchoring on Britishness, however unintended and threatening to the FO's pragmatic scheme concerning this dispute in the past two years, could still be seen as Wilson's pragmatic governing style. It would have been irrational to fail to perform an action or to adopt a policy preference that was practically necessary.

On the other hand, given the unintended outcome, the switch of policy preferences was, pragmatically speaking, what the legitimacy of government. As Alderman rightly argued, "it is the business of the government, and of the organs of government, to do what the citizens of the state want, not what it is thought is in their interests. In a democracy it is the *wishes* of the people [italicised by Alderman], not their interests (defined by whom?) which are paramount".¹⁹ The second policy preference has to be seen in this light. It would have been not reasonable, if the Wilson Government had disregarded where the power sources came from and had continued its first policy preference in late 1968. To continue the former policy was to leave "out of account the principal channels through which the mass of the citizenry brings influence to bear on the decision makers",²⁰ and that was detrimental to the sustainability of source of power for that government.

¹⁷ Paul Foot (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson* (London: Middlesex), pp. 332-3.

¹⁸ Ibid..

¹⁹ Geoffrey Alderman (1984) *Pressure groups and government in Great Britain* (London & NY: Longman), p. 143.

²⁰ R. T. McKenzie (1968) "Parties, pressure groups and the British political process", in Robert Benewick and Robert E. Dowse (eds.), *Reading on British politics and government* (London: University Of London Press), p. 142.

This thesis also sees the second policy preference coming to the fore as evidence to support the assumption of prospect theory that consistency or not is a secondary concern in decision-making and decision-makers are adaptable. Decision-makers are quite capable of explaining away, at least to themselves, the inconsistencies of their policy-making.²¹ The policy shift in late 1968 was a moment that highlighted a "dialectical interaction" between the government and its social structure.²² To give up the designated policy preference held in 1966-68 reflected the FO's recognition that the policy designated in mid-1967 had "gone beyond socially tolerable bounds".²³ Under the dual pressure of motivated framing in terms of loss, and the ill-conceived domain of loss in 1968, the FO's giving prominence to a particular code of moral conduct, i.e. the British way of life could not be seen as uncommon.

However, this did not mean that morality excelled at the final hour so that it would be taken for granted by the FO. The policy shift for the FO was a matter of pragmatic response, not of moral rightness. Otherwise, there would have been no further sovereignty talks in the 1970s. Despite giving ground the concern of Britishness in late 1968, the FO clearly understood that moral assessment could do harm to foreign policy in terms of national interests and moral standards were applicable only to a limited range.²⁴ This understanding was indeed the essence of the FO's pragmatism. The shift of policy lines from the interests of the islanders to their wishes was a practical necessity against the framing in terms of losses. It struck a balance between government and responsiveness, and this seemed a satisfactory solution in terms of power stability, despite temporarily, for the Wilson Government in late 1968.

However, the degree of influence to the decision to give up the Memorandum of Understanding from the FO's strategic thinking should not be exaggerated. There were, admittedly, practical difficulties both in cognitive capability and power of judgement. In retrospect, there were decision-makers, such as Brown, Hohler and Chalfont, who failed to grasp the magnitude and complexity of the problem; solely

²¹ Berndt Brehmer (1976) "Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 6, p. 1000; Leon Festinger (1957) *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (London: Tavistock), pp. 1-2; Charles. E. Osgood and P. Tannenbaum (1955) "The principle of congruity and the prediction of attitude change", *Psychological Review*, 62, p. 43.

²² Walter Carlsnaes (1992) "The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis", *International Studies Quarterly*, 36, 3, p. 261.

²³ Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations*, p. 228-30.

²⁴ Felix E. Oppenheim (1987) "National interest, rationality, and morality", *Political Theory*, 15, 3, p.

setting the reference point at the level of aspiration. There were also those, such as Edmonds Diggines, who did realise the complexity of this problem, but whose proposed solutions were equally simplistic. There were others, such as Haskard and Lathbury, who might really care and had tried to initiate their motivated framing in terms of loss, but found it difficult to cope with the two-pronged motivated framing. There were still some, who had been struggling to no avail and suffering from this policy dilemma, such as Stewart and Creswell.

In gathering implications, this thesis is deeply concerned not to be trapped into a structuralist perspective. It believes it unfair for Klein to comment that the Wilson Government "derived policies from the circumstances rather than from aims" due to a domain of loss in 1968.²⁵ Instead, the FO's Falklands policy, during the period under study, exemplified a state-actor's strenuous effort to manipulate the changing circumstances, given the domain of framing sliding down from gains to losses. The two British policy preferences in the conduct of the Falklands policy from 1966 to 1968 were pragmatic in policy style with a view to promoting the interests of Britain. Both policy preferences "were ultimately disposed through the absence or presence of social validation".²⁶ They were timing responses and pragmatic options, because, ultimately, in "circumstances of confusion and pressure, instinct or tradition frequently prevails".²⁷

The two policy preferences reflected the FO's pragmatic attitude in its conduct of Falklands policy. With the benefit of hindsight, the FO's primary objective in the sovereignty talks with Argentina in 1966-68 was to absorb the negative impact as prudently as possible against the wave of decolonisation movements in the 1960s.²⁸ This attitude became increasingly manifest with the Government's standing being at stake in 1968. Despite the emphasis on economic integration, international institutions and norms on different occasions, these ideas did not have an autonomous influence on the FO. Instead, the FO seemed fully aware of "the sharp distinction between the

383.

²⁵ Rudolf Klein (1968a) "Labour's loves lost", *New Society*, 12, 313, p. 460.

²⁶ Emanuel Adler (1992) "The emergence of cooperation: National epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control", *International Organisation*, 46, 1, p. 108.

²⁷ David Reynolds (1991) *Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the twentieth century* (London & NY: Longman), p. 63.

²⁸ S. M. Smith (1981) "Traditionalism, behaviouralism and change in foreign policy analysis", in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.), *Change and the study of international relations: The evaded dimension* (London: Frances Pinter), p. 194; Philip Darby (1977) "East of Suez Reassessed", in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), p. 56.

desirable and the possible".²⁹ With several policy failures home and abroad, and, more specifically, with the Argentine retaliation against British exports due to the meat ban, some officials in the FO might pessimistically realise that a co-operative attitude towards Argentina had little to do with the realities.³⁰ In other words, decision-makers in the FO did acknowledge the importance of British prestige and better relations with Argentina. But when the designated policy exploded into a crisis, prestige and prospects of gains, in Morgenthau's words, became "at most the pleasant by-product of foreign policies".³¹ The FO as a result perceived the need to sideline these kinds of concerns, however grudgingly. This was a pragmatic response, as far as the prestige of the Government was concerned. Ultimately, according to Morgenthau, the objectives of foreign policy "are not the reputation for power but the substance of power".³² At that critical moment in December 1968, the substance of power apparently lay in the domestic realm.

A response to motivated framing, not to reference point

The second empirical finding of the thesis is that the reversal of policy preference from the interests to the wishes in late 1968 was the FO's hasty response to the motivated framing in terms of losses, but not a response to the reference point—British identity.

To begin with, the FO rarely dwelt on the notion of British identity throughout the policy debate either in Parliament or in memos. Despite the motivated framing in terms of a sell-out, formulated by the mass media, the FIEC and the backbenchers, there were few remarks made by the FO that communicated the idea of British identity. This lack of mentioning of British identity, either in the official papers or oral debates, indicated that morality was secondary in the policy calculation. The FO was pragmatic enough to guard against "overrating" this concern.³³ Having no interest in framing the issue in terms of British identity, the FO showed that there was a fundamental difference in the way of locating the reference point between those opposed to the designated policy and the FO. The motivated framing banking on British identity was not what the FO intended to uphold. Despite having been criticised in the parliamentary debate, the FO's reference points remained firmly

²⁹ Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations*, p. 7.

³⁰ F. H. Hinsley (1986) *Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 1.

³¹ Morgenthau (1966) *Politics among nations*, p. 79.

³² *Ibid.*

located in a broader spectrum straddling prospects of both gains and losses. British identity was rarely the FO's language. The second policy preference should be seen as a political expedient, adjusting to the deteriorating domain of losses. The expediency indicated that what was surrendered in late 1968 was the FO's motivated framing, not its reference points. It also explains why in the next decade after 1968, when chances allowed, the FCO would persistently advise the Cabinet that "a transfer of the islands to Argentine sovereignty was the only policy consistent with the need to protect British interests in Latin America".³⁴ This is precisely because, despite the pressure stemming from the opposition, the FCO still took better relations with Argentina and Britain's prestige in the world forum as the reference points in policy calculation. The view for the FCO was a long and pragmatic one.

The difficulty of the FO's motivated framing in competing with the one formulated by the Falkland Islands in 1968 is understandable. If "Britishness" is "a matter of one's very make-up, one's flesh and blood",³⁵ the islanders fall right within this ethnic boundary. They are linked to Britain by Britishness in that they are a self-aware group, possessing the emotional elements of a national image, and a common British way of cultural life. More specifically, they share historical memories with their ancestry that can be traced back up to six generations there as British.³⁶ The debates in December 1968 therefore represented the rise of ethnic nationalism, and this belief was grounded in "shared ancestry or genetic bond".³⁷ What made the debate even more difficult for the FO to cope with was that some MPs including John Biggs-Davison, Julian Amery, Knox Cunningham, and Cyril Osborne, took the lead opposing the FO's first policy preference. These people tended to see the issue as an occasion to find an outlet for their nationalist fervour. Eight months before, they were quoted as commenting that Enoch Powell in the Birmingham speech was not a racist, but was exposing the problematic relationship between state and society in Britain.³⁸ It is not a concern of this thesis whether they made a correct comment about Enoch

³³ Ibid., p. 233.

³⁴ J. E. Spence (1984) "British foreign policy: Tradition and change", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press and St Martin Press), p. 222.

³⁵ Jessica Jacobson (1997) "Perception of Britishness", *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 2, p. 191.

³⁶ Michael Billing (1995) *Banal nationalism* (London: Sage), p. 8; Walker Connor (1978) "A nation is a nation is a state is an ethnic group is a ...", *Ethnic and Racial Study*, 1, 4, p. 388; John Patten (1989) "The Muslim community in Britain", *The Times*, 5 July.

³⁷ Neil MacCormick (1996) "Liberalism, nationalism and the post-sovereignty state", *Political Studies*, 44, p. 563.

³⁸ Labour Research Department (1969) *Powell and his allies* (London: LRD), p. 18.

Powell. But they might correctly point out the imbalance of attention paid by the Wilson Government in respect for governance and responsiveness this time.

Looking ahead, it may not be wide of the mark to argue that the FO will continue with this pragmatic attitude in dealing with the issue of the Falkland Islands. If the domain of frame bodes well, the FCO may take initiatives to set its motivated framing in terms of gains, looking forward to settling the issue even multilaterally. If, however, motivated framing in terms of a "sell-out" emerges, the FCO may again come to defend its policy by strengthening its reference points, characterised by a broad spectrum rationally covering both gains and losses. Nevertheless, if there are dramatic events taking place and prove unfavourable to the overall domain of gain, to the extent that they create a domain of loss, the FCO will subsequently adjust the reference point back to the status quo.

The agreement reached on 14 July 1999 among the Falkland Islands, London and Buenos Aires has to be understood on this basis. In his letter to this writer, Rex Hunt, Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association, made a positive comment on the agreement on the ground that "the majority [of the islanders] had decided that, taking the package as a whole, the benefits outweighed the dangers".³⁹ Hence, when the Government talked about the "excellent" relations, booming markets in Argentina, and cooperation,⁴⁰ the FCO's motivated framing in terms of gains, just as that in 1966, has actually come back. This certainly encourages development of good neighbourly relations in the process of managing the potential risk.⁴¹ However, it is still premature to make judgements as this thesis has only a year in which to review the results of the current talks.⁴² It is premature also because the anchoring effect of the war in 1982 is still fresh; the islanders' attitude towards Argentina has not relaxed and the Blair Government seems more willing to leave the issue of sovereignty to the islanders.

The problem is that when London leaves the issue of sovereignty to the islanders in the name of their wishes, the issue is sometimes easily transformed into an emotive one. On the other hand, although the Blair Government is apparently attempting to build an economic relationship between the two sides, an issue "relating to political

³⁹ Letter from Sir Rex Hunt to this writer, 22 July 1999.

⁴⁰ *Falkland islands News Network*, 7 March 2000.

⁴¹ *Falkland islands News Network*, 28 January 2000.

⁴² *Falkland islands News Network*, 17 October 1999.

identity and legitimacy cannot be resolved by economic means alone".⁴³ Prospect theory prompts this thesis to ask: what if the risks outweigh the benefits, when the Government's domain of frame turns sour? It is reasonable for this thesis to expect that when the motivated framing in terms of losses comes back; i.e., when the domain of loss occurs, Britishness as the reference point will, again, become powerful enough to tip the whole balance of the Government's scheme in pursuit of a permanent solution.

Assessment of the three policy proposals

The last point anticipates the whole argument of this section. Seen from prospect theory, the surface attraction of the three policy proposals, which have been discussed in Chapter 1, including the ideas of leaseback, shared sovereignty and integration into the Antarctic Treaty System, conceal conspicuous difficulties, if the passage of time is not long enough.

The idea of leaseback

In any leaseback arrangement following the Hong Kong model, the discussion is always hindered by the motivated framing in terms of "keeping the British way of life" under the pledge of the wishes of the islanders. From the perspective of argumentation based on British nationality, indeed, it is exceedingly hard to draw a parallel from the case of Hong Kong. There is no local lifestyle that can represent a "people" in Hong Kong. According to Baker and Lau, people living in Hong Kong have little feeling of local community.⁴⁴ By contrast, the Falkland Islanders have a strong sense of community and they rarely think that they are a "transient population".⁴⁵ It is said that geographical remoteness has little diminished their sense of British identity. As Biggs-Davison emphatically noted, the islanders were "more British than the population of London".⁴⁶ Therefore, when Beck harped on the idea of leaseback with the excuse of its being "less painful" to Britain than to Argentina, his prescription is filled with difficulties. Beck has to be reminded that the suggestion of the Hong Kong model will

⁴³ Muthiah Alagappa (1995) "Regionalism and conflict management: A framework for analysis", *Review of International Studies*, 21, p. 382.

⁴⁴ Hugh D. R. Baker (1995) "Hong Kong: A view from both sides", *Asian Affairs*, 24, 1, p. 12; Siu-kai Lau (1992) "Colonial rule, transfer of sovereignty and the problem of political leaders in Hong Kong", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 30, 2, p. 226.

⁴⁵ David Thomas (1991) "The view from Whitehall", in Waynes S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 19.

⁴⁶ Michael Charlton (1989) *The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 80; Colin Phipps (1977) *What future for the Falklands* (London: Fabian Tract), p. 6.

mean no more than surrender to the Argentine appetite for sovereignty in the eyes of Falklands lobbyists. Beck may be correct in extracting the specific lesson from 1966, when the sovereignty discussions began in a "cordial" atmosphere. However, he definitely commits a fallacy in applying the lesson without regard to the impasse in late 1968. So far as this thesis can determine, on the other hand, the power of the motivated framing in terms of loss together with the domain of loss cannot be lightly dismissed. Beck's prescription has apparently run ahead of the empirical tests. What concerns this thesis even more is that an adequate standard by which the international community can judge the justice of distribution of interests with "less pains" in this case has not been readily at hand.⁴⁷ The interpretation of "being less painful" will be made at great cost to the concern of justice either from the perspective of "consensus" or from that of the "reasonable comprehensive view".⁴⁸

Integration into the Antarctic Treaty System

Another suggestion is that Britain ought to resume the Antarctic Treaty as the reference point.⁴⁹ It is admitted that the Antarctic Treaty is an appreciable multi-lateral approach to the arbitration of different claims to sovereignty in this area. It may furthermore restrain risk-seeking behaviour on both sides. However, the fundamental point is that Argentina has consistently expressed its suspicion about introducing other factors into the framework of the Treaty. Malaysia, for instance, sought to enter the concept of "community heritage of mankind" into the Antarctic structure.⁵⁰ This viewpoint met strong opposition from Argentina. Roberto Guyer, the Argentine Ambassador to Germany, argued that "Any attempt to internationalise the region would not only mean the end of the Treaty—i.e. the end of an understanding among the countries directly concerned—but also the beginning of a critical period of confrontation".⁵¹ Indeed, the Antarctic Treaty by nature is more law-declaring than law binding. It is declarative in the sense that the Treaty represents what "was already

⁴⁷ Raymond Plant (1984) *Equality, markets and the state* (London: Fabian Society), p. 2.

⁴⁸ John Rawls (1972) *A theory of justice* (Oxford: Clarendon), p. 581; Brian Barry (1995) "John Rawls and the search for stability", *Ethics*, 105, 4, p. 901, p. 914.

⁴⁹ Jack Child (1988) *Antarctic and South American geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* (NY: Praeger), pp. 88-9.

⁵⁰ R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G. Haward (1990) "Antarctica's future symbols and reality", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctic's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 12.

⁵¹ Roberto E. Guyer (1983) "Antarctic's role in international relations", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 275.

agreed to as a matter of custom".⁵² In other words, the current achievements of the Treaty cannot be taken for granted. It needs caution to maintain the delicate status quo. Accordingly, adding an issue of sovereignty into this framework may rekindle the dormant sovereignty dispute at any moment.⁵³ The general rule must be to keep the long-running friction over the Falkland Islands from infecting the situation in Antarctica.

Besides, it is also hard to see what political advantages will accrue to Britain from placing the Falklands factor into the framework of the Antarctic Treaty, given the character of the Treaty that every participant state has strenuously sought to protect. This thesis, accordingly, sees no practical reason for Britain in the near future to choose this option. It seems sensible for Britain not to rock the boat to add the destabilising element—the Falklands dispute—into the status quo in Antarctica.

Shared sovereignty

Perhaps the notion of shared sovereignty is a worthwhile alternative. To start with, the notion of shared sovereignty recasts the relevance of the concept of community, which is a distinctive idea that New Labour intends to "shake up the party's thinking" before the 1997 election,⁵⁴ and to build an interdependent relationship between "self-interests and altruism" as its philosophical basis.⁵⁵ Regional community has been held by New Labour as an "over-reaching concept of the public interest" invoked in support of the "merits of a competitive market economy" that the old socialists find scarcely compatible.⁵⁶ As an attack on the framing around identity, Blair's words come readily to mind. "We do not lose our identity in our relations with others", as quoted by Rentoul. Blair went on and asserted that "we achieve our identity by those relations".⁵⁷ Although this remark does not necessarily indicate a decline of nationalistic attitude, which still constitutes a basic

⁵² William Thomas Jr. Mallison (1974) "Legal implications: International Law", in Schatz, Gerald S. (ed.), *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), p. 41.

⁵³ Bruce Davis (1990) "Science and politics in Antarctic and southern oceans policy: A critical assessment", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctic's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), p. 41.

⁵⁴ Peter Mandelson and Roger Liddle (1996) *The Blair revolution: Can New Labour deliver?* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber), p. 19.

⁵⁵ Steven Fielding (1995) *Labour: Decline and renewal* (London: Baseline), p. 102.

⁵⁶ Tudor Jones (1996) *Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair* (London & NY: Routledge), p. 136.

⁵⁷ John Rentoul (1995) *Tony Blair* (London: Warner), p. 43.

characteristic of western culture,⁵⁸ it certainly reflects recognition of the current European elite that, to compete economically world-wide, Britain has to put aside political nationalism, and stress the functions of regional frameworks.⁵⁹

Nevertheless, the notion of community is, at most, a signpost for the path to a solution of the issue, it is not promising.⁶⁰ The practical situation between the Falklands and Argentina is far more complex. To uphold the idea of community gives no indication that competition and conflict owing to different values will be consequently undermined.⁶¹ Judging from the argument that the basis of political community is to define the appropriate boundary between belonging and not belonging,⁶² one will find that the talks of a community in the full sense of the term may be premature in this case.

Practically, in respect of "a community-based political subjectivity",⁶³ Argentina has done less than enough. The Argentine Government seems to perceive a double standard towards the calls for environmental protection, which is a primary concern of the Falkland Islands.⁶⁴ According to Greenpeace, an organisation which campaigns for environmental protection, Argentina at the time of writing is about to sign a decree to allow Taiwanese and South Korean fishing boats to come back again, operating in the neighbouring seas. As these vessels have no inspectors on board, the Argentine decision will be a direct threat to the economic incomes of the Islanders, who have been extremely concerned about the poaching in and around the Falklands' waters.⁶⁵ Hence, despite British unilateral efforts to "loosen the insecurity trap" in the islanders' sceptical mind by stressing the better relationship,⁶⁶ what is still lacking between the

⁵⁸ Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry (1999) "The nature and sources of liberal international order", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, p. 194; Mattei Dogan (1994) "The decline of nationalisms within Western Europe", *Comparative Politics*, 26, 3, p. 281.

⁵⁹ Peter Cocks (1980) "Towards a Marxist theory of European integration", *International Organisation*, 34, 1, p. 39.

⁶⁰ Robert J. Lieber (1972) *Theory and world politics* (Massachusetts: Winthrop), pp. 58-9.

⁶¹ Eileen Younghusband (1968) (ed.) *Community work and social change: The report of a study group on training set up by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation* (London: Longman), pp. 77-8.

⁶² Daniel Warner (1996) "Levinas, Buber and the concept of otherness in international relations: A reply to David Campbell", *Millennium*, 25, 1, p. 112.

⁶³ Paul Rabinow (1994) "Representations are social facts: Modernity and post-modernity in anthropology", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography* (Los Angeles, Berkeley & London: University of California Press), p. 257.

⁶⁴ Caroline Thomas (1992) *The environment in international relations* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs), pp. 12-3.

⁶⁵ BBC World Service (1999) *Calling the Falklands*, 29 September, manuscript by D. Palmer.

⁶⁶ Hansard (Commons) col. 1094, 22 July 1998; David Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations: From Thucydides to the present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 405; Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth (1987) "Beyond the security dilemma: Technology, strategy and

Falkland Islands and the Argentine continent is a shared normative stance across the two sides. Argentina seems insensitive to the "thick morality" of a particularistic society that is highly vulnerable to the external world.⁶⁷ It seems not fully aware that, although "environmental degradation has no particular national character",⁶⁸ the Falkland Islands on fisheries is an exception. If the islanders' economic means is under threat, it can be detrimental to the notion of a community becoming reality.

Historically, as Calhoun studied the dynamic of the British society and noted, there is a "danger in taking at face value the apocalyptic assertion of contemporaries about change in their 'communities'",⁶⁹ because, explained Deudney, "Britain's political values have to be read into the historical experience".⁷⁰ Seen in this light, historical sentiments are what communitarians pay homage to.⁷¹ But they may be more of an obstacle to developing a broader regional involvement with Argentina than a solution.⁷² The oft-repeated wishes of the islanders to retain their link to the British way of life will represent nothing but a view hardly compatible with the regional blueprint, seeking to combine the two sides. In this regard, the development of the Falkland Islands illustrates what Little concerns. Namely, the British governments seem to suffer from a policy dilemma between integration into an interdependent international community through regional development on the one hand, and keeping sovereignty on the other hand.⁷³

Theoretically, the moral claims of community also espouse the norm of non-intervention embedded in relativism,⁷⁴ or in parallel with the principle of self-

international security", in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), *The uncertain course* (NY: Oxford University Press), p. 321.

⁶⁷ Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations*, p. 405.

⁶⁸ Daniel Deudney (1990) "A case against linking environmental degradation and national security", *Millennium*, 19, 3, p. 465.

⁶⁹ Craig Calhoun (1982) *The question of class struggle: Social foundations of popular radicalism during the industrial revolution* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 184-5.

⁷⁰ Peter Madgwick (1994) *A new introduction to British politics* (London: Stanley Thornes), p. 21.

⁷¹ John R. Wallach (1987) "Liberals, communitarians, and the tasks of political theory", *Political Theory*, 15, 4, p. 592.

⁷² Barbara McGuinness (1995) "Communitarian politics, justice and diversity", in Joni Lovenduski and Jeffrey Stranier (eds.), *Contemporary political studies, I* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom), p. 71.

⁷³ Richard Little (1988a) "The study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), p. 256.

⁷⁴ Mark Hoffman (1994) "Normative international theory: Approaches and issues", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), p. 33.

determination.⁷⁵ It is therefore an illusion for an observer to expect that the concept of community held by the Labour Government will deny the presence of "a particular quality and dimension of social experience" in the Falklands society.⁷⁶ Ultimately, the reinterpretation of socialism by advocating community is also relevant to the issue of identity, seen from the communitarian appeal.⁷⁷ Thus prompted, there is a tension between the idea of shared sovereignty and New Labour's communitarian appeal. Because Communitarians emphasise "an identity that embodies historical continuity", this emphasis can be "more enthusiastic nationalists" in nature.⁷⁸ Hence, while invoking the notion of community, the entailed strategy of the British Government is still uncertain. Blair, with this strategy, rhetoric or not, may leave ample room for this thesis to doubt the practical meaning of community in this issue. It seems that this strategy open more space for this Government to manoeuvre, when Blair stated that the basic value of community should be applied differently to the modern world.⁷⁹

Hence, the notion of shared sovereignty based on connotations of the term "community" is tantalising, but tenuous. The perspective from prospect theory will continue to be relevant in this regard. To be precise, if the political climate is unfavourable, and if the Falkland Islands resuscitates motivated framing in terms of losses, it is highly likely that the FCO will be forced to reconsider taking the wishes of the islanders as the negotiating principle again. It will be expedient to let moral concerns underpin the issue, and subdue the current framing either in terms of regional community or in terms of economic gains.

No easy alternative

Taken together, no easy alternative suggests itself. This thesis understands that the current diplomatic breakthroughs claimed by ex-President Menem and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook are still not at the final stage of the game. British initiatives towards Argentina can at best be described as "fence mending" for the past 18 years since the war.⁸⁰ But from the perspective of prospect theory that observes the

⁷⁵ R. John Vincent (1986) *Human rights and international relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 115.

⁷⁶ Raymond Plant (1974) *Community and ideology: An essay in applied social philosophy* (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul), p. 85.

⁷⁷ Ken Booth (1991) "Security in anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice", *International Affairs*, 67, 3, p. 531.

⁷⁸ Michael Freeman (1999) "The right to self-determination in international politics: Six theories in search of a policy", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 3, p. 364.

⁷⁹ *The Times*, 26 April 1997.

⁸⁰ Victor Bulmer-Thomas (1989) "Britain and Latin America: Closer in the 1990s?", *The World Today*,

competing sets of motivated framing against the rise of and fall of the domain of frame, there are reasons for pessimism. The Falklands lobbyists may be "marginal to the policy process",⁸¹ but they know that their chances of seizing the spotlight remain. This is not only because backbenchers express their view more freely in moral issues,⁸² or because the nature of this issue can be one "cross party",⁸³ but also because, when the domain of loss sets in, the reference point anchoring around British identity may constitute a powerful motivated framing that will nip the FCO's schemes to resolve the issue in the bud.

The implications are complex for the longer term. Britain's attitude to its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands in the immediate future will be contingent upon, first, whether the dramatic effect of the war remained deeply rooted among the islanders. With reference to the domain of frame, historical memory of the war remains a critical reference point to arouse emotion. By this token, time will play an important role. The more time passes the weaker the anchoring effect of the war. On the other hand, the reference point around Britishness cannot be taken for granted. National identity comes and goes without a constant momentum.⁸⁴ A survey, conducted by the Economist and published in November 1999, shows that only two per cent of Britons think of their British identity first.⁸⁵ It is therefore likely that "British nationalism may already have reached its apogee",⁸⁶ and that the British public have become less and less concerned about "the more general issue of UK nationalism".⁸⁷ In other words, when the reference point of Britishness recedes and war memories fade, the proposal of shared sovereignty and Beck's Hong Kong model may have a better chance of being brought forward by the FO for policy debates.

Second, the future trend will also depend upon whether Argentina takes "a similar normative stance" in its dealings with economic and environmental affairs in

45, 11, p. 198.

⁸¹ Walter Little (1992) "Political opinion in Britain", in Waynes S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), p. 68.

⁸² Austin Mitchell (1994) "Back-bench influence: A personal view", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 4, p. 699.

⁸³ Philip Cowley (1998) "Conclusion", in Philip Cowley (ed.), *Conscience and parliament* (London: Frank Cass), p. 187.

⁸⁴ David Boucher (1998) *Political theories of international relations*, p. 379.

⁸⁵ *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 November 1999.

⁸⁶ Anthony Heath, Bridget Taylor, Lindsay Brook and Alison Park (1999) "British national sentiment", *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1, p. 173.

⁸⁷ Douglas E. Schoen (1977) *Enoch Powell and the Powellites* (London: Macmillan), p. 278.

the Falklands' waters.⁸⁸ In this respect, Argentina may have made good use of opportunities in the past two decades, but they are apparently less sensitive to the fact that annual incomes from licences are the mainstays of the Falkland Islands, and this is what the islanders are currently most concerned about.

To sum up, the development of the issue of the Falkland Islands can be seen as an interaction where the FO's motivated framing in terms of gains, the Falkland Islands' motivated framing in terms of losses, and the general domain of frame shadowing the issue, and competing with one another. The interaction is also fundamentally influenced by the time/space biases of the British public towards the issue alongside the history.⁸⁹ Above all, the interaction serves as a barometer of the future development of this issue, to the extent that even the durability of current multilateral arrangements in the South Atlantic can be the function of this interaction.⁹⁰

For the FCO as a result, the issue currently remains firmly lodged in a kind of political limbo. It has never been quite removed from the Cabinet's agenda, but never been able to gain sufficient political sympathy to make significant progress. What have been left are, as discussed in Chapter 1, the Argentine unceasing nationalist appeal, Britain's intransigence on sovereignty, controversy over the principle of self-determination and an enduring security concern!

2. A theory restatement bearing on foreign policy making

As a territory dispute symbolises a new frontier for prospect theory, this thesis asserts that the explanatory power of prospect theory is reinforced by this case study. Also, through the test of the four hypotheses, despite some points remaining ambiguous, prospect theory in this case has proved capable of shedding its unfavourable criticism of being "micro-foundational" suited only to the laboratory.⁹¹ Levy's point that prospect theory is "unlikely to be replicated in the complex empirical

⁸⁸ Chris Brown (1995) "International theory and international society: The viability of the middle way", *Review of International Studies*, 21, 3, p. 196.

⁸⁹ Ronald J. Deibert (1999) "Harold Innis and the empire of speed", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, p. 286.

⁹⁰ John Gerard Ruggie (1992) "Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution", *International Organisation*, 46, 3, p. 568, p. 595.

⁹¹ Roderick M. Kramer (1989) "Windows of vulnerability or cognitive illusions? Cognitive processes and the nuclear arms race", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1, p. 97; Jack Levy (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for international conflict", *International political Science Review*, 17, 2, p. 184, p. 192.

world of international relations" may no longer be valid.⁹² On the other hand, when rational choice models fail to provide explanation consistently within their own premises in Chapter 2, prospect theory with its explanations in Chapter 4 meets the requirement that it must be "evaluated in the light of its competitors".⁹³ However, as Waltz admits in an interview, a theory "cannot be about everything".⁹⁴ This thesis realises that the broader the scope a theory covers, the less accurate will be its explanation.⁹⁵ In an attempt to provide stimulus to further theory development, this thesis concludes in this section with a restatement of prospect theory.

Broader than rational choice models

Prospect theory can be seen as a broader but contingent framework than rational choice models. Based on the premise of representativeness within the domain of frame, prospect theory can explain preference formation, wherein rational choice models such as neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism are silent.⁹⁶ Secondly, with the assistance of decision weight—a subjective force, and dramatic events—an objective impact, prospect theory is also capable of explaining preference reversals that the latter finds hard to account for.⁹⁷ Thirdly and more importantly, as the case study indicated, framing in a territorial dispute was not "static" as Stein claimed.⁹⁸ Framing can be formulated in terms of losses, as most IR researchers bank on their hypotheses. It can also be formulated in terms of gains, when a decision-maker is highly motivated, locating the reference point above the status quo and seeking a better trade-off.

In the light of the finding that framing can also be formulated in terms of gains, Levy is correct to argue that motivated framing can be thought of as a weak form of rational choice model.⁹⁹ This is because prospect theory does not accept highly

⁹² Jack Levy (1997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, 1, p. 98.

⁹³ Barbara Farhan (1992) "Introduction", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, p. 168.

⁹⁴ Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg (1998) "Interview with Ken Waltz", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 379.

⁹⁵ Robert Keohane (1986b) "Theory of world politics: Structural realism and beyond", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its critics* (NY: Columbia University Press), p. 187.

⁹⁶ William Roberts Clark (1998) "Agents and structures: Two views of preferences, two views of institutions", *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, 2, p. 252.

⁹⁷ Keith Dowding and Desmond King (1995) "Introduction", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 2.

⁹⁸ Janice Gross Stein (1993) "International cooperation and loss avoidance: Framing the problem", in Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University), p. 12.

⁹⁹ Levy (1997a), "Prospect theory, rational choice", p. 93.

idealised conceptions of rationality that take political decisions solely as a moment of one's seeking for gains, or purely independent of the structure.¹⁰⁰ Rather, it takes a weaker form of rationality that assumes a choice preference as the result of interaction of structures and decision-making agents.¹⁰¹

To start with, with the notion of the domain of frame and motivated framing, prospect theory holds a compromise assumption of rationality. It expects to see choice as a response to environmental stimuli due to the interaction of two forces between the domain of frame and different sets of motivated framing.¹⁰² This is because prospect theory sees political decisions in foreign affairs as a lively ongoing process. Alongside this decision-making process, a policy preference can be influenced by different variables including personal motivation and negative impacts from the structural change. However, prospect theory admits that the cognitive capacity of human beings is limited. A decision-maker may "act for reasons", despite a lack of "practical reasoning".¹⁰³ To do this, the decision-maker seeking to acquire more about the background information has to draw inference.¹⁰⁴ He or she has to be assisted by a "situation-perception" map.¹⁰⁵ However, this map can never be complete so far as information gathering is concerned. The incomplete map will render decision-makers' rationality only a weak one. Viewed in this light, rationality in prospect theory seems more compatible with the idea of a "bounded", "procedural" or minimal" form of rationality. It has departed from the core assumption of rational choice models.

Because of its weaker form of rationality, this thesis argues that prospect theory offers a more powerful model than rational choice models. To begin with, there are

¹⁰⁰ Christopher Cherniak (1986) *Minimal rationality* (London: MIT), pp. 9-11, p. 16; Rose McDermott (1998) *Risk-taking in international politics: Prospect theory in American foreign policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), p. 3. Herbert A. Simon (1986) "Rationality in psychology and economics", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, p. s210.

¹⁰¹ Dudley Shapere (1985) "Observation and the scientific enterprise", in Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (eds.), *Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science* (Cambridge: The MIT), p. 30.

¹⁰² Jak Jabes (1978) *Individual process in organisational behaviour* (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM), p. 5.

¹⁰³ Robert Audi (1997) "Acting for reasons", in Alfred R. Mele (ed.), *The philosophy of action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 104.

¹⁰⁴ Robert Axelrod (1976c) "The analysis of cognitive maps", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), p. 57.

¹⁰⁵ David Chalmers (1995) "High-level perception, presentation, and analogue: A critique of artificial-intelligence methodology", in Douglas Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (eds.), *Fluid concepts & creative analogies: Computer models of the fundamental mechanisms of thought* (NY: BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.), p. 181.

descriptive failures from the perspective of rational-choice models.¹⁰⁶ Prospect theory, with its assumption of weak rationality, tacitly admits that a primary factor "affecting policy at time-1 is policy at time-0".¹⁰⁷ In other words, it sees a preferred choice as a result of interaction between cognitive response to the structure and decision-makers' initiatives.¹⁰⁸ Arguing in this way, the structural impact cannot be dismissed in observation. Structural impact, instead, becomes the starting point of observation.

On the other hand, however, decision-making in prospect theory is by no means dictated to by structural impact. Policy preferences in the form of choices are an interactive result of one's preferences and one's surroundings (the domain of frame) where an individual's motivated framing is nurtured.¹⁰⁹ More dynamically, this interaction is reinforced by dramatic events taking place occasionally that draw decision weight closer to an "appropriate" reference point as time passes by. Prospect theory therefore offers the reader a more powerful decision-making model than a rational choice. It is capable of offering an explanation for preference formation and preference reversal from a perspective, which consists of structural impacts and subjective evaluation.¹¹⁰

Broader than cognitive psychology

A weaker form of rationality also takes prospect theory one step further forward than cognitive psychology in the literature of decision-making. To begin with, the explanatory weakness in cognitive psychology lies in the tendency to explore little about the subjective value-system. It instead presents the behaviour of decision-

¹⁰⁶ David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott (1979) "Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon", *The American Economic Review*, 69, 4, p. 634; Michael Nicholson (1995) "Rational decision in international crises: A rationalisation", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 163.

¹⁰⁷ Peter A. Hall (1993) "Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain", *Comparative Politics*, 25, p. 277.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Bennett and Michael Nicholson (1994) "Formal methods of analysis in IR", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), p. 208; Hilel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth (1986) "Decision making under ambiguity", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, p. s225; Mark Wickham-Jones (1995) "Rationality, revolution, and reassurance", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational Choice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), pp. 249-50; Herbert A. Simon (1976) "From substantive to procedural rationality", in Spiro J. Latsis (ed.), *Method and appraisal in economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 130-1; Simon (1985) "Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science", *American Political Science Review*, 79, pp. 293-305.

¹⁰⁹ F. H. Bradley (1922) *Principle of logic, vol. 1* (London: Oxford University Press), p. 98.

¹¹⁰ Joseph Frankel (1970) *National interest* (London: Macmillan), p. 24.

making in too general a term of representativeness.¹¹¹ However, as discussed in Chapter 3, that cognitive psychology explains decision-making solely by representativeness is still debatable. Take communication theory for instance, it emphasises metaphors and visual images, but makes no differentiation of the decision-makers concerned.¹¹² This is problematic. It can hardly escape the criticism of *bifurcationism* simplistically assuming that the human "experience reaches out no further than contact with perceptible types".¹¹³

Prospect theory in this regard clearly has a broader and more contingent perspective than the notion of representativeness. Although a domain of frame in prospect theory is taken as the primitive force,¹¹⁴ it does not reduce a decision to the effect of representativeness or deny the subjective value of strategic thinking.¹¹⁵ Instead, the reference points, accentuated by decision weight and dramatic events, help an analyst to see how "different decision-makers (or the same decision makers at different times) may be rational in different ways".¹¹⁶ This is a plausible situation in foreign policy making as well as international politics. With different sets of motivated framing and different reference points whereupon decision weight lies, the argument based on cognitive psychology can be marginalised because of different sets of rationality.¹¹⁷

However, emphasising subjective values in prospect theory does not mean that subjective values will dominate policy outcomes. Although each subjective value-system influences the general framing of a problem, it has to be made clear that there may simultaneously exist several sets of motivated framing competing with one another in pursuit of a dominant status. Therefore the decision-makers' efforts to formulate their motivated framing do not guarantee that a new domain of frame of the same issue will emerge at one's will. It may also be possible that other sets of

¹¹¹ J. R. Anderson, J. R. (1983) *The architecture of cognition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press), pp. 46-7, p. 126; John B. Best (1995) *Cognitive psychology*, 4th edition (Minneapolis: West Publishing), pp. 11-2.

¹¹² Robert M. Entman (1991) "Framing U.S. coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran air incidents", *Journal of Communication*, 41, 4, p. 7.

¹¹³ Michael Luntley (1999) *Contemporary philosophy of thought: Truth, world, content* (Oxford: Blackwell), p. 300.

¹¹⁴ Nicholas Rescher (1964) *Hypothetical reasoning* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 7.

¹¹⁵ George W. Downs (1989) "The rational deterrence debate", *World Politics*, 41, 2, p. 237.

Pascal Engel (1989) *The norm of truth: An introduction to the philosophy of logic* (London: Harvest & Wheatsheaf), p. 294.

¹¹⁶ Eric Herring (1995) *Danger and opportunity: Explaining international crisis outcomes* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press), p. 64.

¹¹⁷ Stephen D. Krasner (1995/96) "Compromising Westphalia", *International Security*, 20, 3, p. 148.

motivated framing, despite having been rejected by the central decision-makers, do not disappear but continuously challenge the dominant motivated framing.¹¹⁸ The preference of Governor Haskard and his effort to formulate the motivated framing in terms of loss by the end of 1968 can be understood in this light. Under these circumstances, cognitive psychology based on sole concept of representativeness will be weak in explaining preference reversals as it "does not embody a revision phase" in its theoretical domain.¹¹⁹ Motivated framing as another explanatory variable in this thesis will be helpful in this regard. To be precise, subjective value in motivated framing can be seen as a filter, through which a decision maker will strategically determine what kind of information about the external world is selected for better argumentation, with reference to the positive or negative domain of frame.¹²⁰ Additionally, with selection of better arguments, there is at least a case to be made that motivated framing can be part of strategic thinking. It is capable of regenerating a new domain of frame through the medium of reasons when arguments are exchanged.

To summarise, prospect theory represents a meeting place of weaker rationality and representativeness. It can be seen as the perspective driving a wedge between rational-choice models and cognitive psychology. With the assumptions of bounded rationality and cognitive power, it avoids being criticised for explaining the behaviour as the partial understanding the whole. It also avoids the inconclusive debates between rationality and behaviourism.¹²¹ Its methodological design exemplifies an explanatory framework that an observer needs so as not to see the influence of structure and agents as "mutually exclusive".¹²² This design echoes Stein's call for integrating "cognitive and affective dimensions of judgement" in foreign policy analysis.¹²³ Meanwhile, the notions of dramatic events and decision weight also form a bridgehead to meet the question of interaction between the structural impacts and

¹¹⁸ Julius Kuhl (1986) "Human motivation: From decision making to action control", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), p. 11.

¹¹⁹ G. Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro (1986) "Mapping structures of thought", in Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds.), *Different text analysis procedures for the study of decision making* (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research Foundation), p. 46.

¹²⁰ Richard Little (1988) "Belief system in the social science", in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), *Belief systems and international relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), p. 47.

¹²¹ Richard Zeckhauser (1986) "Comments: Behavioural versus rational economics: What you see is what you conquer", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, ss435-6.

¹²² Herbert A. Simon (1966) "Political research: The decision-making framework", in David Easton (ed.), *Varieties of political theory* (NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), p. 15.

¹²³ Janice Gross Stein (1988) "Building politics into psychology: The misperception of threat", *Political Psychology*, 9, 2, p. 265.

agents' deliberation. With this broader and contingent framework, this thesis concludes that prospect theory is better positioned to explain decision-making than cognitive psychology and rational choice theories.

A critique of loss avoidance

This thesis finds that treatment of loss avoidance as an independent variable bearing on the causal mechanism of prospect theory is a mistake. To begin with, losses in prospect theory refer to properties that are measured against the reference point. But this notion is too vague to grasp what a decision-maker exactly intends to communicate or argue for. To put it another way, losses are a difference between the status quo and an expected result. However, when a decision-maker talks about an expected result of loss, the term can be understood as properties locating above the status quo, or found staying below it. In other words, there are in fact two kinds of loss that a decision-maker may intend to avoid. If a decision-maker sets a reference point at the level of aspiration, and calls for action because of loss avoidance, the decision-makers, according to prospect theory, can be expected to have a risk-averse inclination. The first British policy preference in late 1966 was a case in point.

There are occasions when decision-makers are engaged in the effort of maintaining the status quo. Under this condition, properties of loss concern refer to those below the level of status quo. A decision-maker under this circumstance, when calling for action in the name of loss avoidance is making an attempt to keep the status quo and protect the expected loss. For a decision-maker bargaining in this situation, according to prospect theory, we can expect a risk-acceptant preference to emerge in the ensuing policy behaviour. The second British policy preference that hurriedly came to the fore in December 1968 was a case in point.

That said, loss avoidance is irrelevant to the risk propensity of a decision-making unit in terms of mechanism, because concern about loss may bring about either desperation to keep the status quo or a pre-emptive act to pursue an expected gain. This is because, following prospect theory, we can identify two kinds of loss avoidance as psychological forces at work. It may refer to loss of the status quo or loss of an expected utility above the status quo. Without realising that there are two different natures of losses, i.e. two different perceptions of loss avoidance, analysts, when taking loss avoidance as an independent variable, may put the reader on slippery ground when they attempt to explore the causal relationship bearing on prospect

theory. Hence, there is no causal mechanism from the perspective of loss avoidance. Sparta's response to Athens' rising power, for instance, was a case owing to loss avoidance,¹²⁴ leading to Sparta's preference for war—a pre-emptive act.¹²⁵ But loss avoidance also can lead to cooperation with other states, such as Japan's decision to co-develop FSX fighters with US—a desperate choice that Japan only made unwillingly.¹²⁶

Indeed, the explanatory power of loss avoidance is weak. As Herring argues, “decision-makers may be motivated by potential loss or potential gain, and how they act may also be influenced by the extent of opportunity available to avert losses or make gains”.¹²⁷ Because of the existing motivated bias, a “decision-maker”, as Herring explained, might be “powerfully motivated by desire for gain”.¹²⁸ Dyer and Sarin concur, arguing that it would be more descriptive to call a decision-maker a “relatively risk neutral individual” with the indication that “preference for risky alternatives are neutral to the introduction of risk”.¹²⁹ Seen in this light, even the status quo bias is questionable. The motivated framing in terms of gains does not necessarily give ground to that in terms of losses.

The idea of loss avoidance can be problematic with the task of explaining policy preferences. Caution is needed when taking it as an explanatory variable in observation. It would, instead, be better to take loss avoidance as a dependent variable. Another point is that, in a wider context, loss avoidance is a constant variable in human behaviour, relative to expected utilities. As loss avoidance also has been so appealing in rational choice theories,¹³⁰ this thesis does not think that the notion of loss avoidance is a claim specific to prospect theory.

Tension between a reference point and framing

¹²⁴ Laurie M. Johnson Bagby (1994) “The Use and abuse of Thucydides in international relations”, *International Organisation*, 48, 1, p. 136.

¹²⁵ Richard Ned Lebow (1996) “Play it again Pericles: Agents, structures and the Peloponnesian war”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, 2, p. 232, p. 246.

Spar, Debora (1993) “Co-developing the FSX fighter: The domestic calculus of international cooperation”, in Janice G. S. and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press), pp. 65-92.

¹²⁷ Herring (1995) *Danger and opportunity*, p. 50.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 69.

¹²⁹ James S. Dyer and Pakesh K. Sarin (1982) “Relative risk aversion”, *Management Science*, 28, 8, p. 875.

¹³⁰ David E. Bell and Howard Raiffa (1988) “Marginal value and intrinsic risk aversion”, in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 395.

This thesis also finds the tension exists between the reference point and motivated framing in prospect theory. This tension will make the comment that "prospect theory is a reference-dependence theory" problematic.

To begin with, it is debatable that British identity, as one reference point, was a decisive factor forcing the negotiating principle from the interests back to the wishes in late 1968. In this light, the whole argument will return to Femenia's notion of identity in the British-Argentine dispute.¹³¹ This is unacceptable. The decisive cause in December 1968 was the result of two major sets of motivated framing fiercely competing with each other. To put it more succinctly, it was not the concern for British identity, but the combination of the whole framing in terms of losses that forced the FO's motivated framing to fall apart.

As Maoz argued, there are many manipulations anchoring on different reference points that compete with one another. However, manipulations do not necessarily bring about the expected motivated framing on the grounds that the effects of the manipulations are constrained by the domain of frame.¹³² A better understanding as a result should be: with the dynamic of the dramatic events working against the domain of loss, the Falkland Islands' version of motivated framing gradually became powerful, to the extent that it was powerful enough to influence the policy shift in late 1968. British identity in defeating the FO's motivated framing was the straw that broke the camel's back.

Hence, Britishness was only one reference point among many in the overall framing of the issue. It cannot be seen as consistently decisive throughout the Falklands history. Before the war of 1982 indeed, Britishness had rarely entered into the FO's measurement, and apparently December 1968 was one exception when Britishness became a dominant reference point. However, even in the midst of the bitter rows in Parliament, the FO did not mention the importance of Britishness. Thus prompted, Britishness came as a dominant reference point and turned down the FO's motivated framing, indeed. But it only indicated that the FO backed down from its two-pronged motivated framing. It by no means proved that British identity became the FO's major reference point in the foreseeable future to come. Therefore, despite the causal mechanism of prospect theory being declared valid, i.e., the motivated

¹³¹ Nova A. Femenia (1996) *National identity in times of crises: The scripts of the Falklands/Malvinas war* (NY: Nova Science Publishers).

framing and the domain of loss both in terms of losses brought about risk-acceptant behaviour in December 1968, caution is needed. The empirical finding does not indicate that the FO had its reference point anchored in British identity. As Stewart later remarked, "The Cabinet took the plain British man in the street's view about the Falkland Islanders—more plainly and definitely than I did, because they, unlike me, had not been sort of 'soaked' in the Foreign Office atmosphere".¹³³ No word could be more straightforward than the "atmosphere" referred to by Stewart. The word indicated that the FO, unlike other departments in the Government, was well aware of the discontent on the Argentine side. It was therefore reluctant to replace the interests of the islanders by their wishes as the negotiating principle. The FO's reference points remained stubbornly the same, although the dominant motivated framing was about Britishness. Its unchanged reference points, i.e. better relations with Argentina, British prestige, and even potential markets reflected that the FCO in the following decade still thought that its motivated framing formulated in 1966-68 was of value. It also explained why there was at the FCO an unceasing effort in initiating proposals to solve the dispute. Meanwhile it implies that theoretically, discussants of prospect theory have to be cautious that motivated framing can be one thing, the reference point, another. It is highly likely that it is the content of argument, instead of the linguistic reference, that is the source of power for action.¹³⁴ Exponents of prospect theory have to dispel the myth that the theory is reference-dependent. There exists tension between the reference point assumed by a decision-making body and the motivated framing of an issue.

The restatement of prospect theory

The restatement of prospect theory developed above can be justified as follows.

First, the traditional focus of loss avoidance in application of prospect theory does not advance the theory itself very far. Rather, an analysis based on the notion of loss avoidance or the status quo bias will run the risk of being trapped into rational choice models that are concerned more with relative loss trade-offs. This is, however, not what proponents of prospect theory, including Tversky and Kahneman, intend to argue.

Secondly, the FO in mid-1967 formulated a dual motivated framing that broadly

¹³² Zeev Maoz (1991) "Framing the national interest", *World Politics*, 43, 1, p. 95.

¹³³ Charlton (1989) *The little platoon*, p. 27.

represented both the prospects of gains and losses. This formula has gone beyond what the classical prospect theory posits that an issue can be framed either in terms of gains or losses. It instead shows that the motivated framing of a choice can be formulated in both directions as this thesis observes.

Thirdly, although many scholars have claimed that prospect theory is a reference-dependent model,¹³⁵ this case study demonstrates that one's reference point can be forced to be withdrawn, but remains different from the dominant reference point around which the current motivated framing develops.

Fourthly, prospect theory, with the distinction between the domain of frame and motivated framing, proves capable of explaining the puzzles that the competing theories fail to offer in this thesis. It meets the rule to "solve more [i.e. two puzzles at least in this case] empirical problems than the reigning theories".¹³⁶

In giving an explanation, prospect theory does not stay at the conceptual level, explaining things by vague metaphors or static images,¹³⁷ such as the imperialist/colonial interpretation, patriotism, or parliamentarianism. Rather, it builds a causal mechanism to cope with this complex issue based on the reasoning that facts are no substitute for a structure. In this regard, prospect theory clearly excels those arguments based on identity, culture and lobby politics that paid less attention to contextual factors. In other words, it is safer to argue that prospect theory is a systematic structure of thinking that reflects the causal relationship. It helps understand a case with less possibility of being prejudiced.

Fifthly, prospect theory demonstrates a "multi-causal" capability to explain anomalies in the existing literature,¹³⁸ because the theory displays itself "a higher corroborated content" that consists of rational choice and cognitive response.¹³⁹ It can

¹³⁴ Luntley (1999) *Contemporary philosophy of thought*, p. 230, p. 232.

¹³⁵ John C. Hershey, Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul J. H. Schoemaker (1988) "Sources of bias in assessment procedures for utility functions", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 439; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1991) "Loss aversion in risk choice: A reference-dependence model", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CVI, 4, pp. 1039-1061.

¹³⁶ Patrick James (1993) "Neorealism as a research enterprise: Toward elaborated structural realism", *International Political Science Review*, 14, 2, p. 131.

¹³⁷ Stanley Hoffmann (1965) *The state of war: Essays on the theory and practice of international politics* (London: Frederick A. Praeger), p. 5.

¹³⁸ Andrew Moravcsik (1997) "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics", *International Organisation*, 51, 4, p. 516.

¹³⁹ Imre Lakatos (1970) "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes", in Imre Lakatos and Alan. Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge

be seen as a broader and contingent framework, straddling the cognitive process and deliberate strategy.

On the one side, in observation of the domain of frame, an analyst assumes that decision-makers are "endowed with an ontological status", which is exactly "what constitutes a systemic focus".¹⁴⁰ On the other side, the assumption of weaker rationality makes prospect theory compatible with motivational bias and allows preference reversals to take place. As this case demonstrates, the editing phase in prospect theory provides an angle more relevant than Gamba-Stonehouse's world-system perspective. The emphasis on the dramatic events that are interacting with decision weight also proves more task-specific than Beck's historical approach. Weinberg argues that "The most important thing for the progress" of a discipline "is not the decision that a theory is true, but the decision that it is worth taking seriously".¹⁴¹ Weinberg's remark is suggestive of two implications. First, so far as theory is concerned, prospect theory is a worthy tool of analysis, not because it explains the puzzles in this thesis, but because, when further information is available, it is an advisable method for analysing and inferring with a required degree of precision.¹⁴² It encourages an analyst to move beyond the conceptual level.¹⁴³

Next, so far as the discipline is concerned, this thesis concurs with Tversky and Kahneman when they argued that decision-makers should be concerned more about "what will I feel then?" than "what do I want now?"¹⁴⁴ Indeed, to most modern governments pressurised by the demand of rationality with a single and definitive parameter—efficiency—in their decision-making,¹⁴⁵ the remark made by Tversky and Kahneman exposes the problem of rationalism in decision-making.¹⁴⁶ This research drops the hint of an alternative model that reasonably takes ethical value into

University Press), p. 118.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Little (1977) "Three approaches to the international system: Some ontological and epistemological considerations", *British Journal of International Studies*, 3, 3, p. 281, p. 285.

¹⁴¹ Steve Weinberg (1992) *Dreams of a final theory* (NY: Oantheon), p. 103.

¹⁴² Ernest Nagel (1961) *The structure of science: Problem in the logic of scientific explanation* (London: Rouledge & Kegan Paul), p. 133.

¹⁴³ Fred Halliday and Justin Rosenberg (1998) "Interview with Ken Waltz", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, p. 379.

¹⁴⁴ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1985) "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice", in George Wright (ed.), *Behavioural decision making* (NY & London: Plenum), p. 40.

¹⁴⁵ Jean Ladriere (1986) "Scientific and ethical rationality", in Ruth Barcan Marcus, George J. W. Dorn and Paul Weingarnter (eds.), *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science VII* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), p. 701.

¹⁴⁶ P. C. Fishburn (1988) "Normative theories of decision making under risk and under uncertainty", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive*

account, despite not being compulsory.¹⁴⁷ It is with this broad concern in mind—a weaker form of rationality as well as pragmatism—that this thesis believes prospect theory is worth taking seriously in international politics. It is most relevant when the theory comes to description and analysis.

3. An agenda for further research

This thesis recommends further study to explore the effect of J. S. Bennett's reports of the cession of three British colonial territories on the FO before December 1968. This may possibly be made with the release of archives (File no. FCO 7/141 to FCO7/148) in 2008. Although Bennett's report stressed the degree of moral concerns in Britain's past diplomatic records, and some decision-makers did emphasise its significance several times, this thesis cannot be sure of the direct effect of moral assessment had on Stewart's directive to search for new reference points through the archival studies.

Secondly, this thesis recommends the possibility of integrating the idea of policy mood into prospect theory. "Policy mood" is defined as "latent attitude structures underlying specific aggregate preferences, which propel these preferences in directions consistent with the outlook".¹⁴⁸ The above definition indicates that there is an overlapping interest between public mood and the idea of the domain of frame. Hopefully, the integration may help prospect theory enter into the quantitative analysis, as there has been significant progress in quantitative approaches adopted by the study of policy mood.

Thirdly, Wilson was seen as the "artful dodger" in decision-making.¹⁴⁹ His personality will make the argument from prospect theory uncertain about whether the two British policy preferences were also Wilson's instinctual response to the framing due to his unique personality. This is of course not to advocate a "hero-in-history model of foreign policy".¹⁵⁰ When talking about personality as the invariant properties to function as a pro-active factor, this thesis understands that the issue is not whether

interactions in decision making (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 82.

¹⁴⁷ O. P. Dwivedi (1988) "Bureaucratic morality: Concluding comments", *International Political Science Review*, 9, 3, p. 237; Henry Shue (1995) "Ethics, the environment and the changing international order", *International Affairs*, 71, 3, p. 455.

¹⁴⁸ Samuel J. Best (1999) "The sampling problem in measuring policy mood: An alternative solution", *The Journal of Politics*, 61, 3, p. 722.

¹⁴⁹ R. W. Johnson (1985) *The politics of recession* (London: Macmillan), p. 270.

¹⁵⁰ Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1995) *World politics: Trend and transformation* (NY: St. Martin's Press), p. 62.

Wilson had a unique disposition, but whether personality has a determinative role.¹⁵¹ In this regard, exploration is worthwhile, because Wilson's personality was commented on in 1968 as "probably an important element in explaining the failure of the present Labour government".¹⁵² This comment is relevant. It will bring about another question: are risk-averse and risk-acceptant responses personality-driven?¹⁵³ Retrospectively, Thatcher had "an instinctive resistance to national decline" during the invasion in 1982.¹⁵⁴ Personality was undoubtedly an important part in her decision-making. But this question is more difficult to answer when the sense of urgency in late 1968 was not as high as that in 1982. In other words, it is likely that Wilson's personality could be an intervening factor in the final decision either in late 1968 or 1966. Hence, it is sensible to doubt that there might be two competing explanatory variables, the framing effect and personality could be co-relational in this case. The uncertainty needs more effort to clarify.

¹⁵¹ Gian Vittorio Caprara (1999) "The notion of personality: Historical and recent perspectives", *European Review*, 7, 1, p. 133.

¹⁵² Rudolf Klein (1968b) "Without the prince", *New Society*, 11, 298, p. 881.

¹⁵³ Cathy McFarland and Dale T. Miller (1994) "The framing of relative performance feedback: Seeing the glass as half empty or half full", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 6, p. 1068; Herbert McClosky (1960) "Perspectives on personality and foreign policy", *World Politics*, 13, 1, p. 132; Jane M. Klinger (1999) *When in the realm of losses: Prospect theory and decision making in war*, paper presented at the International Studies Association, 16-20 February, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ Geoffrey Smith (1986) "The British scene", *Foreign Affairs*, 64, 5, p. 924.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Part 1: British Government Publications

- British Government (1965) *Statement in defence estimates*, Cmnd. 2592 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1967) *Further documents on Gibraltar, October 1966—June 1967*, Cmnd. 3325 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1968) *Further documents on Gibraltar, June 1967—June 1968*, Cmnd. 3325 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1981) *The United Kingdom defence programme: The way forward*, Cmnd. 8288 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1983) *Falkland Islands review: Report of a committee of privy counsellors*, Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1985) *Falkland Islands: Fifth report from the Foreign Affairs Committee*, Cmnd. 9447 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1990a) *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, Cmnd. 1022-I (London: HMSO).
 ---(1990b) *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, Cmnd. 1022-II (London: HMSO).
 ---(1992) "The Falkland Islands", Cmnd. 1824 (London: HMSO).
 ---(1998) "Dependent territorial review: Interim report", by the Foreign Affairs Committee, 3 February, website, <<http://www.parliament.the-stationery office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmfaff/347ii/fa0201.htm>>

Hansard (Commons) (1962) 26 March, vol. 761, col. 242.

- (1962) 8 May, vol. 659, col. 21.
 ---(1962) 20 November, vol. 667, col. 118.
 ---(1964) 19 February, vol. 689, col., 216-7.
 ---(1964) 15 May, vol. 695, col. 118.
 ---(1964) 30 July, vol. 699, col. 357.
 ---(1966) 8 August, vol. 733, col. 239.
 ---(1966) 31 October, vol. 735, col. 13.
 ---(1966) 1 November, vol. 735, col. 59.
 ---(1966) 7 November, vol. 753, col. 963.
 ---(1968) 18 March, vol. 761, cols., 14-5, 18, 27, 31-4, 57.
 ---(1968) 19 March, vol. 761, cols., 67-8.
 ---(1968) 20 March, vol. 761, col. 92.
 ---(1968) 26 March, vol. 761, cols., 242, 1446-67.
 ---(1968) 28 March, 1968, vol. 761, cols., 1865-76.
 ---(1968) 1 April, vol. 762, cols., 3-5, 25.
 ---(1968) 9 April, vol. 762, cols., 1060-2.
 ---(1968) 25 April, vol. 763, cols., 479-80.
 ---(1968) 6 May, vol. 764, cols., 31-2.
 ---(1968) 7 May, vol. 764, col. 54-5.
 ---(1968) 21 May, vol. 765, cols., 279-80.
 ---(1968) 12 June, vol. 766, cols., 243-300.
 ---(1968) 22 July, vol. 769, col. 35.
 ---(1968) 18 November, vol. 773, cols., 872-3.
 ---(1968) 2 December, vol. 774, cols., 387-8.
 ---(1968) 3 December, vol. 774, cols., 1253-68.
 ---(1968) 3 December, vol. 774, cols., 1530-40.
 ---(1968) 4 December, vol. 774, cols., 513-4.
 ---(1968) 11 December, vol. 775, cols., 424-32.
 ---(1968) 12 December, vol. 775, cols., 591-715.
 ---(1968) 16 December, vol. 775, cols., 849-52.
 ---(1968) 18 November vol. 773, cols., 871-4.
 ---(1968) 3 December, vol. 774, col. 443.
 ---(1968) 12 December 1968, vol. 775, cols., 590-715.
 ---(1968) 16 December, vol. 775, cols., 240-2.
 Hansard (Lords) (1968) 13 March, vol. 290, cols., 205-12.
 ---(1968) 27 March, vol. 290, cols., 989-1002.
 ---(1968) 25 April, vol. 291, cols., 738-9.
 ---(1968) 26 June, vol. 293, cols., 1389-93.
 ---(1968) 3 December, vol. 298, cols., 24-36.
 ---(1968) 11 December, vol. 298, cols., 532-42.

Part 2: FCO & CO Archive, Public Record Office

5/1,	7/158, AA4/15, Part B
7/20, A2/19	7/160, AA4/17
7/21, A2/19	7/164, AA6/5, Part A
7/25, A2/26, Part A	7/164, AA6/5, Part B
7/56, A6/31	7/165, AA6/5, Part A
7/57, A6/39	7/165, AA6/5, Part B
7/64, A6/71	7/166, AA6/12
7/65, A6/75	7/167, AA6/18
7/90, A10/18	7/168, AA6/24
7/126, AA21/2	7/170, AA7/3, Part A
7/130, AA2/4	7/170, AA7/3, Part B
7/131, AA2/6	7/171, AA7/3, Part A
7/136, AA3/5	7/171, AA7/3, Part B
7/140, AA4/2	7/173, A10/7
7/148, AA 4/5	7/174, AA10/9
7/149, AA4/6	7/176, AA10/14, Part B
7/150, AA4/7	7/177, AA10/17
7/151, AA4/8	7/185, AA 21/2
7/152, AA4/9	7/186, AA21/4
7/153, AA4/10	7/235, AAF3/1
7/155, AA4/13	7/240, AAF10/1, Part A
7/156, AA4/14	7/241, AAF10/1
7/157, AA4/15, Part A	7/996, AZ2/4
7/157, AA4/15, Part B	1024/300, 36/41/04
7/158, AA4/15, Part A	

Part 3: Books and Articles

- Abelson, P. Robert (1981) "Psychological status of the script concept", *American Psychologist*, 36, 7, 715-29.
- Abrams, Philip (1971) "Social structure, social change, and British foreign policy", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), 331-51.
- Achen, Christopher H. and Duncan Snidal (1985) "Rational deterrence theory and comparative case studies", *World Politics*, 41, 2, 143-69.
- Achinstein, Peter (1985) "The methods of hypothesis: What is it supposed to do, and can it do it?", in Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (eds.), *Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science* (Cambridge: MIT), 127-45.
- Adler, Emanuel (1992) "The emergence of cooperation: National epistemic communities and the international evolution of the idea of nuclear arms control", *International Organisation*, 46, 1, 102-45.
- Adonis, Andrew (1993) *Parliament today*, 2nd edition (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press).
- Alderman, Geoffrey (1984) *Pressure groups and government in Great Britain* (London & NY: Longman).
- Alderman, R. K. and Martin J. Smith (1990) "Can British prime ministers be given the push by their parties?", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 43, 3, 260-76.
- Aldrich, Richard J. (1998) "British intelligence and the Anglo-American 'special relationship' during the Cold War", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, 331-51.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C. (1990) "Analytic debates: Understanding the relative autonomy of culture", in Jeffrey C. Alexander and Steven Seidman (eds.), *Culture and society: contemporary debates* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1-27.
- Allan, Graham (1991) "Qualitative research", in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds.), *Handbook for research students in the social sciences* (NY & London: Falmer), 177-89.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba (1965) *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Alvesson, Mats (1993) *Cultural perspectives on organisations* (Cambridge: Cambridge

- University Press).
- Amaturo, Winifred L. (1995) "Literature and international relations: The question of culture in the production of international power", *Millennium*, 24, 1, 1-25.
- Anand, V. S. and F. A. Ridley (1969) *The enigma of Enoch Powell: An essay in political racialism* (London: Mendusa).
- Anderson, Benedict (1983) *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of nationalism* (London: Verso).
- Anderson, J. R. (1983) *The architecture of cognition* (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press).
- Anderson, Norman H. (1982) *Methods of information integration theory* (NY: Academic).
- (1986) "A cognitive theory of judgement and decision", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevón (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 63-108.
- Apter, David E. (1957) "Theory and the study of politics", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, 747-62.
- Arend, Anthony (1985) "The Falklands war and the failure of the international legal order", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 52-63.
- Arrow, Kenneth J. (1951) *Social choice and individual values* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press).
- Ashly, Richard K. (1984) "The poverty of neorealism", *International Organisation*, 38, 1, 25-86.
- Atkinson, J. W. and D. Birch (1978) *Introduction to motivation* (NY: Can Nostrand).
- Auburn, F. M. (1982) The Falkland Islands dispute and Antarctica. *Marine Policy Reports*, 5, 3, 1-5.
- Audi, Robert (1997) "Acting for reasons", in Alfred R. Mele (ed.), *The philosophy of action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 75-105.
- Auerbach, Yehudit (1989) "Legitimation for turning-point decisions in foreign policy: Israel vis-a-vis Germany 1952 and Egypt 1977", *Review of International Studies*, 15, 4, 329-40.
- Austen-Smith, David (1992) "Strategic models of talks in political decision making", *International Political Science Review*, 13, 1, 45-58.
- Axelrod, Robert (1976a) "Decision for neo-imperialism: The deliberations of the British Eastern Committee in 1918", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 77-95.
- (1976b) "Results", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 221-48.
- (1976c) "The analysis of cognitive maps", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 55-73.
- (1976d) "Limitations", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 251-65.
- Bagby, Laurie M. Johnson (1994) "The Use and abuse of Thucydides in international relations", *International Organisation*, 48, 1, 131-53.
- Bailey, Peter (1993) *Bring human rights to life* (Sydney: The Federal).
- Baker, Hugh D. R. (1995) "Hong Kong: A view from both sides", *Asian Affairs*, 24, 1, 10-9.
- Baldwin, David A. (1980) "Interdependence and power: A conceptual analysis", *International Organisation*, 34, 4, 471-506.
- (1997) "The concept of security", *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1, 5-26.
- Barber, James (1991) *The prime minister since 1945* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Bar-Hillel, Maya (1982) "Studies of representativeness", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 69-98.
- Barnes, John (1998) *Federal Britain: No longer unthinkable?* (London: CPS).
- Barnett, Anthony (1982) *Iron Britannia* (London & NY: Allison and Busby).
- Barry, Brian (1995) "John Rawls and the search for stability", *Ethics*, 105, 4, 874-915.
- (1998) "The limits of cultural politics", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, 307-19.
- Bartlett, C. J. (1977) "The military instrument in British foreign policy", in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), 31-51.
- Bauman, Zygmunt (1992) "Soil, blood and identity", *The Sociological Review*, 40, 4, 675-701.
- Baumgart, Winfried (1982) *Imperialism: The idea and reality of British and French colonial expansion, 1880-1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Baylis, John (1977) "Introduction", in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), 11-29.

- (1989) *British defence policy, striking the right balance* (London: Macmillan).
- BBC World Service (1999) *Calling the Falklands*, 29 September, manuscript by D. Palmer.
- Beattie, Alan and Patrick Dunleavy (1995) "Imperial government and the formation of the British ministerial state", in Joni Lovenduski and Jeffrey Stranyer (eds.), *Contemporary political studies, I* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom), 120-31.
- Beck, Peter J. (1982) "Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute: The Anglo-Argentine search for a way forward", *Journal of International Studies and World Affairs*, 24, 1, 37-58.
- (1983a) "Research problems in studying Britain's Latin American past: The case of the Falklands dispute 1920-50", *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 2, 3, 3-16.
- (1983b) "Argentina's 'philatelic annexation' of the Falklands", *History Today*, 33, 2, 39-44.
- (1983c) "The Anglo-Argentine dispute over title to the Falkland Islands: Changing British perceptions on sovereignty since 1910", *Millennium*, 12, 1, 6-24.
- (1983d) "Britain's Antarctic dimension", *International Affairs*, 59, 3, 429-44.
- (1985) "The future of the Falkland Islands: A solution made in Hong Kong?", *International Affairs*, 61, 4, 643-60.
- (1986) *The international politics of Antarctica* (London & Sidney: Croom Helm).
- (1987) "A cold war: Britain, Argentina and Antarctica", *History Today*, 37, 6, 16-23.
- (1988) *The Falkland Islands as an international problem* (London & NY: Routledge).
- (1989) "British relations with Latin America: The Antarctic dimension", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 164-85.
- (1990) "Antarctic as a zone of peace: A strategic irrelevance? A historical and contemporary survey", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), 193-224.
- (1991) "Fisheries conservation: A basis for a special Anglo-Argentine relationship?", *The World Today*, 47, 7, 102-6.
- Beer, Samuel H. (1957) "The representation of interests in British government: Historical background", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, 613-50.
- Bell, David E. (1988) "Disappointment in decision making under certainty", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 358-83.
- and Howard Raiffa (1988) "Marginal value and intrinsic risk aversion", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (1988) "Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 9-30.
- Bem, Daryle J. (1967) "Self-perception: An alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena", *Psychological Review*, 74, 3, 183-200.
- Benn, Tony (1980) "The case for a constitutional premiership", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 33, 1, 7-22.
- (1987) *Out of the wilderness: Diaries 1963-67* (London: Hutchinson).
- Bennett, Andrew and Alexander L. George (1997) "Research design tasks in case study methods", draft paper presented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, 17-19 October.
- Bennett, Peter and Michael Nicholson (1994) "Formal methods of analysis in IR", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), 206-15.
- Bennett, Richard P. and Joseph P. Carbonari (1976) "Personality patterns related to own-, joint-, and relative-gain maximising behaviours", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 6, 1127-34.
- Berdie, Douglas R. and John F. Anderson (1974) *Questionnaires: Design and use* (NJ: Scarecrow).
- Berejekian, Jeffrey (1997) "The gains debates: Framing state choice", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4, p. 789-805.
- Bernstein, Richard J. (1983) *Beyond objectivism and relativism: Science, hermeneutics and praxis* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).

- Bertilsson, M. (1997) "The theory of structuration: Prospects and problems", in Christopher G. A. Bryant and David Jary (eds.), *Anthony Giddens: Critical assessments, vol. 1* (London & NY: Routledge), 44-60.
- Best, John B. (1995) *Cognitive psychology*, 4th edition (Minneapolis: West Publishing).
- Best, Samuel J. (1999) "The sampling problem in measuring policy mood: An alternative solution", *The Journal of Politics*, 61, 3, 721-40.
- Bethell, Leslie (1989) "Britain and Latin America in historical perspective", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1-24.
- Betts, Richard K. (1993) "Systems of peace as causes of war? Collective security, arms control, and the new Europe", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), 265-301.
- Bhavnani, Kum-Kum (1991) *Talking politics: A psychological framing for views from youth in Britain* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Billing, Michael (1987) *Arguing and thinking: A rhetorical approach to social psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (1995) *Banal nationalism* (London: Sage).
- Birnbaum, Pierre (1996) "From multiculturalism to nationalism", *Political Theory*, 24, 1, 33-45.
- Blaug, Mark (1976) "Kuhn versus Lakatos or paradigm versus research programmes in the history of economics", in Spiro J. Latsis (ed.), *Method and appraisal in economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 149-80.
- Blyth, Mark M. (1997) "Any more bright idea? The ideational turn of comparative political economy", *Comparative Politics*, 29, 2, 229-50.
- Bobko, Philip, Larry Shetzer and Craig Russel (1991) "Estimating the standard deviation of professors' worth: The effects of frame and presentation order in utility analysis", *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, 64, 2, 179-88.
- Boiko, Pavel (1984) "Mounting anti-imperialist struggle", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 110-22.
- Bologna, Alfredo Bruno (1983) "Argentinian claims to the Malvinas under international law", *Millennium*, 12, 1, 39-48.
- Bonham, G. Matthew and Michael Shapiro (1976) "Explanation of the unexpected: The Syrian intervention in Jordan in 1970", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 113-41.
- (1986) "Mapping structures of thought", in Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds.), *Different text analysis procedures for the study of decision making* (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research Foundation), 29-52.
- Booth, Ken (1991) "Security in anarchy: Utopian realism in theory and practice", *International Affairs*, 67, 3, 527-45.
- Borthwick, R. L. (1984) "Parliament", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press and St. Martin's Press), 49-71.
- Boston, Richard (1968) "How the immigrants acts was passed?" *New Society*, 11, 287, 448-52.
- Boucher, David (1998) *Political theories of international relations: From Thucydides to the present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Boyer, Mark A. (1993) *International cooperation and public goods: Opportunities for the western alliance* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press).
- Bradley, Dick (1992) *Understanding Rock'n'Roll: Popular music in Britain 1955-1964* (Buckingham & Philadelphia: Open University).
- Bradley, F. H. (1922) *Principle of logic, vol. 1* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Braybrooke, David (1958) "The relevance of norms to political description", *American Political Science Review*, 52, 4, 989-1006.
- Brehmer, Berndt (1976) "Social judgement theory and the analysis of interpersonal conflict", *Psychological Bulletin*, 83, 6, 985-1003.
- Brendl, C. Miguel, E. Tory Higgins and Kristi M. Lemm (1995) "Sensitivity to varying gains and losses: The role of self-discrepancies and event framing", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69, 6, 1028-51.
- Brew, Marilynn B. and Roderick M. Kramer (1986) "Choice behaviour in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 3, 543-49.
- Brewer, John (1989) *The Sinews of power: War, money and the English state, 1688-1783* (London: Unwin Hyman).

- Brittan, Samuel (1969) *Steering the economy: The role of the Treasury* (London: Penguin).
- Brooks, Stephen G. (1997) "Duelling realisms", *International Organisation*, 51, 3, 445-77.
- Brown, Archie (1967) "What power has a prime minister?", *New Society*, 9, 244, 790-2.
- Brown, Chris (1985) "Development and dependency", in Margot Light and A. J. R. Groom (eds.), *International relations: A handbook of current theory* (London: Francis Pinter), 60-73.
- (1995) "International theory and international society: The viability of the middle way", *Review of International Studies*, 21, 3, 183-96.
- (1997) *Understanding international relations* (London: Macmillan).
- Brown, George (1971) *In my way: The political memoirs of Lord George-Brown* (London: Victor Gollancz).
- Brown, Jonathan C. (1979) *A socio-economic history of Argentina, 1776-1860* (Cambridge: Cambridge University).
- Brown, Robin (1998) "Political studies and cultural studies: A response to Finlayson and Martin", *Politics*, 18, 3, 173-7.
- Bruce, James (1954) *Those perplexing Argentines* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode).
- Brutents, Karen (1984) "The conflict in the South Atlantic: Consequences and lessons", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 123-48.
- Buenos Aires Herald* (1968) 25 February 1968.
- Bull, Hedley (1977) *The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics* (NY: Columbia University Press).
- Bulmer, Martin (1984) "Facts, concepts, theories and problems", in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Sociological research methods: An introduction*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan), 37-50.
- (1985) "The rejuvenation of community studies? Neighbours, networks and policy", *The Psychological Review*, 33, 3, 430-48.
- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor (1989) "Britain and Latin America: Closer in the 1990s?", *The World Today*, 45, 11, 198-201.
- Burch, Martin and Ian Holliday (1996) *The British cabinet system* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Bulpitt, Jim (1988) "Rational politicians and conservative statecraft in the open polity", in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan), 180-205.
- Burch, Martin and Ian Holliday (1996) *The British cabinet system* (London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Burk, Kathleen (1983) "Book reviews", *Political Quarterly*, 54, 2, 209-11.
- Burke, Edmond (1989) "Reflections on the revolution in France 1790", in Paul Langford and L. G. Mitchell (eds.), *The writings and speeches of Edmund Burke, vol. 8: The French revolution, 1790-1794* (Oxford: Clarendon), 53-293.
- Burns, E. Bradford (1982) *Latin America: A concise interpretative history* (NJ: Prentice-Hall).
- Burns, Robert Andrew (1986) *Diplomacy, war, and parliamentary democracy: Further lessons from the Falklands or advice from academe* (Lanham, NY & London: University Press of America).
- Burt, Edwin A. (1965) *In search of philosophic understanding* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Butt, Ronald (1969) *The power of Parliament* (London: Constable).
- Butterfield, Herbert (1951) *History and human relations* (London: Collins).
- Butts, Robert E. (1968) (ed.) *William Whewell's theory of scientific method* (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh).
- Buzan, Barry (1983) *People, states and fear: The national security problem in international relations* (Wheatsheaf).
- (1991a) "Interdependence and Britain's external relations", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 10-41.
- (1991b) "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century", *International Affairs*, 67, 3, 431-51.
- (1991c) *People, states and fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Byrd, Peter (1988) "Defence policy", in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin's Press), 157-79.
- Cain, P. J. and A. G. Hopkins (1993) *British Imperialism: Crisis and deconstruction, 1914-1990* (London & NY: Longman).

- Calhoun, Craig (1982) *The question of class struggle: Social foundations of popular radicalism during the industrial revolution* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Callaghan, James (1987) *Time and chance* (London: Collins).
- Callincos, A. (1986) *Ideology and foreign policy: Problems of comparative conceptualisation* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Calvert, Peter (1983) "Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis", *International Affairs*, 52, 3, 405-13.
- Calvert, Ranall L. (1995) "The rational choice theory of social institutions: Cooperation, co-ordination, and communication", in Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (eds.), *Modern political economy: Old topic, new directions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 216-67.
- Campbell, David (1998) "Why fight: Humanitarianism, principles, and post-structuralism", *Millennium*, 27, 3, 497-521.
- Cameron, Sukey (1998a) "Speech to the South Atlantic Council Conference—Falkland Island update", London, 3 February, <http://www.falklands.gov.fk/9h.htm>
- (1998b) "Address at the annual Falkland Island Government reception", 10 June, <http://www.falklands.gov.fk/9m.htm>
- Caprara, Gian Vittorio (1999) "The notion of personality: Historical and recent perspectives", *European Review*, 7, 1, 127-37.
- Caporaso, James A. (1992) "International relations theory and multilateralism: The search for foundations", *International Organisation*, 46, 3, 597-632.
- Carey, Susan (1995) "On the origin of causal understanding", in Dan Sperber, David Premack and Ann James Premack (eds.), *Causal cognition: A multidisciplinary debate* (Oxford: Clarendon), 268-302.
- Carlsnaes, Walter (1992) "The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis", *International Studies Quarterly*, 36, 3, 245-70.
- Carlson, Andrew R. (1970) *Germany foreign policy, 1890-1914, and colonial policy to 1914: A handbook and annotated bibliography* (NJ: Scarecrow).
- Carlton, David (1970) *MacDonald versus Henderson: The foreign policy of the second Labour government* (London: Macmillan).
- Carney, James D. and Richard K. Scheer (1980) *Fundamental of logic* (London: Collier Macmillan).
- Carroll, John S. (1980) "Analysing decision behaviour: The magician's audience", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 69-76.
- Castle, Barbara (1990) *The Castle diaries, 1964-1976* (London: Papermac).
- Caute, David (1988) *Sixty-eight: The year of the barricades* (London: Hamish Hamilton).
- Cawkell, Mary (1983) *The Falkland story, 1964-1976* (London: Papermac).
- Chalmers, David (1995) "High-level perception, presentation, and analogue: A critique of artificial-intelligence methodology", in Douglas Hofstadter and the Fluid Analogies Research Group (eds.), *Fluid concepts & creative analogies: Computer models of the fundamental mechanisms of thought* (NY: BasicBooks, A Division of HarperCollins Publishers, Inc.), 169-93.
- Chambers, Iain (1993) "Narratives of Nationalism: Being 'British'", in Erica Carter, James Donald and Judith Squires (eds.), *Space & place: Theories of identity and location* (London: Lawrence & Wishart), 145-64.
- Chan, Steve and Donald A. Sylvan (1984) "Foreign policy decision making: An overview", in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), *Foreign policy decision making: Perception, cognition, and artificial intelligence* (NY: Praeger), 1-19.
- Chan, Stephen (1993) "Culture and linguistic reductionisms and a new historical sociology for international relations", *Millennium*, 22, 3, 423-42.
- Charlton, Michael (1989) *The little platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands dispute* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1997) *Ideas and international political change: Soviet/Russian behaviour and the end of the cold war* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press).
- Child, Jack (1988) *Antarctica and South American geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* (NY: Praeger).
- Childs, David (1992) *Britain since 1945: A political history*, 3rd edition (London: Routledge).
- (1997) *Britain since 1945: A political history*, 4th edition (London: Routledge).
- Chong, Dennis (1992) "Social incentives and the preservation of reputation in public-spirited collective action", *International Political Science Review*, 13, 2, 171-98.
- Christiansen, Lars and Keith Dowding (1994) "Pluralism or state autonomy? The case of

- Amnesty International (British section): The insider/outsider group", *Political Studies*, 42, 1, 14-24.
- Christensen, Thomas J. (1993) "Conclusion: System stability and the security of the most vulnerable significant actor", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), 329-56.
- Christie, Clive J. (1985) *Nationalism and internationalism: Britain's left and policy towards the Falkland Islands, 1982-1984, Hull papers in politics, no. 37* (Hull: University of Hull).
- Christie, M. J. (1970) *The Somonstown agreements: Britain's defence and the sale of arms to South Africa* (London: The Africa Bureau).
- Clark, Jon and Gordon Causer (1991) "Introduction: Research strategies and decisions", in Graham Allan and Chris Skinner (eds.), *Handbook for research students in the social sciences* (London: Falmer), 163-76.
- Clarke, Michael (1991) "Defence and security in Britain's external relations" in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 74-96.
- (1992) *British external policy-making in the 1990s* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- Clark, William Roberts (1998) "Agents and structures: Two views of preferences, two views of institutions", *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, 2, 245-70.
- Claude, Inis L. Jr. (1985) "UN efforts at settlement of the Falkland Islands crisis", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 118-31.
- Clifford, James (1986) "Introduction: Partial truth", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography* (Los Angeles, Berkley & London: University of California Press), 1-26.
- Cocks, Michael (1989) *Labour and the Benn factor* (London & Sidney: MacDonald).
- Cocks, Peter (1980) "Towards a Marxist theory of European integration", *International Organisation*, 34, 1, 1-40.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. (1973) *The question of imperialism: The political economy of dominance and dependence* (London: Macmillan).
- Cohen, Robin (1994) *Frontiers of identity: The British and others* (London & NY: Longman).
- Coll, Alberto R. (1985a) "Lessons for the future", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 232-44.
- (1985b) "Philosophical and legal dimensions of the use of force in the Falklands war", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 34-51.
- Colley, Linda (1984) "The apotheosis of George III: Loyalty, royalty and the British nation 1760-1820", *Past and Present*, 102, 94-129.
- (1989) "Radical patriotism in eighteenth century England", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 169-87.
- (1992) *Britons: Forging the nation 1707-1837* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press).
- Collier, David (1992) "The popular roots of the Argentine Tango", *History Workshop*, 34, 92-100.
- Collier, Simon (1981) "Argentina: Domestic travail, international censure", *International Affairs*, 57, 3, 477-81.
- (1983) "The first Falklands war? Argentine attitudes", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, 459-64.
- Colson, David A. (1985) "The Falkland Islands crisis and the management of boundary disputes", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 212-24.
- Conde, Roberto Cortes (1993) "The growth of the Argentine economy, 1870-1914", David Brookshaw (trans.), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 47-77.
- Conil Paz, Alberto and Gustavo Ferrari (1966) *Argentina's foreign policy, 1930-1962*, John J. Kennedy (trans.), (Notre Dame & London: University of Notre Dame Press).
- Connell-Smith, Gordon (1982) "The OAS and the Falklands conflict", *The World Today*, 38, 340-7.

- Connolly, Patricio Gavan (1994) (Trans.) *The constitution of the Argentine nation 1994* (Buenos Aires: Latin American Linguistic Service).
- Connor, Walker (1978) "A nation is a nation is a state is an ethnic group is a ...", *Ethnic and Racial Study*, 1, 4, 377-400.
- Corbin, Ruth M. (1980) "Decisions that might not get made", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 47-67.
- Cornford, J. P. (1974) "Review article: The illusion of decision", *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 2, 231-43.
- Cortell, Andrew P. and Susan Peterson (1999) "Altered states: Explaining domestic institutional change", *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1, 177-203.
- Coser, Lewis A. (1984) "Two methods in search of a substance", in Martin Bulmer (ed.), *Sociological research methods: An introduction*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan), 294-307.
- Cosgrave, Patrick (1989) *The lives of Enoch Powell* (London: The Bodley Head).
- Cottrell, Stella (1989) "The devil on two sticks: Franco-phobia 1803", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge), 259-74.
- Cowhey, Peter F. (1993) "Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States", *International Organisation*, 47, 2, 299-326.
- Cowley, Philip (1998) "Conclusion" in Philip Cowley (ed.), *Conscience and parliament* (London: Frank Cass).
- Coxall, Bill and Lynton Robins (1998) *Contemporary British politics*, 3rd edition (London: Macmillan).
- Craig, Alexander (1967) "Argentina: The latest revolution", *The World Today*, 23, 5, 206-215.
- Crawford, Beverly (1994) "The new security dilemma under international economic interdependence", *Millennium*, 23, 1, 25-55.
- (1996) "Explaining defection from international cooperation: Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia", *World Politics*, 48, 4, 482-521.
- Crick, Bernard (1966) "The tendency of political studies", *New Society*, 8, 214, 681-3.
- (1968) "How governments should lead", *New Society*, 11, 278, 115-6.
- Crossman, Richard (1977) *The diaries of a cabinet minister, volume three, secretary of state for social services, 1968-70* (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape).
- (1979) *The Crossman diaries: Selections from the diaries of a cabinet minister, 1964-1970*, introduced and edited by Anthony Howard (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape).
- Crozier, W. Ray (1990) "Accounting for decisions: Justification and rhetoric", in K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie and G. Erdos (eds.), *Lines of thinking: Reflections on the psychology of thought*, vol. 1: Representation, reasoning, analogy and decision making (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 315-25.
- Cummings, L. L. (1982) "Organisational behaviour", *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 541-79.
- Cunningham, Hugh (1981) "The language of patriotism, 1750-1914", *History Workshop*, 12, 8-33.
- Czaja, Ronald and Johnny Blair (1996) *Designing surveys: A guide to decisions and procedures* (London: Pine Forge).
- Dabat, Alejandro and Luis Lorenzano (1982) *Argentina: The Malvinas and the end of military rule*, Ralph Johnstone (trans.), (London: Verso).
- Daily Mail* (1968) 13 February.
- Dalyell, Tam (1982) *One Man's Falklands* (London: Woolf).
- Daniel, Vera (1952) "Physical principles in human cooperation", *The Sociological Review*, XLIV, 1, 107-34.
- Daniel, W. W. (1968) *Racial discrimination in England: Based on the PEP report* (Middlesex: Penguin).
- Darby, Philip. (1976) *British defence policy East of Suez 1947-1968* (London: Oxford University Press).
- (1977) "East of Suez Reassessed", in John Baylis (ed.), *British defence policy in a changing world* (London: Croom Helm), 52-65.
- Dargie, Charlotte (1998) "Observation in political research: A qualitative approach", *Politics*, 18, 1, 65-71.
- Darwin, John (1988) *British and decolonisation: The retreat from empire in the post-war world* (London: Macmillan).

- Daugherty, William H. (1993) "System management and the endurance of the Concert of Europe", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press), 71-105.
- Davis, A. J. (1995) *We, the nation: The Conservative party and the pursuit of power* (London: Little, Brown and Company).
- Davis, Bruce (1990) "Science and politics in Antarctic and southern oceans policy: A critical assessment" in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), 39-45.
- Day, J. Alan (1996) (ed.) *The annual register: A record of world events 1995*, vol. 237 (London: Cartermill).
- Deakin, Nicholas (1970) *Colour, citizenship and British society, based on the Institute of Race Relations Report* (London: Panther Books).
- Dearlove, John and Peter Saunders (1991) *Introduction to British politics: Analysing a capitalist democracy* (Cambridge: Polity).
- Deas, Malcolm (1989) "Further forward thoughts on the Falklands", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 151-63.
- Deibert, Ronald J. (1999) "Harold Innis and the empire of speed", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, 273-89.
- Dent, Martin (1989) *Shared sovereignty: A solution for the Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Paper).
- Denzin, Norman K. (1978) *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*, 2nd edition (NY: McGraw-Hill).
- Derbyshire, J. Denis and Ian Derbyshire (1990) *Politics in Britain: From Callaghan to Thatcher* (Edinburg: Chambers).
- De-Shalit, Avner (1996) "National self-determination: Political, not cultural", *Political Studies*, 44, 906-20.
- Destéfani, Laurio H. (1982) *The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands, the conflict with Britain*, Martha Heath and Ruth James (trans.), (Buenos Aires: Edipress S. A.).
- Deudney, Daniel (1990) "A case against linking environmental degradation and national security", *Millennium*, 19, 3, 461-76.
- (1999) G. John Ikenberry (1999) "The nature and sources of liberal international order", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, 179-96.
- Devetak, Richard (1996) "Postmodernism", in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of international relations* (London: Macmillan), 179-209.
- Devine, Fiona (1992) "Social identities, class identity and political perspectives", *The Sociological Review*, 40, 2, 229-52.
- Dillman, Don A. (1978) *Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method* (NY: Wiley & Sons).
- Dillon, G. Michael (1988a) *The Falklands, Politics and War* (London: Macmillan).
- (1988b) "Thatcher and the Falklands", in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), *Belief systems and international relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 167-89.
- Dogan, Mattei (1994) "The decline of nationalisms within Western Europe", *Comparative Politics*, 26, 3, 281-305.
- Doggan, B. (1982) "Letters: Falklands", *The Economist*, 1 May.
- Dolowitz, David and David Marsh (1996) "Who learns what from whom: A review of the policy transfer literature", *Political Studies*, 44, 343-57.
- Dominguez, Jorge I. (1989) *To make a world safe for revolution* (London: Harvard University Press).
- Dos Santos, Theotonio (1970) "The structure of dependence", *American Economic Review*, 60, 2, 231-6.
- Doty, Roxanne Lynn (1996) "Immigration and national identity: Constructing the nation", *Review of International Studies*, 22, 3, 235-55.
- Douglas, Mary (1975) *Implicit meaning* (London & Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- (1992) "Governability: A critique of culture", *Millennium*, 22, 3, 463-81.
- Dowding, Keith M. (1991) *Rational choice and political power* (Hunt, England: Edward Elgar).
- (1993) "Government at the centre", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), 175-284.
- and Desmond King (1995) "Introduction", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1-19.

- Downs, George W. (1989) "The rational deterrence debate", *World Politics*, 41, 2, 225-37.
- Drake, St. Clair (1955) "The 'colour problem' in Britain: A study in social definition", *The Sociological Review*, 3, 2, 197-217.
- Drenth, P. J. D. and B. Groenendijk (1984) "Work and organisational psychology in cross-cultural perspective", in P. J. D. Drenth, H. Thierry, P. J. Willems and C. J. de Wolff (eds.), *Handbook of work and organisational psychology* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 1197-229.
- Dretske, Fred I. (1981) *Knowledge and the flow of information* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- (1983) "Precision of knowledge and the flow of information, open peer commentary, and author's response", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 6, 1, 55-90.
- Drewry, Gavin (1993) "Parliament", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), 154-74.
- Dreyer, Ronald F. (1987) *The mind of official imperialism: British and Cape government perceptions of German rule in Namibia from the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty to the Kruger telegram (1890-1896)* (Essen: Reimar Hobbing Verlag).
- Dunleavy, Patrick (1993) "The political parties", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), 123-53.
- Dunnett, Denzil (1983) "Self-determination and the Falklands", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, 416-28.
- Dunsire, Andrew (1988) "Bureaucratic morality in the United Kingdom", *International Political Science Review*, 9, 3, 179-91.
- Duursma, Jorri (1996) *Fragmentation and the international relations of micro-states: Self-determination and statehood* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Dwivedi, O. P. (1988) "Bureaucratic morality: Concluding comments", *International Political Science Review*, 9, 3, 231-9.
- Dyer, James S. and Pakesh K. Sarin (1982) "Relative risk aversion", *Management Science*, 28, 8, 875-86.
- Easton, David (1953) *The political system: An inquiry into the state of political science* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf).
- Ebbesen, Ebbe B. and Vladimir J. Konecni (1980) "On the external validity of decision-making research: What do we know about decisions in the real world?", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 21-45.
- Eccleshall, Robert, Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay, Michael Kenny, Ian MacKenzie and Rich Wilford (1984) *Political ideologies: An introduction* (London & NY: Routledge).
- Eddy, Paul, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman (1982) *The Falklands war* (London: Andre Deutsch).
- Edward, L. Morse (1970) "The transformation of foreign policies: Modernisation, interdependence and externalisation", *World Politics*, 22, 3, 371-92.
- Einhorn, Hillel J. (1980) "Learning from experience and sub-optimal rules in decision making", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 1-20.
- and Robin M. Hogarth (1986) "Decision making under ambiguity", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s225-s50.
- and Robin M. Hogarth (1988) "Behavioural decision theory: Process of judgement and choice", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 113-46.
- Eldridge, John (1994) "Book Review: 'Framing the Falklands war: Nationhood, culture and identity'", *Sociology*, 28, 2, 567-8.
- Eley, Geoff and Ronald Grigor Suny (1996) "Introduction: From the movement of social history to the work of cultural representation", in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming national: A reader* (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press), 3-37.
- Engel, Pascal (1989) *The norm of truth: An introduction to the philosophy of logic* (London: Harvest & Wheatsheaf).
- Entman, Robert M. "Framing U.S. coverage of international news: Contrasts in narratives of the KAL and Iran air incidents", *Journal of Communication*, 41, 4, 6-27.
- (1993) "Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm", *Journal of Communication*, 43, 4, 51-8.
- Estes, William K. (1980) "Comments on directions and limitations of current efforts toward theories of decision making", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in*

- choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 263-74.
- Etzioni, Amitai (1978) "Introduction: Policy research", in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *Policy research* (Netherland: E. F. Brill, Leiden), 1-6.
- Evans, Eric (1994) "National consciousness? The ambivalence of English identity in the eighteenth century", in Claus Bjorn, Alexander Grant and Keith J. Stringer (eds.), *Nations, Nationalism and patriotism in the European past* (Copenhagen: Academic Press), 145-60.
- Evans, Peter B. (1993) "Building an integrative approach to international and domestic politics", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, California & London: University of California Press), 397-430.
- Evena-Pritchard, E. E. (1965) *Theories of primitive religion* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Eysenck, Michael W. and Mark T. Keane (1990) *Cognitive psychology: A student handbook* (Hillsdale, NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
- Faber, Richard (1966) *The vision and the need* (London: Faber and Faber).
- Fagley, N. S. and Paul M. Miller (1990) "The effect of framing on choice: Interactions with risk-taking propensity, cognitive style, and sex", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16, 3, 496-510.
- Falk, Pamela S. (1985) *Cuban foreign policy: Caribbean tempest* (Toronto: Lexington).
- Falkland Islands Association (1998a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, April, no. 71
- (1998b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, June, no. 72.
- (1998c) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, September, no. 73.
- (1999a) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, April, no. 74.
- (1999b) *Falkland Islands Newsletter*, October, no. 75.
- Falkland Islands News Network* (1999) 16/17 October.
- (2000) 24/28 January; 7 February; 7 March.
- Farnham, Barbara (1992) "Introduction", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, 167-9.
- Farrands, Chris (1981) "Perspectives on negotiation: Diplomacy and regime change", in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.), *Change and the study of international relations: The evaded dimension* (London: Frances Pinter), 85-99.
- Fawcett, J. E. S. (1982) "The Falklands and the law", *The World Today*, 38, 203-6.
- Fearon, James D. (1991) "Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science", *World Politics*, 43, 2, 169-95.
- Femenia, Nora A. (1996) *National identity in times of crises: The scripts of the Falklands-Malvinas war* (NY: Nova Science Publishers).
- Ferejohn, John (1993) "Structure and ideology: Change in Parliament in early Stuart England", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 207-31.
- Ferguson, Yale H. and Richard W. Mansbach (1988) *The elusive quest: Theory and international politics* (South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press).
- Ferns, Harry S. (1960) *Britain and Argentina: In the nineteenth century* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (1992) "Argentina: Part of an informal empire?", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), 49-61.
- Festinger, Leon (1957) *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (London: Tavistock).
- Fielding, Steven (1995) *Labour: Decline and renewal* (London: Baseline).
- (1997) (ed.) *The Labour party 'socialism' and the society since 1951* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press).
- Finlayson, Alan (1998) "Psychology, psychoanalysis and theories of nationalism", *Nations and Nationalism*, 4, 2, 145-62.
- and James Martin (1997) "Political studies and cultural studies", *Politics*, 17, 3, 183-9.
- Finsterbusch, Kurt and Mary R. Hamilton (1978) "The rationalisation of social science research in policy studies", in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *Policy research* (Netherlands: E. F. Brill, Leiden), 88-106.
- Fischer, David Hackett (1970) *Historian's fallacies: Toward a logic of historical thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Fischhoff, Baruch (1982) "For those condemned to study the past: Heuristic and biases in hindsight", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 335-51.
- (1983) "Predicting framing", *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition*, 9, 103-16.

- Paul Slovic and Sarah Lichtenstein (1988) "Knowing what you want: Measuring labile values", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 398-421.
- Fishburn, P. C. (1988) "Normative theories of decision making under risk and under uncertainty", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 78-98.
- Fleishman, John A. (1988) "The effects of decision framing and others' behaviour on cooperation in a social dilemma", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 32, 1, 162-80.
- Floria, Carlos (1991) "The Argentine perspective", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 81-106.
- Foddy, William (1993) *Constructing questions for interviews and questionnaires: Theory and practice in social research* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Foder, J. A. and Z. Pylyshyn (1988) "Connectionalism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis", *Cognition*, 28, 3-75.
- Fontana, Anfreia and James H. Frey (1994) "Interviewing: The art of science", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 361-76.
- Foot, Paul (1968) *The politics of Harold Wilson* (London: Middlesex).
- (1969) *The rise of Enoch Powell: An examination of Enoch Powell's attitude to immigration and race* (Middlesex: Penguin).
- Foster, Kevin (1997) "To serve and protect: Textualising the Falklands conflict", *Cultural Studies*, 11, 2, 235-52.
- Francis, Martin (1997) *Ideas and policies under labour, 1945-1951: Building a new Britain* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press).
- Franck, Thomas M. (1985) "The strategic role of legal principles", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 22-33.
- Frankel, Joseph (1970) *National interest* (London: Macmillan).
- (1975) *British foreign policy: 1945-1973* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Frankfort-Nachmias, Chava and David Nachmias (1996) *Research methods in the social sciences*, 5th edition (London: Arnold).
- Fraser, Ronald (1988) *1968: A student generation in revolt* (London: Chatto & Windus).
- Freedman, Lawrence (1982) "British defence policy after the Falklands", *The World Today*, 38, 331-39.
- (1983) "Bridgehead revisited: The literature of the Falklands", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, 445-52.
- Freeman, Michael (1999) "The right to self-determination in international politics: Six theories in search of a policy", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 3, 355-70.
- Frey, Bruno S. and Reiner Eichenberger (1989) "Should social scientists care about choice anomalies?", *Rationality and Society*, 1, 1, 101-22.
- Friden, Jeffrey A. (1994) "International investment and colonial control: A new interpretation", *International Organisation*, 48, 4, 559-93.
- Friman, H. Richard (1993) "Side-payments versus security cards: Domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations", *International Organisation*, 47, 3, 387-410.
- Fuchs, V. E. (1983) "Antarctica: Its history and development", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 13-9.
- Fukuyama, Francis (1992) *The end of history and the last man* (NY: Free Press).
- (1995) *Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity* (NY & London: Free Press).
- Furlong, William L. and Craig L. Albiston (1985) "Sovereignty, culture, and misperceptions: The Falkland/Malvinas war", *Conflict*, 6, 2, 139-75.
- Furtado, Peter (1989) "National pride in seventeenth-century England", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity* (London: Routledge), 44-56.
- Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia (1987) *The Falklands/Malvinas war: A model for North-South crisis prevention* (London: Allen & Unwin).
- Gale, George (1970) "The 1970 election campaign", in John Wood (ed.), *Powell and the 1970 election* (Surrey: Elliot Right Way Books), 50-82.
- Gallhofer, Irmtraud N. and Willem E. Saris (1989) "Three methods for analysing decision

- making using written documents", in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds.), *Process and structure in human decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 99-123.
- Gallo, Ezequiel (1993) "Society and politics, 1880-1916", Richard Southern (trans.), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University), 79-111.
- Garnett, John (1981) "The role of military power", in Michael Smith, Richard Little and Michael Shackleton (eds.), *Perspectives on world politics* (London: Open University Press), 63-5.
- Garrett, Geoffrey and Barry R. Weingast (1993) "Ideas, interests, and institutions: Constructing the European Community's internal market", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 173-206.
- Gavshon, Arthur and Desmond Rice (1984) *The sinking of the Belgrano* (London: Secker and Warburg).
- Geertz, Clifford (1973) *The interpretation of culture* (London: Harper Collins).
- Gellner, Ernest (1985) *Relativism and the social sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- George, Bruce (1991) *The British Labour party and defence* (London: Praeger).
- and Walter Little (1985) *Options in the Falklands-Malvinas dispute* (London: South Atlantic Council Occasional Papers), 1-12.
- Giddens, Anthony (1974) "Elite in the British class structure", in Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens (eds.), *Elites and Power in British society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1-21.
- (1984) *The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press).
- (1995) *A contemporary critique of historical materialism* (London & Basingstoke).
- Gilbert, Richard (1966) "The Left's dilemma", *New Society*, 7, 172, 72-4.
- Gillard, D. R. (1965) "Salisbury's Heligoland offer: The case against the 'Witu Thesis'", *The English Historical Review*, 80, 3, 538-52.
- Gilpin, Robert (1981) *War and change in world politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Glasgow Herald* (1968) 28 March.
- Goebel, Julius (1982) *The struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press).
- Goffman, Erving (1974) *Frame analysis: An essay on the organisation of experience* (London: Penguin Books).
- Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane (1993) "Ideas and foreign policy: An analytical framework", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 3-30.
- Goldwert, Marvin (1972) *Democracy, militarism, and nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966, an interpretation* (Austin & London: University of Texas Press).
- Gollin, Alfred (1965) *Balfour's burden: Arthur Balfour and imperial preference* (London: Anthony Bond).
- Goncharov, Andrei (1984) "Introduction", in Social Sciences Today (ed.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academic of Sciences), 5-16.
- Gonzales, Maria E. Q., Tony French and Paul Treffner (1990) "A naturalistic approach to mental representation", in K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie and G. Erdos (eds.), *Lines of thinking: Reflections on the psychology of thought, vol. 1: Representation, reasoning, analogy and decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 57-68.
- Goodhart, Philip (1976) *Full-hearted consent: The story of the referendum campaign—and the campaign for the referendum* (London: Davis-Poynter).
- Gordon, Michael R. (1969) *Conflict and consensus in Labour's foreign policy: 1914-1965* (California: Stanford University Press).
- Gott, Richard (1989) "Little Englanders", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 90-102.
- Gourevitch, Peter Alexis (1996) "Squaring the circle: The domestic sources of international cooperation", *International Organisation*, 50, 2, 349-73.
- Grant, Wyn (1984) "The role and power of pressure groups", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press & St. Martin's Press), 123-43.

- (1995) *Pressure groups, politics and democracy in Britain*, 2nd edition (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf).
- Green, Duncan (1995) *Silent revolution: The rise of market economics in Latin America* (London: Cassell).
- Greene, Jennifer C. (1994) "Qualitative programme evaluation: Practice and promise", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 530-44.
- Greeno, James G. (1989) "A perspective on thinking", *American Psychologist*, 44, 2, 134-41.
- Grether, David M. and Charles R. Plott (1979) "Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon", *The American Economic Review*, 69, 4, 623-38.
- Grieco, Joseph M. (1988a) "Realist theory and the problem of international cooperation: Analysis with an amended prisoners' dilemma model", *Journal of Politics*, 50, 600-24.
- (1988b) "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism", *International Organisation*, 485-508.
- (1990) *Cooperation among nations* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press).
- (1993a) "The relative-gains problem for international cooperation", *American Political Science Review*, 87, 3, 729-43.
- (1993b) "Understanding the problem of international cooperation: The limits of neoliberal institutionalism and the future of realist theory", in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate* (NY: Columbia University Press), 301-38.
- (1997) "Realist international theory and the study of world politics", in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds.), *New thinking in international relations theory* (Oxford: Westview), 163-201.
- Griffith, J. A. G. (1974) *Parliamentary security of government bill* (London: PEP).
- and M. A. J. Wheeler Booth (1989) *Parliament functions, practice and procedures* (London: Sweet & Maxwell).
- Groom, A. J. R. (1990a) "The setting in world society", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for international cooperation* (London: Pinter), 3-26.
- and John Kinnas (1990b) "Association", in A. J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for international cooperation* (London: Pinter), 69-77.
- Gross, Colin (1968) *The fall of the British empire: 1918-1968* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
- Gould, Philip (1998) *The unfinished revolution: How the modernisers saved the Labour party* (London: Abacus).
- Gumperz, John J. (1982) *Discourse strategies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Gustafson, Lowell S. (1984) "The principle of self-determination and the dispute about sovereignty over the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands", *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, 37, 4, 81-99.
- (1988) *The sovereignty dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Guyer, Roberto E. (1983) "Antarctic's role in international relations", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 267-79.
- Haag, Ernest Van Den (1967) "On deterrence and the death penalty", *Ethic*, 78, 1, 280-8.
- Haber, Ralph Norman (1983) "Can information be objectivised?", *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 6, 1, 70-1.
- Hacon, R. J. (1955) "Neighbourhoods or neighbourhood units?", *The Sociological Review*, 3, 2, 235-46.
- Haines, Joe (1977) *The politics of power* (London: Jonathan Cape).
- Hall, John A. (1993) "Ideas and the social sciences", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 31-54.
- Hall, Peter A. (1993) "Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: The case of economic policymaking in Britain", *Comparative Politics*, 25, 275-96.
- Hall, Stuart (1980) "Recent developments in theories of language and ideology: A critical note", in Stewart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andy Lowe and Paul Wills (eds.), *Culture, media, language: Working paper in cultural studies, 1972-79* (London: Hutchinson), 157-62.
- Halliday, Fred (1994) "Theory and ethics in international relations: The contradictions of C. Wright Mills", *Millennium*, 23, 2, 377-85.
- Halliday, Fred and Justin Rosenberg (1998) "Interview with Ken Waltz", *Review of*

- International Studies*, 24, 3, 371-86.
- Hamilton, Willie (1992) *Blood on the wall* (London: Bloomsbury).
- Hammersley, Martyn (1995) *The politics of social research* (London: Sage).
- Hanessian, John Jr. (1974) "Overview: Some international legal consideration", in Schatz Gerald S. (ed.), *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), 67-71.
- Hardin, Russel (1982) *Collective action* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).
- Harris, Errol E. (1970) *Hypothesis and perception: The roots of scientific method* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Hart, Jeffrey (1976) "Comparative cognition: Politics of international control of the oceans", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 180-217.
- Hartshorne, Charles and Paul Weiss (1998) *Collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, vol. 1* (Bristol: Thoemmes).
- Hass, Ernst B. (1993) "Nationalism: An instrumental social construction", *Millennium*, 22, 3, 505-45.
- Havighurst, Alfred F. (1966) *Twentieth century Britain*, 2nd edition (NY: Harper & Row).
- Hayes, Carlton J H (1949) *The historical evolution of modern nationalism* (NY: Macmillan).
- Hayes-Roth, Barbara and Frederick Hayes-Roth (1977) "Concept learning and recognition and classification of exemplars", *Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behaviour*, 16, 3, 321-38.
- Healey, Denis (1989) *The time of my life* (London: Michael Joseph).
- Heap, J. A. (1983) "Cooperation in the Antarctic: A quarter of a century's experience", in Francisco Orrego Vicuna (ed.), *Antarctic resources policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 103-8.
- (1990) "Sovereignty as a source of stress", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), 181-92.
- Heater, Derek (1996) "Woodrow Wilson and national self-determination", *Modern Historical Review*, 7, 3, 6-8.
- Heath, Anthony, Bridget Taylor, Lindsay Brook and Alison Park (1999) "British national sentiment", *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 1, 155-75.
- Hedrick, Terry E. Leonard Bickman and Debra J. Rog (1993) *Applied research design* (London & New Delhi: Sage).
- Heertje, Arnold (1981) (ed.) *Schumpeter's vision: Capitalism, socialism and democracy after 40 years* (NY: Praeger).
- Hellevik, Ottar (1984) *Introduction to causal analysis: Exploring survey data by cross-tabulation* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Henle, Mary (1955) "Some effects of motivational processes on cognition", *Psychological Review*, 62, 6, 423-32.
- Hennessy, Alistair (1992) "Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and others", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), 9-48.
- Hennessy, Peter (1986) *Cabinet* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Herbert, Andrew M., G. Keith Humphrey and Pierre Jolicœur (1994) "The detection of bilateral symmetry: Effects of surrounding frames", *Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 48, 1, 140-8.
- Hermann, Margaret G. (1984) "Personality and foreign policy decision making: A study of 53 heads of government", in Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (eds.), *Foreign policy decision making: Perception, cognition, and artificial intelligence* (NY: Praeger), 53-80.
- Heron-Fermor, R. (1890) *Speech in condemnation of the cession of Heligoland*, delivered in Brighton on July 9, 1890.
- Herr, R. A., H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (1990) "Antartica's future symbols and reality", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), 11-28.
- Herring, Eric (1994) "International security and democratisation in East Europe", in Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford (eds.), *Building democracy* (London: Leicester University Press), 87-118.
- (1995) *Danger and opportunity: Explaining international crisis outcomes* (Manchester & NY: Manchester University Press).
- Hershey, John C., Howard C. Kunreuther and Paul J. H. Schoemaker (1988) "Sources of

- bias in assessment procedures for utility functions", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 422-42.
- Herter, Christian Jr. and Wayne S. Smith (1991) "Possible solutions", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 121-41.
- Hertzberg, Lars (1986) "The concept of role and human behaviour", in Barcan Marcus et al. (eds.), *Methodology and philosophy of science VII* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), 537-56.
- Hill, Christopher (1989a) "History and patriotism", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 3-8.
- (1989b) "The English revolution and patriotism", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 159-68.
- (1991) *Cabinet decisions on foreign policy: The British experience, October 1938-June 1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hillery, George Jr. (1955) "Definition of community: Areas of agreement", *Rural Psychology*, 20, 2, 111-23.
- Hilsman, Roger (1967) *To move a nation* (NY: Doubleday).
- Hindess, Barry (1990) "Analysing actors' choice", *International Political Sciences Review*, 11, 1, 87-97.
- Hinsley, F. H. (1986) *Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hiperl, Keith W., Muhong Wang and Niall M. Fraser (1988) "Hypergame analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas conflict", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, 335-58.
- Hobsbawn, E. J. (1990) *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Program, myth, reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Hodder-Williams, Richard (1970) *Public opinion polls and British politics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Hoffman, Mark (1994) "Normative international theory: Approaches and issues", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), 27-44.
- Hoffmann, Fritz L. and Olga Mingo Hoffmann (1984) *Sovereignty in dispute: The Falklands/Malvinas, 1493-1982* (Boulder & London: Westview).
- Hoffmann, Stanley (1965) *The state of war: Essays on the theory and practice of international politics* (London: Frederick A. Praeger).
- Hogwood, Brian W. and Thomas T. Mackie (1985) "Cabinet structures in individual countries: The United Kingdom, Decision sifting in a secret garden", in Thomas T. Mackie and Brian W. Hogwood (eds.), *Unlocking the cabinet: Cabinet structures in comparative perspective* (London: SAGE), 36-60.
- Hollis, Martin (1994) *The philosophy of social science: An introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- (1996) *Reason in action: Essays in the philosophy of social science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- and Steven Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and relativism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Holmes, Colin (1988) *John Bull's island immigration and British society, 1871-1971* (London: Macmillan).
- Holsti, Kal. J. (1978) "A new international politics? Diplomacy in complex interdependence", *International Organisation*, 32, 2, 513-30.
- (1995) *International politics: A framework for analysis* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International).
- Holsti, Ore R. (1976) "Foreign policy formulation viewed cognitively", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 18-54.
- Honeywell, Martin and Jenny Pearce (1982) *Falklands/Malvinas: Whose crisis?* (London: Latin American Bureau).
- Hoog, Robert de and Godfriend van der Wittenboer (1968) "Decision justification, information structure and the choice of decision rules", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 191-204.
- Hoogvelt, Ankie M. M. (1969) "Ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and Powellism", *Race*, 11, 1-12.
- Hope, Adrián F. J. (1983) "Sovereignty and decolonisation of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands", *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, 6, 2, 391-466.
- Horowitz, Irving Louis and Ellen Kay Trimberger (1975) "State power and military

- nationalism in Latin America", *Comparative Politics*, 8, 2, 223-44.
- Howard, Michael (1984) *The causes of wars* (London: Unwin Paperbacks).
- Howe, Geoffrey (1990) "Sovereignty and interdependence: Britain's place in the world", *International Affairs*, 66, 4, 675-95.
- Howe, Stephen (1989) "Labour patriotism, 1939-83", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 127-39.
- Hroch, Miroslav (1985) *Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: A comparative analysis of the social composition of patriotic groups among smaller European nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Huber, Oswald (1986) "Decision making as a problem solving process", Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Jure Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 109-38.
- (1989) "Information-processing operators in decision making", in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds.), *Process and structure in human decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons), 3-21.
- (1990) "Cognitive processes in multistage decision making", in K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie and G. Erdos (eds.), *Lines of thinking: Reflections on the psychology of thought, vol. 1: Representation, reasoning, analogy and decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 327-36.
- Huberman, A. Michael and Matthew B. Miles (1994) "Data management and analysis methods", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 428-44.
- Humphreys, Patrick (1986) "Intelligence in decision support", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 333-61.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) "Why international primacy matters?", *International Security*, 17, 4, 68-83.
- Hurd, Douglas and Andrew Osmond (1967) "The trouble with Britain's diplomacy", *New Society*, 9, 248, 951-3.
- Hyvarinen, Joy, Elizabeth Wall and Indrani Lutchman (1998) "The United Nations and fisheries in 1998", *Ocean Development & International Law*, 29, 323-38.
- Inayatullah, Naeem (1997) "Theories of spontaneous disorder", *Review of International Political Economy*, 4, 2, 319-48.
- and David L. Blaney (1995) "Realising sovereignty", *Review of International Studies*, 21, 3-20.
- Isaak, Robert A. (1995) *Managing world economic change: International political economy* (NJ: Prentice-hall International).
- Jabes, Jak (1978) *Individual process in organisational behaviour* (Arlington Heights, Illinois: AHM).
- Jacobson, Jessica (1997) "Perception of Britishness", *Nations and Nationalism*, 3, 2, 181-99.
- Jacobson, Norman (1964) "Causality and time in political process: A speculation", *American Political Science Review*, 58, 1, 15-22.
- Jacowitz, Karen E. and Daniel Kahneman (1995) "Measures of anchoring in estimation tasks", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 11, 1161-6.
- James, Barbara (1990) *Conserving the polar regions* (East Sussex: Wayland).
- James, Patrick (1993) "Neorealism as a research enterprise: Toward elaborated structural realism", *International Political Science Review*, 14, 2, 123-48.
- James, Robert Rhodes (1972) *Ambitions and realities: British politics 1964-70* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
- James, Simon (1994) "The cabinet system since 1945: Fragmentation and integration", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 4, 613-29.
- Jefferys, Kevin (1993) *The Labour party since 1945* (London: Macmillan).
- Jenkin, Peter (1970) *The battle of Downing Street* (London: Charles Knight & Co.).
- Jervis, Robert (1976) *Perception and misperception in international politics* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- (1978) "Cooperation under the security dilemma", *World Politics*, 30, 2, 167-214.
- (1979) "Deterrence theory revisited", *World Politics*, 31, 2, 289-324.
- (1991) "Models and cases in the study of international conflict", in Robert L. Rothstein (ed.), *The evolution of theory in international relations: Essays in honour of William T. R. Fox* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press), 61-81.
- (1992) "Political implications of loss aversion", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, 187-204.
- (1994) "Hans Morgenthau, realism, and the scientific study of international politics",

- Social Research*, 61, 4, 853-76.
- (1988) "Realism, game theory, and cooperation", *World Politics*, 40, 3, 317-49.
- Johnson, Edgar N. and John Dean Bickford (1927) "The contemplated Anglo-German alliance: 1890-1901", *Political Science Quarterly*, 62, 1, 1-57.
- Johnson, Harry J. (1967) "The Atlantic case", *New Society*, 9, 242, 724-7.
- Johnson, Richard D. (1980) "Barrington Moore, Perry Anderson and English social development", in Stewart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andy Lowe and Paul Wills (eds.), *Culture, media, language: Working paper in cultural studies, 1972-79* (London: Hutchinson), 48-70.
- (1987) "Making judgements when information is missing: Inference, biases, and framing effects", *Acta Psychologica*, 66, 1, 69-82.
- Johnson, Robert H. (1985/86) "Exaggerating America's stakes in Third World conflicts", *International Security*, 10, 3, 32-66.
- Johnson, R. W. (1985) *The politics of recession* (London: Macmillan).
- Johnson, Samuel (1977) "The patriot—1774", in Donald J. Greene (ed.), *Samuel Johnson: Political writings* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press), 387-400.
- Jones, Barry and Michael Keating (1985) *Labour and the British state* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Jones, Bill (1993) "The pitiless probing eye: Politicians and the broadcast political interview", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 1, 66-90.
- Jones, Charles A. (1992) "British capital in Argentine history: Structures, rhetoric and change", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), 63-77.
- Jones, Tudor (1996) *Remaking the Labour Party: From Gaitskell to Blair* (London & NY: Routledge).
- Jordan, David (1970) "Argentina's new military government", *Current History*, 58, 342, 85-91.
- Jordan, Grant and Jeremy Richardson (1982) "The British policy style or the logic of negotiation?", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *Policy styles in Western Europe* (London: George Allen & Unwin), 80-110.
- Jorre, John De St. (1972) *The Nigerian civil war* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
- Joyner, Christopher C. (1985) "Anglo-Argentine rivalry after the Falklands: On the road to Antarctica?", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 189-211.
- Judge, David (1993) *The parliamentary state* (London: Sage).
- Kahn, Robert L. and Charles F. Cannell (1967) *The dynamics of interviewing* (London & Sidney: John Wiley & Sons).
- Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1972) "Subjective probability: A judgement of representative-ness", *Cognitive Psychology*, 3, 3, 430-54.
- (1973) "On the psychology of prediction", *Psychological Review*, 80, 4, 237-51.
- (1979) "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk", *Econometrica*, 47, 2, 263-91.
- (1982a) "The psychology of preferences", *Scientific American*, 246, 1, 160-73.
- (1982b) "On the psychology of prediction", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 48-68.
- (1982c) "Subjective probability: A judgement of representative-ness" in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under certainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 32-47.
- Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler (1990) "Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the case theorem", *Journal of Political Economy*, 98, 1325-48.
- (1991) "Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5, 1, 193-206.
- Kalton, Graham and Dallas W. Anderson (1986) "Sampling rare populations", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 149, 1, 65-82.
- Kamenka, Eugene (1973) "Political nationalism—The evolution of the idea", in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The evolution of an idea* (Canberra: Australia National University Press), 2-20.
- Kaplan, Morton A. (1957) "Balance of power, bipolarity and other models of international systems", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, 684-95.
- Karlsson, Gunnar (1989) "Rules and strategies in decision making: A critical analysis from a phenomenological perspective", in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds.),

- Process and structure in human decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 51-62.
- Kavanagh, Dennis (1980) "Political culture in Great Britain: The decline of the civic culture", in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.), *The civic culture revisited* (Boston & Toronto: Little Brown and Company), 124-76.
- (1990) *British politics: Continuities and change* (NY: Oxford University Press).
- (1991) "Why political science needs history", *Political Studies*, 39, 479-95.
- Kay, Cristobal (1999) "Rural development: From agrarian reform to neoliberalism and beyond", in Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay (eds.), *Latin American transformed: Globalisation and modernity* (London, Sydney & Auckland: Arnold), 272-304.
- Kaysen, Carl (1990) "Is war obsolete?", *International Security*, 14, 4, 42-64.
- Kehr, Eckart (1977) *Economic interest, militarism, and foreign policy: Essays on German history* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press).
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1995) *World politics: Trend and transformation* (NY: St. Martin's Press).
- (1996) *American foreign policy: Pattern and process* (NY: St. Martin's Press).
- Kellas, James G. (1991) *The politics of nationalism and ethnicity* (London: Macmillan).
- Kennedy, Ellen (1991) "Towards a theory of state and sovereignty in contemporary Britain", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 143-64.
- Kennedy, Paul M. (1980) *The rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- and Anthony Nicholas (1981) *Nationalist and racialist movements in Britain and Germany before 1914* (London: Macmillan).
- Keohane, Robert O. (1984) *After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- (1986a) "Reciprocity in international relations", *International Organisation*, 40, 1, 1-27.
- (1986b) "Theory of world politics: Structural realism and beyond", in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its critics* (NY: Columbia University Press), 158-203.
- Keohane, Robert O. (1988) "International institutions: Two approaches", *International Studies Quarterly*, 32, 379-96.
- (1989) *International institutions and state power* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview).
- and Lisa L. Martin (1995) "The promise of institutionalist theory", *International Security*, 20, 2, 39-51.
- Khrunov, Yuri (1984) "The South Atlantic in imperialism's plans", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 30-50.
- Kier, Elizabeth (1995) "Culture and military doctrine: France between the wars", *International Security*, 19, 4, 65-93.
- King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994) *Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference in qualitative research* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- (1995) "The importance of research design in political science", *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, 475-81.
- Kinney, Douglas (1985) "Anglo-Argentine diplomacy and the Falklands crisis", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 81-105.
- Kirkpatrick, F. A. (1969) *A history of the Argentine republic* (NY: AMS).
- Kitzinger, Uwe (1966) "Into Europe", *New Society*, 8, 216, 764-6.
- (1973) *Diplomacy and persuasion: How Britain joined the Common Market* (London: Thames and Hudson).
- Klein, Rudolf (1968) "Labour's loves lost", *New Society*, 12, 313, 460.
- (1968b) "Without the prince", *New Society*, 11, 298, 881.
- Klinger, Jane M. (1999) *When in the realm of losses: Prospect theory and decision making in war*, paper presented at the International Studies Association, 16-20 February.
- Knetsch, Jack (1989) "The endowment effect and evidence of non-reversible indifference of curves", *American Economic Review*, 79, 1, 1277-84.
- and J. A. Sinden (1984) "Willingness to pay and compensation demanded: Experimental evidence of an unexpected disparity in measures of value", *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, XCIX, 507-21.
- Knight, David B. (1985) "Territory and people or people and territory? Thoughts on post-colonial self-determination", *International Political Science Review*, 6, 2, 248-72.
- Knights, David and Hugh Willmott (1985) "Power and identity in theory and practice", *The Sociological Review*, 33, 1, 22-46.

- Knox-Johnston, Robin (1995) *Cape Horn: A maritime history* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
- Kohn, Hans (1961) *The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background* (NY: Macmillan).
- Komorita, Samuel S. and Joan M. Barth (1985) "Components of reward in social dilemmas", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48, 2, 364-73.
- Kornberg, Allan and Robert C. Frasure (1971) "Policy differences in British parliamentary parties", *The American Political Science Review*, 65, 3, 694-703.
- Koslowski, Rey and Friedrich V. Kratochwil (1994) "Understanding change in international politics: The Soviet empire's demise and the international system", *International Organisation*, 48, 2, 215-47.
- Kramer, Roderick M. (1989) "Windows of vulnerability or cognitive illusions? Cognitive processes and the nuclear arms race", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1, 79-100.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1993) "Westphalia and all that", in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press), 235-64.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich V. (1985) *Peace and disputed sovereignty: Reflections on conflict over territory* (London: University Press of America).
- Kuhl, Julius (1986) "Human motivation: From decision making to action control", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 5-28.
- Labour Party Conference (1966) *Report of the 65th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House).
- (1967) *Report of the 66th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House).
- (1968) *Report of the 67th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House).
- (1969) *Report of the 68th annual conference of the Labour Party* (London: Transport House).
- Labour Research Department (1969) *Powell and his allies* (London: LRD).
- Ladriere, Jean (1986) "Scientific and ethical rationality", in Ruth Barcan Marcus, Georg J. W. Dorn and Paul Weingartner (eds.), *Logic, methodology and philosophy of science VII* (Amsterdam: North-Holland), 699-710.
- La Nacion* (trans.) *The South American Press* (1999) 14/22 September.
- Lakatos, Imre (1970) "Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes", in Imre Lakatos and Alan. Musgrave (eds.), *Criticism and the growth of knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 91-195.
- Lambert, David (1987) *Our world: Polar regions* (East Sussex: Wayland).
- Langlands, Rebecca (1999) "Britishness or Englishness? The historical problem of national identity in Britain", *Nations and Nationalism*, 5, 1, 53-69.
- Larkins, Jeremy (1994) "Representations, symbols, and social facts: Durkheim and IR theory", *Millennium*, 23, 2, 239-64.
- Larrain, Jorge (1999) "Modernity and identity: Cultural change in Latin America", in Robert N. Gwynne and Cristobal Kay (ed.), *Latin America transformed: Globalisation and modernity* (London, Sidney & Auckland: Arnold), 182-202.
- Latta, Robert and Alexander MacBeath (1964) *The elements of logic* (London: Macmillan).
- Lau, Siu-kai (1992) "Colonial rule, transfer of sovereignty and the problem of political leaders in Hong Kong", *Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 30, 2, 223-42.
- Layder, Derek (1988) "The relation of theory and method: Casual relatedness, historical contingency and beyond", *The Sociological Review*, 36, 2, 441-73.
- Layton-Henry, Zig (1984) *The politics of race in Britain* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Lazarev, Marklen (1984) "The legal aspect of the conflict", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 51-66.
- Leach, Robert (1995) "Political ideas", in Maurice Mullard (ed.), *Policy-making in Britain* (London & NY: Routledge), 13-32.
- Lebow, Richard Ned (1989) "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The origins of the Falklands war", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), *Psychology and deterrence* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press), 89-124.
- and Janice Gross Stein (1987) "Beyond deterrence", *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, 4, 5-71.

- and Janice Gross Stein (1989) "Rational deterrence theory: I think, therefore I deter", *World Politics*, 41, 2, 208-24.
- (1996) "Play it again Pericles: Agents, structures and the Peloponnesian war", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, 2, 231-58.
- (1999) "The rise and fall of the Cold War on comparative perspective", *Review of International Studies*, 25, special issue, December, 21-39.
- Legro, Jeffrey and Andrew Moravcsik (1998) *Is anybody still a realist?* Paper no. 98-14, forthcoming in *International Security*.
- Leigh, Monroe (1985) "Trusteeship for the Falklands under joint U.K.-U.S. administration: A proposal", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy, and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 225-31.
- Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich (1996) *Imperialism: The highest stage of capitalism* (London & Chicago: Pluto).
- Leon, Manuel and Norman H. Anderson (1974) "A ratio rule from integration theory applied to inference judgements", *Experimental Psychology*, 102, 1, 27-36.
- Levin, Irwin P., Sara K. Schnittjer and Shannon L. Thee (1988) "Information framing effects in social and personal decisions", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, 5, 520-9.
- Levy, Jack S. (1988) "Review article: When do deterrent threats work?", *British Journal of Political Science*, 18, 4, 485-512.
- (1992) "Prospect theory and international relations: Theoretical applications and analytical problems", *Political Psychology*, 13, 2, 283-10.
- (1996) "Loss aversion, framing, and bargaining: The implications of prospect theory for international conflict", *International Political Science Review*, 17, 2, 179-95.
- (1997a) "Prospect theory, rational choice, and international relations", *International Studies Quarterly*, 41, 1, 87-112.
- (1997b) "Prospect theory and the cognitive-rational debate", in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 33-50.
- Lewis, Roy (1979) *Enoch Powell: Principle in politics* (London: Cassell).
- Lieber, Robert J. (1972) *Theory and world politics* (Massachusetts: Winthrop).
- Lindblom, Charles E. (1965) *The intelligence of democracy* (London: Collier-Macmillan).
- Linklater, Andrew (1994) "Dialogue, dialect and emancipation in international relations at the end of the post-War age", *Millennium*, 23, 1, 119-31.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin (1992) "The centrality of political culture", in Arend Lijphart (ed.), *Parliamentary versus presidential government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 207-11.
- Lipson, Charles (1984) "International cooperation in economic and security affairs", *World Politics*, 37, 1, 1-23.
- Little, Richard (1977) "Three approaches to the international system: Some ontological and epistemological considerations", *British Journal of International Studies*, 3, 3, 269-85.
- (1988a) "The study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), 245-59.
- (1988b) "Belief system in the social science", in Richard Little and Steve Smith (eds.), *Belief systems and international relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 37-56.
- Little, Walter (1984) "The Falklands affairs: A review of the literature", *Political Studies*, 32, 2, 296-310.
- (1988) "Anglo-Argentine relations and the management of the Falklands question", in Peter Byrd (ed.), *British foreign policy under Thatcher* (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin's Press), 137-56.
- (1991) "Political opinion in Britain" in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 63-80.
- Lockhead, Gregory R. (1980) "Know, then decide", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 143-54.
- Loveland, Ian (1993) "Redefining parliamentary sovereignty? A new perspective on the search for the meaning of law", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 3, 319-32.
- Luntley, Michael (1999) *Contemporary philosophy of thought: Truth, world, content* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- Lykken, David T. (1970) "Statistical significance in psychological research" in Pietro Badia, Audrey Haber and Richard P. Runyon (eds.), *Research problems in psychology*

- (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley), 263-77.
- Lynch, John (1993) "From independence to national organisation", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1-46.
- MacCormick, Neil (1996) "Liberalism, nationalism and the post-sovereignty state", *Political Studies*, 44, 553-67.
- MacCrimmon, Kenneth R. and Ronald N. Taylor (1975) "Problem solving and decision making", in Marvin D. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organisational psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally), 1397-453.
- MacDonald, Callum A. (1992) "End of empire: The decline of the Anglo-Argentine connection 1918-1951", in Alistair Hennessy and John King (eds.), *The land that England lost* (London: British Academic Press), 79-92.
- Macfarlane, L. J. (1975) *Issues in British politics since 1945* (London: Longman).
- Mackintosh, John P. (1982) *John P. Mackintosh on parliament and social democracy*, David Marquand (ed.) (London & NY: Longman).
- Mack, Ruth P. (1971) *Planning on uncertainty: Decision making in business and government administration* (NY: Wiley-Interscience).
- MacKenzie, Ian M. (1994) "Taylor and Ricoeur on narrative identity", in Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer (eds.), *Contemporary political studies*, vol. 2 (Belfast: Political Studies Association), 730-9.
- Mackintosh, John (1967) "The Common Market case", *New Society*, 9, 241, 686-7.
- Macleod, Alex (1997) "Great Britain: Still searching for status?", in Philippe G. Le Pretre (ed.), *Role quests in the post-Cold War era: Foreign policies in transition* (London: McGill-Queen's University Press), 161-86.
- Madeley, John (1985) *Diego Garcia: A contrast to the Falklands, report no. 54* (London: Minority Rights Group).
- Madgwick, Peter (1994a) *A new introduction to British politics* (London: Stanley Thornes).
- (1994b) "Ending in failure? Lives of the great political leaders", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 3, 469-82.
- Macridis, Roy C. (1996) "Comparative analysis: Methods and concepts", in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), 1-14.
- Maechling, Charles Jr. (1991) "Confidence building and the future", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 109-19.
- Mallison, William Thomas Jr. (1974) "Legal implications: International Law", in Schatz, Gerald S. (ed.), *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), 37-47.
- Mandelson, Peter and Roger Liddle (1996) *The Blair revolution: Can new Labour deliver?* (London & Boston: Faber and Faber).
- Maoz, Zeev (1986) "Multiple paths to choice: An approach for the analysis of foreign policy decisions", in Irmtraud N. Gallhofer, Willem E. Saris and Marianne Melman (eds.), *Different text analysis procedures for the study of decision making* (Amsterdam: Sociometric Research Foundation), 69-93.
- (1991) "Framing the national interest: The manipulation of foreign policy decisions in group settings", *World Politics*, 43, 1, 77-110.
- Marchand, Marianne H. (1994) "The political economy of the north-south relations", in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (eds.), *Political economy and the changing global order* (London: Macmillan), 289-301.
- Marsh, D. (1983) "Introduction: Interest groups in Britain—Their access and power", in David Marsh (ed.), *Pressure politics: Interest groups in Britain* (London: Junction), 1-19.
- and Joanna Chambers (1983) "The abortion lobby: Pluralism at work?" in David Marsh (ed.), *Pressure politics: Interest groups in Britain* (London: Junction), 144-65.
- Martin, Joanne and Debra Meyerson (1988) "Organisation cultures and the denial, channelling and acknowledgement of ambiguity", in Louis R. Pondy, Richard J. Boland, Jr. and Howard Thomas (eds.), *Mapping ambiguity and change* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 93-125.
- Martin, Lisa L. (1992) "Institutions and cooperation: Sanctions during the Falklands Islands conflict", *International Security*, 16, 4, 143-78.
- (1994) "International and domestic institutions in the EMU process", in Jeff Frieden and Barry Eichengreen (eds.), *The political economy of European unification* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview), 87-106.
- Martin, Paul and Patrick Bateson, Frs (1993) *Measuring behaviour: An introductory guide*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

- Martynov, Boris (1984) "Position of the organisation of American states", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 89-101.
- Marwick, Arthur (1998) *The sixties: Cultural revolution in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, c. 1958—c.1974* (Oxford & NY: Oxford University Press).
- Mastanduno, Michael (1991) "Do relative gains matter?—America's response to Japanese industrial policy", *International Security*, 16, 1, 73-113.
- (1993) "Framing the Japan problem: the Bush administration and the Structural Impediments Initiative" in Janice G. S. and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), 35-64.
- Mathews, John C. III (1996) "Current gains and future outcomes: When cumulative relative gains matter", *International Security*, 21, 1, 112-46.
- Maule, A. John (1985) "Cognitive approaches to decision making", in George Wright (ed.), *Behavioural decision making* (NY & London: Plenum), 61-84.
- Maxwell, James Clark (1965) *Scientific paper, vol. 1* (NY: Dover).
- Maxwell, Joseph A. (1996) *Qualitative research design: An interactive approach* (London & New Delhi: Sage).
- Mayall, James (1994) "Nationalism in the study of international relations", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), 182-94.
- McCarthy, Terry (1999) "The son of heaven?", *Time*, 29 November 1999, 36-9.
- McClosky, Herbert (1960) "Perspectives on personality and foreign policy", *World Politics*, 13, 1, 129-33.
- McDermott, Rose (1998) *Risk-taking in international politics: Prospect theory in American foreign policy* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press).
- McFarland, Cathy and Dale T. Miller (1994) "The framing of relative performance feedback: Seeing the glass as half empty or half full", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66, 6, 1061-73.
- McGraw, Anthony (1998) "Realism vs. cosmopolitanism: A debate between Barry Buzan and David Held", *Review of International Studies*, 24, 3, 387-98.
- McGuinness, Barbara (1995) "Communitarian politics, justice and diversity", in Joni Lovenduski and Jeffrey Stranier (eds.), *Contemporary political studies, I* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom), 64-72.
- McGuire, William J. (1967a) "The current status of cognitive consistency theories", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in attitude theory and measurement* (NY: Wiley & Sons), 401-21.
- (1967b) "Cognitive consistency and attitude change", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in attitude theory and measurement* (NY: Wiley & Sons), 357-65.
- McKenzie, R. T. (1968) "Parties, pressure groups and the British political process", in Robert Benewick and Robert E. Dowse (eds.), *Readings on British politics and government* (London: University of London Press), 137-50.
- McKeown, Timothy (1993) "Decision processes and cooperation in foreign policy", Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (London: John Hopkins University Press), 202-19.
- McLynn, F. J. (1983) "Peron's ideology and its relation to political thought and action", *Review of International Studies*, 9, 1, 1-15.
- McMillan, Susan M. (1997) "Interdependence and conflict", *Mershon International Studies*, 41, 33-58.
- Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/5) "A realist reply", *International Security*, 20, 1, 82-92.
- Melhuus, Marit (1999) "Insisting on culture?", *Social Anthropology*, 7, 1, 65-80.
- Mendez, Nicanor Costa (1987) "Beyond deterrence: The Malvinas-Falklands case", *Journal of Social Issues*, 43, 4, 119-22.
- Mercer, Jonathan (1993) "Independence or interdependence: Testing resolve reputation", in Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis (eds.), *Coping with complexity in the international system* (Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview), 163-89.
- Mercopress (1998) 11 September; 30 November.
- (1999) 4 April; 14 April; 12 December
- Messick, David M. (1986) "Decision making in social dilemmas: Some attributional effects", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevón (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 219-27.
- Metford, J. C. J. (1968) "Falklands or Malvinas? The background to the dispute", *International Affairs*, 44, 3, 463-81.

- Michels, Robert (1997) "The iron law of oligarchy", in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), 244-9.
- Miller, David (1989) *Market, state, and community: Theoretical foundations of market socialism* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- (1993) "In defence of nationality", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 10, 3-17.
- Milliken, Jennifer (1999) "The study of discourse in international relations: A critique of research and methods", *European Journal of International Relations*, 5, 2, 225-54.
- Milner, Helen V. (1992) "International theories of cooperation among nations", *World Politics*, 44, 3, 465-96.
- (1997) *Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and international relations* (NJ: Princeton University).
- Minkin, Lewis (1978) *The Labour party conference: A study on the politics of intra-party democracy* (London: Allen Lane).
- Minogue, Kenneth R. (1969) *Nationalism* (London: B. T. Batsford).
- Miroshevsky, Vladimir (1984) "Britain's armed invasion of La Plata", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 17-21.
- Mitchell, Austin (1994) "Back-bench influence: A personal view", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47, 4, 687-704.
- Mitchell, Christopher (1994) "Conflict research", in A. J. R. Groom and Margot Light (eds.), *Contemporary international relations: A guide to theory* (London: Pinter), 128-41.
- Montgomery, Henry (1987) "Image theory and dominance search theory: How is decision making actually done", *Acta Psychologica*, 66, 1, 221-4.
- (1989) "From cognition to action: The search for dominance in decision making", in Henry Montgomery and Ola Svenson (eds.), *Process and structure in human decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons), 23-49.
- Moorhouse, Geoffrey (1977) *The diplomats: The Foreign Office today* (London: Janathan Cape).
- Moran, Michael (1989) *Politics and society in Britain: An introduction*, 2nd edition (London: Macmillan).
- Moran, Theodore H. (1970) "The 'development' of Argentina and Australia: The radical party of Argentina and the Labour party of Australia in the process of economic and political development", *Comparative Politics*, 3, 3, 71-92.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993) "Introduction: Integrating international and domestic theories of international bargaining", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press), 3-42.
- (1997) "Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics", *International Organisation*, 51, 4, 513-53.
- Morgan, Kenneth O. (1987) *Labour people: Leaders and lieutenants, Hardie to Kinnock* (Oxford & NY: Oxford University Press).
- Morgan, Roger (1971) "The role of medium powers in world politics: The case of Britain", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and West Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), 261-76.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. (1951) *In defence of the national interest: A critical examination of American foreign policy* (NY: Alfred A. Knopf).
- (1966) *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, 3rd edition (NY: Alfred A. Knopf).
- (1978) *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, 5th edition (NY: Alfred A. Knopf).
- Moro, Ruben O. (1989) *The history of the South Atlantic conflict: The war for the Malvinas* (London: Praeger).
- Morrow, James D. (1997) "A rational choice approach to international conflict", in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 11-31.
- Morse, Janice M. (1994) "Designing funded qualitative research", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 220-35.
- Myhre, Jeffrey D. (1983) "Title to the Falklands-Malvinas under international law", *Millennium*, 12, 1, 25-38.
- Nagel, Ernest (1968) *The structure of science* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Nairn, Tom (1977) *The break-up of Britain: Crisis and neo-nationalism* (London: Verso).

- Neisser, U. (1983) "Components of intelligence or steps in routine procedures", *Cognition*, 15, 189-97.
- Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson and Zoe M. Oxley (1997) "Media framing of a civil liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 3, 567-83.
- Newell, Allen and Herbert A. Simon (1972) *Human problem solving* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).
- New Society* (1966a) "Observation: What is at stake?", 7, 179, 3.
- (1966b) "Observation: A hope of progress", 7, 184, 3.
- (1967a) "Observation: An Atlantic alternative?", 9, 223, 3-5.
- (1967b) "Labour and unemployment", 10, 261, 419-20.
- Nisbet, Robert A. (1962) *The quest for community* (NY: Oxford University Press).
- Nicholson, Michael (1995) "Rational decision in international crises: A rationalisation", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational choice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 162-78.
- Northedge, F. S. (1974) *Descent from power: British foreign policy 1945-1973* (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Norton, Philip (1984) *The British polity* (NY & London: Longman).
- Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (1988) "Neorealism and neoliberalism", *World Politics*, 40, 2, 235-51.
- Odell, John S. (1993) "International threats and internal politics: Brazil, the European Community, and the United States, 1985-1987", in Peter B. Evan, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley & London: University of California Press), 233-64.
- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W. (1977) *The principle of self-determination in international law* (NY: Nellen).
- Oppenheim, Felix E. (1987) "National interest, rationality, and morality", *Political Theory*, 15, 3, 369-89.
- Orbell, John (1991) "A 'cognitive miser' theory of co-operator's advantage", *American Political Science Review*, 85, 2, 515-28.
- Orme, John (1987) "Deterrence failure: A second look", *International Security*, 11, 4, 96-124.
- Ortner, Sherry B. (1973) "On key symbols", *American Anthropologist*, 75, 5, 1338-46.
- Osgood, Charles E. (1967) "Cognitive dynamics in the conduct of human affairs", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Readings in attitude theory and measurement* (NY: Wiley & Sons), 422-36.
- and P. Tannenbaum (1955) "The principle of congruity and the prediction of attitude change", *Psychological Review*, 62, 42-55.
- Oye, Kenneth A. (1985) "Explaining cooperation under anarchy" in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.) *Cooperation under anarchy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 1-24.
- Parsons, Anthony (1983) "The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March-14 June 1982", *International Affairs*, 59, 2, 169-78.
- Patten, John (1989) "The Muslim community in Britain", *The Times*, 5 July.
- Patton, Michael Quinn (1990) *Qualitative evaluation and research methods* (London: Sage).
- Paul, Darel E. (1999) "Sovereignty, survival and the Westphalian blind alley in international relations", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 2, 217-31.
- Pauly, Louis W. (1993) "The political foundations of multilateral economic surveillance", in Janice Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), 94-127.
- Payne, John W. (1980) "Information processing theory: Some concepts and methods applied to decision research", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 95-115.
- Pearce, Joan (1982) "The Falkland Islands dispute", *The World Today*, 38, 161-5.
- Penguin News* (1999) 17/21/28 May; 4 June; 2/9/16/23 July; 15 October.
- Perina, Ruben M. (1991) "The view from Buenos Aires", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publisher), 45-60.
- Pettman, Jan Jindy (1998) "Nationalism and after", *Review of International Studies*, 24, Special issue, December, 149-64.
- Phillips, D. C. (1987) *Philosophy, science and social inquiry: Contemporary methodological controversies in social science and related applied fields of research* (Oxford: Pergamon).
- Phipps, Colin (1977) *What future for the Falklands* (London: Fabian Tract).

- Pickering, W. S. F. (1984) *Durkeim's sociology of religion: Themes and theories* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
- Pierson, Paul (1993) "When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change", *World Politics*, 45, 4, 595-628.
- Pimlott, Ben (1992) *Harold Wilson* (London: Harper Collins).
- Pitz, Gordon F. (1980) "The very guide of life: The use of probabilistic information for making decisions", in Thomas S. Wallsten (ed.), *Cognitive processes in choice and decision behaviour* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 77-94.
- and Natalie J. Sachs (1984) "Judgement and decision: Theory and application", *Annual Review of Psychology*, 35, 139-63.
- Plamenatz, John (1973) "Two types of nationalism", in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: The evolution of an idea* (Canberra: Australia National University Press), 22-36.
- Plant, Raymond (1974) *Community and ideology: An essay in applied social philosophy* (London & Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
- (1984) *Equality, markets and the state* (London: Fabian Society).
- Platt, D. C. M. (1972) "Economic imperialism and the businessmen: Britain and Latin America before 1914", in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), *Studies in the theory of imperialism* (London: Longman), 295-311.
- Plight, Joop van der and Els C. M. van Schie (1990) "Frames of reference, judgement and preference", in Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone (eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology*, vol. 1 (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 61-80.
- Poincare, H. (1952) *Science and hypothesis* (London: Dover).
- Pommerehne, Werner W., Friedrich Schneider and Peter Zweifel (1982) "Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon: A re-examination", *American Economic Review*, 72, 569-574.
- Posner, Michael I. (1982) "Information processing models—In search of elementary operations", *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 477-514.
- Potash, Robert A. (1980) *The army and politics in Argentina, 1945-1962: Peron to Frondizi* (London: Athlone).
- (1996) *The army and politics in Argentina, 1962-1973: From Frondizi's fall to the Peronist restoration* (California: Stanford University Press).
- Potter, Allen (1966) "The political consensus", *New Society*, 7, 182, 9-11.
- Poundstone, Willism (1985) *The recursive universe: Cosmic complexity and the limits of scientific knowledge* (NY: Oxford University Press).
- Powell, J. Enoch (1970) "Enoch Powell's campaign speech", in John Wood (ed.), *Powell and the 1970 election* (Surrey: Elliot Right Way), 92-124.
- (1972) "Immigration", in John Wood (ed.), *Still to decide* (London: B. T. Batsford), 184-207.
- Pratt, Mary Louise (1986) "Fieldwork in common places", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography* (Los Angeles, Berkley & London: University of California Press), 27-50.
- Proudfoot, Mary (1974) *British politics and government, 1951-1970: A study of an affluent society* (London: Faber and Faber).
- Punnett, R. M. (1987) *British government and politics*, 5th edition (Aldershot: Gower).
- Putnam, Robert D. (1993a) "Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games", in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press), 431-68.
- (1993b) *Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Quattrone, George A. and Amos Tversky (1988) "Contrasting rational and psychological analyses of political choice", *American Political Science Review*, 82, 3, 719-36.
- Quilty, Patrick G. (1990) "Antarctica as a continent for science", in R. A. Herr, H. R. Hall, and M. G. Haward (eds.), *Antarctica's future: Continuity or change?* (Hobart Tasmania, Australia: Australian Institute of International Affairs), 29-37.
- Rabinow, Paul (1994) "Representations are social facts: Modernity and post-modernity in anthropology", in James Clifford and George E. Marcus (eds.), *Writing culture: The poetics and politics of ethnography* (Los Angeles, Berkley & London: University of California Press), 234-61.
- Raison, Timothy and Humphrey Taylor (1966) "Britain into Europe—So we want to join?", *New Society*, 7, 195, 6-9.
- Ragin, Charles C. (1994) *Constructing social research: The unity and diversity of method* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge).

- Ramirez-Faria, Carlos (1991) *The origins of economic inequality between nations* (London: Unwin Hyman).
- Rapoport, Anatol (1958) "Various meaning of 'theory'", *American Political Science Review*, 52, 4, 972-88.
- Raton, Pierre (1984) *The international status of Andorra* (Andorra: Grafinter).
- Rawls, John (1972) *A theory of justice* (Oxford: Clarendon).
- Reed, Bruce and Geoffrey Williams (1971) *Denis Healey and the policies of power* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson).
- Reilly, Robert J. (1982) "Preference reversal: Further evidence and some suggested modifications in experimental design", *American Economic Review*, 72, 576-84.
- Rennie, Ysabel F. (1945) *The Argentine Republic* (NY: Macmillan).
- Rentoul, John (1995) *Tony Blair* (London: Warner Books).
- Rescher, Nicholas (1964) *Hypothetical reasoning* (Amsterdam: North-Holland).
- Reynolds, Charles (1973) *Theory and explanation in international politics* (London: Martin Robertson).
- Reynolds, Charles (1981) *Modes of imperialism* (Oxford: Martin Robertson).
- Reynolds, David (1991) *Britannia overruled: British policy and world power in the twentieth century* (London & NY: Longman).
- Rhodes, Edward (1998) "Book review", *American Political Science Review*, 92, 4, 985-6.
- Richardson, Jeremy, Gustafsson Gunnel and Jordan Grant (1982) "The concept of policy style", in Jeremy Richardson (ed.), *Policy style in Western Europe* (London: George Allen and Unwin), 1-16.
- Richardson, Laurel (1994) "Writing: A method of inquiry", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 516-29.
- Richardson, Louise (1993) "Avoiding and incurring losses: Decision-making in the Suez crisis", in Janice G. S. and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), 170-201.
- Ricour, Paul (1981) "The task of hermeneutics", in John B. Thompson (ed.), *Hermeneutics and the human science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 43-62.
- Riddell, Peter (1997) "Cracks in the Cabinet cement", *The Times*, 10 November.
- Riley, Robert T. and Thomas F. Pettigrew (1976) "Dramatic events and attitude change", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 5, 1004-15.
- Robbins, Keith (1990) "British culture versus British industry", in Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins (eds.), *Debates in modern history: British culture and economic decline* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 1-23.
- Robinson, Ronald, John Callagher and Alice Denny (1961) *African and the Victorians* (London: Macmillan).
- Rock, David (1985) *Argentina 1516-1982* (California: University of California Press).
- (1993) "Argentina: 1930-1946", in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 173-241.
- Roett, Riordan (1992) "The foreign policy of Latin America", in MacRidis Roy C. (ed.), *Foreign policy in world politics* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International).
- Rogers, Ronald W. and C. Ronald Mewborn (1976) "Fear appeals and attitude change: Effects of a threat's noxiousness, probability of occurrence, and the efficacy of coping responses", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 1, 54-61.
- Rogow, Arnold A. (1957) "Comment on Smith and Apter: Whatever happened to the great issues?", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, 763-75.
- Rogowski, Ronald (1995) "The role of theory and anomaly in social-scientific inference", *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, 467-70.
- Roney, Christopher J. R., E. Tory Higgins and James Shah (1995) "Goals and framing: How outcome focus influences motivation and emotion", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21, 11, 1151-60.
- Rootes, David (1980) *Exploration into the polar regions* (London: Belitha).
- Roper, Christopher (1983) "The Falkland war: A review of three books", *History Workshop*, 15, 180-2.
- Rosati, Jerel A. (1984) "The impact of beliefs on behaviour: The foreign policy of the Carter administration", in Donald A. Sylvan and Steven Chan (eds.), *Foreign policy decision making* (NY: Praeger), 158-91.
- Rose, E. F. B. (1969) *Colour and citizen: A report on British race relations* (London: Institute of Race Relations).
- Rose, R. (1993) *Lesson-drawing in public policy: A guidance to learning across time and space* (NJ: Chatham House).
- Rose, Richard (1989) *Politics in England: Change and persistence*, 5th edition (London: Macmillan).

- Rosenau, James N. (1997) *Along the domestic-foreign frontier: Exploring governance in a turbulent world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- and Mary Durfee (1995) *Thinking theory thoroughly: Coherent approaches to an incoherent world* (Oxford: Westview).
- Ross, Michael and Fiore Sicoly (1982) "Egocentric biases in availability and attribution", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 179-89.
- Ross, Stuart A. (1976) "Complexity and the presidency: Gouverneur Morris in the constitutional convention", in Robert Axelrod (ed.), *Structure of decision: The cognitive maps of political elites* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 96-112.
- Roth, Andrew (1972) *Heath and the Heathmen* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
- Rouquie, Alao (1983) "Argentina: The departure of the military-end of a political cycle or just another episode?", *International Affairs*, 59, 4, 575-86.
- Rubin, Alfred P. (1985) "Historical and legal background of the Falkland/Malvinas dispute", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 9-33.
- Rubinstein, W. D. (1990) "Cultural explanations for Britain's economic decline: How true?", in Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins (ed.), *Debates in modern history: British culture and economic decline* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson), 305-23.
- Ruggie, John Gerard (1992) "Multilateralism: The anatomy of an institution", *International Organisation*, 46, 3, 561-98.
- (1998) *Constructing the world polity: Essays on international institutionalisation* (London & NY: Routledge).
- Sampson, Anthony (1971) "The institutions of British foreign policy", in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan (eds.), *Britain and west Germany: Changing societies and the future of foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press), 171-89.
- (1982) *The changing anatomy of Britain* (London: Hodder & Stoughton).
- Sampson, Edward E. (1981) "Cognitive psychology as ideology", *American Psychologists*, 36, 7, 730-43.
- Samuel, Raphael (1989) "Continuous national history", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 9-17.
- Samuelson, William and Richard Zechhauser (1988) "Status quo bias in decision making", *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 1, 7-59.
- Sandel, Michael J. (1996) *Democracy's discontent* (Cambridge: Belknap).
- Sanders, David (1990) *Losing an empire, finding a role: British foreign policy since 1945* (London: Macmillan).
- (1993) "Foreign and defence policy", in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds.), *Developments in British Politics* (London: Macmillan), 285-370.
- (1994a) "Behaviour analysis", chapter prepared for inclusion in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and methods in political science* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1995).
- (1994b) *Neorealism, neoliberalism and the condition of contemporary international relations*, paper for presentation at a panel entitled "The state of the discipline: International relations" at the XVIth Congress of the International Political Science Association, Berlin, August 21-25.
- Sandven, Tore (1999) "Autonomy, adaptation, and rationality—A critical discussion of Jon Elster's concept of 'sour grapes', part II", *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 29, 2, 173-205.
- Sartori, Giovanni (1996) "Comparing and mis-comparing", in Bernard E. Brown and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Comparative politics: Notes and readings*, 8th edition (London: Wadsworth), 20-30.
- Schamis, Hector E. (1991) "Reconceptualising Latin American authoritarianism in the 1970s", *Comparative Politics*, 23, 2, 201-20.
- Schatz, Gerald S. (1974) (ed.) *Science, technology, and sovereignty in the polar regions* (London: Lexington), 97-104.
- Schie, Van Els C. M. and Joop Van der Plight (1990) "Problem representation, frame preference, and risky choice", *Acta Psychologica*, 75, 243-59.
- Schneider, David M. (1976) "Notes toward a theory of culture", in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in anthropology* (USA: University of New Mexico Press), 197-220.

- Schober, Michael F. and Frederick G. Conrad (1997) "Does conversational interviewing reduce survey measurement error?", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61, 4, 576-602.
- Schoen, Douglas E. (1977) *Enoch Powell and the Powellites* (London: Macmillan).
- Schul, Yaacov and Yoav Ganzach (1995) "The influence of quantity of information and goal framing on decision", *Acta Psychologica*, 89, 1, 23-36.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1951a) "Capitalism", in Richard V. Clemence (ed.), *Essays on topics of J. A. Schumpeter* (NY: Kennikat), 184-205.
- (1951b) *Imperialism and social classes*, Heinz Norden (trans.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
- Schweller, Randall L. and David Priess (1997) "A tale of two realisms: Expanding the institutions debate", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, 1, 1-32.
- Scott, Andrew M. (1967) *The functioning of the international political system* (London: Collier-Macmillan).
- Searing, Donald D. (1995) "Backbench and leadership roles in the House of Commons", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 48, 3, 418-37.
- Segal, David R. and Katherine Swift Gravino (1985) "The empire strikes back: Military professionalism in the South Atlantic war", in James Brown and William P. Snyder (eds.), *The regionalisation of warfare* (Oxford: Transaction Books), 17-36.
- Seymour-Ure, Colin (1970) "The 'disintegration' of the cabinet and the neglected question of cabinet", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 24, 3, 196-207.
- Shackleton, Lord (1976) *Economic survey of the Falkland Islands, vol. 1* (London: Economist Intelligence Unit).
- Shapcott, Richard (1994) "Conversion and coexistence: Gadamer and the interpretation of international society", *Millennium*, 23, 1, 57-85.
- Shapere, Dudley (1985) "Observation and the scientific enterprise", in Peter Achinstein and Owen Hannaway (eds.), *Observation, experiment, and hypothesis in modern physical science* (Cambridge: MIT), 21-45.
- Shapiro, Michael J. (1998) "Book Review: What if they gave a crisis and nobody came? Interpreting international crises", *American Political Science Review*, 92, 4, 977.
- Sharpe, J. A. (1987) *Early modern England: A social history 1550-1760* (London: Arnold).
- Shaw, Malcolm N. (1995) *International law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Shepherd, Robert (1996) *Enoch Powell* (London: Hutchinson).
- Shlaim, Avi, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury (1977) *British foreign secretaries since 1945* (London: David & Charles).
- Shokina, Izabella (1984) "Argentine workers' movement at the new stage", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 102-9.
- Shue, Henry (1995) "Ethics, the environment and the changing international order", *International Affairs*, 71, 3, 453-61.
- Sibeon, Roger (1999) "Agency, structure, and social chances as cross-disciplinary concepts", *Politics*, 19, 3, 139-44.
- Silverstein, Michael (1976) "Shifters, linguistic categories, and cultural description", in Keith H. Basso and Henry A. Selby (eds.), *Meaning in anthropology* (USA: University of New Mexico Press), 11-55.
- Simon, Herbert A. (1966) "Political research: The decision-making framework", in David Easton (ed.), *Varieties of political theory* (NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.), 15-24.
- (1976) "From substantive to procedural rationality", in Spiro J. Latsis (ed.), *Method and appraisal in economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 129-48.
- (1985) "Human nature in politics: The dialogue of psychology with political science", *American Political Science Review*, 79, 293-305.
- (1986) "Rationality in psychology and economics", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s209-s224.
- Sjoberg, Lennart (1980) "Political problems in carrying through a difficult decision", *Acta Psychologica*, 45, 123-32.
- Sked, Alan and Chris Cook (1993) *Post-war Britain: A political history* (London: Penguin Books).
- Slovic, Paul and Sarah Lichtenstein (1983) "Preference reversals: A broader perspective", *American Economic Review*, 73, 4, 596-605.
- and Baruch Fischhoff (1988) "Response mode, framing, and information-processing effects in risk assessment", in David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Descriptive, normative, and prescriptive interactions in decision making* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 152-66.
- Smith, Barbara Leigh, Karl F. Johnson, David Warren Paulsen and Frances Shocket (1976) *Political research methods: Foundations and techniques* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

- Smith, D. Anthony (1971) *Theories of nationalism* (London: Duckworth).
- (1979) *Nationalism in the twentieth century* (Oxford: Martin Robertson).
- Smith, David G. (1957) "Political science and political theory", *American Political Science Review*, 51, 3, 734-746.
- Smith, Geoffrey (1986) "The British scene", *Foreign Affairs*, 64, 5, 923-38.
- Smith, Philip (1991) "Codes and conflict: Toward a theory of war as ritual", *Theory and Society*, 20, 1, 103-138.
- Smith, Ron (1991) "The political economy of Britain's external relations", in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 97-142.
- Smith, S. M. (1981) "Traditionalism, behaviouralism and change in foreign policy analysis", in Barry Buzan and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.), *Change and the study of international relations: The evaded dimension* (London: Frances Pinter), 189-208.
- Smith, Steve (1991) "Foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy", in Lawrence Freeman and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Britain in the world* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 42-73.
- and Steve Michael (1988) "The analytical background: Approaches to the study of British foreign policy", in Michael Smith and Brian White (eds.), *British foreign policy: Tradition, change and transformation* (London: Unwin Hyman), 3-23.
- Smith, Trevor (1996) "Citizenship, community and constitutionalism", *Parliamentary Affairs*, 49, 2, 262-72.
- Smith, Wayne S. (1991) "Why resolution of the dispute is important", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 9-12.
- Smithies, Bill and Peter Fiddick (1969) *Enoch Powell on immigration* (London: Sphere).
- Snidal, Duncan (1985) "The game theory of international politics", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under anarchy* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 25-57.
- (1991) "Relative gains and the pattern of international cooperation", *American Political Science Review*, 85, 3, 701-26.
- Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing (1977) *Conflict among nationals: Bargaining, decision making and system structure in international crisis* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Snyder, Jack (1991) *Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press).
- Snyder, Louis L. (1968) *The meaning of nationalism* (NY: Greenwood).
- Snyder, Mark and William B. Swann, Jr. (1976) "When actions reflect attitudes: The politics of impression management", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 5, 1034-42.
- Solar, Lucio Garcia del (1990) *Argentina and the United Kingdom: From war to peace* (Southampton: University of Southampton).
- Sorensen, Georg (1997) "An analysis of contemporary statehood: Consequences for conflict and cooperation", *Review of International Studies*, 23, 3, 253-69.
- Spar, Debora (1993) "Co-developing the FSX fighter: The domestic calculus of international cooperation", in Janice G. S. and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press), 65-92.
- Spearmen, Diana (1968) "The anti-Enoch letters", *New Society*, 11, 300, 945.
- Spears, R., Abraham S. C. S., Abrams D. and Sheeran P. (1992) "Framing in terms of 'high-risk groups' versus 'risky practices' and prognoses of HIV infection", *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 2, 195-210.
- Spence, J. E. (1984) "British foreign policy: Tradition and change", in R. L. Borthwick and J. E. Spence (eds.), *British politics in perspective* (NY: Leicester University Press and St. Martin's Press), 195-229.
- Stacey, Margaret (1969) *Methods of social research* (Oxford: Pergamon).
- Stake, Robert E. (1994) "Case studies", in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of qualitative research* (London: Sage), 236-47.
- Stamp, Lord (1983) "The challenge of the Falklands", *Contemporary Review*, 242, 1404, 1-6.
- Stanley J. and Barbara H. Stein (1970) *The colonial heritage of Latin America: Essays on economic dependence in perspective* (NY: Oxford University Press).
- Stein, Arthur A. (1990) *Why nations co-operate: Circumstance and choice in international relations* (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press).
- Stein, Janice Gross (1988) "Building politics into psychology: The misperception of threat", *Political Psychology*, 9, 2, 245-71.
- (1993) "International co-operation and loss avoidance: Framing the problem", in Janice

- Gross Stein and Louis W. Pauly (eds.), *Choosing to co-operate: How states avoid loss* (Baltimore & London: John Hopkins University Press), 2-34.
- and David A. Welch (1997) "Rational and psychological approaches to the study of international conflict: Comparative strengths and weaknesses", in Nehemia Geva and Alex Mintz (eds.), *Decision-making on war and peace: The cognitive-rational debate* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 51-77.
- Steinbaum, Linda (1984) "Background to the conflict", in "Social Science Today" (eds.), *The Malvinas (Falkland) crisis: The causes and consequences* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences), 23-9.
- Steiner, Ivan D. (1980) "Attribution of choice", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Progress in social psychology, vol. 1* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 1-47.
- Stenger, Horst and Siegfried Gabler (1994) "Theory and practice of sample survey", in Ingwer Borg and Peter Ph. Mohler (eds.), *Trends and perspectives in empirical social research* (Berlin & NY: Walter de Gruyter), 125-38.
- Stewart, Michael (1980) *Life and Labour: An autobiography* (London: Sidwick & Jackson).
- Stoecker, Randy (1991) "Evaluating and rethinking the case study", *The Sociological Review*, 39, 1, 88-112.
- Stokes, Geoff (1990) "Towards the good and relational life: Method and value in the crisis of political theory", *International Political Science Review*, 11, 1, 45-57.
- Strang, David (1991) "Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: Realist and institutional accounts", *International Organisation*, 45, 2, 143-62.
- Strange, Susan (1988) *States and markets* (London: Pinter).
- Street, John (1991) "Youth culture and the emergence of popular music", in Terry Gourvish and Alan O'ay (eds.), *Britain since 1945* (London: Macmillan), 305-23.
- Stremlau, John J. (1977) *The international politics of the Nigerian civil war, 1967-1970* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Stretton, Hugh (1969) *The political science* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).
- Studlar, Donley T. (1974) "British public opinion, colour issue, and Enoch Powell: A longitudinal analysis", *British Journal of Political Science*, 4, 4, 371-81.
- Sudman, Seymour (1972) "On sampling of very rare human populations", *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 67, 335-9.
- and Norman M. Bradburn (1989) *Asking questions: A practical guide to questionnaire design* (San Francisco & Oxford: Jossey-Nass).
- Summers, Anne (1989) "Edwardian militarism", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity, vol. 1* (London: Routledge), 236-56.
- Swedberg, Richard (1991) (ed.) *Schumpeter: The economics and sociology of capitalism* (NJ: Princeton University Press).
- Swindler, Ann (1986) "Culture in action: Symbols and strategies", *American Sociological Review*, 51, 2, 273-86.
- Sylvester, Christine (1999) "Development studies and postcolonial studies: Disparate tales of the 'Third World'", *Third World Quarterly*, 20, 4, 703-21.
- Szaniawski, Klemens (1980) "Philosophy of decision making", *Acta Psychologica*, 45, 327-41.
- Szuchman, Mark D. (1984) "Disorder and social control in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 15, 1, 83-110.
- Talal, Asad (1990) "Multiculturalism and British identity in the wake of Rushdie affair", *Politics & Society*, 18, 41, 455-80.
- Tallant, Chris and Robert Strachan (1995) "The importance of framing: A pragmatic approach to risk assessment", *Probation Journal*, 42, 4, 202-7.
- Tarrow, Sidney (1995) "Bridging the quantitative-qualitative divide in political science", *American Political Science Review*, 89, 2, 471-4.
- Taylor, Charles (1985) *Philosophy and the human sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Taylor, Humphrey and Timothy Raison (1966) "Britain into Europe? General attitude", *New Society*, 7, 194, 5-8.
- Taylor, Michael (1976) *Anarchy and cooperation* (London: John Wiley & Sons).
- Taylor, Miles (1992) "John Bull and the iconography of public opinion", *Past and Present*, 134, 93-128.
- Thaler, Richard (1980) "Toward a positive theory of consumer choice", *Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation*, 1, 39-60.
- The Daily Telegraph* (1998) 3 January; 28 October; 4 November.
- The Economist* (1968) 11 May.

- (1982) 10 April.
- (1999) 29 May; 30 October.
- The Financial Times* (1968) 2 November.
- (1997) 30 May; 8 April; 9 June.
- (1998) 6 February; 8 October; 6 November.
- The Guardian* (1983) 22 September.
- The Times* (1997) 2 January; 21 January; 23 April; 3 May.
- (1998) 27/29 October; 13 December, 26 December.
- (1999) 24 May.
- Thomas, Caroline (1992) *The environment in international relations* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs).
- Thomas, David (1989) "The United States factor in British relations with Latin America", in Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.), *Britain and Latin America: A changing relationship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 68-82.
- (1991) "The view from Whitehall", in Wayne S. Smith (ed.), *Toward resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas dispute* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner), 9-43.
- Throne, Christopher (1983) "International relations and the prompting of history", *Review of International Studies*, 9, 2, 123-35.
- Thrope, Andrew (1997) *A history of the British Labour party* (London: Macmillan).
- Thuring, Manfred and Helmut Jungermann (1986) "Constructing and running mental models for inferences about the future", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevon (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 163-74.
- Toda, Masanao (1980) "Emotion and decision making", *Acta Psychologica*, 45, 133-55.
- Tollison, Robert D. and Thomas D. Willett (1979) "An economic theory of mutually advantageous issue linkages in international negotiations", *International Organisation*, 33, 4, 425-49.
- Torre, Juan Carlos (1993) "Argentina since 1946", Elizabeth Ladd (trans.), in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Argentina since independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 243-63.
- Triandis, Harry C. (1994) *Culture and social behaviour* (NY: McGraw-Hill).
- Trope, Yaacov (1982) "Inferences of personal characteristics on the basis of information retrieved from one memory", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 378-87.
- Trumbore, Peter F. (1998) "Public opinion as a domestic constraint in international negotiations: Two-level games in the Anglo-Irish peace process", *International Studies Quarterly*, 42, 3, 545-65.
- Tsebelis, George (1990) *Nested games: Rational choices in comparative politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Tsygankov, Andrei P. (1997) "From international institutionalism to revolutionary expansionism: The foreign policy discourse of contemporary Russia", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41, 2, 247-68.
- Tversky, Amos (1977) "Features of similarity", *Psychological Review*, 84, 4, 327-52.
- Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1980) "Casual schemas in judgements under uncertainty", in Martin Fishbein (ed.), *Progress in social psychology, vol. 1* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates), 49-72.
- (1982a) "Judgements of and by representativeness", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 84-98.
- (1982b) "Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 3-20.
- (1982c) "Causal schemas in judgements under uncertainty", in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky (eds.), *Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 117-28.
- (1985) "The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice", in George Wright (ed.), *Behavioural decision making* (NY & London: Plenum), 25-41.
- (1986) "Rational choice and the framing of decision", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s251-s78.
- and Paul Slovic (1990) "The causes of preference reversal", *The American Economic Review*, 80, 1, 204-17.
- (1991) "Loss aversion in risk choice: A reference-dependence model", *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, CVI, 4, 1039-61.

- Tyszka, Tadeusz (1986) "Information and evaluation process in decision-making: The role of familiarity", in Berndt Brehmer, Helmut Jungermann, Peter Lourens and Guje Sevón (eds.), *New directions in research on decision making* (Amsterdam, NY, Oxford & Tokyo: North-Holland), 151-61.
- Ullock, Christopher J. (1996) "Imaging community: A metaphor of being or becoming?", *Millennium*, 25, 2, 425-41.
- Vandierendonck, Andre (1990) "Rule structure, frequency, typicality gradients, and the representation of diagnostic categories", in K. J. Gilhooly, M. T. G. Keane, R. H. Logie and G. Erdos (eds.), *Lines of thinking: Reflections on the psychology of thought, vol. 1: Representation, reasoning, analogy and decision making* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons), 29-40.
- Vasquez, John A. (1997) "The realist paradigm and degenerative versus progressive research programs: An appraisal of neotraditional research on Waltz's balancing proposition", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4, 899-912.
- Vaughan, Elaine and Marianne Seifert (1992) "Variability in the framing of risk issues", *Journal of Social Values*, 48, 4, 119-35.
- Verney, Douglas V. (1977) *British government and politics: Life without a declaration of independence* (NY & London: Harper & Row).
- Verrier, Anthony (1983) *Through the looking glass: British foreign policy in an age of illusions* (London: Jonathan Cape).
- Verweij, Marco (1995) "Cultural theory and the study of international relations", *Millennium*, 24, 1, 87-111.
- Verzijl, J. H. W. (1968) *International law in historical perspective, vol. 1* (Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff-Leiden).
- Vincent, Andrew (1992) *Modern political ideologies* (Oxford: Blackwell).
- (1997) "Liberal nationalism: An irresponsible compound?", *Political Studies*, XLV, 275-95.
- Vincent, R. John (1986) *Human rights and international relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Vital, David (1968) "The making of British foreign policy", *The Political Quarterly*, 39, 3, 225-68.
- Vlek, Charles (1987) "Towards a dynamic structural theory of decision behaviour", *Acta Psychologica*, 66, 1, 225-30.
- Wakeford, Geoffrey (1969) *The great Labour mirage: An indictment of socialism in Britain* (London: Robert Hale & Company).
- Walker, Patrick Gordon (1970) *The cabinet* (London: Jonathan Cape).
- (1972) *The cabinet* (London & Glasgow: Fontana/Collis).
- Walker, Stephen G. (1995) "Psychodynamic process and framing effects in foreign policy decision-making: Woodrow Wilson's operational code", *Political Psychology*, 16, 4, 697-717.
- Wallace, William (1983) "How frank was Franks?", *International Affairs*, 59, 3, 453-8.
- Wallach, John R. (1987) "Liberals, communitarians, and the tasks of political theory", *Political Theory*, 15, 4, 581-611.
- Walt, Stephen (1991) "Alliance formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and bandwagoning in cold war competition", in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Dominoes and bandwagonings: Strategic beliefs and great power competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (NY & Oxford: Oxford University Press), 51-84.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) *Theory of international politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
- (1997) "Evaluating theories", *American Political Science Review*, 91, 4, 913-7.
- Walvin, James (1984) *Passage to Britain* (Harmondsworth: Penguin).
- Ward, Lawrence M. (1975) "Heuristic use or information integration in the estimation of subjective likelihood", *Bulletin of the Psychological Society*, 6, 1, 43-6.
- Warner, Daniel (1996) "Levinas, Buber and the concept of otherness in international relations: A reply to David Campbell", *Millennium*, 25, 1, 111-28.
- Warwick, Paul V. (1994) *Government survival in parliamentary democracies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Weir, Stuart and David Beetham (1999) *Political power and democratic control in Britain: The democratic audit of the United Kingdom* (London & NY: Routledge).
- Weiss, Carol H. and Michael J. Bucuvalas (1980) *Social science research and decision-making* (NY: Columbia University Press).
- Weldes, Jutta (1996) "Constructing national interests", *European Journal of International Relations*, 2, 3, 275-318.
- Diana Saco (1996) "Making state action possible: The United States and the discursive

- construction of the 'Cuban problem', 1960-1994", *Millennium*, 25, 2, 361-95.
- Weinberg, Steve (1992) *Dreams of a final theory* (NY: Oantheon).
- Wendt, Alexander E. (1987) "The agent-structure problem in international relations theory", *International Organisation*, 41, 4, 335-70.
- (1998) "On constitution and causation in international relations", *Review of International Studies*, 24, Special Issue, December, 91-117.
- Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Ken Booth (1987) "Beyond the security dilemma: Technology, strategy and international security", in Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.), *The uncertain course* (NY: Oxford University Press), 313-37.
- Whipp, Richard (1985) "Labour markets and communities: A historical review", *The Sociological Review*, 33, 4, 768-91.
- Whitaker, Arthur P. (1964) *Argentina* (NJ: Prentice-Hall).
- White, Brian P. (1992) "British foreign policy", in Roy C. MacRidis (ed.), *Foreign policy in world politics* (NJ: Prentice-Hall International), 7-31.
- Wicker, Allan W. (1969) "Attitude versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt response to attitude object", *Journal of Social Issues*, 25, 4, 41-78.
- Wickham-Jones, Mark (1995) "Rationality, revolution, and reassurance", in Keith Dowding and Desmond King (eds.), *Preferences, institutions, and rational Choice* (Oxford: Clarendon), 249-65.
- Wikan, Unni (1999) "Culture: A new concept of race", *Social Anthropology*, 7, 1, 57-64.
- Williams, Judith Blow (1935) "The establishment of British commerce with Argentina", *The Hispanic Historic Review*, 15, 1, 43-64.
- Williams, Philip M. Williams (1979) *Hugh Gaitskell: A political biography* (London: Jonathan Cape).
- Williams, Raymond (1961) *The long revolution* (London: Hogarth).
- (1994) "Selections from Marxism and Literature", in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley and Sherry B. Ortner (eds.), *Culture/power/history: A reader in contemporary social theory* (NJ: Princeton University Press), 585-608.
- Wilson, Harold (1971) *The Labour government 1964-70: A personal record* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph).
- Windsor, Philip (1983) "Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands crisis", *Millennium*, 12, 1, 88-96.
- Wolffe, John (1989) "Evangelicalism in mid-nineteenth century England", in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The making and unmaking of British national identity*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge), 188-200.
- Wright, T. (1994) *Citizen and subjects* (London: Routledge).
- Wyatt, Woodrow (1968) "Stand firm on Falklands", *Daily Mirror*, 29 March.
- (1977) *What's left of the Labour party?* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson).
- Yee, Albert S. (1996) "The causal effects of ideas on policies", *International Organisation*, 50, 1, 69-108.
- Young, Elizabeth (1982) "Falklands fall-out", *The World Today*, 38, 327-30.
- Young, John W. (1997) *Britain and the world in the twentieth century* (London: Arnold).
- Younger, Kenneth (1964) *Changing perspectives in British foreign policy* (London: Oxford University Press).
- Younghusband, Eileen (1968) (ed.) *Community work and social change: The report of a study group on training set up by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation* (London: Longman).
- Yurdusev, A. Nuri (1993) "Level of analysis and unit of analysis: A case for distinction", *Millennium*, 22, 1, 77-88.
- Zakaria, Fareed (1992) "Realism and domestic politics: A review essay", *International Security*, 17, 1, 462-83.
- Zakheim, Dov S. (1985a) "The South Atlantic conflict: Strategic, military, and technological lessons", in Alberto R. Coll and Anthony C. Arend (eds.), *The Falklands war: Lessons for strategy, diplomacy and international law* (Boston: George Allen & Unwin), 159-88.
- (1985b) "The South Atlantic: Evaluating the lessons", in James Brown and William P. Snyder (eds.), *The regionalisation of warfare* (Oxford: Transaction Books), 37-54.
- Zeckhauser, Richard (1986) "Comments: Behavioural versus rational economics: What you see is what you conquer", *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, s435-s449.
- Ziegler, Philip (1993) *Wilson: The authorised life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson).

APPENDIX A

Dear Sir/Madam:

I am a military officer in the Taiwanese Army, serving in the Military History and Translation Bureau, and a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics of Bristol University. I am conducting research on the Falklands dispute under the supervision of Dr. Eric Herring.

My pilot study has identified the period of 1966-68 a very important one for British policy on the Falkland Islands. In particular, as you will be aware, the British Government changed from emphasising the "wish" of the Falkland Islanders to emphasising their "interests". As far as I can tell, this period is somewhat under-researched and I would like to fill that gap.

Obviously, as member of the Falkland Islands Association, you were well placed to observe and participate in the events of this period. I would be very grateful indeed if you would grant me an interview so that my research could benefit from your insights.

I would like to interview you in person, if possible, rather than by telephone or by mail. I can be very flexible regarding date and location of our meeting. My questions will relate to relations between the governments of Britain and Argentina in the 1960s, the motivations behind British policy on the Falkland Islands, the impact of the *Antarctic Treaty*, the popularity of the Wilson Government, and British national sentiments on the talks over the sovereignty of the Falklands. I would like to tape-record the interview, but if you would rather I did not, that is perfectly understandable, and I would only take hand-written notes. I would like your comments to be attributable to you personally, but again, if you would rather remain anonymous, that is understandable. I would expect that the interview to take about half an hour.

In addition, may I venture to ask whether I can have access to any documents relevant to this period by you? Finally, can you name any other persons who it might be useful to interview?

I would be happy to answer any enquiries you might have. Please write or call. The telephone number is (0117) 971-4347. Thanks for the assistance. I look forward to hearing from you.

Cordially

Lt. Col. Andrew Chou

APPENDIX B

Questions

Coding

1. Do you think that British policy regarding the Falklands should be founded on the "wishes" or the "interests" of the islanders?	An opening question
2. Why did the British Government change in the period 1966-68 from emphasising the "wishes" of the Falkland Islanders to emphasising their "interests"?	information seeking
3. Why did the British Government hold discussions with Argentina in 1966 regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands?	ning
4. (1) How would you characterise relations between Governments of Britain and Argentina between 1960 and 1966 before the talks began? Please choose one of the following, or offer an alternative if you wish: (a) very hostile / mildly hostile / normal / mildly friendly / very friendly / other (please specify) / don't know (b) deteriorating / stable / improving / other (please specify) / don't know (2) Could you please explain your choice of characterisation?	Framing
5. What impact, if any, did the Antarctic Treaty of the early 1960s have on the talks between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands? Did it: help? / made no difference? / hinder? / don't know / others (please specify) 6. Please explain.	the reference point
7. How popular with the British public was the Wilson Government in the late 1960s? very unpopular / mildly unpopular / neutral / mildly popular very popular / don't know 8. Please explain.	Domain of framing
9. Did this unpopularity have any effect on the British Government's conduct of the talks with Argentina? major effect / minor effect / no effect / don't know 10. Please explain.	framing
11. Did the popularity have any effect on the British Government's decision to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina? major effect / minor effect / no effect / don't know	domain of framing

12. Please explain.	
13. Why did the Wilson Government decide to abandon the talks in December 1968?	Framing anchoring
14. How important was British national sentiment regarding the Falklands in the Wilson Government's decision to abandon the latter on sovereignty? very important / mildly important / important / don't know	anchoring framing
15. Please explain.	
16 Are there any additional points you would like to add, or are there any other questions you think I ought to have asked?	Post-interview question
17. Were there any questions in the interview that you were not sure how to answer? Please explain.	Post-interview question
18. Can you name any other persons you think it would useful for me to interview?	Snow-ball sampling

Appendix C—INTERVIEWING

Cameron, Sukey— Representative of the Falkland Islands Government

Haskard, Cosmo—Falkland Islands Governor in 1968.

Hunt, Rex—Falkland Islands Governor in 1982

Osgood, Robert—writer of the *Franks Report* in 1983, lobbyist

Paul, Brian— Representative of the Falkland Islands Agency

Pepper, Peter—Editor of the *Falkland Islands Association*

Pitaluga, Robin— Falkland Islander

Pitaluga, Saul—Vice Chairman of the Falkland Islands Association

Ranken, Michael—Chairman of the Parliamentary Maritime Group

Taylor, David—Chief Executive of the Falkland Islands Government